Tag: Pakistan
Parsing the Afghanistan quandary: humanitarian aid now, nothing more
The UN is anticipating that virtually the entire population of Afghanistan will soon require humanitarian assistance. The country’s economy is imploding. The new Taliban government is broke. The neighbors currying favor with the new authorities in Kabul are not traditional sources of aid: Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia, not to mention Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekhistan, and Tajikistan. The UN and non-governmental relief organizations will be willing, but they depend on financing from the usual suspects: the US, the EU, Japan, and other developed countries. The one willing Gulf donor is presumably Qatar, which played a role in the negotiations between the US and the Taliban and now runs Kabul airport.
The humanitarian imperative is clear: provide the aid to those in need, no matter what the politics. Life with dignity is everyone’s right. But this is an odd situation: the Taliban just ousted the internationally recognized government, they have not fulfilled the minimal requirements the UN Security Council has levied, and the countries now expected to provide aid are those the Taliban spent twenty years fighting. American taxpayers, having just witnessed the humiliation of the US withdrawal, are now expected to ante up in ways that will make the Taliban regime sustainable?
The problem extends beyond humanitarian assistance. At least that can be done without putting cash in Taliban pockets. The Taliban will still benefit, as otherwise the burden of feeding the population would fall to them. But assistance with government expenditures, including so-called “early-recovery” and reconstruction, will directly help the Taliban to hold on to the power they gained by force, as will unfreezing of Afghanistan’s foreign currency reserves and allowing the Taliban to cash in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights. The Taliban will be no less clever than the previous government in skimming off some percentage.
American interests in this situation need to be parsed. Collapse of Taliban rule and the likely subsequent civil war would be awful from Washington’s perspective. An Islamic State (Khorasan) takeover would be worse. The Americans want what the UNSC resolution specified: exit of those US citizens and supporters who want to leave, access for humanitarian relief, respect for human rights (especially those of women and girls), and an inclusive transitional government. The Taliban have already disappointed by naming a government of their own militants, including people linked to Al Qaeda. While it is early days, they have not demonstrated respect for human rights. Nor have they allowed the exit of more than a minimal number of people.
So do we discount the Taliban failures so far and go ahead with humanitarian relief? I’m afraid we don’t have a lot of choice, both as a matter of principle and pragmatic policy. Humanitarian relief may not save the Taliban government from collapse, but it is the right thing to do and could help to stave off civil war or an IS takeover. We should provide the funds with eyes wide open, trying to verify that access is unhindered and that food and other assistance flows to those in need and is not monetized or otherwise pocketed by Taliban-connected warlords.
There is an argument for at least partially unfreezing reconstruction assistance and Afghanistan’s hard currency assets, because that too could help prevent civil war or worse. Certainly the Taliban will try to extract hard currency with promises to fight the Islamic State. The Pentagon may be sympathetic to this argument. Here I would be far more cautious. The Islamic State is a rival of the Taliban: a jihadi group that wants to govern Afghanistan (and more). The Taliban have their own reasons for wanting to crush IS (Khorasan). I’d prefer to see them doing it for their own good reasons.
As for Al Qaeda, it is clear from inclusion of the Haqqani network, an Al Qaeda affiliate, in their government that the Taliban are not prepared to treat it as an enemy. There is still a question whether a government that includes Sirajuddin Haqqani as “interim” Interior Minister will allow the use of Afghan territory to plot or organize attacks on the US. It is arguable that it is better to have Al Qaeda in the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in. I wouldn’t buy it though: it really doesn’t matter that much where Al Qaeda plots its next attack against the US–9/11 may have been conceived while Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan, but most of the plot was organized and conducted elsewhere. Wherever the Haqqani network helps Al Qaeda, the US interest is clear: weaken both.
Bottom line: Humanitarian assistance yes, but nothing more until it is clearer how the Taliban will govern and whether they will cooperate with those who target, or allow others to target, the United States. Hoisting their flag over the presidential palace in Kabul on 9/11 was not a good omen.
PS: What Ahmed Rashid has to say is always interesting:
Stevenson’s army, September 11
– In WSJ Daniel Byman explains why the US hasn’t suffered another 9/11-sized attack.
– In WaPo, Colbert King notes that most US deaths have been from domestic terrorists.
– Philip Zelikow of the 9/11 commission reflects on the attacks and aftermath.
– NYT notes where the US continues to go after terrorists. As I have mentioned, the presidential war powers report says the US still has troops “equipped for combat” in 18 countries.
– A US official who dealt with Pakistan after 9/11 tells that story.
-NYT investigated and now has persuasive information that the final Kabul drone strike did not kill terrorists, but several civilians.
– NYT also says US trained the soldiers who launched the coup in Guinea.
– BuzzFeed has more on how Capitol Police missed the Jan. 6 insurrection.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, August 26
News:
Biden meets with Israeli PM Bennett today.
NYT notes problems in recent intelligence sharing.
WaPo says Taliban seeks political deal to keep money flowing.
Reps. Moulton & Meijer now say they support Aug 31 deadline.
With no more military aid going to Afghanistan, Politico says lawmakers seek to grab the funds.
