Tag: Qatar
The Geneva 2 Rohrschach
I spent yesterday listening to well-informed people talk (Las Vegas rules) about prospects for the January 22/23 Montreux/Geneva 2 peace talks. The UN faxed invitations Monday. The Syrian government has already named its delegation. The Russians are in. Iran is not invited to the multilateral opening day in Montreux, but John Kerry says it can hang around with everyone else while UN envoy Brahimi meets with the Syrian parties on the second day in Geneva. Faute de mieux, the Americans are committed to Geneva 2 and anxious that it begin a peace process, even if there is no hope it will conclude one. “What else can we do?” they ask plaintively.
The Syrian opposition doesn’t know if it is coming or going. Some portion of Etilaf, the Syrian Opposition Coalition that Washington and other capitals have accepted as the political representative of the Syrian people, is bound to give in to US pressure to attend, but no formal decision has been taken yet. The Syrian National Council component of Etilaf is against attending. So of course are the more extreme Islamists armed groups. Most moderate Islamist armed groups, organized now as the Islamic Front, are also opposed. The Free Syrian Army’s Supreme Military Council will have to go, since it gets a lot of assistance from the US.
Why would the opposition not want to attend? Let me count the reasons:
- There is no serious possibility of Geneva 2 implementing the Geneva 1 goal of a “transitional governing body with full executive authority,” since Bashar al Asad is clearly not prepared to step aside, down or up.
- Anyone from the opposition who attends will be regarded as a traitor by those who don’t, including armed groups with the capacity to do real harm.
- Even if the risks are not mortal, the political risk is significant.
- Attending will fragment the opposition even more and weaken it.
- The opposition does not trust the Americans and loathes the Russians.
- Whatever statement comes out of Geneva 2, it will have to be balanced between the Americans and Russians, which means it could imply support for the scheduled May elections, focus on fighting terrorism rather than ending Asad’s brutality towards the Syrian people and imply an obligation of those attending to cut off supplies of arms (thus obligating Saudi Arabia and Qatar but not Iran).
A ceasefire agreed at Geneva will be meaningless, as the extremist militias not present will violate it right away, with the regime responding in kind (if not pre-empting). The only real upside for the opposition at Geneva would be agreement on humanitarian access. But the opposition believes that could be agreed without negotiation between the warring parties, as it is a clear legal obligation for the government to allow relief to the civilian population.
One-third of Etilaf is already said to have resigned to protest against going to Geneva 2, which even the many fighters who want a political solution regard as an a snare and a delusion. Without changing the military balance on the ground, and without strong American backing, Geneva 2 will cause more fragmentation in the opposition. It will also weaken relative moderates within the opposition and strengthen extremists. The West is setting up the opposition for failure.
What will it do for the the regime, the Russians and the Iranians?
The regime looks to an international meeting like Geneva 2 for legitimacy, which it has never sought from the Syrian people. It will claim to have offered reforms and even amnesty, portray itself as a bulwark against extremism, denounce the international conspiracy against Asad and claim that what it has done on chemical weapons demonstrates its reliability. Disciplined and organized, it will present a clean face to the world in Montreux, even if barrel bombs are still falling on the civilian population of Aleppo.
Moscow’s main objective is to prevent chaos and the flow of extremists from Syria (where 5-600 Russian citizens are fighting against the regime), as well as to protect specific interests like port access and protection of orthodox Christians. It is difficult for Moscow to see how chaos can be avoided if the regime is removed. Russia doesn’t want to see Libyan-style chaos in Syria. In Moscow’s view, a majority of Syrians still supports Asad, who may well run for re-election in May. He is not creating the extremists, who would exist even if there were no war in Syria. The Sunni/Shia divide is exaggerated. It is strife within the Sunni community that is really important. Transitional justice in Moscow’s estimation should be postponed, as it has been in Cambodia. It claims to be ready for a peaceful transition to democracy, but there is no sign it is ready to cut off the weapons flow to the regime.
Nor is there sign Iran is ready to abandon Asad. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in particular the Quds Force, controls Iran’s policy on Syria, not President Rouhani. There is no open dissent from the official narrative: Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia are trying to remove Asad, so the “resistance front” (Hizbollah and the IRGC) needs to respond. They cannot be restrained without stopping the flow of extremists and Gulf financing to the opposition forces. Iran would like an invitation to Montreux, but not with conditions. It will not accept the Geneva 1 goal.
