Tag: Qatar
Is the Middle East only about oil?
Increasing energy demand in the East, decreasing energy demand in the West, and North America’s shale energy revolution have sparked debates regarding the future of OPEC and US-Arab relations. But focusing on energy risks neglect of non-energy dimensions. This week’s National Council on Arab Relations discussion hosted by the international law firm Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP discussed the myths and realities surrounding US-Arab energy relations. Paul Sullivan of NDU, former Shell President John Hofmeister and former Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy Randa Fahmy Hudome pariticipated. The discussion focused on the following questions:
1. Will increasing domestic energy supply cause the the US to disengage from the Middle East, jeopardize US-Arab relations and reduce American influence in the region?
Shale oil and gas have significantly boosted US prospects for attaining energy self-dependence. Projections suggest the US will become a net oil exporter by 2030. Natural gas will replace oil as the country’s main fuel. BP goes so far as to declare the US will become 99% energy self-sufficient by 2030. With this increased supply the US has reduced its oil and gas imports from every Arab country except Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Despite the reduced imports, Middle Eastern stability and protection of the energy resources there remain a US priority. Because the oil market is a global one, the US still has an interest in continuing its role as protector of the choke points, sea-lanes of communication and stability needed to secure world access to Middle Eastern energy resources.
Paul Sullivan emphasized the importance of “virtual energy.” China imports 90% of its oil from the Middle East. A disruption in that flow would affect the price and access to imported Chinese goods. Any US import from China (or India, or Japan, or South Korea, or Europe for that matter) is a “virtual” import from the Middle East. Reduced dependence on Middle East energy imports will not end the strategic importance of the Middle East or strong relations with the Arabs for the US.
2. Is there more to the US-Arab relationship than oil?
The energy dimension represents only one aspect of US-Arab relations. The US and Arab nations cooperate in the defense, military, intelligence sectors, on cyber security and financial markets. If strengthened, these aspects could ensure the survival of strong US-Arab relations despite the decreased relevance of the energy relationship.
Fahmy Hudome noted that OPEC too has begun to invest heavily in renewables. Saudi Arabia plans on generating a third of its electricity from solar energy by 2030, and has formed a joint venture with the US SolarReserve to pursue this goal. The UAE is investing in nuclear energy and signed the 123 Agreement with the US. Fahmy Hudome suggested policymakers view the relationship between the US and the Middle East as cooperative, not adversarial.
3.With the evolution of natural gas as a transport fuel, will OPEC lose its relevance in the energy market?
John Hofmeister was adamant that OPEC’s price-setting days are numbered. He argued that reduced US dependence on oil imports and China’s unilateral approach to energy security through cash-for-oil undermines the cartel. Natural gas will replace oil as a cheaper, more available alternative. Liquid natural gas could increase train and freight mobility in the US and compressed natural gas could fuel the trucking industry. Natural gas can also be converted into methanol, a cheaper, more-efficient alternative to ethanol. With natural gas’s comparative practicality and affordability there is no question the cartel will lose relevance, Hofmeister argued.
Hudome was less convinced. She rejects the idea that the shift in global energy demand and supply represents a zero-sum game between the US and the Middle East. The US and its Arab partners can both gain from the rise of natural gas and renewables. She argued world energy supply and demand projections base themselves on difficult to predict variables: shale oil, the rise of renewable energy, and the future regulatory environment in the US. All these factors will influence OPEC’s future role in the global energy market.
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Arab uprisings fail to satisfy the street
From Tunisia to Egypt new transitional leadership has yet to address the economic, security and structural grievances that triggered the Arab spring uprisings. The concerns that triggered the revolutions continue to pull the people into the streets.
Why have the new political leaders failed to address these concerns? According to University of California professor Laurie Brand, the desire to consolidate power in the face of new challenges and constraints, rather than domestic mass politics, drives current post-revolutionary leaders’ behavior. In her paper Arab Uprisings and Mass Politics: Possibilities, Constraints, and Uncertainty discussed this week at the Wilson Center, Brand examines the mass politics of Egypt and Jordan to understand the effects of increased popular political mobilization on Arab states’ regional behavior.
Egyptian President Morsi’s commitment to the peace treaty with Israel is an example of his continuation of domestically unpopular policies. Morsi’s approach to the Gaza tunnels has proven even tougher than Mubarak’s. Morsi’s confidence after his mediating role between Israel and Gaza led him to assume extra-constitutional powers, causing the greatest domestic uproar of this presidency and showing how disassociated he has become from mass sentiment. The economic crisis and Egypt’s IMF requests make this an inopportune moment for the Egyptian president to risk alienating the US by giving in to domestic anti-treaty sentiment. An “uncomfortable marriage of convenience” between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military ties Morsi’s hands on corruption, a main popular grievance. Several articles in the new constitution protect key military interests at the expense of transparency. The $1.3 billion in annual US military aid keeps Morsi from stepping on the military’s toes.
