Tag: Pakistan
Townsend on terror
Since the 9/11 attacks, counter-terrorism has defined the US security context, sometimes at the expense of civil liberties. Yet the growth of terrorism seems unabated, with the rise of extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). On Thursday, Fran Townsend, former Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Adviser to President George W. Bush, shared her thoughts on Iran, ISIS and US strategy in the Middle East at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The event was moderated by Nina Easton, Senior Associate at CSIS, Editor and Columnist at Fortune, and Chair of Most Powerful Women International.
ISIS vs. Al Qaeda
Just when the US started making significant dents in Al Qaeda’s operations, ISIS flooded the world with a series of alternative terror tactics. Townsend thought ISIS a far more dangerous enemy than Al Qaeda. The caliphate was a notional idea for Al Qaeda, but it is a real territorial idea for ISIS.
ISIS is attacking the “near enemy,” local populations and governments in the Middle East to take control of their lands, whereas Al Qaeda tried to mobilize its forces against the “far enemy,” the West. Al Qaeda fought a war of attrition in which it wanted to bleed out the West militarily and economically. ISIS is fighting a war of acceleration, in which its influence is quickly spreading across the Middle East. The group has already established itself in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen and in parts of Saudi Arabia. Further expansion in Pakistan—which has nuclear weapons—can have devastating consequences.
Townsend also noted ISIS’s ability to attract women who are not only being convinced to marry a “martyr” to elevate their status but also to join the men as fighters.
Counterterrorism Efforts Against ISIS
Townsend explained that in order to deny ISIS its battle space, the US must carry out a two-pronged solution on the cyber and military fronts. In cyberspace, the US government must withhold speeches and videos that further ISIS’s agenda. Townsend specifically referred to the beheading videos, which she thought should not be protected by the First Amendment. She also said yberspace must be filled with a counternarrative, government funded but not controlled.
For the military effort, Townsend urged the US to send advisers and trainers to help Arab allies with intelligence and logistics. Originally there were complaints that the US was fighting the War on Terror alone with other countries providing funding and intelligence support, but lacking military commitment. Now, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are showing unprecedented military commitment, but they cannot be successful without American support.
Failure of Phase IV Operations
Townsend attributed the breeding grounds for violent extremism to the failure of Phase IV operations. These operations are designed to follow military efforts and help build civilian institutions. After the fall of Gaddafi in Libya, it was clear the Libyan government had trouble getting back on its feet, but the US failed to provide much-needed security assistance, training and support as well as institution-building for political parties. Syria has also faced a similar situation. The lack of civilian institutional structure in these countries has precipitated the largest refugee crisis since World War II, which in turn has become the recruiting pool for Al Qaeda and ISIS for coming generations. According to Townsend, our children will fight the next wave of terror against children “who have watched their parents slaughtered, mothers abused sexually and otherwise.”
Iran
Regarding the pending Iran nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries, Townsend is pessimistic that it is possible to cut a good deal. She believes the negotiations started with the premise that the US would deny Iran nuclear weapons capabilities, but the Administration has slowly backed itself into discussing how large Iran’s nuclear capabilities will be.
Townsend emphasized that the Obama administration needs to do a better job of explaining the difference between an agreement and a treaty to Congress, which has the right to review the deal and veto it. She also called on the Administration to support the democratic movement in Iran as it has in Egypt. She has already engaged in a bipartisan effort to communicate with the National Council of Resistance in Iran, which believes in democratic principles, freedom of press and religion, and advancing women’s rights.
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Afghanistan: from bad to worse
Tuesday the United States Institute of Peace hosted a panel entitled Can Afghanistan Stabilize as US Forces Plan their Exit? Panelists included 
William Byrd (USIP Senior Expert in Residence), Ali Jalali (Former Minister of the Interior of Afghanistan and USIP Senior Expert in Residence), Scott Smith (Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, USIP), Moeed Yusuf (Director, South Asia Programs, USIP). The panel was moderated by Andrew Wilder (Vice President, USIP Center for South and Central Asia). A link to a full video of the conference can be found here.
Overview
Wilder presented an overview of the situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have had more casualties this year alone than the US military has had over the entire course of the conflict in Afghanistan. There is pessimism in Kabul over the political deadlock, there is very little economic activity (ironically in part because some investors are scared away by President Ghani’s anti-corruption agenda), and President Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan has been unpopular domestically.
