Tag: Qatar
Answers to Friedman
In reply to my friend @giacomonyt, here are answers to Friedman’s poorly composed questions:
1. Can they name the current leader of the Syrian National Coalition, the secular, moderate opposition, and the first three principles of its political platform? Extra credit if they can name the last year that the leader of the S.N.C. resided in Syria. Hint: It’s several decades ago.
A: The SNC (Syrian National Council) is no longer what Friedman says it is. He means the Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (usually abbreviated SOC), which includes the SNC. The SOC leader is Hadi Bahra. I have no idea when he last resided in Syria, but it isn’t likely to be recently given the oppression there. Hadi was born in Damascus but went to university in the US. So what?
The SOC principles are these:
- Absolute national sovereignty and independence for Syria.
- Preservation of the unity of the Syrian people.
- Preservation of the unity of the country and its cities.
- Overthrowing the Syrian regime and dismantling the security forces and holding responsible parties accountable for crimes against the Syrian people.
- Not to engage in any dialogue or negotiations with the regime.
- Uphold our commitment for a civil democratic Syria.
Of course they’ve violated number 5 by going to the Geneva 2 negotiations, which was the right thing to do but has produced no good outcome.
2. Can they explain why Israel — a country next door to Syria that has better intelligence on Syria than anyone and could be as affected by the outcome there as anyone — has chosen not to bet on the secular, moderate Syrian rebels or arm them enough to topple Assad?
A: I have reason to believe that the Israelis are helpful to the Syrian opposition when possible, even though they understand perfectly well that it will be more insistent on return of Golan than Bashar al Asad, who has essentially let the matter drop. Israeli intelligence officers can tell you all about the configuration of forces on their border with Syria and the risks that extremists pose there. They have wanted Asad gone, because they knew that letting him stay would increase the likelihood of an extremist succession.
3. The United States invaded Iraq with more than 100,000 troops, replaced its government with a new one, suppressed its Islamist extremists and trained a “moderate” Iraqi army, but, the minute we left, Iraq’s “moderate” prime minister turned sectarian. Yet, in Syria, Iraq’s twin, we’re supposed to believe that the moderate insurgents could have toppled Assad and governed Syria without any American boots on the ground, only arming the good rebels. Really?
A: Does Friedman really believe that invasion and foreign occupation is the only way to bring down a dictator? Maliki was sectarian before we left. He didn’t turn that way afterwards. The moderates we should have supported in Syria from the first were the nonviolent protesters. Had they been successful–and it is likely they would have been much faster than the armed rebellion–this question would not have arisen.
4. How could the good Syrian rebels have triumphed in Syria when the main funders of so many rebel groups there — Qatar and Saudi Arabia — are Sunni fundamentalist monarchies that oppose the very sort of democratic, pluralistic politics in their own countries that the decent Syrian rebels aspire to build in Syria?
A: This implies that if the Qataris and Saudis get their way Syria will be a Sunni fundamentalist monarchy. Really? There is good reason for both the Saudis and the Qataris to oppose the Islamic State and to support a relatively moderate regime in Syria.
5. Even if we had armed Syrian moderates, how could they have defeated a coalition of the Syrian Alawite army and gangs, backed by Russia, backed by Iran, backed by Hezbollah — all of whom play by “Hama Rules,” which are no rules at all — without the U.S. having to get involved?
A: Whatever US involvement is needed now to defeat the Islamic State will be much greater than would have been required two years ago to defeat Asad.
6. How is it that some 15,000 Muslim men from across the Muslim world have traveled to Syria to fight for jihadism and none have walked there to fight for pluralism, yet the Syrian moderates would not only have been able to defeat the Assad regime — had we only armed them properly — but also this entire jihadist foreign legion?
A: Friedman needs to meet the many Syrians and expats who have returned, not only to fight but more importantly to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian population, establish some semblance of governance in liberated areas and counter the push toward extemism and sectarianism. The jihadist foreign legion was attracted by Asad’s success. They would not have emerged in Syria had he failed early in the game.
