Tag: Nuclear weapons
Peace picks June 9-13
1. Shaping the Future? The Role of Regional Powers in Afghanistan and Pakistan Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center, Fifth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan and the presidential election there are taking place in a context of growing internal political and economic instability. Roberto Toscano, former Public Policy Scholar of the Wilson Center and former Ambassador to Iran and India, as well as Emma Hooper and Eduard Soler i Lecha, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, will discuss the reasons why the regional perspective on Afghanistan and Pakistan is relevant, and particularly so at this point in time.
2. Youth and Violence: Engaging the Lost Generation Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 11:00 am US Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This talk explores the factors that are pushing young people towards participation in various forms of violence, including participation in extremism or political violence. It will challenge pre-existing assumptions about youth peace building work and discuss policy changes necessary for new interventions that steer youth away from violence. SPEAKERS Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State, Maryanne Yerkes, Senior Civil Society and Youth Advisor, US Agency for International Development, Rebecca Wolfe, Director, Conflict Management & Peacebuilding Program, Mercy Corps, Marc Sommers, Consultant & Visiting Researcher, African Studies Center, Boston University, and Steven Heydemann, Vice President, Applied Research on Conflict, USIP.
3. Re-Thinking Democracy Promotion Amid Rising Authoritarianism Monday, June 9 | 9:30 am – 5:00 Kenney Auditorium, Paul H. Nitze Building; 1740 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The crisis caused by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the threat to freedom posed by kleptocratic autocracies. The world is watching how the democratic community of nations responds to Putin’s brazen attack not only against Ukraine, but against the very concept of freedom and the ability of people to choose their own political destiny. Much is at stake, for authoritarian regimes pose a danger not only to their own populations through suppression of human rights but to others as well. This requires a re-examination of democracy promotion, the threats it faces, and how best to advance it. SPEAKERS Charles Davidson, Francis Fukuyama, Walter Russell Mead, Elliott Abrams, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard Haass, and more.
4. Nuclear Flashpoints: US-Iran Tensions Over Terms and Timetables Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event will explore key conflicts and possible trade-offs with Iran as the third round discussion hosted by a coalition of eight Washington think tanks and organizations. It will assess how many years an agreement could last, the breakout time, and when and how the U.S. will act. SPEAKERS Stephen J. Hadley, Chairman of the Board, USIP, Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, and Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic relations, Director for International Security Studies.
5. Rhythms at the Intersection of Peace and Conflict: The Music of Nonviolent Action Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 1:00 pm United States Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event brings together three individuals whose work meets at the nexus of music and nonviolent action: Arash Sobhani, an underground musician from Iran, Timothy O’Keefe, a music producer and co-founder of Freedom Beat Recordings, and Dr. Maria Stephan, one of the world’s leading scholars on strategic nonviolent action and Senior Policy Fellow at USIP. These three individuals will guide us through an exploration of nonviolent action, both past and present, through a musical lens.
6. WWI and the Lessons for Today Tuesday, June 10 | 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm Allison Auditorium, Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Victor Davis Hanson, Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow in Residence at Stanford University, will explore the lessons that the U.S. has learned since World War I and how the lead-up to the Great War has affected our government’s policies over the past 100 years. This event will be hosted by James Jay Carafano, Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and E. W. Richardson Fellow.
7. Researching the Middle East Tuesday, June 10 | 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This panel will discuss the challenges of researching and writing on recent international Middle East history and U.S. policy in the region. Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Consulting Archivist, David Palkki, Council on Foreign Relations, Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor at George Mason University, Michael Eisenstadt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Kevin M. Woods, Institute for Defense Analyses, will all discuss their own experiences and substantive findings studying conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq War, and the War in Afghanistan.
8. After Snowden: The Road Ahead for Cybersecurity Thursday, June 12 | 8:45 am – 1:15 pm American Enterprise Institute, Twelfth Floor; 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Internet has been a remarkable force for freedom and prosperity, but it has faced challenges from individuals and governments intent on abusing its openness and interconnectivity. This conference will kick-start a national debate on America’s role in protecting and promoting free enterprise, personal security, and individual liberty in cyberspace. Jeffrey Eisenach, AEI, Michael Hayden, Chertoff Group, and Mike Rogers, Chairman of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will share their insights into the future of cybersecurity policy, and will be moderated by Mike Daniels.