The real differences between Morsi and Mubarak’s foreign policies occur at the regional level, not in relation to the US. Under Morsi, Egypt entertains closer relations with Muslim Brotherhood-sympathising Qatar than with Mubarak’s preferred Saudi Arabia. Morsi’s visit to Iran also represents a significant break with the previous regime. These shifts in regional alignment did not result from mass political pressures, but rather from an attempt to reassert Egypt’s independent regional role.
Much like Morsi, Jordan’s King Abdullah has remained steadfast in the face of mass protests, even as young East Bankers have mobilized in the Harika movements and directly criticize the government, calling for its removal. Jordan’s relations with the US have remained unchanged, while its relations with Egypt have chilled. Military exercises between the US and Jordan testify to the continued relationship, while Jordan’s domestically unpopular containment of the Muslim Brotherhood renders relations with the Egyptian government difficult.
Since the beginning of the Arab spring, popular demands have focused on domestic issues like unemployment, inflation, insecurity and the rule of law. These mass demands have not however shaped the current Arab leaders’ behavior. They are far more interested in solidifying their power in the face of regional and international challenges and constraints. The growing gap between the people of Arab Spring countries and their governments will probably become a source of renewed conflict in the future. Marginalization of the youth and labor movements – what Brand calls the “footmen of the revolution”—resulted in the their failure to produce charismatic leaders with legitimate revolutionary credentials. Instead of new, young leaders coming to the fore, long suppressed, exiled or co-opted opposition leaders attained political power. Once in charge, these leaders did not find serious disagreement with their predecessors’ international alignments and presented no remedy for the countries’ domestic issues.
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Syria seen from Venus and Mars
I enjoyed yesterday two events on Syria, back to back and less than a block from each other. An all-women panel at the Stimson Center co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute was upbeat and optimistic. An all-men panel at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) was anything but. Commentators on both panels were keen observers, including several with recent experience in and near Syria.
With Mona Yacoubian moderating, the Stimson/MEI panel focused on “Syria Beyond Assad: Building a New Syria from the Grassroots.” Rafif Jouejati, spokesperson for the Local Coordinating Committees and leader of FREE Syria (a nongovernmental organization) underlined that the mood among Syrians, who are seeking freedom, dignity and democracy, is far more optimistic than the Western press would lead you to believe. The revolution is determined to build civil society and protect minority rights. There are still upwards of 300 peaceful demonstrations every Friday. Fear of an Islamist takeover is exaggerated. A hijab may be necessary to meet some people, but they quickly forget if it slips off your head. Civil society training for Syrians in Turkey is accomplishing a lot, as they go back into Syria and train others.
Honey al Sayed, a former Syrian anchor now associated with ROYA Association for a Better Syria and the internet radio station SouriaLi emphasized the importance of rebuilding from the grassroots, as Syrian society has collapsed. The challenges are enormous, but Syrians believe in “unity in diversity” and will meet them. Elizabeth O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War focused on the relationship between the civilian local councils and armed groups, which she said are not anxious to provide basic services or govern because they are still fighting the regime. Warlordism is not the problem portrayed in the Western press–there is lots of room to empower civilians. There has been some abuse of regime prisoners, looting and exploitation of aid shipments, but no major massacres. Islamist fighters have no difficulty dealing with a Western woman asking questions. Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra keeps its distance, but most other armed groups do cooperate with each other.
Only Leila Hilal of the New America Foundation clouded the Venusian horizon. The situation is complex and fluid. There are a lot of questions about local legitimacy and authority. Who is really in charge? Elders? Religious leaders? Fighters? Technocrats? What will their relationship be to the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC in Washington parlance)? Will the local councils provide aid? Will they also govern? Are they political bodies or technical ones? What will the role of minorities and women be? How will Western preferences for inclusivity be met? Should we even express them?
The clouds thickened at WINEP, where staff reported on recent travel in the region. With Patrick Clawson moderating, Andrew Tabler described Syria as melting down and spilling over. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan are facing serious refugee challenges. Jordan has seen 100,000 enter in the last 60 days, many of them running a regime gauntlet to get out of Syria. Fighting has spilled into Lebanon. Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are spilling back from Lebanon into Syria. In addition to refugees, Turkey is seeing a big buildup of displaced people inside Syria along the border. There is a concentration of Islamist extremists (including Jabhat al Nusra) along the border with Israel, which is concerned about the transfer of “strategic” weapons (chemicals, anti-aircraft and missiles) to Hizbollah and to Sunni extremists.
