Tag: Qatar
Fin de regime
My guess is that we are finally in the waning days of the Asad regime in Syria. UN envoy Brahimi was in Damascus yesterday and will talk with the Russians this weekend. His is sounding like a last ditch effort. Moscow has made it clear that it will no longer prop up Asad. Now they have to be convinced to give him a shove in the right direction. It shouldn’t be all that hard. Bashar’s military police chief has famously absconded, joining his foreign ministry spokesperson. The regime is cracking, though not yet crumbling.
This is a delicate moment in which a great deal is at stake. The devil is in the details. Brahimi is still pressing for a solution that jibes with last June’s Geneva agreement, which Moscow and Washington both endorsed, on formation of a fully empowered government with Bashar still in place. I doubt the revolutionaries will accept it. They want him out before agreeing to a ceasefire. Provided that condition is met, a negotiated transition of power to some sort of “unity” government (which means it would include a “remnant” of the Asad regime) with a guarantee of a future transition could be a good thing, provided it genuinely puts Syria on a democratic path and extracts it from the violence now on going. But it could also sell the Syrian revolution short by putting a new autocrat in place and creating conditions for renewed violence.
There will be precious little real international support for a true transition to democracy. The Saudis and Qataris, who have provided the bulk of the arms and money to the revolutionaries, are not much interested in anything beyond getting Asad out and installing a Sunni (preferably Islamist) regime, democratic or not. The Russians, Iranians and Iraqis will fear that outcome and want to preserve a secular regime, whether democratic or not. The Americans and Turks will want a secular democracy, but they are not in a position to insist on it. The Americans have been reluctant to get too involved. Only if Turkey decides to put its boots on the ground inside Syria will it have the kind of clout required. Even then, it may fail to get what it wants.
The Syrians hold the key to the outcome. But of course they point in many different directions. There are lots of Syrians who would prefer a secular democracy, but they are stronger among the nonviolent protesters than among the revolutionary military forces deciding the outcome. The Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, now recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, is trying to project a unified and moderate image. But the results so far are rudimentary: a few press statements, not always on the most pressing issues. There is still no transition government.
Jabhat al Nusra, a leading Islamist group among the fighters, is producing more substantial results. Rejecting the Coalition, it is anti-Western, Islamist, socially conservative and hard-fighting. The United States has designated it a foreign terrorist organization. Washington’s primary concern is its links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which Jabhat al Nusra denies. But I’ve also heard that the designation was done in part to please the Russians, who are genuinely (and justifiably) concerned with Syria becoming a source of Islamist extremism that could infect parts of Russia. Baghdad is also worried about a Sunni extremist regime in Syria that would try to counter Prime Minister Maliki’s increasingly Shia (and autocratic) drift in Iraq.
Few in Syria want the state to collapse or divide territorially. The revolution has not been fought on ethnic or sectarian grounds, even if it has exposed ethnic and sectarian divisions. Only Syria’s Kurds lean in the direction of federalism, inspired and supported by their confrères in Iraq. But I see no real plan on the horizon to prevent revenge killing, despite the very real likelihood it will happen. If there is extreme violence against the Alawites or other minorities thought to have supported the regime, collapse and division become more likely.
All decisions that depend on the will of a single individual, as Bashar’s to step aside does, are inherently unpredictable. There is of course the possibility he will refuse and hang on for a while, even defying the Russians to do so. A Google search for “fin de regime” turns up a lot of hits concerning Syria, in 2011. The longer this goes on, the worse it will be in the end.
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Bashar al Asad’s apocalypse
I published a daring series of predictions at the end of last year. Very few were correct. The only two that came close were these:
Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
Even then, you’ll need to ignore the part about Kosovo meeting all the requirements (it hasn’t yet) and that last part about a successful Al Qaeda bombing in the U.S. (that hasn’t happened yet either). Is it an accident that the two places I know best were also the subject of my most accurate predictions?
I’ll rely on other people for my next big prediction: Andrew Tabler and Jeff White, who know Syria much better than I do, were at the Washington Institute yesterday predicting the end of the Asad regime within weeks, at most a few months. Even if the Mayan apocalypse hasn’t happened, Bashar al Asad’s will.
According to Jeff, the regime’s military capacity to defend itself is way down. Its air power, artillery and Scuds are little avail. Its large-scale maneuver capacity is declining, as are its numbers. There is fighting in 12 of 14 provinces. Regime armor and mechanized infantry can no longer move freely. The only potential major game changers out there are Hizbollah, Iran and chemical weapons. Iran and Hizbollah are not likely to risk more than they already have.
