Tag: Nuclear weapons
Missive offense and defense
America’s patriots were hard at work this week, not attacking the nation’s enemies but each other. First the Romney brigade launched a missive, apparently the first salvo in a planned barrage. The Obama missive defense went ballistic. The question is this: how much difference is there, really, between the two presumed candidates?
On one issue, defense spending, there is a clear and present difference: Obama is in the midst of cutting close to half a billion dollars from projected increases in the Pentagon budget over the next ten years. Romney says he would not do that (without explaining how he would avoid it). He has committed himself to a naval buildup, apparently in anticipation of a Chinese challenge that will be decades in the making. Presumably to cover the interim, he has declared Russia America’s main foreign threat. Obama is already moving to shore up America’s presence in Asia and the Pacific, but he shows much less concern about Russia and more about Iran.
Romney has said Iran will not get a nuclear weapon if he is elected president. Obama says Iran will not get a nuclear weapon while he is president. Romney is clearly thinking more about military threat that enables diplomacy and Obama more about diplomacy enabled by military pressure. That’s a distinction with a difference in emphasis.
Both candidates are Israel‘s best friend. Obama has its back. Romney has its front. Neither is willing to pressure his best friend to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians. Romney seems inclined to ignore their existence. Obama does not but has reached a dead-end on the issue.
Both candidates are also Castro’s worst enemy. Romney would pursue a tougher isolation policy with Cuba, one that has failed for more than 50 years to bring results. Obama would try to undermine the Castro regime with soft power, a more recent approach that has also failed to work.
On Iraq and Afghanistan, there are again some real differences. Romney says it was a mistake for Obama to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq. Obama asks how they could stay if Iraq did not want them and refused to allow immunity from prosecution. Romney says the drawdown in Afghanistan is too fast. Obama leans toward accelerating it. That difference too is real: Romney would stay in Afghanistan to win, Obama wants to get out before we lose.
Then there are the issues that have not yet been launched. Romney will likely say Obama hasn’t done enough to support the rebellion in Syria. Obama won’t say it, but he hesitates on Syria because he wants to keep his powder dry and needs Russian support on Iran. Obama will vaunt his accomplishments against Al Qaeda. Romney will criticize Obama for failing to bring around Pakistan.
There are also the intangibles. Romney says the United States needs to be number 1 and lead. Obama says the United States needs to collaborate with others and share burdens. Romney says he would never apologize for the United States. Obama apologizes when we are responsible for something going terribly wrong. Romney will say Obama is too soft. Obama will say Romney is too simplistic.
There are some who think this kind of missive exchange is clarifying or otherwise edifying. I’m not so sure, even if I think my team–that’s the Obamites–got the best of it on this occasion. I guess I am nostalgic, but it would be nice to return to the “water’s edge”: that’s a foreign policy that ignores partisan differences once we leave the east and west coasts to go abroad. We shouldn’t hide the real differences, but there is more similarity here than either side would like to admit. Nor will they do so any time before November.
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The view of Tehran from Rome
So, you might ask, how did the Italians react to my presentation today at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) on the Iranian nuclear program?
My co-presenter, Riccardo Alcaro, made a number of interesting points:
- A military attack would end International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and the information they provide, making uncertainty about it much greater and increasing the difficulty of repeated military action after the first effort.
- There is an important distinction between Israel’s concerns, which focus on the existential threat of Iranian nukes as well as the need to maintain Israeli strategic superiority, and American/European concerns that have more to do with an unstable Middle East.
- Europe has played a constructive role at several important moments in dealing diplomatically with Iran and will likely continue to do so, even if it cannot lead the effort.
Riccardo views Israel’s concern with the existential threat as exaggerated. He also notes that nuclear weapons have never really given any state enhanced regional capability to compel others to do as the nuclear state wants. I think he is basically correct about this. Nuclear weapons contribute to the frame in which power relations are determined, but they do not provide a practical diplomatic or military tool.
Questioning focused on the legal basis for military action, the significance of proposals for a nuclear-free (or WMD-free) zone in the Middle East, the reaction of Sunni Arabs to a military attack on Iran, and whether American aversion to containment might moderate after the U.S. election.