PS: In my haste this morning, I skipped an important point. The arming of the moderate opposition was never proposed to defeat Asad’s forces. It was intended to bring him to a serious negotiation for a democratic transition. That it might have achieved, had it been aggressive enough.
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An unhappy Eid
For most Muslims, today marks the begining of Eid al Fitr, the feast thats end the month of Ramadan. It won’t be an Eid Mubarak (Blessed Eid) for lots of people: there is war in Syria, Iraq, Gaza/Israel, Sudan and Libya, renewed repression in Egypt and Iran, instability in Yemen. The hopes of the Arab spring have turned to fear and even loathing, not only between Muslims and non-Muslims but also among Shia, Sunni and sometimes Sufi. Extremism is thriving. Moderate reform is holding its own only in Tunisia, Morocco and maybe Jordan. Absolutism still rules most of the Gulf.
The issues are not primarily religious. They are political. Power, not theology, is at stake. As Greg Gause puts it, the weakening of Arab states has created a vacuum that Saudi Arabia and Iran are trying to fill, each seeking advantage in their own regional rivalry. He sees it as a cold war, but it is clearly one in which violence by surrogates plays an important role, even if Riyadh and Tehran never come directly to blows. And it is complicated by the Sunni world’s own divisions, with Turkey and Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia opposing it.
The consequences for Arab civilians are dramatic. Well over 100,000 are now dead in Syria, half the population is displaced, uncounted more are dead in Iraq and millions more displaced. Egypt has largely reversed the liberation of its aborted 2011 revolution but still faces more violence than before it. Libya has been unable to tame or dissolve its militias, which are endangering its population and blocking its transition. While the total numbers killed in the Gaza war are far smaller than in Syria or Iraq, the percentage of civilians among the victims–and the broader impact on the civilian population–is causing anti-Israel revulsion worldwide.
Greg wants the United States to favor order over chaos. The trouble is it is hard to know which policies will do what. Will support for Iraq Prime Minister Maliki block the Islamic State, or will it incentivize extremist recruitment and make matters worse, perhaps even causing partition? The military government in Egypt, with which Greg thinks we should continue to engage, is arguably creating more problems with extremists in Sinai and the western desert than it is solving with its arbitrary and draconian crackdown against liberals as well as Islamists. The Obama administration is inclined to support America’s traditional allies in the Gulf, as Greg suggest, but what is it to do when Qatar and Turkey are at swordpoints with Saudi Arabia ?
Many Arab states as currently constituted lack what every state needs in order to govern: legitimacy. The grand failure of the Arab spring is a failure to discover new sources of legitimacy after decades of dictators wielding military power. The “people” have proven insufficient. Liberal democracy is, ideologically and organizationally, too weak. Political Islam is still a contender, especially in Syria, Iraq and Libya, but if it succeeds it will likely be in one of its more extreme forms. In Gaza, where Hamas has governed for seven years, political Islam was quite literally bankrupt even before the war. Their monarchies’ ability to maintain order as neighbors descend into chaos is helping to sustain order in Jordan and Morocco. Oil wealth and tribal loyalties are propping up monarchies in the Gulf, but the demography there (youth bulge and unemployment) poses serious threats.
The likelihood is that we are in for more instability, not less. Iran and Saudi Arabia show no sign of willingness to end their competition. They will continue to seek competitive advantage, undermining states they see as loyal to their opponent and jumping in wherever they can to fill the vacuums that are likely to be created. Any American commitment to order will be a minor factor. This will not, I’m afraid, be the last unhappy Eid.
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Hedging all the way to the bank
It is always difficult to write about a place that you visit for only a week or so, but Qatar poses unique problems: Qatari citizens represent perhaps 10% of the population. The rest are foreigners, brought in from India, Pakistan, Kenya, Nepal, Spain and virtually every other place on earth. They make up the vast bulk of the work force, often living here in group dormitories while they send money home to their families. An Indian restaurant manager told me he could double his salary coming here (and there are no taxes). A Nepali told me he misses the green and the mountains, but living here is okay. A Spaniard rated it higher than that. Palestinians, Syrians and Egyptians (hiding out here from the restored military regime) also gave Qatar the thumbs up. Of course there is little risk to a foreigner in giving the place high marks, but the responses seemed genuine.
