Tag: Qatar
Escalation as distraction
Whatever doubt there might be about the origin of recent attacks on shipping in and near the Gulf, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has claimed responsibility for yesterday’s shoot-down of a large American Navy drone. The Iranians say it violated their airspace. The Americans say it was shot down over international waters.
Both could be true, but it doesn’t matter. The significance of the Iranian move is to confirm that we are on an escalatory ladder. President Trump has so far declined, at least in public, to retaliate for the attacks on ships. We don’t really know what Washington has done covertly. Tehran is now testing Trump further with the shoot-down of the drone. The Iranians will likely continue to take steps that either they can claim publicly are in self-defense or interfere covertly with shipping oil and oil products by other Gulf countries.
The Iranian actions demand a response, one way or another. Even doing nothing is a response, as it is likely to encourage continued Iranian attacks. Tit for tat is also a possibility: certainly the US could shoot down an Iranian drone, one of which is said to have been responsible for last night’s success. Some argue the escalatory ladder could reach the point of taking out Iran’s shore-based missiles. It might in fact go much further.
The response could also be at least partially diplomatic rather than wholly military. The Iranians are claiming to be guarantors of Gulf security. They should be challenged to prove it. Once it has done, covertly or publicly, its proportional retaliation, the US should consider easing up on sanctions and allowing , Oman, Iraq, or some other relative neutral to convene a multilateral meeting on Gulf maritime security, to include Iran and the US as well as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Even a meeting at which the parties shout at each other could serve to clear the air and begin the process of climbing down from a ladder that all too predictably leads to a catastrophic new war in the Middle East.
The current situation stems inexorably from the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. The aim should be to return to the status quo ante, which was surely better than what we are facing today. Trump will need some sort of face-saving process, but he is certainly capable of 180 degree policy and rhetorical reversal, a trick he successfully performed with North Korea. The US should also establish rapid military-to-military communications with Iran, since that could help to avoid unintentional provocations and support a diplomatic effort.
Congress needs to weigh in decisively at this point. The effort of the Administration to sell the existing Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) as the basis for war with Iran is not just a stretch. It relies on a claim of active Iranian support for Al Qaeda that is as dubious as Iranian claims that the US and its allies actively support Al Qaeda (the Iranians are particularly fond of quoting a dreadful interview with former Trump National Security Adviser Flynn to that effect).
The simple fact is that the US is not ready to go to war with Iran. Doing so would be a blatant effort by the Administration to distract attention from its all too serious domestic challenges. The Iranians might like war for the same reason: their economy is in a shambles, not only due to sanctions but also due to mismanagement. This is a perilous situation. Military strength has a role to play, but the way out is diplomatic.
PS: In case you don’t believe that Flynn bit, here it is:
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Doha impressions
I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
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Riyadh impressions
I spent four days in Saudi Arabia last week, which is wholly insufficient to do anything but scratch the surface. But I’m not without those superficial impressions. The SAIS study trip was focused on the GCC conflict, but I won’t comment in detail on that today. Caveat emptor: I am not agreeing with the Saudi perspectives, only trying to render them faithfully.
Here are my more general impressions:
- Saudis in government and government-influenced institutions (which are the only ones I visited) sincerely support the domestic reforms the Crown Prince has undertaken and believe they will lead to profound and badly needed changes in opening up and modernizing the society.
- The Saudi elite is not prepared to question the Crown Prince on anything, including his foreign policy moves like the rift with Qatar and the war in Yemen. They emphasize forcefully the justice of the grievances against Qatar and humanitarian assistance provided to Yemen. They of course see Iran as a serious threat throughout the region.
- While appreciating the ample support of the Trump Administration and good citizen-to-citizen feelings (due mainly to the many Saudis who study in the US), Saudis have doubts about the Administration’s reliability that were not much alleviated by Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit last week. Many people in Riyadh view American withdrawal from the region as highly likely if not inevitable.
The inclination in Riyadh to accept top/down decisions on reform is palpable and often attributed to tribal attitudes: consultation and discussion are welcomed, but in the end it is the sheikh’s responsibility to decide and everyone else’s to obey. Constraints on executive power by an independent judiciary or other regulatory bodies, separation of powers, or a press free of government pressure are ideas that have little resonance.
