Tag: Nuclear weapons
Giving pause
Nuclear talks in Geneva with Iran ended without an agreement and will reconvene November 20. The P5+1 (that’s US, UK, France, China, Russia+Germany) are mostly exuding confidence that an agreement can be reached. The talks did not break down, they paused. What blocked agreement? Reuters reports:
Diplomats said the main stumbling blocks included the status of Iran’s Arak heavy-water reactor of potential use in making bomb-grade plutonium, the fate of Iran’s stockpile of higher-enriched uranium – both acute issues for France – and the extent of relief from trade sanctions demanded by Tehran.
The first two are critical issues for the P5+1. Their purpose is to prevent Iran from accumulating all the material (either highly enriched uranium or plutonium) it needs for a quick or undetected sprint to build nuclear weapons. The third is Iran’s main concern. It desperately needs sanctions relief for its battered economy.
Criticizing from the sidelines is Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, who wants Iran’s ability to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium destroyed completely and sanctions lifted only when that ambition is fulfilled. His hostility to an agreement that delivers anything less appears to have motivated France’s hard line in Geneva. While the press is treating this intransigence as a surprise, French President Francois Hollande is on the record saying: Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks, November 4-8
Apologies for the late posting (DPS):
The upcoming week’s top events:
1. Responding to the Rebalance: ASEAN between China and the US
Monday, November 4 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm
East-West Center, Sixth Floor Conference Room, 1819 L Street NW
An Asia-Pacific Security Seminar featuring:
Mr. Julio Amador III
2013 Asia Studies Visiting Fellow, East-West Center in Washington
Foreign Affairs Research Specialist, Philippines’ Foreign Service Institute
Dr. Charmaine Misalucha (Discussant)
Assistant Professor, De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines
The rebalancing of the United States to Asia in an effort to stem China’s surge in regional leadership has placed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in a difficult position. While ASEAN recognizes China as one of its most important Dialogue Partners, the regional association’s members have always recognized that the US plays a special role in the Asia Pacific as the guarantor of security. Meanwhile, China and the US are set on a rivalry that, while not officially acknowledged, is apparent to observers in Southeast Asia. Within this context, how is ASEAN as a regional organization dealing with Chinese-American rivalry?
Mr. Julio Amador III will describe regional perspectives about the direction of ASEAN in the context of the US Rebalance. He will discuss the tensions in the South China Sea as the backdrop for the rivalry between China and the US, and ASEAN’s subsequent attempts at autonomy in settling the issue. He will also assess ASEAN’s internal dynamics and describe how member-states attempt to form a regional consensus while maintaining their national strategic interests. While China and the US contend for primacy in the region, ASEAN still has a role to play, but only if it is willing to move beyond the narrow strategic limits set by its member states.
This program will be off-the-record; thank you for your cooperation.
A light luncheon will be served.
Julio Amador III is an Asia Studies Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington and a Fulbright Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. He is on leave as a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist at the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the Philippines’ Foreign Service Institute. He provides policy analysis and strategic advice on ASEAN issues, Southeast Asia security and international relations, and foreign policy to the Department of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Amador has held numerous fellowships in the United States, Europe, and Australia.
Dr. Charmaine Misalucha is currently a US-ASEAN Fulbright Fellow in the School of International Service of American University. She is also an Assistant Professor at De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines, specializing international relations, security studies, and the arms trade. She received her PhD in International Relations from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The other North Korean challenge
I don’t write much about North Korea, because I don’t know a lot about it. But I’m convinced it poses a potentially enormous challenge on two fronts:
- as a nuclear power
- as a collapsed state
Bruce Bennett’s presentation on the second challenge at Heritage Foundation October 17 strikes me as generally well-informed, even if might quarrel on details (I don’t much like the idea of airdropping humanitarian assistance, for example). So I’m posting it here, along with a link to his RAND study on Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse. Those who think the United States doesn’t need a capacity to plan for and deal with weak, fragile or collapsed states–in this case in cooperation with South Korea–should take note:
As Bennett points out, the issue is not whether we would want to intervene, but whether we would have to in order to avoid serious risks to our own national security as a result of North Korean collapse. It is clear that any intervention would have to be a combined military/civilian operation.