Tomorrow: I’ll attempt to answer that plaintive question: “what else can we do?”
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Sharp differences on Syria
Al-Monitor and Johns Hopkins SAIS teamed up last week for a full-day conference on “The United States, Russia and the Middle East”. The afternoon session had a panel on the Syrian regional crisis, which moderator David Sanger of The New York Times described as not the typical panel in Washington, with everyone getting along.
Josh Landis, Director of the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Middle East Studies, said the US is now mostly concerned with the al-Qaeda presence in Syria and the refugee problem affecting Syria’s neighboring countries. Inside Syria there are no good guys. The military cannot be a substitute for Assad. The idea that the military and Ba’th Party can stay in power if Assad is removed is fictional. These institutions are expressions of Assad. If there is no plan to remove Assad then the civil war inside Syria is going to continue. The only two alternatives for Syria would be either to partition the country or to allow Russia to support Assad with arms in order to regain control of the country. Neither option is good for the rebels. Read more
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Peace picks, November 18-22
DC’s top events of the week:
1. Oil Security and the US Military Commitment to the Persian Gulf
Monday, November 18 | 9:00am – 2:30pm
George Washington University Elliott School, 1957 E Street NW, Lindner Family Commons Room 602
9:00-9:20: Introduction
Charles Glaser, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
9:30-11:00: Threats to U.S. Oil Security in the Gulf: Past, Present and Future
Salim Yaqub, University of California-Santa Barbara
Thomas Lippman, Middle East Institute
Joshua Rovner, Southern Methodist University
Chair: Rosemary Kelanic, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
11:15-12:15: The Economic Stakes: Oil Shocks and Military Costs
Eugene Gholz, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas-Austin
Kenneth Vincent, George Washington University
Chair: Charles Glaser, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
12:45-2:15: Possibilities for U.S. Grand Strategy in the Persian Gulf
Daniel Byman, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Caitlin Talmadge, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
Rosemary Kelanic, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
Chair: Charles Glaser, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
The U.S. strategic objective of protecting Persian Gulf oil has generated little controversy since the Gulf became a focus of U.S. military deployments over three decades ago. This may seem unsurprising given the widely-appreciated importance of oil to the global economy. Nevertheless, quite dramatic changes have occurred in the regional balance of power, the nature of security threats, and the global oil market since the U.S. made its commitment-raising the possibility that the U.S. role should be revisited. This conference examines two critical questions for U.S. grand strategy in the Gulf. First, should the United States continue to rely on military capabilities to preserve the flow of Persian Gulf oil? Second, if the U.S. security commitment remains strategically sound, what military posture should U.S. forces adopt? The conference panels examine the key rationales driving current U.S. policies, the costs and benefits of alternative approaches, and options for revising the U.S. military stance in the region.
Lunch will be served.
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Unhappy allies need to carry more burdens
Everyone’s favorite subject this weekend is America’s allies, who are unhappy for many reasons:
- France and Germany don’t like their phones bugged, and Brazil is also in a lather;
- Saudi Arabia wants the Americans to push harder against Syria’s Bashar al Asad and Iran’s nuclear program;
- Israel concurs on Iran and would rather President Obama didn’t insist it talk to the Palestinians;
- the Egyptian military didn’t like the cutoff of some major military equipment;
- President Karzai has not yet agreed to U.S. jurisdiction for troops who commit criminal acts in Afghanistan post-2014.
Everyone found the US government shutdown disconcerting. No one is looking forward to the January budgetary showdown, except maybe Russian President Putin. He likes anything that brings America down a peg.
There are solutions for each of these issues. We’ll no doubt reach some sort of modus vivendi with the Europeans, who won’t want to shut down either their own eavesdropping or America’s. More likely they’ll want us to share, while swearing off Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande’s cell phones. The Brazilians will be harder to satisfy, but they aren’t exactly what I would call an ally either. The Saudis may go off on their own to arm whomever they like in Syria, thus deepening the sectarian conflict there. That could, ironically, increase the prospects for some sort of political settlement at the much discussed but never convened Geneva 2 conference. It is hard to find anyone at this point who seriously opposes the effort to negotiate a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. The alternatives (war or containment) are worse. Even Netanyahu has toned down his objections, while unleashing Sheldon Adelson to advocate nuclear war. The Egyptian military doesn’t actually need more Abrams tanks; it has lots in storage. Karzai has convened a loya jirga to approve the continuing American presence in Afghanistan and to share the rap for agreeing to American jurisdiction. Read more
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Breaking up is hard to do
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace yesterday afternoon focused on the changing regional and international atmosphere for the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.* Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment and moderator of the event, opened the discussion asking what the current disagreements with the GCC, particularly Saudi Arabia, mean for the future of US-Gulf relationships?