In response, I offered a few thoughts. Harold Koh (the State Department legal advisor) will surely write a good memo on the legal basis, but it is also possible it would be fixed after the fact, as the intervention in Kosovo was. The Americans simply don’t have the kind of prohibition on military action without UN approval that several European countries have in their constitutions. The nuclear free zone is a lovely idea with no practical impact; it will be a consequence of peace in the Middle East, not a cause of it. The Muslim Brotherhoods that have been the big political winners thus far in Tunisia and Egypt are still developing their relations with the United States. The Sunni street, which is admittedly more important after the Arab spring than before it, may not respond sympathetically to Iran. The successful use of force has its own logic.
On containment, the Americans will certainly turn to it if their efforts to prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons (including military action) fail. What other choice would they have? In that case several Sunni Arab states may decide to develop nuclear weapons, unless the Americans provide a credible nuclear umbrella. But that is precisely what the Americans do not want to do. I can’t say failure to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons is not an option, since it always is a possibility. But its consequences could be devastating to American hope of turning attention away from the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific.
The Iranian embassy official present, first counselor Ahmad Hajihosseini, averred that Iran is a victim in all this talk about nuclear weapons and complained that no Iranian was on the panel. I of course would welcome an Iranian speaker at Johns Hopkins, as IAI would in Rome. And I don’t think it was so bad an idea for Tehran to get a report on this discussion among Americans and Europeans.
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Blink, or else
I am speaking tomorrow at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on Iran, the United States and Europe. Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself.
1. This year’s biggest foreign policy puzzle is how to handle Iran and its nuclear program. The piece of this puzzle I would like to talk about is Washington. What have the Americans got in mind? What are they trying to achieve? What will they do to achieve it? What happens if they fail?
2. The objective is clear: President Obama aims to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. He rejects containment. He has broad support in the Congress and beyond for this position.
3. There should really be no doubt about American willingness to use force to achieve this goal. If diplomacy fails to stop Iran from moving toward nuclear weapons, the Americans will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and possibly much more.
4. This would not be a one-time decision. It would only set back the Iranian nuclear effort a year or two. We will have to repeat the attacks, likely at more frequent intervals. I don’t agree with Marvin Weinbaum that the Iranians will welcome military action, but it offers only a temporary and unsatisfactory solution. That may be enough for Israel, as Richard Cohen suggests, but it is not good enough for the U.S., which has other priorities in the world and needs to tend them.
5. Karl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland, are also wrong to suggest diplomacy is the only option. But it is a preferred option. In a little noted passage in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg earlier this month, the President outlined what his preference:
…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.
6. David Frum misinterprets this passage as meaning that the president is bluffing on the use of force. That is a mistake. But Obama is clearly saying he prefers a diplomatic solution, because it has the potential to be longer-lasting than the military one.
7. From the Washington perspective, Iran is in diplomatic, political and economic isolation. The P5+1 are united. Sanctions are biting. The Sunni Arab world has come to the realization that Iranian nuclear weapons will require a response, one that will make the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it has been even in the past several decades.
8. Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to. They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s.
9. The trouble is that Iran, a state party to the NPT, has violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime and also working on nuclear explosives. So President Obama will be looking for verifiable commitments reflecting a genuine decision not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on the calculation that Iran will be better off without them.
10. How could that be? Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates security dilemmas for Tehran. The United States will target a nuclear Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons, greatly complicating Iran’s situation.
11. Keeping its enrichment technology but giving up on nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems. U.S. intelligence leaks claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President suggests.
12. Such a diplomatic solution would require Iran to agree to rigorous and comprehensive inspections as well as limit enrichment to well below weapons grade, which is 90% and above.
13. The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines. As Martin Indyk points out, they are currently engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken: Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….
14. Can Obama deliver on such a diplomatic solution? The Americans are hard to read. Best to listen to is Senator Mitch McConnell, who as Senate opposition leader represents the anti-Obama position. He declared earlier this month:
If Iran, at any time, begins to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level, or decides to go forward with a weapons program, then the United States will use overwhelming force to end that program.
15. This was generally read as a belligerent statement, since it makes explicit the American willingness to use military force if its red lines are crossed. But in fact it is consistent with the kind of diplomatic solution Obama has in mind.