9. The Many Faces of Tyranny: Why Democracy Isn’t Always Possible Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. History has not ended. Across the world today, we are witnessing both a heroic struggle for democracy and reform and the disturbing strength of tyrannical regimes and movements. Whether it be the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the aggressiveness of Putin’s Russia or the increasing bellicosity of China, the forces of democracy and the forces of tyranny are in a dead heat. Waller R. Newell, Carleton University, examines how the West should respond and how we should make the difficult choice between better and worse kinds of non-democratic authority when overthrowing today’s dictatorship may only bring about a much worse totalitarian alternative tomorrow.
10. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm Hayek Auditorium, Cato Institute; 1000 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In his new book, Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies Program at MIT, explains why the dominant view among the nation’s foreign policy elites, what he calls “liberal hegemony,” has proved unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. His alternative – restraint – would resist the impulse to use U.S. military power, and focus the military’s and the nation’s attention on the most urgent challenges to national security. This discussion features comments by Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Blake Hounshell, Deputy Editor of POLITICO Magazine, and is moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
11. Center for a New American Security Debate: War with Iran? Friday, June 13 | 9:00 am – 12:00 pm Willard Intercontinental Hotel; 1401 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for a New American Security and the Civis Institute invite you to attend a public debate featuring two of the country’s top collegiate debate programs – Georgetown University and the University of Michigan. The teams will discuss whether or not the United States should use military force against Iran if nuclear diplomacy fails. The debate will be followed by comments from Dr. Colin Kahl, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at CNAS, and a moderated Q&A with the debate teams.
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Triage again
President Obama gave an intellectually vigorous response to his foreign policy critics today, in a commencement speech at West Point:
He made clear that the US would use military force, if necessary unilaterally, to defend its core interests. But at the same time he made it clear that crises that do not directly threaten the US do not merit the same response. Then, he suggests, nonmilitary efforts and multilateral military action are more appropriate and more effective.
Terrorism he identifies as the current top priority threat. But he wants to deploy the US military less and partner more with the countries where terrorists find haven. The now diffuse threat requires a more networked response, with other countries’ security forces taking the lead, as is soon to happen in Afghanistan. He wants $5 billion for training and equipping others. In Syria, he pledged to step up support to the neighbors and to the Syrian opposition, with the objective of reaching a political solution. In undertaking direct strikes against terrorists, the President cites the need for a continuing imminent threat and near certainty of no civilian casualties, so as not to create more enemies than we eliminate. He pledges to explain what we do publicly, asking the military to take the lead.
The second priority the President cites is protection of the international order, including multilateral international institutions. World opinion and international institutions blocked a Russian invasion of Ukraine and gave the country a chance to elect a new president, with America “firing a shot.” Sanctions on Iran, and the ongoing nuclear negotiations, are another example. We hope to achieve something better than what could have been achieved using force. These are signs of American strength and leadership, not weakness or hesistancy. So too is strengthening the forces of countries that contribute to international peacekeeping.
Cybersecurity, the South China Sea and climate change require a multinational approach. The President said we need to lead by example, subjecting ourselves to the same rules that apply to everyone else, including the still unratified Law of the Sea Convention. America is made exceptional by affirming international law and its own values, not by flouting it. This means closing Guantanamo and putting rules in place to regulate intelligence collection.
American leadership also requires acting in favor of human dignity. This means support for democracy, open economies and human rights, even where security interests come first, as in Egypt. Everyone’s best example these days is Burma (despite the many equivocal aspects of its still ongoing transition). But the President also squeezed in helping with electricity in Africa and education in Nigeria. “Human dignity” is a category that encompasses a lot of things.
It wasn’t a particularly stirring speech, but it was a logical one. I still wish he would do more about Syria, which threatens to collapse the neighboring states and provide haven to international terrorists. But he is into triage, not retreat, trying to limit American commitments and conserve America’s strength for whatever serious threats lie ahead. That’s what any smart president would want to do.
