Tag: Qatar
Fog of peace
With a gloomy National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan summarized in the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post reporting on resumption of peace talks with the Taliban, and the New York Times unveiling the tortured history of the negotiations so far, it is time to consider again the prospects for a negotiated outcome to the war.
For all the heavy breathing and interesting reporting about the negotiations, there is still a lot that is unclear.
The Americans keep on saying the Afghans have to lead the process, but there is little sign of that. The Americans and Europeans had to bludgeon Karzai into accepting the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, which is no more than a modest but useful preliminary step in the negotiating process. Karzai seems more than a little concerned that his largely Northern Alliance-originated opposition, which fought the Taliban in the 1990s, is not prepared to accept a settlement that brings the Taliban back into Afghanistan’s political life. Will he run the political risks involved?
It is unclear whether that office will represent all the Taliban, or only Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura. How the Haqqani network, which does a good deal of the damage in Afghanistan, fits in no one seems to know. But the Taliban have already let it be known that the Youtube video apparently showing American Marines desecrating Taliban bodies will not make them shy away from talks.
The role of Pakistan is also uncertain. In the past, Islamabad has gone out of its way to prove that no negotiations can go ahead without its consent. U.S. drone strikes have resumed in Pakistan, but are the Pakistanis ready to support a U.S.-sponsored negotiating effort headquartered in Qatar? Islamabad is absorbed at the moment in its own internal power struggles between the civilian government and the army, which was displeased this week when the prime minister fired one of its favorite defense ministers. Maybe the Pakistanis are distracted? Or are they on board?
The agreement to open the office requires an American quid pro quo: release of several Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo. This is not easy for any American Administration to do, especially as the people the Taliban are asking for presumably really are deadly enemies of the United States. Is President Obama prepared to run the gauntlet of criticism he will get for this in the middle of a reelection campaign?
It is being hinted that the Taliban are prepared to forswear support to international terrorism as part of this deal. A verifiable pledge of that sort would be more than a confidence-building measure. It would represent a major diplomatic achievement: separating the Taliban from Al Qaeda. In principle, this is conceivable, since the Taliban’s ambitions are largely limited to Afghanistan (and Pakistan), whereas Al Qaeda is waging a global war for establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The opening of the office in Qatar is certainly not something Al Qaeda would support. But do we really have a verifiable commitment of this sort?
We also need to remember the difficult choices that lie ahead for the United States. If the Taliban are going to lay down arms, they are going to want something in return. There isn’t much to offer. There is a role in governing Afghanistan nationally, a role in governing provinces where the Taliban are strong, and control over economic resources (drugs, minerals, trade and transport). Or more likely, some combination of those things.
Oh yes: and American withdrawal. It is hard for me to picture the United States, which has sought from Karzai a long-term strategic agreement providing for a continuing American presence after 2014, agreeing to withdraw completely. But it is also difficult to picture the Taliban accepting a continuing U.S. presence, which is what they have always said they are fighting against. Compromise on this issue is theoretically possible: a U.S. military training presence but complete transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghans, for example. But I’m not sure our soldiers are going to be comfortable living and working with an Afghan army that has lots of Taliban reintegrated. Nor is it easy to picture the Taliban comfortable with the kind of presence such a training mission would require.
All that said, I applaud Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Special Representative Marc Grossman, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and their German partner Ambassador Michael Steiner for the enormous effort they have made over the past year to open up a negotiating channel. It would not, of course, have been possible without the extraordinary military efforts the U.S. troops have made. If the Taliban are ready to talk, it is because at least some of them are tiring of the fight.
But we are still far from peace, and the fog is thick.
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Best freebie next week
Game Changer: Policy and Politics
For a New Middle East
The Grand Hyatt Hotel
1000 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Thursday, November 17, 2011
8:45am-5:30pm
Conference Schedule
8:45am-9:00am – Opening remarks
Ambassador (ret.) Wendy Chamberlin, Middle East Institute President
9:00am-10:30am – After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy in the Middle East
Steve Clemons, New America Foundation, The Atlantic
Ambassador (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Princeton University
Ambassador (ret.) Ron Schlicher, Former US Department of State
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Deputy Assist. Secretary of State-NEA
10:45am-12:15pm – The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
Esraa Abdel Fattah, Egyptian Democratic Academy
Michele Dunne, Atlantic Council
Larry Diamond, Stanford University
Radwan Masmoudi, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
2:15pm-3:45 pm – Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
Abdelkhaleq Abdalla, UAE University
Jamal Khashoggi, Al-Arab TV
Haim Malka, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mohsen Milani, South Florida University
Paul Salem, Carnegie Middle East Center
4:00pm-5:30pm- Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
Adel Abdellatif, UN Development Programme
Odeh Aburdene, OAI Advisors
Iman Bibars, Ashoka/MENA
Ambassador William B. Taylor, US Department of State
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Are things going to hell in Libya?
Not yet is the answer.
But you wouldn’t know that from the media coverage. National Transitional Council (NTC) chair Mahmoud Jalil’s comment about allowing polygamy got a lot of ink. So too does every hiccup of the armed militias in Tripoli, not to mention what happens if an Islamist sneezes or a supposed Al Qaeda flag flies. I need hardly mention the disgusting, criminal behavior of the young men who capture Qaddafi and then allegedly sodomized and murdered him.
I wouldn’t want to minimize any of these issues. In fact, I drew attention to the militia and Islamist issues weeks ago. Integrating the militias under NTC control, establishing law and order and ensuring no room for Al Qaeda are vital, as is regaining control of as many surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs) as possible.
But any government that can peacefully switch out its prime minister and begin the process of appointing a new cabinet, in accordance with its constitutional framework, is not yet going to hell in a handbasket. Nor does the relatively chaotic situation outside of Tripoli and Benghazi, and the wasteland that used to be Sirte, prove that things are going in the wrong direction.
