peacefare.net

Think twice

With U.S. officials saying–malgre’ moi–that the Annan plan is already failing, the White House is pledging to ramp up pressure on Syria.  The House Foreign Affairs Committee has also held hearings looking for policy options.

They aren’t finding many, other than the now tired safe areas, humanitarian corridors, no fly zones and other euphemisms whose only real utility is to initiate what would no doubt be a lengthy and frustrating international military intervention with an uncertain outcome.  Arming the opposition is another standby, but the perils of doing that have become more obvious with the continued fragmenting of the Syrian National Council, which was supposed to serve as the opposition “umbrella” and conduit for money.  It just isn’t clear who might eventually benefit from the arms. Giving weapons to Sunni-dominated insurgents in Syria could have repurcussions in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and beyond that would not be in the U.S. interest.

The one point of consensus in the testimony is provision of greater support to the in-country opposition, including intelligence about the movement of the Syrian security forces.  This is eminently reasonable, but even those who say

The regime has had a far harder time dealing with civil resistance over the past year than armed resistance

still advocate support to the armed resistance, presumably to gain influence over it.  That’s too bad, since armed resistance tends to discourage the more effective nonviolent resistance.

We can always tighten sanctions, or get someone else to tighten them, but it is in their nature that the easy and more obvious restrictions get done first.  The extension of financial and travel sanctions to more and more marginal regime figures may net a few bad guys, but the marginal utility is likely to be low, unless we happen to hit a regime fixer more important than he appeared to be in the first round.  A look at who is still buying Syrian oil might turn up something interesting we could accomplish, and it would likely be useful to extend some of the sanctions on Iran’s banking system to Syria.  But let’s be clear:  doing that will unquestionably make life even harder than it has been for ordinary Syrians.

The sad fact is that there is  not much else we can do to raise the costs to Bashar al Assad, unless we are prepared to take military action.  Despite White House mumbling about ramping up pressure, my sense is that we are nowhere near that decision.  There are good reasons for this.  Apart from all the tactical difficulties of attacking Syrian forces that are inside major population centers, the Administration’s top priority has to be mounting a credible military threat against Iran’s nuclear program.

An attack on Syria without UN Security Council approval could end Russia’s support for the P5+1 negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program, and any prospect for UNSC approval of action against Iran.  We also run the risk that an attack on Syria would not go well, or that it would chew up U.S. assets like cruise missiles, or that it would provide Iran with intelligence on our capabilities that would make an attack there less effective.  You don’t want to get into a scrap in Syria if your top priority is Iran (that’s true even though I would oppose an attack on Iran).

This leaves the main U.S. focus in Syria on diplomacy, in two directions:  Moscow and the Syrian opposition.  The renewal of the UN observer mission in Syria comes up in July.  We need Moscow to bring Bashar al Assad into full compliance with the Annan plan by then.  At the same time, we need to get the Syrian opposition in compliance, by ending its counter-productive use of violence.  This is what none of those testifying at the House have been willing to say.

If we get to July without the Annan plan implemented, then we will need to consider withdrawal of the observers as well as the use of military force.  I understand perfectly well the arguments in favor–there is no doubt in my mind that Bashar al Assad is capable of continuing the crackdown and committing much greater atrocities than he has so far.  And I understand why some U.S. government officials (and President Sarkozy) are trying to create the impression that military action is likely, even though it isn’t.

But President Obama is unlikely in the middle of an election campaign focused on the economy to take us to war, yet again, in an Arab country Americans don’t care much about.  Withdrawal of the observers without the subsequent use of force would leave Bashar al Assad to crack down even harder, which is what he did after the departure of the Arab League observers.  That would not be a good outcome.

We need to be thinking twice about Syria at every stage.