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Triage, not retreat
I spent yesterday morning at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) annual shindig on the Middle East, “Allies, Adversaries and Enemies.” It began with a big-think panel on American foreign policy since 9/11: Robert Kagan, Walter Russell Mead and Leon Wieseltier. FDD President Cliff May moderated. The luminaries skipped any serious discussion of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Nor did they mention the drone wars in Pakistan and Yemen. The consensus was plainly and vigorously anti-Obama: he is shy of using force and leading an American retreat from the world that will get us into deeper trouble in the future. Congressman McKeon (R-CA) makes a similar argument in today’s Washington Post.
This is not my natural habitat, so I’ll try to give an account of the local fauna before launching into a tirade against them.
The panel hit President Obama hard and fast. Wieseltier criticized him for portraying all the alternatives to his policies everywhere as war. Spooked by Iraq, he trumps up phony dichotomies. The truth is he is looking for ways to pull the US out of overseas engagements, especially in the Middle East. As a result, all our friends need reassurance. His policy is one of introversion and absence. The President doesn’t see US power as a good thing and doesn’t recognize that even multilateralism requires US leadership. He wants no more land wars and is trying to ensure that with cuts at the Pentagon, an idea he admittedly inherited from Donald Rumsfeld.
Dissenting sardonically from the view that Obama is a Kenyan socialist, Mead offered a slightly more generous appraisal: Obama believes that as the US withdraws a balance of power will emerge, one that costs the US less than at present. This is a 1930s-style policy close to what most Americans want. But it won’t work, even if the limits of public opinion are real. We’ll get clobbered somehow. The president should harness pro-engagement sentiment and lead more forcefully. Only a balance of power under US hegemony can be stable and reliable.
Kagan concurred, remarking that Americans (unfortunately) have a high tolerance for a collapsing world. But the issue really is military power and America’s willingness to use force. We are on a slippery slope. The Obama doctrine is simply to avoid using force, which is undermining the world’s confidence in our ability and willingness to defend the liberal world order. That is the key objective for American foreign policy. We lost Iraq when Obama withdrew the American troops. The same thing could happen in Afghanistan. Nuclear Iran will be a big problem, but not a threat to the liberal world order, which is more threatened by the waxing military dictatorship in Egypt and the rebellion it will trigger in the future.
Doutbts about whether the US would attack Iran, or let Israel do it, wafted through the room. General Michael Hayden in the next session threw cold water on the idea that Israel either could or should undertake a military strike on its own. No one bothered to consider what would happen in the aftermath of a massive US strike on Iran. Would that stop or accelerate their nuclear program?
The only part of the panel presentations I would happily agree with is the well-established reluctance of the American public to be overly engaged abroad. It was notable that the panel offered not one example of something they thought Obama should do now to respond to the crises in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Egypt or lots of other places. They were full of examples of what he should have done in the past, and absolutely certain he would not do the right things in the future, including decisive military action against the Iranian nuclear program.
Time and energy don’t allow me to respond to all of the points above. Let me comment on three countries I know well: Iraq, Ukraine and Syria.
The notion that it was President Obama who decided to withdraw troops from Iraq is simply wrong. Here is a first-person account from Bob Loftis, who led the failed negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):
[The decision to withdraw US troops] happened in mid-2008 [during the Bush Administration]. My team and I were instructed to work on an agreement that would allow a long term US military presence. At no time did the issue of withdrawal arise, even when the term “SOFA” became politically toxic in Baghdad. SOFA talks were suspended in May 2008, with the focus placed on negotiating the Strategic Framework Agreement (which would have some vague references to “pre-existing arrangements” (i.e. certain parts of CPA17). I then heard in September 2008 that…there were new SOFA talks which were about withdrawal. The “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” was signed on 17 November 2008 by Ryan Crocker: Article 24 (1) states “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”
People will tell you that President Bush thought the agreement would be revised in the succeeding administration to allow the Americans to stay in some limited number. But that doesn’t change the fact that it was Bush, not Obama, who decided on US withdrawal. Once in office, Obama did try to negotiate permission for the Americans to stay. Prime Minister Maliki didn’t want to give up jurisdiction over crimes committed by US troops. Hard for me to fault the President for not yielding on that point, especially in light of the arbitrary arrests and detentions Maliki has indulged in since. Nor do I think US troops in the mess that is today’s Iraq would be either safe or useful.
