Tag: Nuclear weapons
What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
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Next week’s peace picks
It surprises me that anyone would try to do an event during Thanksgiving week, but there are in fact a few good ones on the docket. And don’t forget the AEI/CNN/Heritage Republican Presidential [Candidates] debate, 8 pm November 22. That promises to be the most amusing of the lot: watch for the Taliban in Libya, fixing the debt problem by zeroing out foreign aid and how tough talk will scare the nukes out of Iran.
1. The View from the Middle East: The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll
Polling and Public Opinion, Arab-Israeli Relations, Middle East, The Arab Awakening and Middle East Unrest, North Africa
Event Summary
Event Information
When
Monday, November 21, 2011
2:00 PM to 3:30 PM
Where
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Event Materials
RELATED CONTENT
Have the Arab Uprisings Made Israel Less Secure?
Daniel L. Byman
Slate
August 11, 2011
Can Israel Survive Without a Palestinian State?
Shibley Telhami
The New York Times (Room for Debate blog)
September 15, 2011
Participants
Presenter
Shibley Telhami
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Discussants
Steven Heydemann
Senior Advisor for Middle East Initiatives
The United States Institute of Peace
Margaret Warner
Senior Correspondent
PBS NewsHour
2. A Bottom-Up View of the Continuing Conflict in South Kivu
-
Monday, Nov 21, 2011 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm
with
Dr. Ferdinand Mushi Mugumo
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.
B1 Conference Room
CSIS 1800 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
As the sixteenth anniversary of the Dayton Accords approaches, it is time to reassess the policies of the United States and the European Union toward the Western Balkans. Please join us for a morning conference featuring policy experts and officials from the United States, European Union and the Western Balkans as we discuss the new CSIS report entitled: “A New Transatlantic Approach for the Western Balkans: Time for Change in Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.” The conference will feature separate panels on Serbia and Kosovo as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition to keynote addresses from senior United States and European Union government figures.
Please find a draft agenda here.
Light breakfast will be served.
Please contact Terry Toland at ttoland@csis.org to RSVP.
The discussion will be ON the record.
4. Iran and International Pressure: An Assessment of Multilateral Efforts to Impede Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Event Summary
Event Information
When
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
9:00 AM to 2:00 PM
Where
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Event Materials
RELATED CONTENT
Osiraq Redux: A Crisis Simulation of an Israeli Strike on the Iranian Nuclear Program
Kenneth M. Pollack
The Brookings Institution
February 2010
A Transatlantic Front: United Against Iranian Nukes
Charles Grant and Philip H. Gordon
International Herald Tribune
September 15, 2005
Iran’s Nuclear Program: The U.S. and EU have to Come Together
Ivo H. Daalder and Michael A. Levi
International Herald Tribune
February 27, 2004
Participants
9:00 AM — Panel 1: Iran’s Internal Dynamics and the Nuclear Program
Moderator: Kenneth M. Pollack
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Charles Ferguson
President
Federation of American Scientists
Kevan Harris
Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar
U.S. Institute of Peace
Ray Takeyh
Senior Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations
10:45 AM — Panel 2: Maintaining International Unity
Moderator: Fiona Hill
Director, Center on the United States and Europe
John Parker
Visiting Research Fellow
National Defense University
Francois Rivasseau
Deputy Head of Delegation
European Union Delegation to the United States
Yun Sun
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies
1:00 PM — Keynote Remarks
Introduction: Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution
Moderator: Steven Pifer
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Tom Donilon
National Security Advisor
The White House
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Waffling, weak-kneed, paltry stuff
Carl Bildt, Sweden’s able foreign minister, today tweeted this “good conclusion” from the Euroepean Union meeting today:
In the light of the new IAEA report, which is to be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors, the Council expresses its increasing concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme and the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts. It condemns the continuous expansion of Iran’s,enrichment programme, and expresses particular concerns over the findings of the IAEA Director General report on Iranian activities relating to the development of military nuclear technology. Iran has been found in violation of international obligations, including six UNSC and ten IAEA Board Resolutions. We urge Iran to address the international concerns over the nature of its nuclear programme
through full cooperation with the IAEA and by demonstrating readiness to engage seriously in concrete discussions on confidence building steps, as proposed by the HR on behalf of the E3+3. The Council recalled the latest European Council conclusions inviting it to prepare new restrictive measures against Iran. The Council will continue to examine possible new and reinforced measures and revert to this issue at its next meeting, taking into account Iran’s actions.