Abdullah al-Shayji, Professor at Kuwait University, sees the widening trust deficit between the US and the GCC as alarming. This is not the first time that the GCC and US have had disagreements, but Shayji sees something amiss in the relationship. The US hesitation about involvement in Syria, and its overture with Iran, make the GCC question whether it can rely on the US.
The GCC also sees Washington as dysfunctional and fatigued based on sequestration and the government shutdown. The relationship is at a tipping point but not at a critical state yet. The GCC sees itself as shut out from US foreign policy regarding the region and wants a more nuanced and holistic approach. Diverging trust can ultimately be detrimental to the US-GCC relationship. The US should be more receptive and open-minded toward its junior GCC partner.
Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar Mehran Kamrava focused his comments on Qatar and its changing foreign policy. Before 2010, Qatar wanted to come out of the Saudi shadow. This was mainly a policy of survival, but Doha also made attempts to project power and influence in the region. Qatar had four “ingredients” for its pre-2010 foreign policy: Read more
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Syria has dropped off the screen
The White House justifications for backing out of a bilateral summit with President Putin lack one important one: Syria. The list is a long, citing (in addition to the asylum for Edward Snowden):
our lack of progress on issues such as missile defense and arms control, trade and commercial relations, global security issues, and human rights and civil society.
Some might hope that this presages progress in convening the proposed Geneva 2 meeting on Syria, but there is no sign of that. The more than 100,000 people killed in Syria in the past 2.5 years, the 1.5-2 million who are refugees, the 4 million who are displaced inside Syria and the 7 million in humanitarian need have dropped off the radar of an administration that promised to anticipate and prevent mass atrocities.
A colleague deeply immersed in Syria asked the other day whether watching the Bosnian implosion was this bad. I answered that it was worse, because the crisis was on the front pages daily. And it went on for 3.5 years before President Clinton carried out the threat he had made during his first campaign for the presidency to bomb Serb forces. That is why it is not on the list of reasons for canceling the Obama/Putin meeting.
Why was it on the front pages every day? The proximate causes were two: the Bosnians had forceful and effective spokespeople, mainly their ambassador to the UN in New York and their wartime prime minister. Ambassador Mo Sacirbey was on CNN daily strumming the heartstrings of ordinary Americans. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic would whip himself into a lather bemoaning the latest atrocity. Students organized against the war on college campuses, Congress held hearings, Foreign Service officers resigned and newspapers ran daily accounts of a war in which little of strategic significance was happening.
While Senator McCain and a few others have raised their voices about Syria, mobilization today against the atrocities in Syria extends little beyond the Syrian American community, which is doing its best to funnel in humanitarian assistance but has found no resonance in the broader US population. There is no recognizable and consistent Syrian voice speaking out daily on US television.
Part of the reason is political instability in the Syrian opposition, which has gone through three or four “presidents” in a couple of years, none of whom became a welcome figure in the American media. Divided international sponsorship–the Qataris backing the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudis backing less Islamist forces–underlies this instability.
The Bosnians faced similar divisions among their international sponsors: their money and weapons came from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others. But the government in Sarajevo had from the first a stable leadership: the laconic Alija Izetbegovic was the more or less uncontested first among equals, accepted even by his rivals as the legitimate president of the beleaguered Bosnian state. There was stolid consistency at the top, which helped to paper over the differences among the international donors and reduce the perceived significance in Washington of the jihadi fighters who joined the Bosnian cause.
In Syria, the Saudis, perhaps emboldened by the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, are now trying to play a leadership role by offering to buy off the Russians. They have managed to install one of their favorites as president of the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. What they have not managed to do is counter the growing significance of the extremist fighters, who have frightened Washington away from embracing the revolutionary cause.
The Syrians are not lacking in rhetorical power: sister and brother Rafif and Murhaf Jouejati here in DC do a great job trying to bring the latest atrocity to our attention. But they are doing it essentially as civil society activists rather than as official representatives of the Syrian opposition. And they are heard mostly in a narrow circle of Syria-watchers and expatriate Syrians, none of whom carry much weight in the broader American body politic. Syria really has dropped off Washington’s screen.
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