Saudi Arabia’s justice system is viewed as fair, though many are aware that it is subject to scathing international criticism. The Saudi teenager who escaped to Thailand and has found refuge in Canada is viewed as someone who failed to take advantage of existing human rights mechanisms in the Kingdom. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is viewed as a matter for the courts, which will decide whether the accused are guilty in open hearings with adequate defense attorneys. The women activists who protested the driving ban stand accused, it is said, of other crimes having to do with passing information to foreign governments or accepting foreign assistance (no one seems clear about which). Protection for foreign workers, all hired under contracts approved by their own governments, has been enhanced.
There are discontents. The conservative religious establishment comes in for frequent criticism (again, by people associated with the government). The Muslim Brotherhood looms menacingly. Fear of youth radicalization is palpable. Anxiety about terrorism and disorder, both in the Kingdom and in the region, is high. Sectarianism is bad. The government is sponsoring active efforts to counter extremism and promote dialogue among Saudis of different stripes.
There are good things as well. Pluralism, even if more apparent in ancient ruins we visited in Al Ula than in Riyadh, is good. Islam and Sharia law are good, when properly understood. The solidarity of the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in the Gulf conflict is good, as is the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially its military cooperation (which still includes Qatar, Saudis claim). Moderation, often defined as allowing everyone to modernize at their own pace, is good. Israel might be okay, but only if it does right by the Palestinians and accepts the Arab Peace Plan.
But above all, stability is good and worth sacrificing for. The nearby examples of Syria and Yemen are glaring. Even the one success of the Arab spring, Tunisia, is tottering. It is critical to counter the big de-stabilizing factor–Iran–and to avoid any new sources of Middle East strife. That Crown Prince is the key to stability as well as reform in the Kingdom and merits, the Saudis I talked with think, the wholehearted support he is getting, the internationals be damned.
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Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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Middle East chaos: the Saudi-Iranian axis
Since the four following panelists last met at the Wilson Center on December 5, 2017 (click here for that event’s summary), turmoil and chaos in the Middle East seem to have only increased in range and intensity. Faced with developments across the region, the Wilson Center hosted a follow-up panel entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation and the US government reaction. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of Iran and Saudi Arabia; a following post will consider the topics of Syria and Israel/Palestine.
Wright began by emphasizing how the past six months have seen the worst domestic turmoil in Iran since President Rouhani was elected in 2013. Economically, Iran has been on the defensive, with stubbornly low prices and the Trump Administration’s re-imposed sanctions creating a “vulnerable moment.” Iran has also been on the defensive politically; President Rouhani is failing to fulfill two of his campaign promises – preserve the JCPOA, and improve the economic situation.
Diplomatically, Iran has actually gone on the offensive by campaigning to convince the five other signatories of the JCPOA – France, the UK, Germany, China, and Russia – to uphold the agreement, despite U.S. sanctions for businesses investing in Iran. Militarily, Iran has been surprisingly restrained in the Persian Gulf, with incidents involving the Iranian navy at a record low. Iran has however ramped up its involvement in Syria, especially as a military confrontation with Israel in the south becomes likelier.
Wright concluded by speculating that the Trump Administration may be quietly pushing for regime change in Iran, although the prospect of such change is dim. While President Trump won 46% of the votes in an election with a 56% voter turnout, President Rouhani and his government were elected with 57% in an election with a 73% voter turnout. He thus commands a broad swath of popular support, despite the protests. The current system will be difficult to displace, especially by a hostile power such as the United States.
Riedel noted that in recent times, Saudi foreign policy has been characterized by recklessness, unpredictability, impulsiveness, and capriciousness, in a manner unprecedented in Saudi history. The best example of this is the civil war in Yemen, which King Salman and his son, Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), expected to be quick and painless. It has now dragged on for more than three years with no end in sight. It may now be reaching a more decisive stage with the ongoing battle for the port of Hodeida. Current Saudi recklessness is also evident in its blockade – or, as Riedel put it, the “siege” – of Qatar.
In the past six months, however, Riedel sees a trend away from recklessness and interventionism. The April 2018 Jerusalem Summit and the June 2018 Mecca Summit put King Salman at the center-stage at the expense of MbS, who seems to be getting sidelined as Saudi Arabia returns to a more risk-averse, conservative style of foreign policy.
