Tag: Pakistan
Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan post-2014
George Washington University’s Pakistani and Afghan Student Associations co-sponsored Thursday’s panel discussion of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan post-2014, when NATO troop reduction spells uncertainty for Pakistan as well as for Afghanistan. The discussion focused mainly on the effect of the drawdown inside Pakistan.
Deteriorating security
Zubair Iqbal of the Middle East Institute projected that the Afghan government will have to decrease government spending as international funding declines, leading to increased unemployment, socio-economic strain and security challenges. Without foreign support, Afghan security forces will encounter difficulties in maintaining security in southern and eastern provinces, including Kandahar. Taliban resurgence in southeast Afghanistan would have serious consequences also for the Pakistani state, which faces its own terrorist insurgency.
What Jonathan Landay of McClatchy characterized as a “defacto economic and security partition” between northern and southeastern Afghanistan could trigger a significant influx of refugees into Pakistan, with serious economic, political and security implications. Adding a refugee crisis to the strain of fighting an insurgency will spread thin the reduced resources of a Pakistani government accustomed to receiving fat stacks of military aid. The upcoming civilian elections will make little difference in Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan. Military preferences will prevail, as they have in the past.
Threats to Pakistan
Pakistan fears US abandonment of the region like in 1989, when US interest declined following the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan. Decreased US interest in the region reduces Pakistan’s leverage, which derives in part from its role as the main transit route for military supplies to Afghanistan.
Shuja Nawaz, Director for the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, highlighted that no single Pakistani point of view exists. The Pakistani army has a “schizophrenic” position on US withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Although some elements of the ISI remain distrustful of US intentions in the region, others fear the reduction of US military aid. When the US draws down in Afghanistan, Pakistan could be forced to rely on deficit financing to support its army. This would lead to inflation and undermine the army’s struggle against Pakistan’s internal terrorist insurgency. If Pakistan cedes territory to the Punjabi Taliban and chaos erupts in Afghanistan following the NATO drawdown, the Pashtun Taliban may take over the border and use Afghanistan as a base to attack the Pakistani state.
Landay laid out another, not mutually exclusive, scenario for Pakistani involvement with Afghanistan post 2014. With the departure of NATO forces, the Pakistani military will revert to seeing India as a lens through which to formulate policy in Afghanistan. To ensure pre-eminence there, Pakistan might indiscriminately back a Pashtun strongman in Afghanistan, an approach that brought the Taliban to power in the first place, when Afghanistan had no serious security forces to resist the maneuver. Today, the well-armed, US-trained, multi-ethnic Afghan army increases the risk of such a strategy.
Pakistan’s inability to absorb Afghan refugees
Today’s Pakistan is characterized by greater insecurity and economic fragility than the Pakistan of the 1980s and 1990s that managed to absorb three million refugees from Afghanistan. Landay claimed that an injection of refugees into the already over-crowded Af-Pak border camps would increase the porousness of the border, providing the Pakistani Taliban with an “inverse sanctuary” from which to access Afghanistan and draw recruits.
The influx of refugees might also exacerbate tensions between Afghans and Pakistani Pashtuns in competition for Pakistani state resources. Iqbal predicted that tensions could lead to Pakistani calls for forced Afghan refugee repatriation back across a border that many in the region view as a bureaucratically contrived boundary.
Nawaz went as far as to claim that “refugees” was not a term applicable to the region, since many individuals on either side do not recognize the legitimacy of the line. He claimed that the only solution to the current and future Afghan refugee problem lies in giving the refugees Pakistani papers and absorbing them into Pakistani society.
Pakistan’s internal terrorist insurgency
According to Ahmad Khaled Majidyar, a Senior Research Associate at the American Enterprise Institute, Al Qaeda remains a network and an ideology in Pakistan, despite Bin Laden’s death. Pakistan and its economy fail to satisfy the demands of its young population, two-thirds of which is under 30. The 20,000 madrasas that often represent the only form of education available to impoverished youth raise the likelihood of extremism. The problem of militants requires a societal solution, not a military solution.
Iqbal suggested addressing the sectarian discord that lies at the core of the Pakistani terrorist insurgency. He claimed it falls to the army — as the country’s most ethnically representative body – to seek out a representative constituency of the warring groups willing to voice their concerns and to mediate a path towards a solution.