16. But this Obama/McConnell proposition asks of Iran considerably less than Israel would like. Israel wants to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. This means giving up the technology required to enrich uranium to weapons grade or reprocess plutonium.
17. No country I know of has given up uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology, once acquired. It isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.
18. If war is to be avoided, someone has to break the cycle Indyk refers to, putting a deal on the table. Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine. He is unlikely to blink. Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran. He has to appear ready and willing to use military force.
19. This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that its parliamentary elections have been held. They marked a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program. Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken. He may even think nuclear weapons necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.
20. It is really anyone’s guess what Khamenei will do. But at least he has an undivided polity behind him. My hope is that either he or Obama–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.
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This week’s peace picks
Quiet until Thursday, when there is a boom of interesting events:
1. Domestic Politics and Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: A Perspective of Taiwan, Johns Hopkins/SAIS, 812 Rome, noon-2 pm March 12.
2. Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, Rumi Forum, noon-1:30 March 13.
Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the process of violent Islamist radicalization, but far less research has explored the equally important process of deradicalization, or how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies. Proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism have been implemented, to varying degrees, in several Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and European countries. A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement (a change in behavior) or deradicalization (a change in beliefs) of militants.
Dr. Rabasa will discuss the findings of the RAND monograph, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists. The study analyzes deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these programs, and makes recommendations to governments on ways to promote and accelerate processes of deradicalization.
BIO:
Dr. Angel M. Rabasa is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He has written extensively about extremism, terrorism, and insurgency. He is the lead author of The Lessons of Mumbai (2009); Radical Islam in East Africa (2009); The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey (2008); Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (2007); Building Moderate Muslim Networks (2007); Beyond al-Qaeda, Part 1: The Global Jihadist Movement and Part 2: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe (2006); and The Muslim World After 9/11 (2004). He has completed the research on patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe, and is currently working on a project on deradicalization of Islamist extremists. Other works include the International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 358, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorists(2003); The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power(2002), with John Haseman; and Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (2001), with Peter Chalk. Before joining RAND, Rabasa served in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Studies Association, and the American Foreign Service Association.
Rabasa has a B.A. and Ph.D. in history from Harvard University and was a Knox Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University.
3. Sudan and South Sudan: Independence and Insecurity, Dirksen 419, 10 am March 14.
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Full Committee
Presiding:
Senator Kerry
Panel One
Special Envoy for Sudan
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
Co-founder
Satellite Sentinel Project
Washington, DC
Co-founder
Satellite Sentinel Project, Enough Project
Washington, DC
4. Two New Publications Examining Iran, Stimson Center, 10-11:30 am March 15
Iran in Perspective:
Holding Iran to Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology
By Barry Blechman
Engaging Iran on Afghanistan:
Keep Trying
By Ellen Laipson
Stimson scholars, co-founder and distinguished fellow Barry Blechman and president and CEO Ellen Laipson have completed new studies that consider how to engage Iran in constructive negotiations. Dr. Blechman will discuss how to achieve greater progress on the nuclear front, while Laipson will outline ways to engage Iran over the future of Afghanistan.
** This event is on the record **
Please RSVP to RSVP@stimson.org – or call April Umminger at (202) 478-3442.
5. Why Does Russia Support the Assad Regime? Middle East Institute, noon-1 pm March 15
Location:
Russia’s relations with Syria – even under the Assad regime – have been more troubled than current press accounts of Moscow-Damascus ties indicate. But despite the internal and external opposition to the Assad regime that has risen up over the past year, the Russian government has defended it staunchly via its Security Council veto and other means. In his talk, Mark Katz will discuss why Moscow supports the Assad regime so strongly as well as why it is willing to incur the costs of doing so.
Bio: Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University who writes and lectures extensively on Russia and its relations with the Middle East. He is the author of Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), Reflections on Revolutions (St. Martin’s Press/Macmillan, 1999), Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves (St. Martin’s Press/Macmillan, 1997) and Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), among other publications.