The food and medical supplies that the US has announced it will provide to the Coalition will not help to bring down Bashar al Asad. Sentiment within the revolution has turned dramatically against the US and the West and towards the Salafists and jihadists. With no political settlement in sight, the US is unable to influence the armed groups who will decide the outcome. It would be far better to provide aid to the armed groups: those taking the shots will soon be calling them. The SOC, and likely the provisional government to be named this weekend, has little traction inside Syria and risks becoming a Potemkin village.
Jeff White continued in this vein. Localized fighting is the basis of political legitimacy and power inside Syria. The revolutionaries are fragmented. Civilians are marginalized. The military councils are really in charge. The Islamists are in the vanguard. They have cohesion, discipline, leadership and morale. Jabhat al Nusra is also particularly good at civic action, including securing and distribution of food as well as street cleaning. Their command and control is tight.
The Free Syria Army has more problems with civilian/military relations, jihadists vs. nationalists and regime penetration. A revolution that began in the name of freedom and democracy has turned definitively in the direction of an Islamic state. Antipathy to the West, in particular the US, and the international community in general is strong. Conspiracy theories are common, most notably the notion that the US, Iran and Israel are collaborating against the revolution.
Though better equipped now with antitank weapons, the revolutionaries still suffer shortages and maldistribution of weapons. Logistics are ad hoc. There is a security vacuum in the south–a kind of no man’s land. No two revolutionary units are alike and numbers are hard to come by. The rebels are nevertheless gaining territory.
Though losing control, the regime remains cohesive, with good supplies from Russia and Iran. Hizbollah’s fighting role is increasing, as is the role of irregular regime forces (Shabiha). The army is being hollowed out, losing 40 or more dead per day and several times that in wounded. The Syrian air force is a wasting asset.
Simon Henderson talked about Gulf attitudes, where there is strong support for the Syrian opposition because of the prospect of a strategic setback for Iran. But competition among the Gulf states is proving stronger than their distaste for Iran. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are both supporting the revolution, but they are also competing for influence. The competition is trumping concern about the outcome, leaving the GCC divided in the absence of strong US leadership. Qatar is far less willing than Saudi Arabia to be seen bucking Iran, as it shares hydrocarbon resources in the Gulf with Tehran.
Are these views from Venus and Mars reconcilable? My heart is on Venus. I hope the women are right. My head is on Mars. What the men are seeing is all too real.
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Light where we can, heavy when we must
Today’s New York Times declares victory for those in the Obama Administration who favor a light footprint abroad. The members of the new national security team–Hagel, Kerry and Brennan–each leans in that direction. Though Hagel voted as a senator for the Iraq war, he later became a doubter. His Vietnam experience and Kerry’s make both new cabinet members hesitant about the use of American military force abroad. Brennan, while always talking a good line in favor of a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in Yemen, is the brains behind the canonical light footprint drone war there against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The light footprint approach is also getting a boost in Afghanistan, where the White House is leaning towards leaving fewer troops after 2014 than some would like. Zero is even a possibility. The leaks to this effect are all too clearly intended to get President Karzai, who is visiting Washington this week, to stop his mouthing off against the American presence and to convince the Taliban that they can get half a loaf if they come to the negotiating table. But feints in diplomacy have a way of becoming reality. America’s parlous fiscal situation will make many members of Congress look benignly on cutting back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
I need hardly mention that the Administration has already taken a light footprint approach to Syria–maybe more like a no footprint approach. It provides humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations and as well as political support to the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and other Syrian opposition organizations. It is also setting up Patriot batteries in Turkey and turning a blind eye to arms flowing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The results so far have fallen well short of the goal of ending the Asad regime and risk letting Syria fall into the hands of Sunni extremists. But the burden on the United States is mainly diplomacy and foreign assistance, not the far more expensive military.
I find it hard to fault the Administration for trying to limit commitments and save money at a time of serious fiscal strain. But it is a mistake to think we will always want to avoid the heavier footprint: troops and civilians on the ground to establish a safe and secure environment and plant the seeds for governance in states that may fail in ways that endanger vital American interests. The problem I see so far is not so much the President’s preference for the light footprint, but rather the assumption that it will ever be thus. Each and every president since the end of the Cold War has tried to avoid state-building efforts abroad. Each and every one has concluded that they were needed in one place or the other. This includes President Obama, who has quietly and correctly (if not alway successfully) indulged in civilian statebuilding to prevent violence in South Sudan since independence (the troops are cheap since they come from the UN). Obama also tried statebuilding in Afghanistan, where it was not a brilliant success.
