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Or else what?

On Twitter, I mocked the Administration’s renewed effort to get Pakistan to act against the Taliban, suggesting that it amounted to doing the same thing over and over expecting to get a different result (one definition of madness).  But here on the blog I should be a bit more analytical.

SecState Clinton was in Islamabad last week with a high powered delegation. The Guardian reported:

US officials are demanding that Pakistan either deliver the Haqqani network to peace talks, kill its leaders, or pave the way for the Americans to eliminate them.

The question is, or else what?  what is America’s leverage? If the Pakistanis don’t do these things, what will the United States do? In the negotiation business, this is called “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA).  I reviewed America’s broad policy options in July, leading to the conclusion that this is the damndest problem. 

But there are “courses of action” for the United States:

1.  Amp up drone attacks, aiming deeper into Pakistan.  Hard to do without Islamabad’s cooperation, sure to create a negative reaction in Pakistan.

2.  Reduce assistance to the Pakistani military. Drives them into the arms of the Chinese and reduces further the likelihood of cooperation on drone attacks.

3.  Help the Pakistan civilian government to gain better control over the military and intelligence service.  The civilians are less reserved in denouncing the drone attacks than the military, which isn’t going to like this idea and won’t sit still while it goes on.

4.  Align the United States more with India (and Afghanistan) against Pakistan.  Also drives Pakistan into the arms of the Chinese.

I was tempted to add a fifth:  target the Inter Services Intelligence headquarters, or other elements of the Pakistani government that support the Taliban, but that is pretty near unthinkable unless we really are prepared to go to war with Pakistan.  It is the kind of thing we’ve done elsewhere and may not remain unthinkable forever.  Maybe this is what Karzai was referring to when he said Afghanistan would be on Pakistan’s side in a war with the United States.

Pakistan’s “BATNA,” which gives it leverage over the U.S., includes blocking or delaying military supplies to American troops in Afghanistan.  As Jackie Northam notes this morning on NPR, Hillary Clinton’s post-Islamabad stops in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan presumably aimed at strengthening the “northern distribution network” supply route, thus reducing vulnerability to a Pakistani squeeze on Afghanistan supplies.

So, yes, there are things we can do, but they’ve got distinct downsides.  For the moment, I remain wanting a thorough reassessment of our relationship with Pakistan, taking into account whatever we learned last week in Islamabad.  It will likely come out in the direction of no. 3 above, but let’s try the reassessment and see.

Listen to the choir

I am finding myself in good company on Pakistan, where I argued early this month that we need to pick our friends with care even as we target those who are our enemies.  In one form or another, I am finding Ann Wilkens of the Afghan Analyts’ Network (whose paper predates my blog post), Bruce Riedel and Christine Fair–all of whom know more about Pakistan than I will ever know–in agreement.

Their arguments lean in favor of befriending civilians who are truly committed to democracy and willing to build serious democratic institutions while recognizing that elements of the military and intelligence services are our enemies and need at least to be contained if not slapped with sanctions.  Ann Wilkens adds a word in favor of establishing the Durand line as the border with Afghanistan.  Chris Fair goes into detail on the kinds of diplomatic contacts and capacity-building we need to get into while Bruce Riedel, less interested in the civilian potential, is explicit about slashing military aid and moving towards an adversarial, containment-focused relationship with Pakistan’s military.  All favor trade over aid.

It seems to me that the Administration would do well to listen to this chorus of calls for reorienting America’s relationship with Pakistan.  How about announcing a re-assessment of the U.S. relations with Pakistan?  Or convening a wise persons’ review?  The main reason Afghanistan really counts for the United States is Pakistan.  We owe it to the forces fighting there and the civilians trying to build an Afghan state to have a hard look at whether adjustments to our Pakistan policies can make their jobs easier.

Karzai may have it right, but it will cost him

It isn’t common or popular in Washington to say nice things about Hamid Karzai, but I confess I find his statement yesterday that he intends to refocus peace talks on Pakistan rather than trying to negotiate with the Taliban refreshing.  Afghans have long believed that they are really at war with Pakistan, which uses the Taliban as a proxy.  I first heard this perspective from a national security advisor to Karzai the better part of a decade ago.  Is it realistic to negotiate with Pakistan, reaching an agreement that would then require Kabul and Islamabad to impose the consequences on the Taliban who remain in their respective countries?