I’ve garnered a few data points on the Qataris themselves. This really is an absolute monarchy at the national level, where a few people make all the key decisions. There is no system or habit of consultation with tribal leaders, as in Bahrain. Only at the municipal level are there elections, but the issues there are strictly local ones.
Among the 200,000 or so Qataris, everyone knows everyone else’s family ties, even if they don’t know the individuals. Some families are more prestigious than others, but others may be wealthier (e.g., those that spent time in Iran after a war with Bahrain and came back with trading and other business skills). Sectarian relations are less problematic than in Bahrain because both the monarchy and the majority are Sunni. Most men content themselves with one wife. Most women cover in public, but to varying extents. The presence here of South Asians is regarded wryly: before natural gas made Qatar wealthy, Qataris used to go to Pakistan and India to work.
Many view the monarchy, which has no religious function, as reasonably wise and benevolent, which isn’t surprising given the sky-high per capita GDP. Even the scandal regarding Qatar’s successful 2022 bid to host the World Cup does not appear to be generating a lot of interest. The international press coverage of World Cup labor practices has raised consciousness about the unfairness of tying immigrant visas to specific employers (which we happen also to use in the US). Support for education and infrastructure is very much in evidence: new roads, mass transit and universities seem ubiquitous. So too are giant shopping malls, luxury apartments, fancy restaurants, and Ferraris parked by the curb. Cranes and yachts everywhere:
I am reminded of a radio ad for a men’s clothing store from many years ago: “money talks and nobody walks.” There are sometimes sidewalks, but only the foreigners use them. Electricity and water are free, for everyone. I turned off the air conditioning in my hotel room upon arrival and haven’t turned it back on. Few complain about the heat outside because no one goes there, though most Qatari men dress in thobes and assure me it is much more comfortable. It is often still above 100 degrees Fahrenheit at midnight.
Qatar does not yet have anything like Bahrain’s fabulous national museum, which displays ample evidence of its pre-Islamic civilization. I am told a national museum is under construction. But Doha already has a fabulous Museum of Islamic Art that reminds a Westerner of how much brighter the so-called dark ages were in Muslimdom than in Christendom. Here is just a random sample that had the virtue of not being behind glass:
A large portion of the iconic museum’s holdings are Persian and Turkish, but there is lots of good stuff from North Africa, Syria, Iraq and on into central Asia. The message is clear: Qatar is not just a tiny kingdom, but a vanguard of civilization for the entire Islamic world, transcending national, ethnic and sectarian distinctions.
Doha, which houses 80% of the kingdom’s population, is more Brasilia than Amsterdam, at least from a visitor perspective. Its forests of oddly shaped and designed twenty- and thirty-story office buildings flashing light shows at night give way on the outskirts to low rise villas behind high walls. The Souq Wakif is pleasant enough, but clean and orderly to those who have enjoyed the market places in Cairo, Damascus or Aleppo (in better times). Doha’s version feels more like a pleasant World’s Fair pavilion. At the high end of commerce there is “The Pearl,” an artificial island of fasionable shops, luxury apartments and big yachts.
While the world is focused on the collapse of Iraq, less than 500 miles northwest, Doha seems calm almost to a fault. Has someone here helped to finance the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that is wrecking havoc there? Or are they financing the more moderate Islamists tring to counter ISIS? I’m not likely to discover the answer to that question, as the Qataris who know such things haven’t been accessible to me.
Reserved to a modest fault, the kingdom nevertheless prides itself on getting along with everyone (especially Iran in addition to the US) and generally succeeds, except for the Saudis, who are arch rivals, at least for now. Hedging is the classic diplomatic strategy of small countries. Qatar’s rulers are good at it. The place is thriving.