Rebel offensive performance is improving. They are taking objectives and interrupting lines of communication. They appear to be self-sustaining now in arms, their numbers are still growing, and they are capable of more sustained and coordinated action. The Islamists are playing an increasing role. Rebel losses are up, especially among commanders, but their recruitment stream is still strong.
Jeff suggest five possible endgames:
1. Province by province dismantlement of the regime, which has already begun.
2. Chaotic collapse of the regime.
3. Controlled regime contraction to Damascus or the coast.
4. A headlong rush to the coast.
5. Regime recovery, which looks unlikely.
Possible indicators the end is near: there may be desperate pleas for a ceasefire, evacuation of Russian nationals, senior defections or flight, military units abandoning the regime, a coup attempt and last (but not entirely in jest) burning papers at the Iranian Embassy.*
Andrew agreed. There is a marked deterioration in the humanitarian situation, with food in short supply, refugee and displaced people camps overcrowded and ill-equipped. The revolution is turning in an Islamist direction, in part because of U.S. unresponsiveness to its needs. Anti-Western sentiment is strong. It was a mistake to designate Jabhat al Nusra as a terrorist organization before recognizing the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
The Coalition remains badly divided by sect, class, rural/urban and by personality. While the military and civilian leaderships have met and issued a joint statement, how the two insurgent efforts will be combined at various levels is not at all clear. The armed rebellion, with which the U.S. is not well-connected, is likely to be in the lead once Bashar falls. The U.S. should be sending arms, more to gain influence than anything else, as they are no longer needed as much as once they were for military purposes. We need to be ready also with civilian assistance, which has been too slow. The aid should be overt and direct, not covert and indirect, if we want to gain influence over the outcome. Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may well move faster than we do, as they have with arms, with consequences for our interests.
It is clear Syria will need a lot of help once this is over. Post-war reconstruction has stumped the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has boots on the ground, which isn’t going to happen in Syria. Working through and with the Coalition, which we’ve now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, to produce a decent outcome is going to be an an enormous challenge. Failure could ignite a broader conflict in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Success would damage Hizbollah and Iran. This one is worth a candle.
*This morning I would add use of cluster bombs.
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Easier said than done
Hillary Clinton is on her way from Cambodia to Jerusalem. This is precisely the opposite direction from the one President Obama intends for American foreign policy: his announced intention is to pivot American attention from the Middle East to Asia. His visit to Asia just a few days after re-election was meant to underline that message.
The current Middle East crisis is over Gaza, where rocket launches against Israeli targets have precipitated a ferocious response, so far mainly from the air (though there have also been sea and land artillery barrages). Israel has mobilized ground forces, which appear ready for a land incursion into Gaza. Hamas, which governs Gaza (but does not necessarily launch all the rockets), has attracted support from Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, which is seeking to mediate a ceasefire.
This is a pretty clear cut case of the urgent taking priority over the important. Even in the Middle East, there are things going on that are more important to vital U.S. interests than the highly regrettable Hamas/Israel conflagration. The civil war in Syria above all requires more attention than it has gotten, even if Obama’s hesitancy to get more deeply involved is understandable when you look at the array of unappealing options available. Iran’s nuclear program continues to produce 20% enriched uranium. If diplomacy does not produce an end to its nuclear weapons ambitions in the next few months, military action by both the U.S. and Israel becomes likely. The fight against al Qaeda in Yemen isn’t working well–the drone war seems to produce more terrorists than it kills. Let’s not even mention the sometimes faltering revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, or the apparent extremist takeover of northern Mali.
Whatever. For the moment Gaza is at the top of America’s to do list. The immediate problem is a ceasefire, but Ehud Yaari argues that a broader arrangement is really what is needed. This would entail high-level political agreements between Egypt and Israel on blocking arms smuggling to Hamas, clamping down on extremists in Sinai and opening the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza to both trade and people.
The problem with these ideas is that they tie Hamas-governed Gaza more closely to Egypt and loosen its already attenuated ties to the West Bank, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) governs. If there is any sense at all in Israel’s right-wing efforts to block Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution the rest of the world favors, it lies precisely in a scheme to separate Gaza and the West Bank, returning the former to Egypt’s suzerainity and the West Bank to Jordan.
But that does not mean Yaari’s ideas are bad, only that what I take to be their unintended consequences should not be allowed to block Palestinian unity. It is an added irony that the main obstacle at the moment is the Palestinians themselves, who have not managed to reconstitute a united polity despite many efforts to do so. It will be interesting to see if the Israeli air attacks sharpen the differences between Gaza and the West Bank or narrow them. Palestinian unity, like the pivot to Asia, is easier said than done.