There may of course be something lurking here that is not spelled out: we can hope that there will in fact be “new and reinforced” measures out of the next meeting. But on the face of it, this is waffling, weak-kneed, paltry stuff from people who should know better and by now be ready to act.
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No no-brainer
Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery argue that President Obama should “take out” Iran’s nuclear program:
The closer Iran gets to acquiring nuclear weapons, the fewer options will be available to stop its progress. At the same time, Iran’s incentives to back down will only decrease as it approaches the nuclear threshold.
This is an argument to be taken seriously, as it is surely also being made inside the United States government. Dismissing it summarily, as commenters on the Foreign Affairs website have done so far, is foolish.
There are two propositions here: 1) fewer options in the future to stop Iran’s progress; 2) Iran’s incentives to back down only decrease as it approaches the nuclear threshold. There are problems with both.
Even after Iran develops and deploys nuclear weapons, we would have the option of striking their key nuclear facilities and as many of their nuclear weapons as we could find. The difficulty with doing this is that it invites a nuclear counter-strike with any surviving weapons, at Israel if not at the U.S. But even if we strike now, we are unlikely to be 100% successful, and we would be giving Iran an enormous incentive to accelerate their nuclear program as best they could with whatever facilities they had remaining. The danger of an Iranian counter-strike might not be immediate, but it would be just as real. This takes us down the road of repeated strikes on Iran. I’d like to discuss the regional consequences of that before assuming it is preferable to strike now.
As for Iran’s incentives, I think it likely they can achieve as much or more of what they want by approaching the nuclear threshold but not going over it, which in effect is what they say they are doing. Having the material and technology to produce nuclear weapons will give Iran regional prestige and clout without necessarily setting off the regional arms race that Edelman, Krepinevich and Montgomery fear. Going over the threshold will not only precipitate nuclear programs by far richer countries, it will also cause the U.S. to target Iran with nuclear weapons (let’s assume Israel already does), vastly increasing Tehran’s uncertainty about what might happen.
Edelman et. al. put the bottom line this way:
Given these trends, the United States faces the difficult decision of using military force soon to prevent Iran from going nuclear, or living with a nuclear Iran and the regional fallout.
Even in this formulation, the answer is by no means self-evident. But to imply that there will not be regional fallout from using military force is clearly wrong. I might reformulate it this way:
The United States faces the difficult decision of using military force soon and repeatedly to prevent Iran from going nuclear, or continuing to ratchet up sanctions, cyberattacks and other efforts in convince the Iranians that crossing the nuclear threshold will be injurious and not beneficial to their national security.
We are going to have to live with regional fallout, which will be different but substantial whichever choice we make. This is not a no brainer.
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IAEA suggests Iran going nuclear
This IAEA report sounds pretty tame in bureaucratese, but it in effect says the UN agency can’t confirm that Iran has no nuclear weapons program and suggests Iran is violating its Non-proliferation Treaty obligations and developing nuclear weapons. The Annex on “Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Programme” is particularly eye opening. I still think this is all in preparation for ratcheting up sanctions rather than a military attack, but if the sanctions don’t get ratcheted up or don’t slow Iranian progress…
Here is what the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded (bolding is mine):
52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs [locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used] declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
53. The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.
54. Given the concerns identified above, Iran is requested to engage substantively with the Agency without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme as identified in the Annex to this report.