US drone strikes will shape the future of Pakistan’s domestic insurgency. The strikes eliminated the Taliban’s middle ranks. A new generation of young men inculcated with what Landay characterizes as “bin Ladenism” replaced them. Today’s Taliban does not pursue nationalist goals but rather ascribes to re-establishment of the caliphate advocated by Bin Laden. The drone strikes do not solve the issues underlying extremist militancy. They may, however, have contributed to dispersing militants, as recent events in North Africa and the Sahel indicate.
The Pakistani military distinguishes between a “good” and a “bad” Taliban, characterizing Taliban elements that conduct missions against NATO forces in Afghanistan as “good” and those that attack the Pakistani state as “bad.” This shortsighted policy fails to recognize the shared mentality that will unite the groups against the Pakistani state.
Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan
The panel offered many possibilities for how NATO troop drawdown in Afghanistan may destabilize Pakistan, but little concrete insight on Pakistan’s future role in Afghanistan. Nawaz did offer one remedy: the best role for Pakistan in Afghanistan is no role. Pakistan should look inward and focus on embracing its pluralism, instead of fanning the flames of sectarianism.
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Peace Picks: February 25 to March 1
A relatively quiet but high quality week:
1. Al Qaeda in the United States
Date and Time: February 26 2013, 10-11 am
Address: Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
B1 Conference Center
Speakers: Michael Hayden, Robin Simcox, Stephanie Sanok
Description: In recent years, several individuals from a wide variety of backgrounds have attempted to attack the United States on behalf of al-Qaeda. These individuals have defied easy categorization, creating challenges for intelligence, law enforcement, and other agencies tasked with countering their activities. However, with the publication of ‘Al-Qaeda in the United States’, the Henry Jackson Society seeks to provide new insights into the al-Qaeda movement and its U.S. operations by rigorously analyzing those involved or affiliated with the organization. Please join CSIS and the Henry Jackson Society on February 26 for an on-the-record discussion of this new report and the nature of al-Qaeda-related terrorism in the United States.
Register for this event here: http://csis.org/event/al-qaeda-united-states
2. The United States, India and Pakistan: To the Brink and Back
Date and Time: February 26, 2013, 2-3 pm
Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
Speaker: Bruce Riedel
Description: India and Pakistan are among the most important countries in the 21st century. The two nations share a common heritage, but their relationship remains tenuous. The nuclear rivals have waged four wars against each other and have gone to the brink of war several times. While India is already the world’s largest democracy and will soon become the planet’s most populous nation, Pakistan has a troubled history of military coups and dictators, and has harbored terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. In his new book, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Brookings, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of Brookings Intelligence Project, clearly explains the challenge and importance of successfully managing America’s affairs with these two emerging powers while navigating their toxic relationship.
Based on extensive research and his experience advising four U.S. presidents on the region, Riedel reviews the history of American diplomacy in South Asia, the conflicts that have flared in recent years and the prospects for future crisis. Riedel provides an in-depth look at the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008—the worst terrorist outrage since 9/11—and concludes with authoritative analysis on what the future is likely to hold for the United States and South Asia, offering concrete recommendations for Washington’s policymakers.
On February 26, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host an event marking the release of Avoiding Armageddon. Bruce Riedel will discuss the history and future of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan and options for avoiding future conflagration in the region. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks, and Tina Brown, editor-in-chief of The Daily Beast and Newsweek, will lead the discussion.
3. Democrats, Liberals, the Left and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Date and Time: February 27 2013, 12 pm.
Address: Georgetown University
37 St NW and O St NW, Washington, DC
Edward B. Bunn, S.J. Intercultural Center CCAS Boardroom, 241
Speaker: Jonathan Rynhold
Description: Prof. Jonathan Rynhold (George Washington University) will present his analysis of the various grand strategies of Democrats, Liberals, and the Left towards the Middle East, as well as elite discourse and public attitudes towards the conflict. He explains the trend towards increasing criticism of Israel and increasing preference for a neutral approach to the conflict. Prof. Rynhold argues this is not simply to do with changes in Israeli policy but deeper changes within the Democratic Party and among liberals in their attitudes to foreign policy and politics in general.
