Tag: OSCE
Putin is hesitating but not yet lost
Russian President Putin has given his military orders to prepare for the invasion of Ukraine, but he is hesitating to give the green light. The French claim he has agreed to a meeting with President Biden following on a meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Blinken February 24. For the Americans, all of this is contingent on the Russians not invading Ukraine. Moscow says there are no plans for a presidential meeting.
What is going on? There are several possible explanations:
- Military preparations are not yet complete.
- Putin is not satisfied with his domestic support in Russia and Donbas.
- The Chinese warning against invastion has given him pause.
- Diplomatic efforts are promising.
- The Western threat of sanctions is deterring action.
Military preparations
I’m no military expert, but journalists report that Russian commanders have everything they need to proceed. Blood supplies and field hospitals were already in place by last week. Putin was lying when he said Russian forces were drawing down. They are now up to 150,000, enough to seize and control a piece of the country but not enough to occupy its entire territory.
I still am not inclined to believe the Russian objective is to seize Kyiv. I think they aim to make the Sea of Azov a Russian lake. A movement toward Kyiv might make the Ukrainians draw down in the south. But a serious attack on Kyiv would cause devastation that would be difficult for the Russians ever to repair, not to mention Ukrainian hostility and resistance.
Support in Russia and in Donbas
Russia’s parliament has already urged Putin to recognize the independence of the Russian proxy authorities in Donestk and Luhansk, as he has done for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. The de facto authorities in Donbas have ordered an evacuation of civilians, many of whom have been getting Russian citizenship.
But they are for the most part not departing, even though the rebel military forces have ratcheted up the bombardment of Ukrainian targets to provoke a response. The popular mood in Russia does not favor full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But extending Russian control in the Donbas area would not prove highly problematic either in Russia or in the insurgent portion of Donbas.
Chinese opposition
President Xi did not give Putin the full-throated endorsement he sought for invasion of Ukraine when they met at the opening of the Beijing Olympics. Then last week the Chinese Foreign Minister used the occasion of the Munich Security Conference to back Russia’s position on keeping Ukraine out of NATO but also to pull the rug out from under Putin’s invasion plans.
China favors continued diplomacy instead. Russia will desperately need China to help in sanctions-busting if the invasion proceeds. Beijing however wants to avoid further aggravation of relations with the US. Putin needs again to seek and get Chinese reassurance.
Diplomatic efforts
There is little sign that diplomatic efforts are bearing fruit. According to French President Macron, Putin has agreed to meet with Ukraine and the OSCE. But that is thin gruel.
The US has rejected Russia’s demand that Washington guarantee no NATO membership for Ukraine. Moscow has continued to insist. The Americans have tried to shift the diplomatic agenda to mutual arms and conventional force limitations. They hope Russia will view those as responsive to Moscow’s effort to roll back NATO forces from its borders. Putin however isn’t buying. He wants Russian forces right on the borders of the Baltics, Poland, Belarus, or Ukraine.
Sanctions
Sanctions are a likely factor in Putin’s hesitation. Britain is prepared to end Russia’s access to pounds and British property. The Americans are presumably ready to do likewise. For a country that depends on oil and gas exports, both normally denominated in dollars or another hard currency, that is major.
We don’t know what German Chancellor Scholz said to Putin during his visit last week to Moscow. But President Biden has repeatedly asserted that the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline (completed but not yet operational) is toast “one way or the other” if Russia invades. We don’t know what that means. Scholz likely does. He has shown no sign of disagreeing with Biden.
Bottom lines
Putin holds his cards close, but he is hesitating. I’d give sanctions and the China factor each 40% as factors in his hesitation. Support in Russia and Donbas as well as military preparations I’d each put at 10% each. The diplomatic factor is important only insofar as Blinken continues to reassure Putin that the Americans are still willing to negotiate. That gives him reason not to hurry while he gets China and sanctions-busting fixed.
Still, invasion is more likely than not. Putin is hesitating, but he is not yet lost.
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It’s not only about Ukraine
Negotiations with Russia went nowhere in this first week. The US, NATO, and the OSCE failed to budge Putin from his insistence on rolling back the NATO presence in Europe and blocking forever NATO membership for Ukraine. The Russians failed to budge NATO from its insistence that the door to membership be kept open (even if both NATO and the Russians know that Ukrainian membership is not in the cards for now). The odds of war, already high, have likely gone up, not down. What now?