WSJ says US is conducting missions to get people to the airport in Kabul.
Opinions:
Another senior US officer [3 star] acknowledges mistakes in Afghanistan.
NYT says Pakistan is big winner in Afghanistan.
Pompeo has to answer to GOP on Afghanistan.
Media are overhyping Afghan fiasco.
Former officials say bring in the UN.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
It isn’t going to be easy to choose what to do
Tony Cordesman offers a set of “negative” policy options for the US in dealing with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan:
- Threaten to attack any terrorist groups that launch attacks outside Afghanistan.
- Withhold recognition of the new government.
- Pressure other states, including Afghanistan’s neighbors.
- Cut off the aid that funded some 80% of the former government’s operations and security efforts.
- Introduce yet another mix of sanctions to exert maximum pressure.
But he thinks incorporating in addition a more “positive,” conditional approach would be more effective. These boil down to “carefully planned and executed” diplomatic recognition and economic aid. Peter Galbraith likewise argued on BBC today that diplomatic recognition should be considered, not because the US approves of the Taliban takeover but because it could enable more rescue of people who want to leave. Without consular officers in Kabul, getting people out is going to be difficult, mainly because of US bureaucratic requirements. An embassy might also be able to exert some influence on Taliban behavior, provided of course that Washington gets iron-clad security guarantees for the Americans returning to Kabul.
The financial cut-off has already begun. Taliban access to Afghanistan government accounts in the United States has been blocked and scheduled dollar cash transfers suspended. The next big move may be suspension of IMF and World Bank activities. The kind of targeted sanctions in fashion these days–focused on the personal finances and travel of miscreants–is mostly ineffective with the Taliban, since they presumably are too smart to keep their savings in dollars and uninterested in international travel.
The threat to attack international terrorist groups hardly needs reiteration. The problem will be identifying and locating them. Past cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan had little real impact. Even the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan did not destroy Al Qaeda, which has burrowed in to many different countries even if it hasn’t been able to mount attacks on the US for most of the last two decades.
Afghanistan’s neighbors are likely beyond pressuring: Pakistan because it is delighted with the Taliban victory and Iran because it is already profoundly unhappy with it. Russia will suck up to the Taliban until they either support terrorists inside Russia or in the stans that are its northern neighbors. China will likely be a bit more cautious, fearing the Taliban might just care about the treatment of the Uygurs, or even support tererorist attacks, from across the short border with Xinjiang. The commercial temptation for the Chinese will be great, as Afghanistan has appetizing mineral deposits, but the risks will loom large.
So the diplomatic option starts to look good when you realize how limited the other options are. But its feasibility depends on how the Taliban treat the Afghan population, especially women, minorities, journalists, and people who supported the effort to build a democratic states for the past twenty years, either directly or indirectly. There is a reason the Taliban are making friendly noises about women’s rights and amnesty for those who fought against them. They are savvy enough to know that surviving this time around depends on not offending international sensibilities too dramatically.
But the Taliban are not pluralists. They will not tolerate competition for power, even in the limited forms it existed under Presidents Karzai and Ghani. The Taliban are totalitarians who intend to govern by their own, fundamentalist, interpretation of Sharia. We know well what that meant 25 years ago: little or no education for women, abuse of minorities, no elections, no press (much less freedom of), catastrophically poor health care, and heavy reliance on drug trafficking for income. It is difficult to picture any organized opposition to Taliban authority, which they claim comes not from the people but from God.
There is a hint of insurgency in the Panjshir valley, the majority-Tajik center of resistance to the Soviets and the Taliban in the 1990s. You can expect the Taliban to be merciless in cracking down there, when the time comes. Taliban forces have already fired on demonstrators in Herat and Jalalabad. We’ve seen in Hong Kong and Belarus how autocracies can succeed against popular, nonviolent rebellion. The Taliban are likely to make the Chinese and Belarusians look like softies.
The Taliban are still allowing the evacuation of thousands of people from the Kabul airport. No one should be fooled: this is ridding them of many of their most capable, internationally well-connected, opponents. At some point, they will decide enough is enough and either start blocking access–there are reports that is already happening, especially to women trying to get to the airport–or demand the US and other Western powers start paying for the privilege.
Our options are limited. Diplomatic recognition could bring an onslaught of domestic US criticism. It isn’t going to be easy to choose what to do.
Biden was right and wrong
Afghanistan is falling to the Taliban much faster than most anticipated. So was President Biden right to get American troops out of harm’s way, or was he wrong to abandon friends and allies?
Right
The great virtue of his decision is apparent: the remaining 2500 or so American troops in Afghanistan, along with the diplomats and other officials, were in danger. Twenty years of American support, equipment, and training had not turned the tide. The Americans were doing little fighting, but the Afghan security forces were declining in effectiveness. There was little or no reason to believe that they would improve and considerable reason to doubt that they could continue to hold the Taliban at bay. Enlarging the US presence in Afghanistan would have been foolhardy. It is hard to give credit for a tragedy averted, especially when a different tragedy (for Afghans rather than Americans) ensues, but that is what Biden deserves.
