Tag: Political Islam
Peace picks July 14-18
1. Ending Wars to Build Peace: Conflict Termination Workshop Monday, July 14 | 8:30 am – 1:00 pm United States Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Designing a conflict termination strategy is an essential but often overlooked component of warfighting. Improperly planned or incorrectly implemented, a failure to effectively terminate a conflict will leave open the original issues that brought on the war and likely create the conditions for future conflict. The U.S. Institute of Peace, U.S. Military Academy’s Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations and RAND Corporation invite you to an event featuring notable experts sharing their observations and concerns about the issue of war termination, its planning, transition and challenges. SPEAKERS: Gideon Rose, Author, How Wars End, Amb. Jim Jeffery, Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Hon. James Kunder, Former Deputy Administrator, USAID, Lt General Mark Milley, Commander, U.S. Army III Corps, and Dr. Rick Brennan Senior Political Scientist, RAND.
2. Ukraine: The Maidan and Beyond Monday, July 14 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm National Endowment for Democracy;1025 F Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The forthcoming July 2014 issue of the Journal of Democracy will feature a cluster of eight articles on Ukraine. Please join NDI as four of the contributors elaborate on the subjects discussed in their articles. Serhiy Kudelia analyzes the evolution of Ukraine’s political system during the past four years and why it led to the downfall of President Viktor Yanukovych. Lucan Way assesses the role that civil society played in bringing down Yanukovych and the challenges that it will now face. Anders Aslund examines the “endemic corruption” that has long plagued Ukraine and goes on to suggest how the new government can rebuild the country’s economy. Finally, Nadia Diuk considers the longer-term significance of the Maidan Revolution.
3. Doing Business in Burma: Human Rights Risks and Reporting Requirements Tuesday, July 15 | 8:15 am – 10:00 am Center for Human Rights & Humanitarian Law; 500 8th St. NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In 2012, the U.S. lifted economic sanctions on resource-rich Burma, sanctions that had been in place for over a decade. American businesses are required to publicly report to the State Department on the potential human rights, environmental, and political impacts of their investments if they exceed $500,000. Some of the questions that will be addressed: How can the Reporting Requirements guide companies and their attorneys in assessing and managing the risks that accompany new investment in Burma? Why is the information contained in the reports valuable to the State Department and other organizations? SPEAKERS: Amy Lehr, Attorney, Foley Hoag LLP, Jason Pielemeier, Esq., U.S. Department of State/DRL, Genevieve Taft, Global Manager of Workplace Rights, Coca-Cola, and Jennifer Quigley, Executive Director, U.S. Campaign for Burma.
4. New Story Leadership for the Middle East Congressional Forum Tuesday, July 15 | 10:00 am – 2:00 pm New Story Leadership; Cannon House Office Building, 200-299 New Jersey Ave SE, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND New Story Leadership for the Middle East is presents their class of 2014, featuring presentations from young Israeli and Palestinian leaders who are living, working, and learning together this summer in Washington, DC. Young voices throughout the world have decisively spoken up for change, demanding new leadership, greater freedom, and the right to choose their own futures. Now a new generation of Israelis and Palestinians wants to engage you in an emerging conversation by sharing their stories and their hopes for peace.
5. For the Least of These: A Biblical Answer to Poverty Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Heritage Foundation;214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND While much progress has been made toward poverty alleviation, many well-intentioned efforts have led Christians to actions that are not only ineffective, but leave the most vulnerable in a worse situation than before. Is there a better answer? Combining biblical exegesis with proven economic principles, For the Least of These: A Biblical Answer to Poverty equips Christians with both a solid biblical and economic understanding of how best to care for the poor and foster sustainable economic development. With contributions from fourteen leading Christian economists, theologians, historians, and practitioners, For the Least of These presents the case for why markets and trade are the world’s best hope for alleviating poverty. SPEAKERS: Dr. Anne Bradley, Dr. Art Lindsley, Michael Craven, and Derrick Morgan.