Register for this event here: http://events.georgetown.edu/events/index.cfm?Action=View&CalendarID=349&EventID=101111
4. The Resistible Rise of Islamists?
Date and Time: February 27 2013, 12-1:30 pm
Address: Woodrow Wilson Center
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Moushira Khattab and Marina Ottaway
Description: Some call it the Islamist winter while others talk of revolution betrayed. Neither claim portrays accurately what is happening in Arab countries in the throes of popular uprisings and rapid political change. The rise of Islamist parties in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings took most by surprise, including in some cases the Islamist parties themselves, which were more successful than they dared to hope. Coupled with the disarray of the secular opposition, the success of Islamist parties augurs poorly for democracy, because a strong, competitive opposition is the only guarantee against the emergence of a new authoritarianism.
Register for this event here: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-resistible-rise-the-islamists
5. Economic Effects of the Arab Spring: Policy Failures and Mounting Challenges
Date and Time: February 28 2013, 12-1 pm.
Address: Middle East Institute
1761 N Street
Speakers: Dr. Zubair Iqbal and Dr. Lorenzo L. Perez
Description: The Middle East Institute is proud to host economists Dr. Zubair Iqbal and Dr. LorenzoPérez for an examination of the economic impact of the upheavals affecting Arab Spring countries, including Egypt and Tunisia. Since the 2011 uprisings, growth in the MENA region has slowed, inequality worsened, and unemployment increased, thus weakening the popular support needed for new governments to introduce difficult, but necessary, economic reforms. The speakers will address the reasons for the inadequate reforms taken by these new governments and the economic consequences of an unchanged policy environment. By focusing on developments in Egypt, they will highlight the economic challenges posed by recent events, strategies to address them and what role the international community can play in helping stabilize Arab economies.
Register for this event here: https://www.mei.edu/civicrm/event/register?id=300&reset=1
6. No One Saw It Coming: Civil Resistance, the Arab Spring and the Conflicts That Will Shape the Future
Date and Time: February 28, 5:30 pm
Address: Johns Hopkins/SAIS, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
Speaker: Peter Ackerman, Founding Chair, International Center for Nonviolent Conflict
Register here.
7. The 2013 Annual Kuwait Chair Lecture: US Military Intervention in Iraq: Cost and Consequences
Date and Time: February 28 2013, 6:30-7:45 pm
Address: Elliott School of International Affairs
1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052
Harry Harding Auditorium
Speaker: Ambassador Edward W. (Skip) Gnehm Jr.
Description: Ambassador Edward W. (Skip) Gnehm, Jr., Kuwait Professor of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, GW
The final convoy of U.S. combat forces withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, but the U.S. military intervention produced transformative effects that continue to reverberate in Iraq and throughout the region. On the 10 year anniversary of the U.S. intervention, Ambassador Gnehm will reflect on the costs and consequences of that action on the U.S., Iraq, specifically, and the Middle East, more broadly.
Register for this event here: https://docs.google.com/a/aucegypt.edu/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dEJIbXNYazRvODZyakN2aGJTNEFkUFE6MQ
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This week’s peace picks
1. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?. Tuesday February 19, 10:00 AM-11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC 20036
Speakers: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Thomas Pickering, Kenneth M. Pollack
After several years of increasingly punishing sanctions against its economy, there is hope that Iran is now prepared to resume negotiations with the international community to reach a solution to the ongoing nuclear standoff. Many experts fear that Iran is quickly approaching the nuclear threshold, and that 2013 could be the last chance to avoid this outcome. If the international community cannot seize that opportunity, it may be left only with much worse alternatives.
On February 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion to examine strategies for resolving the nuclear standoff. Panelists will include former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-founder of The Iran Project, who will present the organization’s latest set of recommendations for addressing the nuclear issue, and Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
Website: here
2. America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Tuesday, February 19, 1:00 PM- 3:00 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC
Speakers: Daniel Kurtzer, Willian Quandt, Shibley Telhami, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen
Please note: This event has been rescheduled for February 19th, from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. If you plan to attend on this rescheduled date, please RSVP here.
As President Barack Obama embarks on his second term and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu builds his coalition government, many warn that time is running out for the two-state solution. On the occasion of its publication, David Ignatius will join three of the authors of ‘The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace’ and USIP’s Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen to discuss their own views on whether and why that door is closing, and what the next Obama administration can do to keep it open.
‘The Peace Puzzle’ was written by Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telhami and co-published by USIP Press and Cornell University Press. It offers a uniquely objective account and assessment of the American role in the peace process over the last two decades, concluding with 11 recommendations for the next administration to strengthen its role in resolving the conflict. While the tone of the book remains optimistic, the authors question whether the ‘determined, persistent, creative, and wise’ American diplomacy and leadership that have ushered in breakthroughs in the past can be recaptured and whether the lessons learned from two decades of failures will be embraced.
