Tag: Russia
A cold shoulder might get more results
This is one of those moments in the Balkans when what is not said is more important than what is said. The Americans and Europeans have so far failed to publish the results of their announced investigations of the September 24 failed Serb uprising in northern Kosovo. On that occasion, Serbia sent a well-armed group to ambush the Kosovo police, killing one officer. The Serbs also tried to draw the police into a firefight at a monastery compound. The perpetrators intended this incident to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention. Presumbly the goal was to seize the four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo.
No doubt
There is really no doubt about what happened and why. The only real question is who authorized this terrorist plot. It was either Serbian President Vučić or not. I have no evidence on that issue. But we know that Vučić usually makes all the really important decisions in Belgrade. If he did not make this one, that is only a marginally better reflection on his rule than if he did.
Ever since the failed plot, Vučić has cozied up even more than usual to anti-democratic forces in the region and beyond. His besties lately have included Bosnian secessionist Dodik, Hungarian would-be autocrat Orban, illegitimate Belarusian chief of state Lukashenko, Azerbaijani dictator Aliyev, as well as Russian and Chinese autocrats Putin and Xi. Here is Vučić siding with Putin in Ukraine.
He intends to follow Aliyev’s lead in taking Nagorno-Karabakh back by force. When geopolitical circumstances permit, he will do likewise with Kosovo.
Vučić did belatedly fire his security and information agency chief Vulin. But he did it in response to US sanctions, not the September 24 events. Milan Radojičić, a close political ally of Vučić as well as Kosovo political and criminal kingpin, has taken responsibility for the plot. The authorities arrested but quickly freed him. The courts will take their time getting around to a trial.
Nor should Serbia try him, since his September 24 crimes were committed in Kosovo. He should be handed over to the Pristina authorities.
So why the silence?
Some diplomats will attribute the silence to preoccupation in Washington and Brussels with the Gaza war. That certainly merits priority and slows high-level decisions on other issues. But the State Department and the EU foreign policy apparatus are both geared to deal with problems worldwide, not just today’s top issues.
More likely they have hesitated because of the Serbian parliamentary elections this Sunday, which won’t bring big surprises. President Vučić would not have called an early poll if he thought he would lose it. There is ample evidence he is using the government’s media dominance, state institutions, patronage, and largesse to ensure a friendly outcome. But no one in Washington or Brussels at this point should want to help him.
The EU has another handicap. It requires consensus for any serious reaction. Most of its 27 members might be ready to do something. But Hungary and perhaps now Slovakia will be prepared to block consensus on sanctions on Serbia.
I might also hope that the State Department is re-evaluating its policy in the Balkans and needs a bit more time to get it right. It has officials devoted to the notion that he has succeeded in getting Serbia to embrace the West. It is sometimes easier at State to change personnel than minds, but it takes time.
Here are three nudges
Maybe Brussels and Washington need a nudge in the right direction. They no doubt have this Kosovo government preliminary report on the September 24 plot. But to my knowledge no one has published it outside Kosovo.
I offered a summary more than a month ago. It is high time that someone make it widely available. Along with the investigation the EU has promised. Read please, and tell me whether Serbia has embraced the West.
Or try this statement from Serbia’s Prime Minister reneging on commitments the US and EU say are legally binding:
Meanwhile, the EU has levied “consequences” on Kosovo that are long past their sell by date. Some Europeans are anxious to say so:
Note that it is the same police who foiled the September 24 plot that the US and EU have wanted withdrawn from northern Kosovo. That would have been a big mistake.
Hedging only works if we play the game
Serbia’s foreign policy relies on hedging between East and West, in the tradition of the non-aligned movement founded in Belgrade in 1961. This makes sense for Serbia, which thereby extracts value from both directions. The game is to lean hard one way and see how much the other side will ante up for you. Vučić has been leaning hard towards the East and collecting bounty from the West. Don’t take it only from me–read what people in Moscow are saying.
But if the West refuses to play the game, the hedging fails, and Serbia lands in the arms of Putin and Xi. That is no great loss to the West, which hasn’t gained much for all the goodies it has rained on Belgrade. Let’s assume though that Vučić is sincerely committed to hedging. A cold shoulder would then make him do a bit more to please the West. Wouldn’t that be nice?