What we need to do now is ensure that they continue to go in the right direction. Where are the goals agreed between the Libyans and the international community? Where is the structure for donor coordination? What kind of program is the European Union putting in place? What are the Qataris up to? The internationals quickly lost their focus once the fighting was over.
This is a big mistake. Libya has bigger problems than Tunisia: the lack of a state, the violence of the rebellion, militia competition, some revenge killing and torturing. But it also has resources, good leadership, and some serious planning, including the constitutional framework. Let’s make sure it heads down Tunisia’s path towards good elections and a constitution.
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Game changer
Politics and Policy in the New Middle East: that’s what they are calling the Middle East Institute 2011 Annual Conference at the Grand Hyatt, 1000 H Street:
Wednesday, Nov. 16th
6:00pm: Kickoff Banquet: Keynote by Bill Burns, DepSecState; awardees Lakhdar Brahimi and Esraa Abdel Fattah
Thursday, Nov. 17th
Conference
8:45 – 9:00am: Opening Remarks: Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, President MEI
9:00-10:30am: After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy In the Middle East
10:45am-12:15pm: The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
12:30-2:10pm: Keynote Luncheon: Samih al-Abed and Yossi Beilin
2:15-3:45pm: Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
4:00-5:30pm: Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
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So how is that revolution going?
Libya is more or less completing its first week since the Qaddafi boys and their father skedaddled to we not where, yet. How is the Transitional National Council (TNC) doing in stabilizing Tripoli and restoring basic services?
Only people “on the ground,” as we say in the conflict world, can answer this kind of question. NPR this morning reports that uniformed but unarmed police are back on the street in response to an appeal from the TNC, but water is still not flowing. The New York Times has a description of jockeying for position among rebel leaders, both in Tripoli and at the national level. Looting and other disorder has been reported, but it does not appear to have been widespread. It is hard to get too excited about the guys who stole Qaddafi’s golf cart, but attacks on government offices to destroy files would betray an organized resistance that poses more serious problems.
The main contestations among the rebels seems to be emerging along the Islamist/secularist and east/west fault lines, with Islamist forces from the west who played a major role in liberating Tripoli claiming they are entitled to a good share of the political spoils. War is about power, which abhors a vacuum even more than nature.
It is nice to have the traffic cops back on the street, so long as the local communities welcome them. But the NTC has a big challenge in consolidating the various militia that fought to liberate Libya into a single army answerable to civilian authority, while finding jobs in the police or elsewhere for enough of the excess personnel to prevent them from creating problems. Right now is when some of these militias will find themselves short of cash or food. They can become protection rackets and organized crime syndicates almost overnight.
The terms of art for dealing with this problem are DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform). More often than not, they have been treated as two separate processes, with DDR preceding SSR. That is a mistake. They are really two sides of the same coin, one that is supposed to buy the authorities a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which is one textbook definition of sovereignty.
If the NTC manages to get control of the militias and restore order in Tripoli, its future prospects will improve dramatically. The unseen hand that can help them are those shadowy foreigners–said to be British and French special forces as well as Qataris, and likely also some Americans–who assisted in the Libyan war. They will have enormous influence with the militias they assisted, and deep knowledge of who really did fight effectively. We all would like to see this revolution proceed with Libyan leadership, but that leadership is going to need foreign assistance in many different ways. Helping to unify the freedom fighters and getting them to respect civilian authority is, I am afraid, one of them.
Getting the water flowing again is more a Libyan responsibility. Qaddafi’s Great Manmade River, which supplies much of the country, is said to have been shut off at Sabha, a town south of Tripoli that is still in the hands of Qaddafi loyalists. The perils of a full-fledged military assault on Sebha and Sirte, Qaddafi’s home town, are serious, which is why the rebels have given the loyalists there until Saturday to surrender. Let’s hope they do, and that no serious damage has been done to the water equipment or supplies.
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Making Bashar al Assad history
As Marc Lynch points out in a tweet this morning, the region is belatedly beginning to react to regime violence against protesters in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denounced it and have withdrawn their ambassadors, along with Qatar and Kuwait. Turkey is sending its foreign minister to Damascus tomorrow with a “final warning.” The Arab League has expressed “growing concern.”
Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy is predicting the downfall not only of Bashar al Assad but of the whole regime:
The whole Baathist system has to come down, and it probably will. The only questions now are how long it will take, and how much more innocent blood will be shed in the process.
I hope he is correct, but it won’t happen unless the pressure builds.
Let’s leave aside the remarkable hypocrisy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia denouncing violence against demonstrators. They are more than welcome to join the international chorus against it in Syria, even if they jointly repressed the demonstrations this spring in Bahrain. The denunciations already make some difference, as they are necessarily the first step on the road to more vigorous action. What more can Syria’s neighbors do that will make a difference?
Andrew Tabler and David Schenker discussed the options early in July. Those that have not been tried yet include depriving Bashar al Assad of revenue by blocking oil exports, expanding sanctions on his businessman cronies, referring him to the International Criminal Court, and encouraging Syrian army defections. Most of the rest of what they recommend has already been tried, including denunciation by UN human rights experts, enhanced relations with the opposition and more vocal alignment with the Syrian people.
The brutal fact is that whether Bashar al Assad falls, and how long it takes, depends more on the wisdom and fortitude of the Syrians than on anything else. So far, they have been remarkable. A journalist who has been there and talked with the protesters recently has assured me that they look even better up close.
The two key “pillars of the regime” remain the army and the business communities in Aleppo and Damascus. If one or both of these crumbles, Bashar al Assad is history.
PS: The LA Times put up this video, allegedly recorded in Idlib yesterday:
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