Security
Jalali discussed Afghanistan’s poor security environment. The end of the Coalition combat mission meant an end to international air and intelligence support in this typical fighting season. The Taliban may be willing to negotiate, but want to improve their bargaining power through gains on the ground.
The ANSF struggle with a low force to space ratio in its attempt to defend vast territories. The troops are spread thinly to maintain a presence in all parts of the country occupying small, remote, vulnerable outposts. The Taliban attack these outposts, causing heavy casualties, and then disperse. Suicide attacks in cities have also increased, demonstrating to citizens that the government is incapable of providing security.
The ANSF lack intelligence capacity. In the past, they were able to foil 70% of planned attacks, but now they foil a mere 30%. Instead of manning remote, strategically insignificant posts, the ANSF should focus on intelligence-gathering to take the fight to the Taliban through ambushes.
Politics
Smith discussed Afghanistan’s political impasse. The government is in a state of institutionalized crisis, as disagreements continue between the supporters of President Ghani and Chief Executive (CEO) Abdullah. The agreement between the two parties gives both sides an equitable share of power, but does not contain mechanisms for dispute resolution if one side oversteps its authority. The result is disputes about how to resolve disputes.
Those who try to serve as mediators between the parties become distrusted by both sides. Ghani has tried to build a competent government but has not appointed anyone with previous ministerial experience. Abdullah is losing some supporters because he cannot provide patronage appointments to all his benefactors.
Meanwhile, an opposition is forming that includes former president Karzai and is hoping this government will collapse so that it can step into its shoes. The risk is that the Taliban will step in instead.
Economics
Byrd discussed Afghanistan’s economic woes. Afghanistan’s economy has traditionally been based on subsistence agriculture and herding. The Coalition’s military campaign brought investment, but this is drying up in the wake of the withdrawal, causing a decline in growth. Growth is not yet negative only because recent harvests have been good.
There is little business investment, capital flight, and high unemployment. Human capital indicators, such as literacy, are poor. There is a dire fiscal crisis, though revenue has improved somewhat in the first four months of this year. The Afghan private sector needs more confidence. Byrd argued that high tariffs on imports of cash crops like apples and almonds, combined with innovative export subsidies, could be beneficial.
Foreign policy and negotiations
Yousef spoke about Ghani’s attempt to reconcile with Pakistan. Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan made sense because he has no other options. The state has gotten weaker and the Taliban stronger. Pakistan has been reluctant to go after the Taliban’s safe havens militarily and has been concerned about Afghan-Indian ties. Ghani has been less warm towards India, hoping that Pakistan can bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.
So far, this has not happened. If negotiations do occur, they should focus on what is needed to achieve a ceasefire. Yousef argued they should not become mired in human rights issues, which can be addressed later.
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May their memory be a blessing
The confirmed killing of two aid workers in a January US drone strike in Pakistan is big news in Washington this morning. Warren Weinstein, 73, lived in this area. Giovanni Lo Porto, 39, was Italian.
Both had been doing the kinds of work many of my students at SAIS aspire to. Weinstein, a former political science professor, was working for a USAID contractor on rural development projects. Lo Porto, who studied peace and conflict issues at London Metropolitan University, was working for a German non-governmental organization on restoring drinking water in a flooded rural area. Experienced operators, they both nevertheless fell victim to kidnappings and ended up in Al Qaeda hands. Weinstein was taken in August 2011 in Lahore. Lo Porto in January 2012.
There was a time when aid workers of this sort might have been left alone by belligerents. No longer. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in particular, but also other “jihadi” groups, have made a thriving business of kidnap and ransom. The Italian government is widely believed to be prepared to deal, even paying substantial ransoms. The American government would like it believed it does not deal and in particular does not pay ransoms. Neither approach yielded the desired result in these two cases.
Kidnapping is not only a business. Increasingly, jihadi groups see aid workers as helping their enemies to establish legitimacy by providing services to the poor. The good works Weinstein and Lo Porto were undertaking might be welcome to the villages where they were undertaken, but not to those who want to undermine and destroy the Pakistani state. Many aid organizations are concerned about this and try to keep all belligerents at more or less equal arm’s length, but that is hard to do when it comes to belligerents who don’t acknowledge anyone as “neutral” or “humanitarian.”