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Survey says
Tuesday Jay Leveton presented the results of the 2014 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller survey at the American Security Project. It focuses on Arab youth perspectives, concerns and aspirations throughout the region. The survey consisted of 3,500 face-to-face interviews conducted over the past year across sixteen countries in the Middle East. The sample was split equally between males and females ranging from 18 to 24 years old. Leveton highlighted the top ten findings:
- Arab youth are embracing modern values. 46% of Arab youth believe that traditional values are outdated and belong in the past. This number has risen from only 17% in 2011, demonstrating a shift away from traditional values. This change is also reflected in the decreasing influence of parents, family, and religion on Arab youth.
- They remain confident in their national government’s abilities. Arab youth show approximately 60% confidence in the government’s ability to address living standards, economic stability, war, unemployment and terrorism. There is great surprise in this confidence, specifically in countries that have suffered from economic hardship or political instability following the Arab Spring. Approval of the impact of the Arab Spring has declined from 72% in 2012 to 54% in 2014, most likely due to the continuous civil unrest and political instability in countries such as Egypt and Syria.
- They are increasingly concerned about the rising cost of living and unemployment. 63% of Arab youth are concerned about growing living expenses, while 42% expressed significant worry over unemployment. Approximately half are apprehensive about their own national economy. However, 55% of youth in countries outside of the GCC are concerned about unemployment, while only 39% within the GCC. This is due to the GCC’s proven ability to assist in job creation, while countries in North Africa and the Levant struggle with their youth unemployment rates.
- Arab youth believe that the biggest obstacle in the Middle East is civil unrest. 55% believe that the recent uprisings and instability are the greatest impediments to the advancement of the region. 38% believe that the lack of democracy is the greatest issue, while some believe it is the threat of terrorism.
- They are increasingly looking towards entrepreneurship as a source of opportunity. 67% feel that the younger generation is more likely to start a business than in previous generations. This entrepreneurial spirit hints at the perceived opportunities in starting one’s own business, specifically in response to some governments’ inability to provide jobs for their youth.
- The country that the younger Arab generation would most like to live in is the United Arab Emirates. 39% said that the UAE is the ideal country they would move to, while 21% said the United States, and 14% said Saudi Arabia. The UAE is the model country for Arab youth in terms of the right balance of governmental responsibility, national economy, foreign relations, etc. The United States has remained high in favor in Arab youth perspectives.
- Arab youth see their country’s biggest allies to be Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 36% believe that Saudi Arabia is their country’s biggest ally and 33% said the UAE. This was followed by Qatar, Kuwait, and lastly the United States, which marks a shift away from Western countries as the largest allies.
- They have a new concern for obesity and rising health issues. Over the past year, there has been a sharp increase in the percentage of youth concerned about obesity from 12% in 2013 to 26% in 2014. An increasing number of the younger generation is worried about diabetes, cancer and heart disease. Among all countries, 52% of youth feel as though the healthcare in their country has remained the same over the past year, while 34% believe that it has improved.
- They believe that the government should subsidize energy costs and aren’t too concerned about climate change. 74% believe that energy, electricity, and transport fuel should be subsidized by the government. This comes from the rising concern about the cost of living in each respective country. While this is the greatest worry among youth, concern for climate change and the environment is a very low priority at only 6%.
- There has been a great increase in daily news consumption, specifically through online media and social networking sites. Television has been the most popular source of news for the sixth year in a row with 75% of Arab youth using it as their most frequent news source. However, a declining number of youth see the television as the most trusted source of news– 39% now view social media as the most reliable source, rising from 22% in 2013.
While the 2014 survey ranges across sixteen countries that vary in political, economic, and social characteristics, there is nonetheless a great sense of continuity in the hopes, concerns, and priorities of Arab youth in the region.
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Fig leaf?