Ukraine loomed large over this discussion. No one on the panel had a specific suggestion for what to do there, except that Kagan demurred from the President’s assertion that we have no military option. Of course we do, he said. We have absolute air superiority over Ukraine if we want it. That may be true. But it would require the use of US bases in Europe and Turkey. How long does Kagan think US leadership and the liberal world order would last after war between the US and Russia?
On Syria, I dissent from the President’s policy as much as any of the panelists. But I have specific suggestions for what he should at least consider doing: recognize the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) as the legitimate government of Syria, overtly arm its affiliated fighters and destroy as much of the Syrian air force and missile inventories as possible. I suppose big thinkers like Wieseltier, Kagan and Mead don’t trade in such small beer, but those of us who treasure concreteness think they should.
It seems to me what the President is up to is not retreat but triage: he is focusing on Iran’s nuclear weapons and the Asia Pacific because he thinks the issues there threaten vital US interests. Syria for him falls below the line. For me it is above: the threat to neighboring states in the Levant and the growth of extremism put it there. But that simple and entirely understandable distinction would not inspire the kind of disdain that the panelists indulged in and the audience applauded at yesterday’s event.
PS, May 6: For the skeptical masochists among you, here is video of the event, which arrived today:
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Requirements for a final Iran nuclear deal
Although Iran and the P5+1 seem to be adhering to their Joint Plan of Action, both sides face pressure to reach a final nuclear deal before the end of the six-month interim agreement, which began implementation in January. On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion to discuss the Iran nuclear negotiations. The panelists were Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn, former special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; Dennis Ross, counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Frank N. von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated.
Robert Einhorn: It is important to ask ourselves what the main goal of the agreement ought to be. Some argue that the main goal of an agreement should be to eliminate Iran’s capability to produce nuclear arms. Given its technical knowhow, experience, and resources, Iran already has a nuclear weapons capability.
An agreement could however deter Iran’s leaders from ever making the decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would have three basic requirements:
- It would provide confidence that any steps by Iran to break out of an agreement and move towards nuclear weapons, whether at covert or at declared nuclear facilities, would be detected quickly.
- It would ensure that the period of time between initiation of breakout steps and the production of enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon would be long enough to enable the international community to intervene decisively to stop Iran.
- As a result of actions taken outside an agreement, Iran would get the clear message that any attempt to break out and make nuclear weapons would be met with a firm international response, including military force.
Each of these points is discussed in Bob’s Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Requirements for a Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement.
Reaching an agreement that meets these three requirements will not be easy. Both President Obama and President Rouhani face strong domestic opposition that will limit their room for maneuver. No agreement that emerges from current negotiations will be ideal.
The true test for any agreement is how it compares to alternative approaches for dealing with the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program. One alternative is to ratchet up the sanctions until Iran makes major concessions. Another alternative is use of military force. Before we turn to these, we should make every effort to achieve an agreement that deters Iran by making the pathway towards acquiring nuclear weapons as detectable, lengthy, and risky as possible.
Dennis Ross: Bob’s report made a reference to the possible military dimensions of the Iranian program. He also mentioned the difficulty of getting Iranians to admit their weapons program. It is critical to expose what has been done in the past. It is difficult to forge an agreement if there are certain aspects of the program that are hidden. The Iranian narrative claims it is a peaceful program. It is not. If the deal does not take place, this should be part of the Western narrative: all along the Iranians had a program that was not peaceful. That will help to justify some of the steps we may take.
Bob makes the case that this is going to be an agreement where Iran will be able to enrich uranium in a limited way. This is important because in the event that diplomacy fails, we must demonstrate to the international community that what we offered was credible. If the Iranians turn the offer down, it will mean they are not satisfied with peaceful nuclear energy. We need to be in a position to unmask the Iranians if diplomacy fails.
Another way to affect the Iranians and strengthen deterrence measures is to lengthen the breakout time. If extended to twelve months, their program would be set back far enough that the steps they have to take would be daunting. A longer breakout time will reduce their temptation to cheat.
To deter the Iranians from cheating, the consequences of cheating need to be clear. Bob mentioned a Security Council resolution, IAEA involvement, and Congressional authorization for the president to use force. The clearer we are on the consequences of cheating, the greater likelihood we will produce an agreement.