6. The Madrid 3/11 Bombings, Jihadist Networks in Spain, and the Evolution of Terrorism in Western Europe Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:50 pm Brooking Institute; 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Ten years after the terror attacks in Madrid, Professor Fernando Reinares, a senior analyst within Elcano Royal Institute, has published a definitive account of the attacks. Reinares provides evidence showing that the decision to attack Spain was made in December 2001 in Pakistan by Moroccan Amer Azizim and that the Madrid bombing network began its formation more than one year before the start of the Iraq war. Spain battles the challenge of jihadist radicalization and recruitment networks that are sending fighters to join the wars in Syria and elsewhere. On July 15, the Intelligence Project at Brookings will host Professor Reinares for a discussion on his book’s revelations, the empirical data on the evolution of jihadism in Spain and the future of terrorism in Western Europe.
7. Forgotten, but Not Gone: The Continuing Threat of Boko Haram Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm International Institute for Strategic Studies; 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The furor of the #BringBackOurGirls movement has faded rapidly and Boko Haram’s insurgency, now in its fourth year, has again been largely forgotten by the international media, despite the fact that violence has continued in the form of mass killings, attacks in the capital, Abuja, and new abductions. Virginia Comolli will be discussing the implications of Boko Haram’s insurgency for Nigeria, repercussions for other West African countries and the role of non-African partners in dealing with the security challenges the group presents. Comolli is the Research Fellow running the newly established IISS Security and Development Programme.
8. Petrocaribe, Central America, and the Caribbean: Who Will Subsidize the Future? Wednesday, July 16 | 8:30 am – 10:30 am Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th St. NW, 12th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND US Vice President Joe Biden used his recent trip to Latin America to announce a new initiative to promote energy security in the Caribbean. Is it enough? Join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center for a timely discussion on the future of Petrocaribe. The huge Venezuelan oil subsidy enters its tenth year, and continues to provide Caracas with political support from its closest neighbors – but at what cost to the region? Given Venezuela’s economic demise, will Petrocaribe continue delivering into the future? Now is the moment to examine energy alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America. This event will launch the Atlantic Council’s new report, Uncertain Energy: The Caribbean’s Gamble with Venezuela, authored by Arsht Center Senior Nonresident Energy Fellow David L. Goldwyn and his associate, Cory R. Gill.
9. The Resurgence of the Taliban Wednesday, June 16 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In autumn 2001, U.S. and NATO troops were deployed to Afghanistan to unseat Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. Yet, despite a more than decade-long attempt to eradicate them, the Taliban has endured—regrouping and reestablishing themselves as a significant insurgent movement. Hassan Abbas, author of The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier, will examine how the Taliban not only survived but adapted to regain power and political advantage. Carnegie’s Frederic Grare will moderate.
10. Citizens, Subjects, and Slackers: Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes Wednesday, June 16 | 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Marc Berenson’s unique surveys of Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians, conducted from 2004 to 2012 regarding their attitudes towards paying taxes, illustrate that Polish citizens express a far greater willingness and support for paying taxes than Russian citizens, who, in turn, are more willing taxpayers than Ukrainian citizens. Unlike Poles, whose compliance is related to their trust in the state, and Russians, whose compliance is related to their fear of the state, Ukrainians, showing the lowest support for tax obedience, have reacted to state efforts to increase compliance with less fear and little trust. This suggests that post-transition governments must find ways to create and build up levels of trust on the part of citizens in their state, but that bridging the exceptionally high and long-held levels of distrust in the Ukrainian state will remain an extreme challenge for those seeking a new rule-of-law Ukraine. Kennan Institute Global Fellow, Amb. Kenneth Yalowitz, will provide discussion.
11. Fixing the US Department of Veterans Affairs: Prospects for Reform Thursday, June 17 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am American Enterprise Institute; 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Recent scandals at medical centers for veterans have trained a spotlight on longstanding inefficiencies within the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In the case of the VA’s disability system, a nearly century-old approach to wounded veterans still prevails. The widespread consensus is that the problem goes much deeper than falsified waiting lists and delayed access to care, and necessitates a global overhaul. What would a renewed vision of veteran care look like, and how should we clarify the objectives of the VA’s disability system? In the interim, what short-term reforms are practical? Join AEI as House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Chairman Jeff Miller presents a blueprint for reform, followed by a discussion with experts in health care, disability, and public administration. Other speakers include Michael H. McLendon, Joseph Antos, Richard V. Burkhauser, Peter Schuck, and Sally Satel.
12. Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia with Professor Aaron Friedberg Thursday, June 17 | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm IISS; 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND China’s military build-up, particularly the expansion of its long-range nuclear forces and its development of ‘anti-access/area-denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities, poses a serious threat to both the American position in East Asia and the security of other regional powers. The growth of these forces challenges Washington’s ability, and perhaps its willingness, to project power into the region. This could call American security guarantees into question, eventually undermining the United States’ place as the dominant Asia-Pacific power. Left unchecked, perceived shifts in the regional military balance away from the US and its allies towards China could also raise the risks of miscalculation and deterrence failure. Professor Aaron Friedberg of Prince University will be launching his new Adelphi series book, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia.” He will be joined by discussant Elbridge Colby, the Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for New American Security.
13. Putting Military Personnel Costs in Context: Analysis by AEI and BPC Friday, July 18 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am Russell Senate Office Building; Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND According to a new study by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the per capita cost of military personnel on active duty increased by 42 percent over the last decade. Overall, growth in cost was much faster than growth in the number of people serving. AEI and BPC invite you to a conversation about the cost trends impacting America’s professional volunteer force and their implications for the future. SPEAKERS: Linda Bilmes, Charlie Houy, Scott Lilly, Ann Sauer, and Charles Wald.
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Schisms in Shi’ism
With sectarian violence flaring in the Middle East, it is tempting to view the Islamic world in terms of the Sunni-Shia schism. However, there are conflicts within the Shia community itself, and on Thursday, the American Enterprise Institute hosted a multipanel event to discuss them. The first two panels focused on the struggle for legitimacy between the two competing theological centers in Iraq and Iran, and the third panel offered policy recommendations going forward. Michael Rubin moderated.
Iraqi Shi’ites are not a monolithic community, said Abbas Khadim, noting that there are two competing schools, or hawza, within Shi’ite Islam: one in Najaf, and one in Qom. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani heads the hawza in Najaf, which acts as counterweight to the Iranian hawza in Qom. According to Khadim, Sistani told him personally that he wanted to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, adding that only political parties in Iraq are interested in patronizing Iran.
Najaf was the center of Shi’ite scholarship until the early twentieth century, declining with the establishment of modern Iraq in 1921. The rise of Qom coincided with the Iranian revolution, and for thirty years it commanded more influence that its rival. According to Toby Mathhiesen, however, the number of Shia worldwide who follow Khameini has declined to around 10%, while Sistani commands a much larger following.
In practice, the panel agreed, the Iranian republic is not a secure model. While Khomeini was able to exercise power in large part through the strength of charisma, Khamenei’s lackluster personality commands far less allegiance than his predecessor. The weakness of his administration was especially apparent in 2009, when thousands of Iranians ignored his orders to remain off the streets.
Sistani’s quietist brand of Islam, meanwhile, has played a moderating role in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. Following the bombing of Samara, for instance, his refusal to issue a call to arms to Iraq’s Shia population prevented a widening of the civil war. Even Saddam Hussein recognized Sistani as a counterweight to Iranian influence. During the 1980s, Saddam wanted him expelled, but ultimately decided that without Sistani, Iran would be able to leverage even more control within his country.
The speakers agreed that if Sunni governments allocated money for Shiite theological seminaries in their own countries, their Shia minorities would be less inclined to travel to Qom, thus curbing Iranian influence. In fact, Iranian scholars would leave Iran to study in other countries, as many did after the fall of Saddam Hussein (including Khamenei’s grandson).
The third panel was asked to address the question, “should America have a Shia policy?” According to Robert Rook, the short answer is no. This is because the Shia are not a single, indistinguishable group, any more than the Sunni are. Kenneth Pollack said that the US has a bad habit of neglecting human rights in the Middle East, most recently in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Lebanon, to name a few. Instead, America should champion the human rights we claim to espouse. By ignoring human rights abuses in Syria, he added, we have allowed the conflict to devolve into a sectarian crisis.
By focusing on the Sunni-Shia divide, we neglect the equally large gap between secular and extremist poles in Islam. The US should be backing moderates in all countries, and we should build viable opposition movements that will be able to contest extremism of all sorts. In 2007, Pollack noted, the US was able to successfully build an apolitical army. Walking away from Iraq and Syria feeds extremism. Maliki’s policies have been far more sectarian since the US left Iraq.