Please join us for this discussion with David Ignatius on the prospects for a breakthrough in the peace process and the lessons offered in ‘The Peace Puzzle.’
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/americas-quest-arab-israeli-peace
3. A National Security Strategy for Lebanon, Wednesday, February 20, 12:30-2:00 PM, Aspen Institute
Venue: Aspen Institute, One Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 700, Washington DC 20036
This event will feature a panel of experts to explore the challenges facing Lebanon’s national security and promote actionable recommendations for a solvent national security strategy for the country going forward, especially as it relates to US-Lebanese relations, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.
Website: http://www.aspeninstitute.org/events/2013/02/20/national-security-strategy-lebanon
4. Arab Perspectives on Iran’s Role in a Changing Middle East, Thursday February 21, 10:00 AM-12:00 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Speakers: Kristin Lord, Shibley Telhami, Michele Dunne
This meeting is co-sponsored by the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the United States Institute of Peace.
While there is much talk of an ‘Arab’ view of Iran, there are in fact significantly divergent views on Tehran’s role, even among rulers in the region. Additionally, despite the Sunni-Shiite divide, Arab public views of Iran and of its regional role are far more complex than-and often at odds with-the views of their leaders. Even those Arab governments that fear Iran most and, in some cases, support American military actions to weaken Iran’s influence, differ markedly from Israel’s calculations and expectations.
Shibley Telhami will present his analysis and paper on this subject on February 21, 2012 from 10:00am to 12:00pm. This is the second in a five-part series co-sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the Wilson Center’s Middle East program on ‘The Changing Security Architecture in the Middle East.’
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/arab-perspectives-iran-s-role-in-changing-middle-east
5.Women in Combat: The Changing Roles of Women in the US Military, Thursday February 21, 12:00 PM- 1:15 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Truman National Security Project & Center for National Policy- Capitol Hill Office, 1 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC, Suite 333
Speakers: Michael Breen, Kayla Wiliams, Scott Bates
On January 24th, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced the elimination of the ground combat exclusion rule for women in the military. Panetta stated his desire to move forward with a plan to eliminate all gender-based barriers to service. Join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel as they discuss the effects Secretary Panetta’s decision will have on current, and future generations of service-members, as well as which barriers will be the most challenging to overcome.
Website: http://cnponline.org/ht/display/EventDetails/i/41816
6. The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Group in Russia’s Volga Region, Thursday February 21, 3:00 PM-5:00 PM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW Washington DC 20006, Basement Level Conference Rooms A & B
Speakers: Sergey Markedonov, Gordon M. Hahn, Andrew C. Kuchins
In the two decades since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian and Western experts, human-rights activists, and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. Recent tragedies in Russia’s Volga region suggest that this sort of violence – and the Islamist terrorists who perpetrate it – may not be confined to the Caucasus. This has raised a question: how likely is it that the North Caucasus scenario will be repeated in the Volga region? Any attempt to answer this question is complicated by the variety of non-official Muslim groups of both local and international origin active there and the complex set of linkages between them.
This report sheds light on the ideological sources and resources of radicalism in the Volga region, nonofficial Islamic movements’ support among the regional population, and opportunities for the potential growth of different forms of Islamist activities. It describes the origins of different nonofficial Islamic movements as well as their post-Soviet development, ideology, and relationship with the authorities and official Muslim clergy. The report also offers practical approaches both for Russian domestic policy and for the U.S.-Russian security cooperation agenda.
Website: http://csis.org/event/rise-radical-and-nonofficial-islamic-groups-russias-volga-region
7. Tunisia: Are Economic Decline and Political Violence Prevailing?, Thursday February 21, 5:30 PM- 7:30 PM, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS-Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC, Room 812
Speakers: Mustapha Kamel Nabli, Emauele Santi, Stephen McInerney, Alexis Arieff, Daniele Moro
Mustapha Kamel Nabli, governor of the Central Bank of Tunisia and senior adviser to the World Bank chief economist; Emanuele Santi, principal country economist at Tunisia African Development Bank; Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy; Alexis Arieff, an analyst in African Affairs at Congressional Research Services; and Daniele Moro (moderator), visiting scholar in the SAIS African Studies Program, will discuss this topic.
