peacefare.net

Too narrow broadens

The Syria war resolution approved in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee goes a long way to correcting the problems in the original draft.  The too narrow definition of American goals has been broadened to include changing the momentum on the battlefield.  It looks as if the Administration has the votes to get this version approved in the Senate, provided it is not filibustered.

The question will be whether the broader definition of American goals is just too much for the House, where the increasingly isolationist Tea Party is strong among Republicans and more liberal Democrats likewise oppose getting involved abroad.  It is one of the ironies of this Administration that it is paying the cost of George W. Bush’s mistake in going to war in Iraq.  The House Republican leadership, while supporting the resolution, will not impose party discipline to ensure its passage, leaving voting entirely up to individual members.  Minority leader Nancy Pelosi, who has come out swinging for the resolution, faces a tough uphill battle to get an overwhelming majority of Democrats to support the resolution.  That won’t be easy.

My guess is that the key to success or failure lies with, whether you like it or not, Israel.  Some think the Israelis are ambivalent about removing Bashar al Asad.  Their politicians may be.  But their intelligence apparatus has concluded that Bashar has to go sooner rather than later, to better the odds of preventing an extremist takeover.  The Israelis have been smart to keep their mouths shut in public, but they are no doubt lobbying hard in private for vigorous military action that would reinforce the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons as well as help to end the war.  Failure of the US Congress to approve military action, or hesitation by the President to take it, would reduce the credibility of an American military threat against the Iranian nuclear program, as Secretary of State Kerry made eminently clear in his testimony in the Senate.

The President can take military action without Congressional approval, but failure of the Congress to act would make an already messy process incomprehensible to most of the world and further reduce the likelihood of finding support among friends and allies.  The Arab League, while denouncing the use of chemical weapons, has so far not called for military action.  With the United Kingdom restricted from participation by its parliament and Germany and Italy reluctant as usual about military action, European support essentially comes down to France and maybe a few smaller countries.  Plus Turkey, whose interests clearly lie in the earliest possible end to the war in Syria.

Russia remains adamantly opposed to military action, even if President Putin is sounding Moscow’s usual meaningless grace notes about not necessarily standing forever with Bashar al Asad and wanting to discuss the matter with President Obama.  Iran is in an tough spot.  It is a diehard opponent of chemical weapons use, as Saddam Hussein gassed Iranian forces in the 1980s, during the Iraq/Iran war.  But its high officials, echoed by Moscow, are still insisting the August 21 attack came from the Syrian opposition, not the regime.  This creates an opening.  If the Americans can present Russia and Iran with detailed, incontrovertible evidence that the regime was responsible, logic would dictate that they at least stop their extensive military support to Bashar al Asad and his Hizbollah allies.  But of course logic doesn’t necessarily govern situations like this one.

The action this week will be first and foremost in the House and then in Saint Petersburg, where the world’s major economic powers will be meeting at the G20 Summit.  If and when a resolution passes in the House, there will be a moment–likely less than a day–for a quick diplomatic maneuver by Russia and Iran to agree to a diplomatic conference that would remove Bashar and save Moscow and Tehran from the embarrassment of an American air attack like the ones in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan that altered the military balance on the ground.  If the diplomacy fails at that point, it will have another chance, but only after whatever happens happens.  The law of unanticipated consequences will then be in full force.