The jihadi presence has caused a vast increase in the protection required to conduct humanitarian operations in today’s war zones, which in turn reduces the credibility of the humanitarian claim and raises your value as a target. If your warehouses, homes and offices all have to be protected 24/7 by armed guards, you start looking like just one more belligerent, or like one more extension of state power. As a non-governmental civilian, this makes me generally more comfortable in a conflict zone outside the envelope of visible security than inside it. Moving from one zone to the other–through checkpoints–is often your most dangerous moment.
Weinstein was reportedly taken in Lahore after his residential guards accepted an offer of a free meal. The circumstances of Lo Porto’s kidnapping are unclear to me. But the point is this: it could happen to any tens of thousands of aid workers in dozens of fragile states around the world. Few nongovernmental organizations can provide a level of physical protection to individuals that will foil a concerted kidnapping attempt by half a dozen toughs. Once taken, a victim in at least a dozen of these countries can be sold on quickly to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.
The best defense is simply not to be at an expected place at the expected time. But strict adherence to that approach would make work on many development issues impossible. Everyone is working remotely to a greater extent than ever before, but it just isn’t possible to do a good job supervising or implementing aid projects, training people and providing advice without seeing the projects first hand and talking directly with the local implementers and beneficiaries.
It takes real courage and conviction to do what Weinstein and Lo Porto were doing. It should never be confused with careless adventure-seeking by those with no serious business in conflict zones. Nor should we blame for their deaths the drone operators and intelligence analysts who take on the enormous responsibility of trying to prevent collateral damage. It is the kidnappers who were responsible for Weinstein and Lo Porto being in the wrong place at the wrong time, no one else.
The people who do aid work in conflict zones merit our appreciation and support as much as those who serve in uniform. The risks they run and the sacrifices they make are far greater than they should be.
Zichronam Livracha
May their memory be a blessing.
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The Islamic Republic and the Kingdom
This morning’s news confirms that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has jinned up a Sunni alliance (including Egypt, Turkey, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan as well as several other countries) to battle the (sort of Shia) Houthi rebellion in Yemen, which the Shia-majority Islamic Republic of Iran backs. No one likes to label wars sectarian, but avoiding it doesn’t make them less so.
Sectarian wars are identity conflicts, which makes them particularly difficult to resolve. No one likes to compromise their identity. During conflict, the multiple (and sometimes common) identities we all sport in more normal times are often shorn in favor of a single one. Middle East experts will all tell you that seeing what is going on exclusively through a sectarian lense is a mistake. But it is a mistake that in a first approximation comes all too close to reality during conflict.
It is increasingly clear that it won’t be possible to manage the conflicts in the Middle East country by country, which is the way diplomacy normally works. War does not. Syria and Iraq are one theater of operations for the Islamic State and for the Iranian-backed militias fighting it. Lebanon could be engulfed soon. Iran supports the Houthi rebellion in Yemen in part because of the Sunni rebellion in Syria.
The Sunni/Shia dimension of these conflicts puts the Americans in an awkward spot. They don’t want to take sides in sectarian war. Their major concerns are not sectarian but rather nuclear weapons, terrorism and oil. So they find themselves supporting Iranian militias in Iraq and as well as their (allegedly moderate) Sunni opponents in Syria and Yemen. The result is that Sunnis feel abandoned by their erstwhile ally even as Iranians accuse the Americans of originating Sunni sectarianism in the Middle East. We are in a lose-lose bind.
Getting out of it is going to require more skilled regional diplomacy than we have demonstrated so far. We need to be able to do two things at once:
- bring home a serious product from the nuclear talks with Iran early next week, and
- counter Iranian aggression and proxies in Yemen and Syria
If the nuclear talks fail, expect to see escalation on all sides: in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. But if the nuclear talks succeed, that will not mean peace in our time, as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will seek a free hand in pursuing its activities abroad to compensate for limits on the nuclear program. Only preparedness to counter the IRGC will convince it otherwise.
The Administration has wisely kept the nuclear talks focused mainly on the Iranian nuclear program. But the time is coming for a wider discussion with Iran of its interests in neighboring countries and the counter-productive way in which it is projecting power through Shia proxies. We’ll also need to be talking with America’s Sunni friends, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, about the opening they provide to Iran by discriminatory and exclusionary treatment of Shia in their own populations.
A classic security dilemma has emerged between Sunni and Shia in many parts of the Middle East. What one group does to make itself more secure the other group sees as threatening. Escalation is the consequence, but that won’t work. Neither Sunni nor Shia will win this war. Eventually the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom will need to reach an accommodation. How many will die before they do?