8. The Middle East: What’s Next? With General James Mattis, Thursday, February 21, 6:00 PM- 7:30 PM, Young Professionals in Foreign Policy
Venue: Russel Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenues and 1st street, NE, Kennedy Caucus Room (SR-325)
Speakers: Gen. James N. Mattis
As the Middle East continues to undergo tectonic political, social, and economic change, the future of the U.S role in the region seems ever-more complex and uncertain. General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, will share his analysis of the ongoing impact of the Arab Spring, long term American strategy in Afghanistan, U.S.-Pakistan relations, troubles with Iran, the future of Iraq, and the shifting balance of power within the Middle East. Gen Mattis will also discuss his perspectives on what Middle Eastern issues are likely to consume the attention of the next generation of foreign policy leaders.
9. Eastern Congo: Changing Dynamics and the Implications for Peace, Friday, February 22, 10:00 Am-11:30, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC
Speakers: Raymond Gilpin, John Prendergast, Bennett Freeman, Ida Sawyer, Sasha Lezhnev
Unrest in northeastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to claim lives, disproportionately target women, fuel the illicit economy, constrain development and undermine prospects for peace. Mediation efforts by the United Nations and the DRC’s neighbors have yielded few tangible results and mistrust is rife. Major issues include the role of the M23 in the peace process, widespread gender-based violence and the resilient illicit economy (particularly in the mining sector).
The M23 rebel group was formed on 4 April 2012 when some 300 soldiers mutinied, citing poor conditions in the army and the government’s unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal. They seized control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in November 2012 and have been involved in regionally-brokered mediation efforts since being forced out in December.
On February 5, the South African government arrested a group of 19 Congolese belonging to a shadowy group called the Union of Nationalists for Renewal, who were allegedly plotting a violent coup in the DRC. This further complicates an already dire situation and injects an added sense of urgency. In light of these developments, peacebuilding in the DRC requires a nuanced assessment of conflict dynamics and creative strategies to leverage windows of opportunity.
On February 22, the U.S. Institute of Peace will convene an event on recent changes in the war in eastern Congo and their implications for peace. Panelists will share insights from recent trips to the region, examine opportunities and risks for advancing a meaningful peace process, and highlight lessons from other relevant peace processes potentially applicable to the Great Lakes.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/eastern-congo-changing-dynamics-and-the-implications-peace
10. Is there a Widening Sunni-Shia Schism?, Friday February 22, 2:00 PM- 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC, 20036
Speakers: Durriya Badani, Suzanne Maloney, Geneive Abdo, Bruce Riedel
An upswing in sectarian violence in Pakistan, Bahrain and elsewhere in recent months highlights the historic tensions, and contemporary political importance of schisms between Sunni and Shia communities across the Muslim world. Why is the level of violence rising and what regional and internal factors are influencing it? What are the implications for these countries should the relationship between the two sects continue to deteriorate? What role does the U.S. or other external actors play in shaping these developments and what could they do to alleviate tensions?
On February 22, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings will host a discussion to explore the factors behind this apparently worsening conflict between Sunni and Shia communities. Panelists will include Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, and Geneive Abdo, fellow at the Middle East program at the Stimson Center and author of a forthcoming Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings paper examining sectarianism in the context of the Arab Awakening. Durriya Badani, deputy director of the Project, will offer welcoming remarks. Brookings Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney will moderate the discussion.
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A better way
North Korea’s third nuclear weapons test yesterday raises three questions:
- Why are they doing this?
- What difference does it make?
- How should the rest of the world respond?
Why does North Korea develop nuclear weapons?
If you believe what Pyongyang says, the answer is clear: to defy and threaten the United States, which the North Koreans see as their primary enemy. But this should not be understood as a classic state-to-state conflict. North Korea poses, at least for now, little military threat to the United States. But Pyongyang believes Washington wants to end its dictatorship (I certainly hope there is some truth in that–even paranoids have enemies). The North Koreans see nuclear weapons as a guarantee of regime survival. No one wants to run the risk of regime collapse if the regime holds nuclear weapons, for fear that they could end up in the wrong hands. NATO attacked Libya only after Qaddafi had given up his nuclear program. So the North Koreans view nuclear weapons as guaranteeing regime survival.
What difference does it make?
South Korea and Japan have reason to be nervous about North Korea’s nuclear weapons and improving missile capability to deliver them. But it is going to be a long time before North Korea can seriously threaten the US with nuclear weapons. And the US holds a capacity to respond massively.