We need to maintain the capacity to do heavier footprints, civilian as well as military, even as we try to avoid situations in which they are likely to be needed. This is the equivalent of asking the U.S. government to walk and chew gum at the same time. It has a hard time doing that. It is much more inclined to dismantle the extensive apparatus and experience built up during more than 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan than to husband and sustain it. The Civilian Response Corps President George W. Bush established, after declaring as a candidate his disdain for “a nation-building corps,” is already gutted. We’ll be reinventing that wheel if ever there is intervention in Syria, Mali, Iran or half a dozen other places where it might be needed in the next decade. This is not wise or economical.
Our mantra should be: light where we can, heavy where we must.
PS: David Rothkopf hopes what he calls the “disengagers” will redouble diplomatic efforts. Would that it be so.
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Syria is getting what Assad wants
A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):
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Submitted on 2013/01/05 at 9:44 am
Dear Mr Serwer, Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations. The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest. Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists. I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers. The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power. In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off. On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform. Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative. When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf. The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran. These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict. In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term. I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation. Best, Hashem Alshamy |
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It is not too early
UN special envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi said Friday in Moscow of the Russian Foreign Minister:
I think Sergey Lavrov is absolutely right that the conflict is not only more and more militarized, it is more and more sectarian…And if we are not careful and if the Syrians are not careful, it will be a mainly sectarian conflict.
The day was a particularly bloody one: more than 200 people are said to have been killed in Homs.
The fear of sectarian conflict is well-founded. No matter how many times Syrians tell me that their revolution is not sectarian and aims at a civil state and open, democratic society in which all citizens are equal, the normal mechanisms of violent conflict lend themselves to increasing polarization along sectarian lines. I am afraid, so I seek safety where I can find it, which for Alawites and some other minorities is with the government while Sunnis seek protection from the Free Syrian Army.
Of course there are Sunnis who fight for the Syrian government and minorities who fight for the rebels, but there will be fewer and fewer as time passes. Then when Assad goes, individuals will try to recover property and seek revenge for the harm done to themselves and their families, even if the more organized and disciplined military units on both sides remain disciplined. Revenge killing spirals quickly, polarizing people further and driving them into the arms of their family, tribe, sect or ethnicity. Building a state on the ruins of a fragmented society is far more difficult than anyone imagines in advance.
That’s why I also welcome something else Brahimi said:
Perhaps a peacekeeping force may be acceptable. But it must be part of a complete package that begins with peacekeeping and ends with an election.
This is the first I’ve seen the obvious mentioned at his level: peacekeeping forces are going to be needed in Syria. They will be needed not only to protect minorities but also to support the post-war state-building effort. We’ve seen in Libya what happens when the new state does not have a monopoly on the means of violence. Extremists of all sorts, including Al Qaeda franchisees, set up shop. State-building without a monopoly on the means of violence becomes a dicey proposition. There will be more than two armed forces in Syria at the end of the civil war: Syrian army, local militias, regime Shabiha, Free Syria Army, Jabhat al Nusra and other jihadi extremists.
The issue in Syria is where peacekeeping troops can be found. Even if they are needed, that does not mean they will be available. The obvious troop contributors have all been protagonists in the proxy war of the past two years: Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The Turks and Russians may be willing, but won’t trust each other. The Americans will not want to put troops into Syria. Nor will the Europeans. China now has experience in 20 UN peacekeeping operations and might like to extend its reach into the Middle East, if the Americans and Russians will allow it. Iran is out of the question, though it will likely stir up trouble using some of the regime militia forces left over. There are lots of other possibilities, but few I can think of that meet the full panoply of desirable criteria: impartial, Arabic-speaking, experienced and self-sufficient in peacekeeping operations, available for deployment abroad. Algeria and Morocco?
A related question is who would authorize and supervise a peacekeeping operation. The UN is one possibility, but the divisions in the Security Council over the past two years hardly suggest it could act decisively. The Arab League is another. Still another is an invitation from a new Syrian government, which would have the advantage of picking which countries to invite and directing where they deploy. But that could defeat the whole purpose of inviting in a more impartial force.
If–against the odds–an international peacekeeping force is somehow put together and somehow properly authorized for Syria, it is important to remember Brahimi’s caution, written before he took up his present position:
Even if such peacekeepers are well-armed and well-trained, however, they will be no match for much larger and well organized forces intent on destroying the
peace or committing mass atrocities. It has to be said upfront that the military forces, civilian police, human rights experts and international aid workers will not provide security, protection, justice, social services and jobs for all of the millions or tens of millions of inhabitants of the country.
A solid political solution is a prerequisite to a peacekeeping deployment.
Syria is going to be a very difficult post-war operation. It is not too early to be thinking about who will conduct it and under what mandate.
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