55. The Agency is working with Iran with a view to resolving the discrepancy identified during the recent PIV [physical inventory verification] at JHL [Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory].
56. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related activities; and, as referred to above, addressing the Agency’s serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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Tehran’s options
While the world debates the significance of the Hamas/Israel prisoner exchange, let me turn back to something that really counts for the United States: Iran’s nuclear program. In the aftermath of the Iran(Car)Tel plot, friend Rashad Mahmood, formerly of Cairo, asks “What would be reasonable Iranian policy to having their nuclear scientists killed (by admittedly much finer spycraft since they haven’t aired any proof of who has done it)?”
This is a reasonable question with some scary answers. Let’s look at some of the (not mutually exclusive) options:
1. They can respond by killing the nuclear scientists of those countries they think responsible for the attacks on their own (presumably Israel, but as Rashad says there is no proof in the public domain). I assume they’ve tried this and haven’t succeeded, or at least we haven’t heard about it.
2. They can accelerate their nuclear program, hide it better, protect the people who work in it and try to get nuclear weapons as soon as possible. They may be trying, but they appear to be failing.
3. They can begin to wonder whether the nuclear program is worth the trouble it is causing and reach an arrangement that reassures friends and foe alike that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons even if it acquires the “fuel cycle” technology required to do so. President Ahmedinejad has proposed something along these lines, but no one is taking him seriously yet, so far as I can tell.
4. They can kill diplomats or citizens of third countries, say Saudi Arabia, that may have little to do with the killing of the Iranians but are hated enemies anyway.
My impression is that they’ve tried at one time or another Nos. 1-3, so far without success. No. 4 doesn’t make any sense to me, but maybe it does to someone in Tehran (and certainly it does to some in DC). The jury is still out on the extent of official Iranian involvement in the IranTel plot.
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration seems to me to be doing the right thing: keeping the focus on the nuclear program and ratcheting up sanctions implementation. This may not bring immediate results, but at least it provides some incentive for no. 3. The trick is knowing when to take Ahmedinejad’s proposition seriously. It is really difficult for outsiders to judge when the right moment comes–we are going to have to trust the White House to call that shot.
Here is the version of what Ahmedinejad has said about limiting uranium enrichment published by the Washington Post:
Q: I understand that you were in favor of the deal you had reached with the United States in 2009, according to which the U.S. would sell you 20-percent-enriched uranium in exchange for Iran exporting low-enriched uranium. But you were attacked by your critics and came under assault and people here could not reach a consensus and the deal fell apart.
Ahmedinejad: In Iran, people are free to express their views. Every day some people criticize the policies of the government. This doesn’t mean that the government is going to abandon their policies. We felt that they wouldn’t give us the fuel required here for our reactor. There were some political leaders who gave interviews in the United States and Europe and they said they want to keep Iran from having access to such fuel. So we realized that they wouldn’t give us that fuel so we had to do it ourselves. Even if they gave us now uranium grade 20 percent, we would not continue with the production of this fuel.
Q: So if the United States sold you the enriched uranium, would you stop enriching yourselves?
Ahmedinejad: Yes. We don’t want to produce uranium of 20 percent. Because they did not give us that uranium, we had to make our own investments. If they start to give us that uranium today, we will stop production.
Q: You reached a deal in Geneva in 2009, and you came back here and the deal fell apart here, and now people in Washington don’t believe a deal is possible.
Ahmedinejad: If they give us uranium grade 20 percent, we would stop production. Those negotiations took place in Vienna. Apparently they know everything. I repeat: If you give us uranium grade 20 percent now, we will stop production. Because uranium grade 20 percent can only be used for such reactors, nothing else.
This is the proposition some commentators think worth considering. Many think it a mirage, but time is on Tehran’s side: even if their nuclear program has slowed, they will eventually get there if there is no verifiable agreement for them to stop.
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