The larger significance of the North Korean nuclear program is the breach it puts in the world’s nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has been remarkably successful in limiting the number of nuclear powers, especially in Asia. But Taiwan, South Korea and Japan face real difficulty in maintaining their abstinence if North Korea is going to arm itself and threaten its neighbors. There are not a lot of worse scenarios for the world’s nonproliferation regime than an expanded nuclear arms race in Asia, where China, India and Pakistan are already armed with nuclear weapons.
How should the rest of the world respond?
This is where the issues get difficult. There are already international sanctions on North Korea, which has managed to survive them so far with a bit of help from Iran on missile technology and China on economic ties. More can be done, especially if the Chinese crack down on illicit trade across the border. But the North Korean objective is juche (self-reliance), so tightening sanctions may help rather than weaken the regime.
The Economist last week suggested the efforts to block the nuclear program have failed and that the international community should instead now focus on regime change, by promoting North Korean travel, media access, Church-sponsored propaganda and trade. This would mean a partial reversal of the efforts to isolate North Korea and a new strategy of building power centers that might compete with the regime, especially among the growing class of entrepreneurs and capitalists operating more or less illicitly in North Korea.
We are not good at reversals of policy. But the failure of our decades-long attempts to isolate the Castro regime in Cuba is instructive. Communism did not fall in Eastern Europe to sanctions. It fell to people who took to the streets seeking a better life, one they learned about on TV and radio as well as in illegally circulated manuscripts. Isolation alone seems unlikely to work. Isolation of the regime with a more concerted effort to inform and educate the people might be a better approach.
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Lawful but awful
I don’t usually get worked up over the drone wars and killing terrorists. I’d rather see many of them dead before a single innocent victim is killed or maimed. But the Justice Department “white paper” on “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or an Associated Force” has chilled my blood.
I hasten to note that I am not a lawyer. If you want the opinion of one, try Lawfare. But I spent decades as a bureaucrat. I could drive a massacre through the policy loopholes outlined in this memo.
The obvious first: the memo focuses on “imminent” threats, but then it includes in “imminent” an operation that hasn’t even yet been planned. That’s a neat trick. By that standard, Ron Paul’s election as president was imminent before he announced he was running. That’s not what the word means. If you call a horse’s tail a leg, how many legs does a horse have?
Capture has to be “infeasible” for the killing to be lawful. But infeasible is in the eye of the beholder. I suspect it is infeasible more often than not because we no longer have anyplace to put such captives. Or is it only infeasible because a military operation with capture as its purpose cannot be mounted without unreasonable risks? And what would unreasonable risks be?
But the problems don’t end there. The decision-maker in the memo is not the president of the United States. It is a well-informed senior official. Presumably he or she gets a delegation of authority from the president. Do we really think killing a U.S. citizen in Yemen by a drone operator in Utah does not require the decision of an elected leader? It should be done by a GS-15? Admittedly we delegate the authority to decide whom to kill on a battlefield to 18-year-old soldiers. But that is the difference between targeted killing at a great distance and conventional warfare requiring split-second decisions to protect our forces.
What is a “senior operational leader?” Here the white paper is more explicit: it is someone known to be “actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans.” I’ve got no problem with targeting someone who is targeting Americans. But how do we know that a particular person is a senior operational leader? The obvious problem is someone like Anwar al Aulaqi, who certainly encouraged killing Americans but publicly available evidence that he was an operational commander at the time of his killing in 2011 was thin. Did the Administration have more? Or is the definition of “senior operational commander as loose as the definition of imminence? Did some well-informed senior official get worked up over Aulaqi’s explicit incitement of violence against Americans?
Then there’s that “associated force” loophole. Is the Taliban a force associated with Al Qaeda? Their goals are certainly distinct, but they have been associated. Is the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (the Tuareg rebel organization in northern Mali) associated with Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM)? It certainly was for a while last spring, but right now it seems to be helping the French do in AQIM. Is the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence directorate “associated” with the Haqqani network? Some days yes, who knows right now?
Let’s not forget the problem of collateral damage: innocent people (including children) who happen to be nearby when a Predator strikes, or targeting errors. That too is a problem on the conventional battlefield, but I might hope that it could be considered more fully when our own soldiers are not at risk. We need to ask the obvious question: are drone strikes creating more enemies than they are killing? Are we raising the risks to ourselves rather than lowering them?