I am hoping to have a post up soon on the UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Public Hearing, held here at SAIS this week. Human rights violations are a clear warning sign of state collapse.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Unhappy allies need to carry more burdens
Everyone’s favorite subject this weekend is America’s allies, who are unhappy for many reasons:
- France and Germany don’t like their phones bugged, and Brazil is also in a lather;
- Saudi Arabia wants the Americans to push harder against Syria’s Bashar al Asad and Iran’s nuclear program;
- Israel concurs on Iran and would rather President Obama didn’t insist it talk to the Palestinians;
- the Egyptian military didn’t like the cutoff of some major military equipment;
- President Karzai has not yet agreed to U.S. jurisdiction for troops who commit criminal acts in Afghanistan post-2014.
Everyone found the US government shutdown disconcerting. No one is looking forward to the January budgetary showdown, except maybe Russian President Putin. He likes anything that brings America down a peg.
There are solutions for each of these issues. We’ll no doubt reach some sort of modus vivendi with the Europeans, who won’t want to shut down either their own eavesdropping or America’s. More likely they’ll want us to share, while swearing off Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande’s cell phones. The Brazilians will be harder to satisfy, but they aren’t exactly what I would call an ally either. The Saudis may go off on their own to arm whomever they like in Syria, thus deepening the sectarian conflict there. That could, ironically, increase the prospects for some sort of political settlement at the much discussed but never convened Geneva 2 conference. It is hard to find anyone at this point who seriously opposes the effort to negotiate a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. The alternatives (war or containment) are worse. Even Netanyahu has toned down his objections, while unleashing Sheldon Adelson to advocate nuclear war. The Egyptian military doesn’t actually need more Abrams tanks; it has lots in storage. Karzai has convened a loya jirga to approve the continuing American presence in Afghanistan and to share the rap for agreeing to American jurisdiction. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Untying the Turkish knot
Mort Abramowitz and Eric Edelman published this week a super Bipartisan Policy Center report “From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing US Turkey Policy.” Mort was US ambassador in Ankara 1989-91 and Eric 2003-5. It doesn’t get much more knowledgeable when it comes to US policy on Turkey than these two. Caveat emptor: Eric is a valued colleague at SAIS (his office is next door to mine) and Mort is a treasured regular lunch partner and occasional co-author.
They argue for something few sitting ambassadors would be keen on, though it seems likely that the current ambassador was at least forewarned if not approving. They want to shift from rhetoric about shared objectives in the Middle East to frank talk (with an Ankara already resenting US policy on Syria, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and other issues) about Turkey’s domestic situation.
The aim is to keep Turkey moving in a democratic direction, restore its economic vitality, and encourage it to play a leadership role in the region consistent with US policy. As diplomatic propositions go, this is pretty daring:
Practically, this means that Washington should be more open with Ankara about its concerns about issues like press freedom, freedom of assembly, rule of law, and the Turkish government’s increasing sectarianism.
Edelman and Abramowitz view such frank assessments as likely to produce good results and cite chapter and verse of Israel-related occasions on which American bluntness was productive.
The agenda they propose for Washington is an ample one: Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The gulf with the Gulf
Yesterday was Gulf day. I spent part of the morning reading Christopher Davidson, who thinks the Gulf monarchies are headed for collapse due to internal challenges, their need for Western support, Iran’s growing power and their own disunity. Then I turned to Greg Gause, who attributes their resilience to the oil-greased coalitions and external networks they have created to support their rule. He predicts their survival.
At lunch I ambled across the way to CSIS’s new mansion to hear Abdullah al Shayji, chair of political science at Kuwait University and unofficial Gulf spokeperson, who was much exorcised over America’s response to Iran’s “charm offensive,” which he said could not have come at a worse time. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was already at odds with the US. The Gulf was not warned or consulted about the phone call between Iranian President Rouhani and President Obama. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to occupy the UN Security Council seat it fought hard to get was a signal of displeasure. The divergences between the GCC and the US range across the Middle East: Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine, in addition to Iran.
On top of this, US oil and gas production is increasing. China is now a bigger oil importer than the US and gets a lot more of its supplies from the Gulf. Washington is increasingly seen as dysfunctional because of its partisan bickering. Its budget problems seem insoluble. American credibility is declining. The Gulf views the US as unreliable. Read more
RSS - Posts