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Peace picks January 19-23
- A Year in Crisis: The Middle East in 2015 | January 20 | 9:30 – 11:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East, already the world’s most volatile region, faces some of its toughest challenges in a century: Borders have been redrawn in Syria and Iraq. States from Libya to Yemen are collapsing. Autocracy is again on the rise in Egypt. And diplomacy is teetering with Iran. Meanwhile, the United States is being sucked back into the region. Come hear four top experts explore the crises of 2015, the stakes, and where they’re headed. The panel of speakers includes Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar, Marina Ottaway, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, Shaul Bakhash, Professor of History, George Mason University and David Ottaway, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Managing, Ending and Avoiding Wars in the Middle East | Tuesday January 20 | 13:00 – 15:30 | Middle East Policy Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Policy Council is organizing its 79th Capitol Hill Conference on the management and resolution of conflict in the Middle East. The conference will feature Michael Hayden, General, USAF (ret.), former Director, CIA and Principal, the Chertoff Group, Daniel Bolger, Lt. General, US Army (ret.), Dafna H. Rand, Deputy Director of Studies, Center for a New American Security and Francis Ricciardone, Vice President and Director, Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. It will be moderated by Omar M. Kader, Chairman of the Board, Middle East Policy Council, and Thomas R. Mattair, Executive Director, Middle East Policy Council will be the discussant.
- Breaking the Cycle: Creating Solutions for Water Security in the Middle East | Wednesday January 21 | 9:30 – 11:30 | Hollings Center for International Dialogue | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Often overshadowed by political turmoil, the Middle East faces increasing environmental and resource-based challenges, notably its depleting water resources. Overuse enabled by government subsidies, growing demographic challenges and misuse of what scarce resources do exist challenge the long-term sustainability of the region’s resources. Despite the gravity of the issue, many innovative ideas for solutions do exist and technological improvements provide hope for addressing these challenges. Please join us for a conversation exploring these potential solutions. The panelists are Raymond Karam, Program Associate at EastWest Institute, Scott Moore, International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations and Paul Sullivan, Adjunct Professor of Security Studies, Georgetown University. The talk will be moderated by David Dumke,Director, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd Program for Strategic Research and Studies, University of Central Florida, with introductions by Michael Carroll, Executive Director, Hollings Center.
- New Challenges for Islamist Movements | Thursday January 22 | 12:00 – 14:00 | POMEPS| REGISTER TO ATTEND | From the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to the regional suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and decline of Ennahda’s prominence in Tunisia, Islamist movements across the Middle East are confronted by new challenges at the start of 2015. Join POMEPS for a panel discussion on the organizational challenges facing Islamist movements and how Islamists, from youth members to senior leadership, are responding. The panelists are Khalil al-Anani, Adjunct Professor of Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Raphaël Lefèvre, Gates Scholar, University of Cambridge, Monica Marks, Doctoral Researcher, Oxford University and Quinn Mecham, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brigham Young University. The discussion will be moderated by Mark Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.
- Once Upon a Revolution: An Egyptian Story | Friday January 23 | 13:00 – 14:30 | New America Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In his new book, Once Upon A Revolution: An Egyptian Story,Thanassis Cambanis tells the inside story of the 2011 Egyptian revolution by following two courageous and pivotal leaders—and their imperfect decisions, which changed the world. In January 2011, in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, a group of strangers sparked a revolution, but had little more than their idealism with which to battle the secret police, the old oligarchs, and a power-hungry military determined to keep control. Basem, an apolitical middle-class architect, jeopardized the lives of his family when he seized the chance to improve his country. Moaz, a contrarian Muslim Brother, defied his own organization to join the opposition. While Basem was determined to change the system from within, becoming one of the only revolutionaries to win a seat in parliament after new elections were held, Moaz took a different course, convinced that only street pressure from youth movements could dismantle the old order. This book launch features a discussion with Thanassis Cambanis, Fellow, The Century Foundation, moderated by Nadia Oweidat, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation.