What difference does it make that the person killed is a U.S. citizen? A lot of the problems I see would be just as troubling if the person were not. Nor do I see much in this paper that makes me think it could not also be applied inside the United States. Now that gets a bit paranoid, but would we feel comfortable with drone strikes against terrorists–U.S. citizen or no–holed up in a bunker in Alabama?*
This white paper raises more questions than it answers. It is hard to imagine that no mistakes are made. Judicial review is the method we use to avoid mistakes in the criminal justice system. A soldier’s behavior on the battlefield is subject to military judicial review. But there is no judicial review of drone strikes, before or–if the Administration continues to have its way–after the fact. Nor is it clear that the bureaucratic process envisaged is adequate to minimize error.
I’m convinced: killing terrorists is not unlawful. But for more than legal reasons we need to be careful about who, how, when, where and why we do it. The white paper suggests the system in place is still far from adequate, even after several hundred drone strikes that have killed thousands. That really is awful.
*PS, March 6, 2013: For those who think I was hallucinating about drone strikes inside the US, read what Attorney General Eric Holder has now said on the subject.
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Masterful
Secretary of State-designate John Kerry was masterful today in his Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing. It wasn’t so much the details of what he said, but the breadth and depth. This is a guy who really knows international affairs.
His prepared statement was notable for some high points: the emphasis on the importance of American economic health in determining the country’s role abroad, the clarity about preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons and the vigor of his defense of the State Department budget. I would also note that John Kerry regards USAID, whose functions he mentioned but not its name, as an integral part of the State Department.
Then Kerry showed a lot of agility in dealing with not only the questions but also a demonstrator, expressing respect for her cries to be heard. He defended Secretary of Defense-designate Hagel’s views on getting rid of nuclear weapons, which he said was an aspiration for a world different from the one we live in today. He described his own changed view of Syria’s President Asad, whom he now hopes to see go soon.
He showed his clear commitment to maintaining the high priority Secretary Clinton has given to gender issues. He was non-committal on the Keystone pipeline, deferring to the official process under way. He was gentle with the Russians, citing their cooperation on particular issues (other than Syria). He was supportive of American anti-corruption and human rights efforts abroad. He showed he knows what is going on in Sudan’s Blue Nile and South Kordofan provinces. He parried accusations about Benghazi.
Of course part of the reason for this masterful performance is the attitude of the questioners, who showed enormous respect for their long-standing colleague. Gone was the idiot questioning of yesterday’s hearing with Secretary of State Clinton on the Benghazi murders. There was little “gotcha.” Certainly had the President nominated Susan Rice, who is far more combative, the tone if not the substance of the hearing would have been different. In a week’s time the Hagel hearing may be far more contentious, even if Hagel himself comes close to matching Kerry in knowledge and equanimity.
On Syria, Kerry advocated changing Bashar al Asad’s calculations, but he was unclear about the means to achieve that. He wants an orderly transition. The Russians appear willing, but differ on the timing and manner of Bashar’s departure. Kerry fears sectarian strife, implosion of the Syrian state and what they might mean for chemical weapons.
The Syrian opposition has not been ready to talk, Kerry said. In a sentence he struck–one of his few moments of hesitation in this long hearing–he started to say that we need to increase the ability of the opposition to do something unspecified. I’d sure like to know how that sentence was supposed to end: increase their ability to negotiate? increase their ability to strike the regime militarily? There’s a big difference. It sounded to me more like he wanted them to be more flexible on negotiations, but I’m not certain.
Kerry hit a lot of other subjects. On Afghanistan, he put his chips on a good April 2014 presidential election, which has to provide legitimacy to Karzai’s successor. Kerry wants “a metric” for stopping infiltration and attacks on Americans from Pakistani territory. He noted China is “all over” Africa (and America has to get into the game). Al Qaeda has dispersed at the urging of Osama bin Laden and is now a threat in the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb, where the solution is not only drone strikes but (unspecified) civilian efforts. We don’t like what Egyptian President Morsi says about Jews, but we need him to maintain the peace treaty with Israel. On Israel/Palestine, Kerry was cagey and refused to be drawn out, except to reiterate commitment to the two-state solution. The solution to climate change is energy policy, which will enable job growth. The “war on drugs” is ill-conceived. We need to do more on the demand side.
Here is the lengthy (four hours?) video of the hearing:
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