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The Gaza war in regional context
While the news media is mainly focused on the exchanges of rocket and air attacks between Israel and Gaza, my guess is that the broader regional picture will be decisive in determining the course and outcome of this latest outbreak of war in the Middle East. Here is a rundown of that broader picture:
1. Egypt: Cairo is trying to broker a ceasefire, with rhetorical support from the Arab League, but the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza Friday made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government will be more sympathetic to Hamas than Hosni Mubarak. Still, Egypt is in a tight spot: continuation of the war will attract militants to Gaza and the Sinai as well as send an already weak Egyptian economy into a tailspin. While Hamas has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, a democratic regime in Egypt has to worry that Egypt’s citizens, sympathetic as they are to the plight of the Palestinians, will not want to sacrifice too much on their behalf. A ceasefire could restore Egypt’s role as a key regional player.
2. Syria: There has already been an exchange of artillery fire between the Syrian regime and Israel, something that hasn’t happened in a long time. Bashar al Asad may well look to military action on the Golan front in an effort to rally his remaining support and try to divert attention from his war against the Syrian revolution, now more than a year and a half old. The Syrian army won’t have a lot of spare capacity to challenge Israel, but it won’t want to be left out of the fight if the war continues.
3. Jordan: The protest movement against the rule of King Abdullah has intensified. The monarchy will not want to divert security forces to a fight against Israel, with which it maintains good if not warm relations. If the protests are successful, the king will be weakened further. A more constitutional monarchy might well be less friendly to Israel, but still unwilling to risk conflict.
4. Hizbollah: On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah is the main military force. It is already heavily engaged fighting against the revolution in Syria, but it could presumably make Israel’s situation more difficult by joining in the rocket barrage. Its record fighting Israeli ground forces is significantly better than Hamas’, so the Israelis would hesitate to engage on both fronts. But Hizbollah will be reluctant to aid Hamas, which has fallen out with the Syrian regime Hizbollah is supporting.
5. Gulf Cooperation Council: The Saudis and the other GCC states have not generally engaged directly against Israel, but the visit last week of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza (and his promise of financing) suggest that they may play a behind the scenes role bankrolling Hamas and others willing to challenge Israel. This could significantly attenuate the quiet but growing accommodation between Israel and the Sunni Arab world.
6. Turkey: Turkey and Israel seemed headed for rapprochement that would cure the 2010 rift over the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza. This now seems much less likely. Turkey’s Islamist government will have to give at least verbal support to Hamas and hesitate to appear to paper over its differences with Tel Aviv.
7. Iran: Many of the larger rockets in Hamas’ arsenal come from Iran, which must be enjoying watching the Israelis engage in Gaza rather than carrying out the threat to destroy Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Iran will no doubt provide Hamas, Hizbollah and Syria as much assistance as it can spare in its sanctions-weakened state, hoping to keep the Israelis preoccupied.
8. The wider Arab world: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan all have their own problems that preclude more than rhetorical engagement in the Palestinian cause. Marc Lynch notes that mobilization in the Arab world so far is limited but could well intensify. The Arab street, which presumably has a louder voice today than before the Arab awakening, is certainly sympathetic to the Palestinians. And it is far more likely to support Hamas’ more aggressive military approach to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic push for membership for membership in the United Nations.
Bottom line: Egypt likely has the decisive role in determining whether this war remains, like the one in 2008/9, a bilateral affair or turns into a wider conflict with more permanent consequences. But Iran, Hizbollah, and Turkey are also important players. If Israeli ground action lines up all the regional forces in favor of Hamas, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.
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George W. Bush’s playbook
I can do no better in summing up Mitt Romney’s foreign policy speech today than he does himself in the penultimate sentence:
The 21st century can and must be an American century. It began with terror, war, and economic calamity. It is our duty to steer it onto the path of freedom, peace, and prosperity.
Here’s the problem: the terror, war and economic calamity Romney refers to occurred not on Barack Obama’s watch, but on George W. Bush’s. And Governor Romney’s foreign policy prescriptions, like many of his domestic policy prescriptions, are drawn from George W. Bush’s playbook.
The few innovations in Romney’s speech at Virginia Military Institute today are hardly worth mentioning. He wants to see the Syrian revolutionaries get more arms, in particular anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, but he fails to say how he will prevent these from being used against us, except to say that those who receive them will have to share our values. That should fix everything in the arms bazaars of the Middle East.
He says he will support a two-state solution for peace between Palestine and Israel. Nice to see him return to the mainstream from the extremist wings of Israeli and American politics, which is where he was during the “47%” fund-raising dinner in Florida when he suggested we would kick the can down the road and maybe skip the two-state solution altogether. Trouble is, the people he pitched that line to are supporting his campaign with fat checks. He says there will be no daylight between America and Israel, which is code for saying that the Jewish settlements will continue to expand, since that is what Netanyahu’s Israel wants. I fail to understand an American presidential candidate who outsources U.S. policy on the Palestinians to Israel.