Of course we won’t really know until it is tried, but the proposition is reasonable.  Administration sources are now claiming that outgoing chairman of the joint chiefs Mike Mullen exaggerated the degree of Pakistani control over the Haqqani network.  But there is no doubt but that the Haqqani network harbors in Pakistan’s North Waziristan.  The Pakistani Army has certainly not done all it could do to pressure them there or to chase them out into Afghanistan, where it could be hoped the Americans and Afghans would deal with them.

Can Karzai do anything to convince Pakistan to undertake an operation to oust the Haqqani network from North Waziristan?  I think he can, but it will require that he do something no Afghan leader for the past 100 odd years has been willing to do:  recognize the Durand line that is the ostensible border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, established in 1893 between British India and an Afghan Amir.

Talking to another national security advisor in Kabul some years ago, I asked why Afghanistan would not do this.  The answer was chilling:  Afghanistan did not want to close off options for future generations.  In other words, someone in Afghanistan harbors irredentist ambitions in the Pashtun-populated parts of Pakistan.  I’ve told this story before, but somehow the Durand line never gets any attention in DC, so I’m telling it again.

Giving up the vanishingly small hope of reuniting the Pashtun population within a greater Afghanistan would appear to cost Kabul little at this point.  It should be much more worried about whether the Pashtuns might be reunited in a greater Pakistan, or even in an independent Pashtunistan.  Pakistan claims to have accepted the Durand line.  Afghan acceptance of it, and a bilateral agreement to demarcate it, would go a long way to removing one serious irritant and give the Pakistanis good reason to try to tidy up their side of the border.

PS:  Those who doubt the importance of the Durand line might want to read what the “tribal elder from Paktika has to say to the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN).

The friends we need in Islamabad

If all roads lead to Islamabad, which one do we take to get out?

Max Boot says we have to begin treating our “frenemies” in Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate the way we do Iran’s Quds force in Iraq:

Apply economic sanctions against its vast range of business interests. Limit the travel and freeze the assets of its leaders, starting with its current head, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. A designation of the ISI as a formal state sponsor of terrorism might also be in order. No doubt the Pakistani military would react angrily to such steps, but many civilians in Pakistan​—​including President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani​—​who chafe under heavy-handed military dominance might quietly welcome them.

Vali Nasr understands the temptation, but urges that we make nice anyway, in order to keep to our 2014 date for drawdown from Afghanistan:

Confrontation with Pakistan presents Washington with a dilemma that will make leaving Afghanistan harder. If the United States truly wishes to change Pakistani behavior for the greater good of the region, then Washington has to be prepared to do what it takes to get that job done. That includes potentially keeping large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan indefinitely to protect that country against the fallout from our policy and to convince Islamabad that it is futile for Pakistan to pursue its own goals in Afghanistan.

But if our goal is to leave Afghanistan in short order, then the prudent course of action is a return to stability in U.S.-Pakistan relations. That would have to start with ending the recent public acrimony but also confronting head-on what Pakistan is after in Afghanistan.

This is as sharp a policy choice as diplomats ever face. Which option is the right one?

Neither Max nor Vali discusses the issue I would regard as paramount:  Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.  Nothing about Afghanistan–even our withdrawal–is more important than making sure they do not threaten the United States.  This could happen if the Pakistani government were to fall under extremist control or if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear technology or materials to people who would use them against the United States.  For those who think that unlikely, it is important to remember that Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan already transferred sensitive technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea in the 1990s.

It seems to me that what we need to ensure our interests are protected is a two-pronged approach.  We should isolate and target (I would say even with military means) those who insist on supporting the Haqqani network and other Taliban forces, as Max suggests.  At the same time, we need to make nice, as Vali suggests, to both civilians and military in the Pakistani government who understand the responsibilities of a nuclear power and are prepared both to cut off support to extremists and ensure that Pakistan’s weapons and technology remain under tight control.  We will also have to provide Pakistan with assurances on limiting the role of India in Afghanistan and with a role in any peace negotiation there.

It is no easy matter to make these distinctions. What if we don’t find reliable civilians and military in the Pakistani government willing to opt unequivocally against extremism?  Then, as Vali suggests, full withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes impossible and we’ll need to hunker down for a long confrontation across the Durand line that marks the border with Pakistan.  That is an unattractive proposition that should make us try all the harder to find the friends we need in Islamabad.