America has tried to ignore the Middle East for the last forty years, an approach that has failed us over and over again. Our long-term approach should be to combine diplomacy with use of force. In fact, Pollack said that the US should offer inducements (weapons systems, money or other) directly to governments in exchange for their cooperation. “We should straight up bribe” them, he suggested.
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Politics first
The American philosopher Alfred North Whitehead talked of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” which is like putting the emPHAsis on the wrong syLLAble. We are at risk these days of doing that in Syria, Iraq and Libya.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rapid advance toward Baghdad is getting a lot of attention, as it should. But Sunni-based ISIS is not a military threat to a city of nearly 4 million people, most of them Shia. ISIS might target the western outskirts near Baghdad International Airport and Abu Ghraib prison, which will grab big headlines. But ISIS is not going to march into what used to be called the Green Zone.
Nor did ISIS take Mosul, Tikrit and other Sunni-majority towns in the north and west solely because of its military prowess. Its success is due to broad Sunni support for action against Prime Minister Maliki, who proved his popularity among the Shia in April’s election but has governed in an increasingly authoritarian and sectarian way. That’s why President Obama has made assistance to him conditional on taking a more inclusive approach. Yesterday’s meeting and declaration of support from a broad cross-section of Iraqi politicians was meant to be Maliki’s response.
What we are facing in Iraq is not merely a military challenge but rather a political challenge to a fragile state.
The outcome of this challenge may well be determined by neither Sunni nor Shia, the prime protagonists of the current fighting. Kurdish peshmerga under the command of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have already filled the vacuum left in Kirkuk by the evaporation of the Iraqi Army. The Kurds have long claimed Kirkuk as their own and won’t leave it without a fight. It is a major oil-producing area that could bring the KRG to the breakeven point: 100% of the oil produced within KRG control could generate as much revenue as the 17% of all of Iraq’s oil that Baghdad is supposed to provide. But Maliki has cut off KRG revenue for months, due to a dispute over accounting for it and over the KRG’s authority to decide on the export and sale of oil independent of Baghdad.
In the past, Kurdistan’s political independence seemed impossible because of Turkish opposition. But Turkish attitudes are changing. Ankara this year received oil directly from Kurdistan, allowing it to be stored and then sold without Baghdad’s permission. Prime Minister Erdogan has appreciated the KRG’s cooperation in tamping down Kurdish violence inside Turkey. Even the Turkish military might think an independent and relatively secular Kurdistan would be a more attractive neighbor than either an ISIS-run Sunnistan or a Shia-run autocracy.
The Kurds will not want to go their own way until ISIS is defeated or contained. But KRG President Barzani even before the latest ISIS advance was promising Kurds a referendum on independence. If he ever follows through, the vote will be overwhelmingly in favor. It is hard to picture the Sunnis staying in an even vaguely democratic Iraq that would then be 60-70% Shia. Sunnistan under ISIS control would be a real threat to the United States and to Iran, which is why Tehran and Washington are trying to make nice these days even as they compete for influence with Maliki while trying to keep Iraq unified.
Focusing exclusively on Iraq would be another fallacy of misplace concreteness. ISIS does not confine its ambitions to a single country. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are already a single theater of operations. The place to attack an enemy is where he is weakest. That might well be inside Syria rather than in Iraq. The Obama administration was unwise to let ISIS get as strong as it has in western Syria. It is late to beef up support to its competitors or help them succeed against Bashar al Asad, but it is still worth a bolder try than Washington has made so far. The issue is not just a military one in Syria either: one of the key shortcomings of the Syrian Opposition Coalition there is its inability to deliver services in liberated areas. That is a political and governance issue, not only a military one.
The same is true in Libya. I’m delighted Ahmed Abu Khattalah is in US custody and will be tried in a civilian court. But whatever role he played in Libya’s Ansar al Sharia will be filled quickly by another jihadist. The problem in Libya, as in Iraq and Syria, is a weak state that lacks legitimacy with its people and is unable to maintain even a modicum of law and order. Dealing with this problem only by training up a General Purpose Force and leaving the governance and political issues unresolved is one more fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
PS: On Iran, best to listen to Randa Slim on NPR this morning:
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Due for a rethink
As US policy towards the Middle East is floundering, the Center for American Progress (CAP) released a timely report Monday entitled “US Middle East Policy at a Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition,” based on field research in four countries. At CAP to discuss the results of the report were Peter Mandaville of George Mason University, Haroon Ullah of the State Department, and Brian Katulis, CAP Senior Fellow and coauthor of the report.