Unity is strength
Above all, the US and European members of NATO need to strengthen Ukraine’s military capacity. Training and equipping should continue and expand. Stefano Graziosi and James Carafano are correct to argue that
Putin fears and respects strength. He exploits weakness. Europe must cease its dithering and give him what he fears, not what he wants.
Just today the Russians apparently launched a cyberattack on Ukraine. There are also indications they are planning a false flag operation as a pretext for invasion. Europe and the US made a pretty good show this week of unity in support of Ukraine. Let’s hope that show is backed up with real weapons and training.
Russia is vulnerable
There is still much more to be done. The Russians are more active today worldwide than the Soviets, who focused less on international presence and more on the strategic standoff with the US. In some of these places, Moscow is vulnerable. Witness what happened to the Wagner proxies in Libya, where Turkish drones forced them out of Tripoli. Some of these vulnerabilities are in Russian satellites. Witness what happened in Belarus and Kazakhstan, both of which had to rely on Moscow to protect their autocrats. And there are vulnerabilities inside the Russian Federation, where the economy is stagnant. The West needs to exploit these vulnerabilities when good opportunities present themselves.
Any Russian intervention will be limited
We also need to think realistically about what Putin is likely to do. An invasion aiming at taking all of Ukraine is unlikely. The 100,000 troops Russia has already massed are not adequate. Moscow would need to increase them by fourfold or more for that purpose. Ukraine has more and far better equipped and trained forces than when Russia first invaded in 2014. Turkey has provided its cheap but effective attack drones.
Kiev has also gained popular support. This report from Kharkiv, close to the Russian border, is telling:
The Russian Army cannot expect to be welcomed in most of a country where the Soviet-imposed Holodomor famine of 1932-33 is remembered as genocidal.
Putin presumably knows this and will keep any military intervention to limited objectives commensurate with the size of his forces. One of my more knowledgeable colleagues suggests this might be the canal that supplies water from the Dnipr to Crimea, or some expansion of the insurrectionist-controlled area in Donbas.
The US will need to lead the Western reaction
That kind of limited intervention will pose a problem for the US and Europe. Should they react with the full force of the financial and technological sanctions and military assistance to Ukrainian resistance fighters that they have threatened? Even those may not be effective. Some in NATO will want to modulate downwards to match the magnitude of any limited Russian intervention. Others will argue that a disproportionate response is appropriate, to deter further offensive efforts on Russia’s part.
The US will need to play the leadership role, whatever the Russians do. The Europeans are too fragmented and compromised to reach quick decisions and implement them with rigor. President Biden has spent a year building up credibility with NATO. He will need to draw down on those credits, especially if he reverses his own decision not to continue objecting to operation of the now completed Nordstream 2 pipeline from Russia to Germany. The Germans have paused their own decision on the pipeline’s operation, but high gas prices in Europe are bringing pressure to go ahead.
Of course it would be best if Moscow backed off and accepted some of the face-saving propositions NATO is offering: limits on military exercises, missile deployments, and other classic OSCE-style confidence building measures. But hope is not a policy. The Americans need to continue to keep the Europeans in line and the Russians concerned about what an invasion of Ukraine might portend, not only in Ukraine but elsewhere as well.
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van der Stoel deadline extended
The Max van der Stoel Award is presented by the Government of the Netherlands every two years. It honours the memory of distinguished Dutch statesman and the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel (seen here in Vukovar, Croatia). (OSCE) Photo details
THE HAGUE, 30 March 2020 – The deadline for receiving nominations for the Max van der Stoel Award 2020 has been extended to 30 April 2020. The award of 50,000 euros recognizes extraordinary and outstanding achievements in improving the position of national minorities in the OSCE participating States.
To propose a candidate, contact an OSCE field operation, a delegation to the OSCE or one of the OSCE institutions (the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Representative on Freedom of the Media or the High Commissioner on National Minorities, as well as the OSCE Secretariat and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly) with the name of an individual, group or organization you wish to be considered for the award. Only the above-mentioned OSCE entities can nominate candidates. The OSCE entity you approach will therefore consider your submission and decide which of the proposed candidates to nominate.
“In order to ensure transparency, fair competition and inclusiveness, my office will nominate all qualified candidates whose application it receives. I encourage all other OSCE entities to do the same,” said OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier.