The key for the negotiations to be successful is to demonstrate to the Supreme Leader the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Historically, the Islamic Republic has only adjusted its behavior when the costs were high. The Supreme Leader needs to realize that the economic costs would be intolerable and the failure of diplomacy would trigger the use of force.
Frank von Hippel: The monitoring of Iran’s centrifuge production is not a traditional part of safeguards, but it is critical. As the US intelligence community says, a sneakout is more likely than a breakout. A sneakout would involve the production of extra centrifuges and installing them in an undeclared location. We need confidence in the IAEA’s ability to keep track of all the components and centrifuges.
Iran’s enrichment program is symptomatic of a more general problem with the current nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge enrichment plants are inherently dual purpose. As long as it is considered legitimate for countries to build and control them nationally, the potential for nuclear weapons breakouts will spread to more countries.
Confrontation and negotiation between Washington and Tehran are only part of the story. There are also parallel confrontations and negotiations within Washington and within Tehran. Those who are working for a diplomatic solution have to be aware of the domestic political constraints of their counterparts on the other side. Compromise will be necessary.
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Costs and benefits of engagement
The Council on Foreign Relations’ Charlie Kupchan, author of How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, and American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Rubin, author of Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes, crossed swords the week before last in a good discussion of costs and benefits of engagement. The result was more light than heat, so if you want to hear the whole event here it is:
If you prefer to save 88 minutes, I’ll try to summarize. Read more
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Tilting the playing field
We tend to treat adversaries as monolithic, especially when they label themselves an Islamic republic and put at its apex a Supreme Leader. So I was attracted to the launch today of the Washington Institute’s Leadership Divided by Nima Gerami, with Mehdi Khalaji commenting and Mike Eisenstadt moderating. Germani maps out the factional differences among Iranian elites:
- those who unreservedly support Iran’s nuclear program and believe Iran has the right to develop nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent against perceived external threats (nuclear supporters)
- those who advocate permanently rolling back Iran’s nuclear program in favor of other national interests (nuclear detractors)
- those who are willing to accept temporary constraints on Iran’s uranium-enrichment-related and reprocessing activities—thereby lowering the degree of nuclear weapons latency—to end Iran’s international isolation (nuclear centrists)
He also maps their influence, based on past experience:
Nuclear centrists have traditionally exerted the greatest influence when Iran is faced with increased internal and external pressures, whereas nuclear supporters have ascended to power when these threat receded. Nuclear detractors have never enjoyed influence equal to the centrists and supporters, primarily because they have been cast out or marginalized from the system as a result of political infighting.
So what, I asked, should the US do and not do to increase the likelihood of a positive outcome to the comprehensive nuclear talks (defined as pushing back nuclear breakout to a year or more)?
Germani was reluctant to respond beyond saying that understanding elite views is useful, but under pressure offered that we should be cautious about letting up on sanctions, which are vital to pushing the Iranians in the right direction (presumably because the pressure strengthens the centrists). Eisenstadt warned that efforts to game our adversaries’ internal fissures often don’t work out well but also added that the threat of military action should be clear and credible but private. Putting it out in public doesn’t help.
Khalaji noted that nuclear supporters are feeling pressure to justify the nuclear program as a contribution to Iran’s energy requirements. Patrick Clawson underlined that the more Iranians know about the nuclear program, including its very large costs and risks, the less likely they are to support it, especially after the Fukushima disaster. Public pressure may not count for much, but it has some influence on what the Supreme Leader thinks possible and not.
On other factors affecting Iranian decision-making, it was noted that the Stuxnet computer virus and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists have discouraged some technically competent people from working in the nuclear program, presumably slowing it. The Supreme Leader’s fatwa against nuclear weapons has not been important, both because it is ambiguous (still never written down!) and because in the Islamic Republic government authorities can overrule any religious strictures and even constitutional provisions.
So no silver bullets here. But the Iranian nuclear challenge is in many ways the most serious national security issue we face for the moment. It could lead to war, or a nuclear arms race in the Gulf, or to Iranian hegemony in the region and an Iranian threat to Israel. None of that is good from an American perspective. Tilting the playing field away from the nuclear supporters and towards its centrists and detractors could help enable a comprehensive nuclear agreement that still, however, seems far off.
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