Islamists are at the center of the regional struggle, but fissures within and between different groups are multilayered and run deep. The Sunni-Shia rivalry is only one element of the conflicts embroiling the Middle East. The intra-Sunni rivalry is another, if less prominent, aspect. The division between rich and poor countries is an additional ingredient, as wealthier states tend to fight out proxy battles in weaker and more divided nations.
In Egypt, for instance, Qatar and Turkey threw their support behind the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are backing the new military regime. Saudi Arabia sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential competitor, rather than just another disjointed Salafist group. A key dynamic is between countries with more resources and less division at home, who fear the success of an alternate model of governance. This complicates US policy, as it is difficult to execute a cohesive strategy in the region while Qatar and Saudi Arabia are locked in a struggle over Egypt’s future.
Mandaville said that the US must look beyond the Sunni-Shia frame to recognize that we are witnessing a potential unraveling of the entire post-Ottoman order. The aftermath of 9/11, coupled with Arab uprisings of 2011, has seen a withering away of post-WWI arrangements. The upheaval is comparable to what we saw in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, when groups whose identities had been in check during the Cold War emerged and began questioning, and ultimately restructuring, the existing order.
One of the major weaknesses of US policy in the region is our tendency to oversimplify the debate. Whether or not American troops should have stayed in Iraq misses the larger picture. American diplomatic engagement needs to be better informed about the regional dynamics of movements in the Arab world. Even after many years, the Arab nationalist-Islamist divide is still not well understood. Americans are good at understanding groups who want to attack us, but we need to peer further into what drives these conflicts in the first place.
Katulis suggested that Obama has bungled his attempts to reengage with the Muslim world. By addressing them as a separate community, he signaled that they are a single constituency, one that should be handled with kid gloves, an approach comparable to George W. Bush’s. The implication is that all Muslims subscribe to a single, transnational identity, a message that is echoed by groups like al Qaeda.
Political Islam has always existed in the background. Partial openings in the political and media environment after the Arab uprisings have allowed some Islamist groups to come to the fore. Islamism, as a point on the political spectrum, has broadened significantly. Despite Egypt’s best efforts to silence Islamists, they are here to stay. Ullah noted that, while President Sisi wants to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood’s comparative advantage in Egypt and revert to the weaker Sadat-era Brotherhood, this is not possible in modern media environment.
He also noted one positive development in America’s attitude towards political Islam, pointing to Assistant Secretary of State Patterson’s comments last week:
Some people in this region conflate Islamists with terrorists and desire to eliminate the Islamists entirely from the political scene. Our difficult fight against violent extremists is made more complicated by this viewpoint. The need for compromise is underscored by political experience in the Arab world as well as our own.
One of the myths the report attempts to debunk is the so-called moderation thesis. This is the false belief that Islamists will moderate their positions if they join the political fray. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to accommodate more moderate positions. Islamist groups have fared better in other countries in the region, including Tunisia’s Ennahda party, partly because they had to contend with a large secular/liberal bloc. Nonetheless, many mainstream Islamists have internalized only the procedural spirit of democracy, without embracing pluralism.
Another myth is that socioeconomic conditions are the primary drivers of extremism. Research has found no causal link between poverty and extremism. The key constituency for Egypt’s Salafist al Nour Party, for instance, is that country’s urban-based middle class.
One persistent challenge to foreign policy is US counterterrorist doctrine, which relegates violence committed by Muslims to the “terrorist” category. This neglects the fact that in places like the Sahel, conflicts are based on ethnic, rather than religious, differences. In Obama’s speech at West Point, he called for additional funding of counterterrorism programs, but the real problem in many of these countries stems from long-running ethnic conflicts.
Mandaville noted that the US government still thinks about the world in terms of the blocs that arose during the Cold War. We would do well to shed these outdated notions of the Middle East, although it will be difficult in light of our current investments in the Gulf and rising sectarianism in the region. As Iraq and Syria descend into sectarian-fueled chaos, it is time for the US to reexamine its strategy in region.
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