The OSCE field operations, delegations and institutions should send their nominations directly to the office of the HCNM either via email (mvds@hcnm.org), through the online nomination form (maxvanderstoelaward.com) or by mail/diplomatic post to:
Max van der Stoel Award
Prinsessegracht 22
2514 AP The Hague
The Netherlands
After receiving all nominations, a special jury of distinguished experts of international repute, chaired by the High Commissioner, will choose the winner. The award will be presented at a ceremony in The Hague in November 2020.
For more information about the award read this factsheet.
Contacts
OSCE High Commissioner on National MinoritiesMedia contactOffice: +31 70 312 5503media@hcnm.org
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Don’t blame the international organizations
Maria-Alexandra Martin, a SAIS Conflict Management graduate active in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, contributed this post. A native of Romania, she previously served as an Operations Officer with the European Union in Georgia.
A year ago I was in Kiev’s railway station embarking on a train to Dnipropetrovsk. That was the closest to the frontline in Eastern Ukraine I could safely get. I had thought of other options, such as getting a press ID to enable me to go to the contact line to observe the war. But I quickly changed my mind when I realized I would put myself in danger, my family and friends under tremendous pressure and risk diplomatic turmoil for my country.
The train was packed with an array of colors and nuanced military uniforms, men and women of all ages, exchanging salutes, smiles and hopes. I sat quietly, trying to identify each badge and catch bits and pieces of their conversation with my poor Russian. I admired the Ukrainians’ patriotic drive.
I reached Dnipropetrovsk five hours later and found a noisy train station, hundreds of people coming and going. The faces were tired and somber, yet hiding a smile of hope, the smile of someone who will see loved ones again. The day I arrived, a massive rotation of one of Ukraine’s territorial battalions had taken place.
Since the beginning of conflict in Eastern Ukraine around 10,000 people have lost their lives. More than three million are in need of humanitarian assistance. The plethora of international organizations present in the country work continuously to improve the life of the people affected by war. But as in every conflict and post-conflict setting, planning is one thing, while the reality is different. Regardless of how well one plans, how much money and personnel one allocates, the resources will always be too scarce to cover all needs. The permanent threat of violence is a variable with tremendous implications for the way any organization carries out its business.
The largest international field presence in the country is the OSCE monitoring mission (OSCE SMM). These unarmed civilians were deployed at the Ukrainian’s government request after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The mandate of the mission is to
gather information on the situation in Ukraine in an impartial and transparent manner, to document incidents as well as violations of OSCE principles and commitments, and to report on its observations on a daily basis.
The SMM is further charged with monitoring the ceasefire agreements and the withdrawal of heavy weapons, as well as observing the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment and mercenaries from Ukraine. Due to access restrictions and the often volatile security situation, the SMM can only monitor withdrawal on a limited basis.
Like any other international mission abroad, the OSCE SMM has a framework for operational purposes (its mandate), agreed in advance by all OSCE members, including Ukraine and Russia. The mandate of a mission represents its core, the source of international legitimization and basic guidelines for doing or not doing something in the field.
But the situation in Eastern Ukraine remains volatile, active fighting is gaining periodic momentum and jeopardizes the fragile ceasefire in place. The few hundred scattered OSCE monitors, unarmed and limited in their freedom of movement, try to perform their obligations according to the agreed mandate. But they perform under threats at gun point, shelling, and detentions, with no means of protection.
When things go south, international organizations get blamed for not being able to prevent it. Yesterday, this already familiar story came again to the surface. The New York Times published Andrew Kramer’s “Keeping Bankers’ Hours, European Observers Miss Most of Ukraine War”. He notes the monitors are patrolling only during daytime for security reasons, while the heavy fighting occurs at night. If unarmed civilians were to patrol during nighttime when shelling occurs, they would clearly be at risk.
Even during daytime, the OSCE SMM lacks freedom of movement and faces serious obstructions that hinder its patrols. These events are reported on a daily basis, but the political negotiations are not done by OSCE monitors. The people in the field are one component of a larger negotiation agenda, agreed at much higher levels, and based on a multitude of national interests. Blaming people on the ground for not doing more connotes a skewed understanding of how the work of international personnel is actually carried out. It also deepens resentments and prolongs conflict.