As for the US, Riedel noted that while Saudi Arabia is happier dealing with the Trump Administration than with Obama’s, the Kingdom seems to pay little heed to American interests and advice – especially when it comes to the Qatar blockade, which the U.S. sees as playing into the hands of the Iranians. Riedel concluded by calling the legalization of women driving in Saudi Arabia a big deal, although the accompanying repression of female activists shows that there is no room for political dissent in the government’s Vision 2030 program.
The Bottom Line – the most interesting contrast between these two panelists was the way in which they qualified current Saudi-Iranian tensions. Riedel saw them as being based in sectarianism, with political tensions the way in which this sectarianism manifests itself, while Wright instead tried to avoid the usual “tribalist trap” by reminding the audience that there is more to Saudi-Iranian disputes than the Shi’a-Sunni divide. As traditional regional powerhouses – Egypt, Syria, Iraq – lose influence in the region, Saudi-Iranian relations will become one of the main determinants of Middle Eastern politics for years to come.
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Keeping our bases covered
The Persian Gulf region has seen a buildup in American military power in recent decades. With major bases in various countries – Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base), Bahrain (headquarters of the Fifth Fleet), Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base), and the UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) among them – the US has grown its military footprint across many of the Gulf.
Today, the operation of American bases has been complicated by the ongoing feud between Qatar and rival Arab Gulf states, most notable Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have cut diplomatic and trade relations since June of 2017. With the crisis showing no sign of resolution, the US is caught in the struggle between its Gulf allies, with America’s military bases put increasingly into question. Will the US follow the demands of its Gulf allies and cut its alliance with Qatar, as some in the White House have indicated?
On April 5, the American Security Project held an event to discuss US military bases in the Persian Gulf region, and their role in furthering American strategic interests in the wake of this crisis. The event featured the Inspector General of the Qatari Armed Forces, Staff Major General Nasser AbdulAziz Al-Attiyah. Joining him were USMP (Ret.) David Des Roches, Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, and Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, along with Asha Castleberry, Professor at Fordham University, who served as moderator in the discussion. Watch a full video recording of the event here:
Takeaways:
The Qatari government is very eager for U.S. bases to remain open. As Asha Castleberry and Stephen Cheney opened the event, they noted that it was put together rather quickly, predicated upon the participation of their Qatari guest. Nasser Al-Attiyah, for his part, repeated that the government of Qatar has been a friend and steadfast ally to the US for over 20 years, as exemplified by readiness to accept American air forces after pressure from Saudi Arabia forced them to move in 2003. Al-Attiyah emphasized Qatar’s value to the United States in both economic terms (as the 2nd-largest global buyer of American weapons) and strategic (as Qatar plans to expand Al Udeid Air Base and construct a new US naval base in coming years). His government sees its relationship with the US “as one of our top priorities,” echoing the views of the Qatari palace.
Qatar has been a particularly comfortable host of American troops in the Middle East. Both Stephen Cheney and David Des Roches noted the tricky nature of hosting military bases in the Middle East. The US government insists on legal immunity for American soldiers, despite the Mideast’s distaste for “capitulations” to foreign powers. Bilateral relations can easily become strained. Qatar has given the US few headaches. American soldiers face fewer restrictions based on cultural taboos than other bases in the region (in contrast to Saudi, in particular). The air base at Al Udeid has been notably comfortable for American troops, with ample creature comforts and enough capacity to handle America’s largest aircraft.
The gains of keeping military bases abroad outweigh the liabilities. The speakers listed the benefits of having military bases distributed around the world: ability to respond to situations quickly, maintaining readiness for larger operations, training with allied nations, and allowing public diplomacy to the host country. But there are drawbacks too. Host countries can gain a certain amount of leverage over the United States by threatening to deny troops’ freedoms, but this is only possible when base residents were highly dependent on local infrastructure (as in Panama).
US strategy in the Persian Gulf benefits from keeping an array of regional allies. Building on Stephen Cheney’s comment that withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would be “inherently foolish” given US interests, Des Roches argued that keeping a “constellation of bases” in the region is an asset in case access to any one is suddenly rescinded. While Al-Attiyah assured that Qatar had agreed to lease its base at Al Udeid to the US until 2023, his promise was couched with the caveat that “in our region everything can be changed overnight.”
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