Nabil Fahmy, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, spoke today at CSIS. He was all sweetness and light: civil liberties, transparency, accountability, participation, inclusivity. He snarled, politely, on only two subjects:
- relations with Turkey and Qatar are “not good” because of their interference in internal Egyptian politics (read their support for the Muslim Brotherhood), and
- Egypt will seek to improve relations with Russia, which he averred will be possible without hurting relations with the US.
I might even say he relished using improved relations with Russia as a means of keeping the United States on the hook, but that would be reading between his lines.
The questioners were not so placid. Three or four asked about abuses by Egyptian courts: in condemning hundreds of people to death after show trials, in trying and convicting American and Egyptian democracy advocates, and in jailing journalists. Fahmy hid behind independence of the judiciary, reluctance to speak on any cases still before the courts, rule of law, and insistence that the death sentences were merely recommendations to the Mufti.
I’d have asked about the three-year sentence handed down (and confirmed on appeal) against activists of the April 6 movement, which has now been banned as well, for “tarnishing the image” of Egypt. But I didn’t get the chance. I admit the case seems small in comparison with some of the others raised, much as I am personally committed to trying to free the April 6 prisoners.
Fahmy said the justice system will evolve, like the rest of Egypt, in an open and democratic direction, but like all other countries it needs to deal with terrorism. The Egyptian embassy provided a handy fact sheet on “Terrorism in Egypt” to underline this point. They also provided a fact sheet on “Democratic Elections for a New Government.” Egypt, we are asked to believe, is headed for democracy at its May 26-27 election, despite the strain of the fight against terrorism. Note to the embassy: please post these fact sheets so I can link them!
I wish it were so. But there is a counter-narrative that appears much more likely. Egypt is using the courts to squelch any serious political competition (from the Muslim Brotherhood or secularists) while it cracks down in ways that spawn terrorism and conducts a sham election guaranteed to coronate Field Marshall Sisi as the “civilian” leader of a restored autocracy.
Fahmy, in this alternate narrative, is not the smooth-talking vanguard of eventual democracy all his friends in Washington (he served many years here as ambassador) would like him to be, but rather the urbane fig leaf hiding the ugly reality of a return to military rule. I don’t doubt Fahmy’s sincerity in wanting Egypt to be democratic. That’s not the issue. The issue is whether the military is using him and his sincerity to smooth relations with the US, attract diaspora and foreign investment, and avoid the wrath of those in Congress who think we should end aid to a military coup.
I’ll be very glad to see the latter narrative disproven. But I doubt it will be. A year from now, I expect to see the Field Marshall enthroned and an elected parliament firmly in his grip. The Muslim Brotherhood will no doubt still be banned as a terrorist organization. April 6 will be under lock and key. Democracy advocates will be allowed only if they are tame and obedient. Journalists will have to toe the line, or end up in prison.
What will the Americans do? Most likely nothing. Contrary to universal Egyptian belief, Washington has been consistent throughout Egypt’s various twists and turns: it supports whoever gains power. Its overriding priorities in Egypt are maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel, the fight against terrorists and military overflight rights and access to the Suez canal. Whoever helps America with those objectives will be considered acceptable, or better. How Egypt governs itself will be a secondary consideration, rising again in our priorities only if someone new turns up at the top.
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Peace Picks March 31 – April 4
1. Ground Truth Briefing: The U.S.-Saudi Relationship: Too Big To Fail?
Monday, March 31 | 9 – 10am
Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
In the wake of President Obama’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, please join us as three veteran observers and analysts of the Saudi and Washington scenes assess the state of relations between the two countries and prospects for the future.
What ails the U.S.-Saudi relationship? Can it be fixed? Or are we witnessing the weakening of one of America’s special relationships in the region?
SPEAKERS
David Ottaway, Senior Scholar
Middle East Specialist and Former Washington Post Correspondent
Abdulaziz Sager
Chairman, Gulf Research Center, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Jim Smith
Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (2009-2013) and USAF Brigadier General, retired
Jane Harman; Director, President and CEO
Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar
Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003
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