I am a fierce promoter of better rules of engagement, improved effectiveness and greater capabilities for international missions abroad. Many faults and misbehavior mar the conduct and credibility of global and regional organizations. But too little is said and published about the good things these missions do. They have given millions of people around the world a chance to live, resettle, access basic services like healthcare, education and justice, and regain their dignity. Things would be much worse without the international missions we are so quick to criticize.
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Extending the 3 day miracle
Alexandra Martin, a Johns Hopkins SAIS graduate student and Eurasia Foundation Young Professional 2015/16, reports:
May 1 most Eastern Europeans celebrated the Orthodox Easter. I have vivid memories about how important this tradition is for the Orthodox community. When I was little, my grand-grandmother used to tell me that people forget about their discords for these three days. Even those who are fighting in a war put their guns down and respect the Holiest of the Orthodox celebrations. She survived both World Wars and many political regimes, including an empire, communist repression and fragile democracy.
Her words came to my mind when I read about the Easter armistice negotiated in Eastern Ukraine. The conflict between Ukrainian authorities and separatist fighters in Donbas had escalated in past weeks. The number of ceasefire violations skyrocketed. A week ago, four civilians lost their lives in Olenivka, when the area came under shelling. They add to the 9187 people killed since the beginning of Ukraine crisis in 2014.
The armistice was brokered in order to ensure that people on both sides of the Contact Line are safe celebrating Easter. Compared to previous weeks, it accomplished some success. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) “observed a low number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, and none in Luhansk region” on Easter Sunday, according to the organization’s daily report. The entire weekend appeared to follow the same trend, with a low number of ceasefire violations. But what will happen now? What will happen as Eastern Ukraine returns to business as usual?
To clarify some of my questions, I reached out to Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor at the OSCE SMM. He was kind enough to answer my concerns.
Q: Why the upward trend in fighting recently? What triggered it?
AH: Let me qualify what is underlying your question: we have always recorded ebbs and flows in ceasefire violations, and they have always concentrated in a couple of hotspots. There have been quieter periods, especially after 1 September, and around New Year. It is true that since mid-January there have been more very active days of fighting. And what is worrying: the usage of weapons which should have been withdrawn from the Security Zone, e.g. mortars, are used much more than in the fall of 2015. A key factor for the near-constant violations of the ceasefire is that military formations are standing too close together and have recently moved even closer in some locations. This represents a violation of the Minsk agreements and must not continue. Disengagement is a necessity in the current situation. Another element contributing not necessarily to an increase, but to the continuation of ceasefire violations is that there is no effective response mechanism for violations.
Q: How is the OSCE getting prepared for this new level of fragility? What additional efforts are designed to re-stabilize the situation?
AH: The SMM remains an unarmed civilian monitoring mission. The SMM has expanded its presence on both sides of the contact line – both in numbers and geographically. Forward patrol bases are now operational in eight locations, bringing the total of SMM locations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions to thirteen, eight in government-controlled areas and five in non-government controlled areas. More forward patrol bases are needed, including in non-government controlled areas, but the SMM needs safety and security assurances from those in effective control in the respective locations.
Currently, the Mission has 699 Monitors, with the aim of further expansion. This expansion is accompanied by an expansion of the Mission’s technical capabilities. Long-range UAVs have been complemented by mid-range and small size UAVs. In addition, the Mission is now operating three static observation cameras in certain hotspots along the contact line, and this number will be expanded.
However, the freedom of movement of the SMM is restricted, which impedes monitoring. Direct attacks against the SMM and its assets are taking place with impunity for the perpetrators. Three serious security incidents have taken place recently: weapons were shot in the direction of SMM Monitors, they were threatened at gunpoint and one vehicle was hit by a bullet.
We have called for an end to this impunity for people who threaten, violently mistreat or attack the SMM, or who violate its freedom of movement at all levels and on all sides.
Q: Many experts and scholars saw Donbas as a new frozen conflict in Eastern Europe. The evidence proves that we are far from frozen. What is your projection for conflict resolution, implementation of Minsk II, and normalization on the ground for the near future? Are the parties running into a stalemate, are there signs of fighting fatigue or exactly the opposite?