- Politics, Comedy, and the Dangers of Satire | Friday 23 January | 16:00 | Georgetown University’s Davis Performing Arts Center | The Laboratory for Global Performance and Politics will host this timely forum, presented in association with the U.S. premiere of Ajoka Theatre of Lahore’s Amrika Chalo (Destination USA). Ajoka Theatre has been the target of violent threats, and Pakistani authorities have banned Nadeem’s Burqavanza for the play’s criticism of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Nadeem himself lived in exile until 1993 because of violent responses to his satirical plays. The tragic incidents in Paris provide a bracing reminder and a highly charged political and ideological context for the complex and essential role satire and freedom of expression play in our society. The forum will feature Shahid Nadeem, Executive Director, Ajoka Theatre, Nikahang Kowsar, Iranian-Canadian cartoonist previously imprisoned in Tehran for his satirical cartoons and Imam Yahya Hendi, Georgetown University Muslim Chaplain. The forum will be moderated by Prof. Derek Goldman, Co-Director of the Laboratory for Global Performance and Politics.
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Why we are losing the long war
The United States went to war with Islamic extremism in the aftermath of the murder of nearly 3000 people on 9/11, when its adherents were largely concentrated in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration called this the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a term that misleadingly included the invasion of Iraq. The Obama Administration has abandoned that appellation but continued what others now term the “long” war, which has spread throughout the Greater Middle East into Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Syria, Egypt, Libya and into sub-Saharan Africa, even as it has subsided in Indonesia, the Philippines and other parts of Asia.
Even this rudimentary description suggests we are not winning. It isn’t even clear what “winning” means, but it almost certainly does not entail spreading the enemy to a dozen or more additional countries, where they are challenging established governments. The geographic spread makes this a tougher fight. Our military much prefers to concentrate forces on a center of gravity whose defeat spells the end of the war.
But now it is no longer clear where the center of gravity is: we used to think it was Al Qaeda Central, holed up in Peshawar or somewhere else along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. But Osama bin Laden’s death did nothing to stem the jihadi tide, even if Al Qaeda Central has lost significance. Today the press would have us believe the center of gravity is with the Islamic State (ISIS), somewhere in eastern Syria or western Iraq. But defeating it there will all too obviously not defeat Al Qaeda-linked terrorists in Yemen and Mali, or the ISIS affiliate in Sinai.
Islamic extremism, despite ISIS’s claim, is still more an insurgency than a state. Insurgencies do not need to win. They only need to survive.
This one is not only geographically resilient but also demographically resilient. I know of no indication that anything we have done for the past decade or more has seriously limited recruitment to Islamic extremism. To the contrary, efforts to repress it using military force seem to make recruitment easier, not harder. New leaders have far more often than not stepped into the roles of those we have killed. Nor have any of our propaganda/psychops efforts worked. There is on the contrary lots of anecdotal evidence that ISIS propaganda efforts do work, at least to recruit cannon fodder.
So we’ve got an enemy that is difficult to locate, whose center of gravity is unclear, and whose psychops are better than ours. What should we do about it?
First is to keep a sense of proportion. For Americans, trans-national terrorism is a vanishingly small threat. The odds are one-ninth those of being killed by a policeman, and comparable to those of being killed by an asteroid. Ninety-nine per cent of the time no American need really fear terrorism outside a war zone, and those who enter war zones do so knowing the risks.
Second is to recognize that if we want to reduce the risk–in particular reduce the risk that the risk will grow in the future–military means are proving massively inadequate and inappropriate. Islamic extremism was far less likely to grow like topsy when confined to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan than it is now, dispersed in at least a dozen weak states. Those cats are out of the bag. We are not going to be able to force Islamic extremists back to where they came from. But we should be cautious about continuing to bombard them with drones wherever they appear. We may think the risks of collateral damage are minimal, but the people who live in Yemen don’t. For those who join extremist groups because of real or imagined offenses to “dignity,” drone strikes are an effective recruiting tool.
This brings us third to the fraught question of countering extremist narratives. I know of no evidence that direct government efforts to counter extremist narratives have been successful. There is evidence that former terrorists and their families can have some influence, working with local communities. But that requires the existence of a relatively free civil society in which religious institutions and private voluntary organizations are at liberty to organize. Community policing is also an effective strategy. But community policing requires the existence of a legitimate and inclusive state that uses security forces to protect its citizens rather than itself.
It is no wonder that we are losing the long war. We are using our strengths, which lie in technology and military action rather than in the far messier (and more difficult) tasks of building civil society and legitimate governance. It is arguable that our technology and military are actually making the task of countering violent extremism even harder. Drone strikes don’t encourage people to think their government is committed to protecting them. Nor do they encourage former terrorists and their families to speak out against extremism, as community-based civil society organizations might.
If the long war is worth fighting, it should be fought to win. For now, we are fighting it in ways bound to make us lose.
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