Wrong
Abandoning the Afghans to the Taliban puts a lot more than 2500 human beings at risk. Even if every single one of the translators and others who helped the Americans is evacuated, thousands of Afghans will die, hundreds of thousands will be displaced, property, careers, and lives will be ruined. A relatively open society will close once again: women will be cloistered, media shuttered, health facilities closed, and education devalued. People who believed in democracy and the rule of law will be lucky to escape the country. Many will be killed, imprisoned, or at the least disempowered.
If you are truly a humanitarian, then it doesn’t matter to you whether the people who suffer are Americans or Afghans. Nor does it matter whether they believe in democracy and the rule of law. They are entitled to a life with dignity. They won’t get it with the Taliban back in power.
Odds are that the Taliban will welcome back (clandestinely if not openly) Al Qaeda or even the Islamic State, which otherwise will present a risk to their rule. While Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are in no position today to represent a big international threat, a few years of rebuilding on Afghan soil could make them a threat once again. You can discount that threat because it is years off, but what is your discount rate? Will you be unhappy if international terrorists return to attack the US in 2 years, 5 years, 10 years?
It was no easy decision
President Biden has said the decision was easy. It should not have been. While he may have imagined that the Afghan security forces would hold, he should have known that there was a possibility of collapse. He also knew that there would be a real possibility the Taliban would not fulfill their commitment to disallow international terrorism.
Biden may have imagined that other countries closer to Afghanistan would step in to save the day. Iran has a great deal to lose from a Sunni extremist regime on its border that will depend on drug trafficking. China and Russia do too. While Pakistan has supported the Taliban, despite Islamabad’s denials, the Pakistani Taliban may gain renewed momentum from the change of regime in Kabul. All of these nearer neighbors have more at stake than the US, but none of them has been ready to shoulder the burden so long as the Americans were doing it for them. Nor is it likely they will do so now.
Bottom line
I don’t think the US presence in Afghanistan was sustainable, for two reasons: domestic US opposition was growing and the Taliban were gaining ground. Biden should have found a more fruitful exit with a better chance of preserving at least some of the gains of the past two decades. President Trump set the process of withdrawal in motion, but Biden had an opportunity to improve on the deal his predecessor unwisely cut. He’ll pay the political price for that at home, though it may not be a high one. Afghans will pay a much steeper price.
You can be right in one dimension and wrong in another.
It’s all over but the shouting, in Kabul or not
It is hard to keep up with the Taliban advance in Afghanistan, which has now engulfed at least 12 provincial capitals and perhaps two-thirds of the country. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is collapsing in many places. Civilians who can are fleeing to the capital. Civilians who can’t are suffering dreadful Taliban depredations. There will soon be little left of the hard-won progress on women’s rights, relatively free media, improved health care, and property rights. The Taliban will take what they want, destroy the hospitals and clinics, dictate to radio and TV, and drive women into hiding. Their is no sign that their years out of power have moderated their extremist views.
The American withdrawal unquestionably precipitated this debacle. It was poorly executed and far too fast for the limited ANA capabilities. President Biden, who says he doesn’t regret it, will take the rap, but it was President Trump who agreed to it. Taliban promises have proven empty. They have not negotiated seriously with the government delegation in Doha and they have not broken with Al Qaeda. They may still do both, but only if the government forces are able to block their advance. That is unlikely.
It would be wrong however to conclude that everything would have been okay had the Americans stayed. The Taliban were already gaining territory before the American withdrawal. The ANA might well have collapsed, even if more slowly, had American support continued. A longer “decent interval” might have allowed for more negotiation in Doha, but the ultimate outcome would likely not have been a lot better than we are likely to see now.
What are we likely to see now? The Taliban will want to secure as much of the country as they can. The only big question is whether they will try to take Kabul by force. They could conceivably conclude it would be better not to do that, in hope of capturing some international aid, or avoiding international opprobrium, in the aftermath. But if they spare Kabul, they will still want President Ghani out and some sort of transitional regime friendly to their cause installed. There is no hope that the negotiations in Doha can produce better results than the military situation on the ground, which is catastrophic from Ghani’s perspective.
Western countries are busy threatening the Taliban with isolation if they continue the offensive. That is pointless. The Taliban don’t care about isolation from the West, which they assume will not provide assistance in the aftermath. The countries whose attitudes will count for the Taliban are the neighboring powers, especially Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia. Pakistan in particular has a lot of clout, because it provides the Taliban with safe haven, but Chinese or Russian aid might carry some weight as well. It will be interesting to see if the Taliban avoid atrocities against the (Shia) Hazaras, in order not to provoke Iran. It will also be interesting to see if the Taliban continue to maintain friendly relations with Al Qaeda and even allow it to use Afghanistan again as a platform for international terror.
President Ghani is calling on civilians to arm and resist the Taliban, including the warlords whom he has rightly tried to marginalize in recent years. Even if he did not try to summon support, the prospect of insurgency against Taliban rule is real. That will make their behavior in victory more abusive, not less. They will want to squelch any armed resistance as quickly and decisively as possible. No one should doubt their level of brutality.
It’s all over but the shouting, in Kabul or not.