AH: During the past weeks, the SMM has registered the highest number of ceasefire violations in months. Artillery and mortars, proscribed by the Minsk agreements, are being used again in increased numbers. Fighting takes place in hotspots. The fighting there varies in intensity over time. Days of relative calm are followed by days, or even weeks, of intense escalation. Just recently, in the week from 11 to 17 April, the Mission has observed particularly intensive violence between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata, to the north of Donetsk. This was the highest level of violence observed since August 2015.
Armed violence also continues around the city of Zaitseve, around Horlivka and around Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve. An upsurge in ceasefire violations has also taken place in the south of Donetsk region and in Luhansk region. An ever increasing number of weapons are missing from permanent storage sites and from known weapons holding areas. Many of these facilities are completely abandoned. Our observations suggest that many of these weapons are back in use at the contact line.
A sustainable ceasefire is of central importance to the further implementation of the Minsk agreements. The sides need to show visible and decisive action to restore it. The SMM stands ready to facilitate dialogue between the sides in order to return normality to the lives of the people of Ukraine. There are no alternatives to the Minsk arrangements, and our experience on the ground proves that the sides can stop the fire when they want to. It is all up to political will at the highest level. We have also seen that when there are quieter periods, trust is increasing and the sides are able to work together, e.g. on repairs, demining etc. I believe it is possible to normalize the situation, and this is necessary not least for the lives of civilians affected. And it is why we are here. We will keep on working on it.
The implementation of Minsk II provisions remains central to a long lasting conflict resolution in Ukraine. The war has already exposed over 3 million people to high risks. They are in urgent need of humanitarian aid. The Orthodox Easter armistice proved that fighting can de-escalate immediately if there is political will. At this point one can only hope that the ‘miracle’ lasts more than three days.
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Scotland and Ukraine
While the OSCE has not yet posted an English version of Friday’s agreement involving Russia and Ukraine, there is one available on www.slavyangrad.org that reads well (I can’t judge whether it is accurate).
The text isn’t as bad as Ukraine’s parlous military situation suggests it might have been.
A good deal of it is unobjectionable: the ceasefire, OSCE monitoring and verification not only of the ceasefire but also of the border on a “permanent” basis, removal of unlawful military forces, release of detainees, national dialogue, humanitarian relief, and economic recovery. Details are lacking, but these are all things that the international community, the Ukrainians and the Russians know how to do if there is political will to do them.
The tougher things are point 3
Implement decentralization of power, including by means of enacting the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status)
and point 6
Enact a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions of Ukraine.
There is also (point 9) provision for early local elections in Donbas.
Moscow is headlining the decentralization associated with the Law on Special Status, which is to be passed in the future. The Russians will seek maximum powers of self-governance for Luhansk and Donetsk. It will also seek some means by which its proxies there can block European Union and NATO membership for Ukraine as a whole. But the fact that the self-governance will be established by a law passed in the Ukrainian parliament gives Kiev an upper hand, especially on the question of any veto powers over Ukraine’s affiliation with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The question of amnesty (point 6) is also fraught. It is difficult to picture an amnesty that would cover the downing of Malaysia Air 17, or some of the other atrocities perpetrated in the Donbas region in recent months. But that appears to be what has been promised. We’ll just have to wait and see what that provision means. Amnesty, like the new special law on status, will need to pass in the Ukrainian parliament.
Nothing in the current agreement appears to offer or promise to the rebels in Donbas or to Moscow anything like a veto over EU or NATO membership. No doubt the Russians would like an arrangement like the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Serb entity has a veto over just about anything it wants to block. I find it hard to believe that something like that isn’t lurking, likely in the national dialogue. But its outcome is far from certain, and implementation of its results could be long in the making.
Much as Ukraine may have suffered in recent days on the battlefield, Corey Flintoff’s interesting report this morning on Russia’s handling of its combat deaths suggests that President Poroshenko isn’t the only one anxious to stop the fighting. Russians are starting to feel the pain. Vladimir Putin no doubt also hopes to forestall European expansion of sanctions, which has been imminent for a week. Russia is no democracy these days, and Putin is riding high, but maybe his nervousness about whether he can make it last is showing.
That said, it is one more sad fact of our current events that Scotland votes September 18 on independence from the United Kingdom. If that goes in the “yes” direction polls are now pointing, we can expect the repercussions to be felt not only in Ukraine but also in the Balkans, the Caucasus and elsewhere. Scotland has nothing to do with those other places, but demonstration effects can be powerful.
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