In Libya he’ll track down the killers of our personnel, which is exactly what Obama promises to do. I’d just be curious how those 15 Navy ships he plans to build each year will help in the effort.
He pledges to condition aid to Egypt but makes the conditions both vague and easy to meet: build democratic institutions and maintain the peace treaty with Israel. There are lots of problems with President Morsy’s Egypt, but you won’t be able to hang him for either of those offenses, yet.
In Afghanistan, he calls the withdrawal the president has pledged a retreat but makes it clear he is not proposing anything very different.
Then there is this on foreign assistance:
I will make further reforms to our foreign assistance to create incentives for good governance, free enterprise, and greater trade, in the Middle East and beyond. I will organize all assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official with responsibility and accountability to prioritize efforts and produce results. I will rally our friends and allies to match our generosity with theirs.
The trouble here is that the Ryan budget guts the foreign affairs budget, including foreign assistance. There won’t be any American generosity to be matched with theirs if Romney is elected. This is where Romney departs definitively from Obama and shows his reliance on George W.’s playbook.
I hasten to add that I’d be all for organizing our assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official. That would be a good idea.
One last issue: with all this overload of American values as the basis for our foreign policy, I’m curious what Romney plans to do about Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and other less than fully democratic friends in the region? They get no mention in this speech, but of course they really can’t be mentioned in a speech that gives unequivocal backing to both our friends and our values. What would Romney do when there is a choice between the two? Keep silent would be a good guess.
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How do you say fast and furious in Arabic?
I’m surprised the American-imposed limits on arms transfers to the Syrian opposition from Qatar and Saudi Arabia are front page news today in the New York Times. It has been common knowledge for some time that the United States does not want shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons (man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS) transferred to Syrian rebels. Anti-tank weapons are likewise blocked.
I thought it obvious why. But apparently not, so let’s review the merits of the case. These weapons pose a serious threat to commercial aircraft and other civilian targets. Washington does not want to transfer weapons that fall into extremist hands and are then used against Americans. “Fast and furious” comes to mind–the scandal surrounding a transfer of guns to Mexican drug cartels in order to track them that ended in the murder of American border patrol agent. So, too, does the Washington-sponsored mujahideen effort against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which armed radical Islamist forces that are now fighting against the Americans.
Rumint has it that there are hundreds of thousands of MANPADs already in circulation. If so, it is hard to understand how none have made it into Syria. I am told that American ones come with a difficult-to-replace 90-day battery. If effective, that would make them relatively unattractive. I don’t know whether Russian, Chinese, Iranian, British and other systems have similar immobilizing measures. There have been a number of incidents in which MANPADS have been used against civilian aircraft: in Rhodesia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Iraq. Some attempts were successful, others not. It does not take a lot of imagination to picture why officials in Washington would worry about MANPADS getting into the wrong hands.
Anti-tank weapons come in a bewildering variety, wire-guided and not. Some seem to have made their way to Syria, where the rebels have often destroyed the regime’s tanks. I have a hard time understanding why Washington would worry much about the transfer of these weapons, especially if they are already in theater. It would of course be wiser to transfer them to more reliable people, but war doesn’t allow a lot of fine distinctions to be made.
A birdie tells me that the Syrian opposition is getting all the AK-47s and other “light” weapons it needs. It is not doing them a whole lot of good. The Syrian army is using artillery, tanks, snipers and the occasional aircraft to project force far beyond the range the rebels can target effectively when they shoot back.
The real question for Washington at this point is whether to allow the Syrian opposition to get MANPADS, which it would use to enforce a de facto no-fly zone over the areas that it controls. This could level the playing field and allow the opposition to hold on to liberated areas. I haven’t been enthusiastic about the arming of the opposition, not the least because it strengthens extreme Islamist and other anti-democratic forces that should not inherit Syria from the Asad regime. But with the civic opposition yesterday demonstrating in favor of arming Free Syrian Army, it is hard to oppose a shift in Washington’s stance that would allow MANPADS with appropriate self-limiting technology and anti-tank weapons to reach it.
U.S. government officials have been insisting that they draw the line at “lethal” assistance, presumably to bolster their so far unsuccessful efforts to turn the Russians and Chinese around on Syria and allow a UN Security Council resolution with teeth to pass. But with Iran, Hizbollah and the Russians pouring arms and men into Asad’s efforts to crush the rebellion and Syria repeatedly firing artillery into the territory of NATO-member Turkey, isn’t it time to consider leveling the playing field, as the diplomats say?
If that shift takes place, we have to recognize that there is a real possibility that the weapons will some day be used us. How do you say “fast and furious” in Arabic?
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