Moderated by NPR’s Tom Gjelten
1:00-2:30 p.m., March 15, 2012
American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th St. NW #1100 Washington, DC
CNN.com will livestream each event. On Twitter? Follow #natsecurity2012for updates throughout the series.7. South China Sea in High Resolution, CSIS 1:30-2:30 March 15
CSIS Southeast Asia Program is pleased to present the inauguration of its innovative new policy tool “South China Sea in High Resolution”.
Presented by
Ernest Z. Bower
Senior Adviser & Director, Southeast Asia Program, CSIS
Followed by an expert panel featuring:
Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Admiral Timothy J. Keating
Former PACOM Commander, U.S. Department of the Navy (Retired)
The Hon. Stapleton J. Roy
Former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia
Thursday, March 15, 2012
1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
CSIS B1 A/B Conference Facility
1800 K ST NW, Washington DC
We are honored to invite you to witness the inauguration of the innovative new CSIS policy tool called “The South China Sea in High Resolution” presented by Ernest Bower, the senior adviser and director of the CSIS Southeast Asia program. An outstanding panel of experts will discuss the presentation and key trends in the South China Sea and its importance to the United States.
The South China Sea in High Resolution presentation will address the myriad issues — ranging from geopolitical to economic to legal — arising from the disputes in the sea. The South China Sea is a topic of vital importance for the Asia-Pacific. American foreign policy rebalance towards Asia has further emphasized the significance of this region. The South China Sea connects the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, but it contains sizeable natural resources and hosts the world’s busiest trade routes. Concerns about maintaining peace in the sea were raised by President Obama and other Southeast Asian leaders during the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit in 2011.
Ernest Z. Bower is senior advisor and director of CSIS’s Southeast Asia Program.
Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson (USMC, Ret.) most recently served as assistant secretary of defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
Admiral Timothy J. Keating (retired) is former commander of Pacific Command (PACOM) and the U.S. Navy’s U.S. Northern Command.
The Hon. Stapleton J. Roy is former U.S. ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia. He is currently the director of the Kissinger Institute on China at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.
Please RSVP to the Southeast Asia Program by noon on March 14. If you have questions, please contact Mary Beth Jordan at (202) 775 3278.
Event Schedule
10:15-10:30am: Welcome
10:30am-12:00pm: Panel 1, How Repression Breeds Religious Extremism – and How Religious Freedom Does the Opposite
Panelists: Johanna Kristin Birnir, Brian Grim, Mohammed Hafez, and Monica Duffy Toft (moderator)
12:00-12:30pm: Lunch
12:30 – 2:00pm: Keynote Discussion, Religious Freedom, Religious Extremsim, and the Arab Spring: Bush and Obama Administration Perspectives
Participants: Dennis Ross, Stephen Hadley, Elliott Abrams, and William Inboden (moderator)
2:15-3:30pm: Panel 2, Fostering Religious Freedom & Curbing Religious Extremism in the Arab Spring – Lessons for US Policy
Panelists: Jillian Schwedler, Samer Shehata, Samuel Tadros, and Thomas Farr (moderator)
Featuring
Stephen Hadley
Dennis Ross
Elliott Abrams
Participants
Johanna Birnir
Thomas Farr
Brian Grim
Mohammed Hafez
William Inboden
Jillian Schwedler
Samer Shehata
Samuel Tadros
Monica Duffy Toft
The Brookings Institution
August 04, 2011
Participants
Panelists
Khaled Elgindy
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Shadi Hamid
Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Tamara Cofman Wittes
3:00 to 4:00 Panel 1: Domestic Issues
Scott Shemwell, Retired Business Professional, “ Challenges for the International Oil and Gas Markets: A Business Perspective ”
Xu Liu, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Visiting Scholar, GW; Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, “The Environmental Factor in Russian Energy Policy ”
4:00 to 4:15 Coffee Break
4:15 to 5:45 Panel 2: Foreign Policy
Keun-Wook Paik, Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, ”East Asia Energy Cooperation”
Dicle Korkmaz, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Visiting Scholar, GW; University of Tampere, “Russian-Turkish Energy Relations ”
Oleksandr Sukhodolia, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Visiting Scholar, GW; Fulbright Scholar, “Russian-Ukrainian Energy Relations ”
Discussion Chair: Robert Orttung, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Assistant Director, GW
RSVP at: http://tinyurl.com/PanelGWU
Sponsored by the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies
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Negotiation time
With all the jabber the last few days about the use of force against both Syria and Iran, media attention is not focused on the prospects for negotiated settlements. But there are such prospects still, even if the odds are getting longer by the day.
Syria
International Crisis Group is out yesterday with a “now or never” manifesto rightly focused on prospects for UN/Arab League envoy Kofi Annan’s efforts:
Annan’s best hope lies in enlisting international and notably Russian support for a plan that:
Arming the Syrian opposition, which is happening already, is not likely to improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement along these lines. To the contrary, Western contemplation of safe areas and humanitarian corridors, loose Arab talk about armed the Syria Free Army, the occasional Al Qaeda suicide bombing and a Russian blank check for the regime to crack down are combining to plunge Syria into chaos. Someone may think that deprives Iran of an important ally, but it also spells lasting (as in decades-long) trouble in a part of the world where we can ill afford it.
The Americans have been mumbling about how arms will inevitably get to the Syrian opposition. This is true enough. But some visible support for Annan, and a behind the scenes diplomatic game with the Russians, would be more helpful to the cause of preventing Syria from becoming a chronic source of instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.
Iran
Netanyahu came but this time did not conquer. He needed President Obama to be forthcoming on an eventual military action against Iran as much as Obama needed him to refrain from aligning with Republican critics. It fell to Senator Mitch McConnell to crystallize the emerging U.S. position: if Iran enriches uranium to bomb grade (at or above 90%) or shows signs of having decided to build a nuclear weapon (design and ignition work), then the U.S. would respond with overwhelming force. This is the proposed “red line.”
We should not be fooled by McConnell’s belligerent tone. Even assuming very strict verification procedures, the line he proposes is a relatively expansive one that leaves Iran with enrichment technology and peaceful uses of atomic energy, which is what the Islamic Republic claims is its red line.
While the press was focused on belligerent statements, the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) have apparently responded to Iran’s offer of renewed negotiations. Iran has also told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it can visit a previously off-limits nuclear site believed to be engaged in weapons research, but procedures have not yet been worked out.
Bottom line
I wouldn’t get excited about the prospects for negotiated solutions in either Syria or Iran. But if ever there was a time to negotiate, this is it. By fall, both situations will likely be too far gone, with serious consequences for the United States, the Middle East and the rest of the world.
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Kim Jong-un tries diplomacy
There are things wrong with the U.S./North Korea nuclear deal announced in parallel by both sides (but not published) today:
- The North Koreans are unreliable and unlikely to implement the agreement fully.
- Badly needed food was withheld from the North Korean population to get Pyongyang to agree.
The United States does not generally use humanitarian assistance as leverage, and I suppose we’ll deny that is what we did in this instance. But we did.
Still, the agreement is a lot better than no agreement at all, which was the alternative. The agreement allegedly gets North Korea (DPRK) to suspend uranium enrichment and begin a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. The Americans say it includes International Atomic Energy Agency verification of the enrichment moratorium and disablement of a worrisome plutonium-production reactor at Yongbyon (Pyongyang failed to mention that).
What did the U.S. give to get? The DPRK statement includes this:
The U.S. reaffirmed that it no longer has hostile intent toward the DPRK and that it is prepared to take steps to improve the bilateral relations in the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and equality….
Once the six-party talks are resumed, priority will be given to the discussion of issues concerning the lifting of sanctions on the DPRK and provision of light water reactors.
Both the DPRK and the U.S. affirmed that it is in mutual interest to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, improve the relations between the DPRK and the U.S., and push ahead with the denuclearization through dialogue and negotiations.
What this sounds like to me is the beginnings of a broader quid pro quo: Washington accepts (maybe even recognizes?) the DPRK and they agree to give up nuclear weapons but keep their enrichment technology. I’ll believe the light water reactors when I see them. Odious though the DPRK regime unquestionably is, if anything like this results we can count ourselves ahead of where we would have gotten without an agreement.
Do I think this will help us with Iran? Unlikely, and only if we are willing to do the same kind of deal: they keep enrichment technology, allow IAEA verification, but give up on nuclear weapons. We give up on regime change. Are we willing to do that?
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