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Stevenson’s army, December 13
– The Zelensky visit produced no breakthrough on Ukraine aid in DC. But FT says EU is looking for technical tricks to get around Orban veto of new aid.
– Politico reports declassified intelligence on Russian losses
– In private meeting with fundraisers, Biden sharply criticized Israel, referred to “indiscriminate bombing.”
– WSJ says Israel is flooding Gaza tunnels.
– In print edition, WaPo has long articles on problems in Ukraine offensive and many pages on the Discord leaks
– House China committee urges legal changes forcing higher tariffs on Chinese goods. Here’s the report.
– Politico says Trump wants deal with North Korea letting it keep nuclear weapons
– FYI, WH sent Congress latest war powers report
– Senate voted against forcing US troops from Syria.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 24
-FT says senior officials dismissed detailed warning about Hamas attacks
– Taiwan opposition crumbles, WSJ says Beijing loses.
– WaPo says Russia & China plan tunnel to Crimea
–NYT doubts PA could govern Gaza
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 12
– WaPo says Ukrainian was involved in Nordstream sabotage.
– NYT says Trump plans mass deportations.
– Legal analyst sees problems with Trump plan to take over regulatory agencies.
– Tim Wu has good ideas for regulating AI.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 9
–Hamas leaders –in Doha — tell NYT their plans for the war.
– SecState Blinken explains US requirements for a peace. See also WSJ. And NYT critique.
– DOD explains US military role. [Note: still no US AUMF for Israel]
– Politico reports on State dissent memo on Israel.
– Andrew Exum has lessons from Lebanon.
– Dan Drezner questions Israel’s ability to restore deterrence.
– Don’t forget: there’s also a tragic war in Sudan.
– Notice: there’s nothing on the plans to fund the government after Nov 17 because too many people have too many plans
-House GOP sets 2024 calendar. Printout here.
– Intelligence analyst argues Putin decided on war before US Afghan debacle
– Politico has good backgrounder on next week’s APEC summit
– NYT magazine answers: What does Space Force do?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The day after should not be Iran’s
While Americans have opined, Israel has so far said little about the “day after” in Gaza. This interview with retired Israeli Brigadier General Amir Avivi provides a hint of at least some of the thinking near the Israeli government. He says essentially that Israeli security the day after will require two things: closing off Gaza from arms supplies shipped through Egypt and allowing Israel to raid as it wants inside Gaza.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has also suggested that Israel will need to provide security for a long time to come, which would mean in essence reoccupation of Gaza (or some portion of it). The Americans are opposing that.
The open air prison
The Israeli proposition amounts to a heightened version of the outdoor prison approach that failed on October 7 to protect Israeli security. It is not clear whether the Israelis are thinking the Egyptians will agree to tighten security at Gaza’s southern border or if they have something else in mind. Nor is it clear why the Israelis think their raiding would be any more effective after the war than it was before October 7. Israeli ground incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank have not been successful in curbing militancy there.
There are other problems with this option. Reconstruction in Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. Why would any Gulf country ante up if Israel is reserving to itself the privilege of destroying whatever is rebuilt? If the rebuilding doesn’t occur, Gaza’s inhabitants will be living in even greater misery than before the war. Why would that not lead to more resentment and extremism rather than less?
An international intervention
Another option would be an international intervention. This could be like the ones executed with a measure of success (at least in re-establishing security) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Gaza, with a population of about 2 million, is small enough to be comparable, even if the conflict there is far more intense.
Using RAND’s data for “heavy peace enforcement,” a similar operation in Gaza would require about 23,000 international troops and 3000 international police. This would be on top of 6000 local troops and 4500 local police. Annual costs would run over $6 billion. You can quarrel with these numbers. But given the dire situation in Gaza they are more likely too low than too high.
Troops and police will not be readily available
The Gulfies could ante up the money, but the troops and police are a serious problem for them. Peacekeeping troops might be available from the more usual UN suspects, but it would be the biggest UN peacekeeping operation in the world today. Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan are now the main UN troop contributing countries. India, now more than ever allied with Israel, might be a problem for the Gazans, but the others are possible.
The international police however would have to be Arab speakers. Which Arab countries have thousands of excess police they would be willing to contribute? Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria can be counted out due to their own civil wars. Egypt will resist, as it has spent decades trying to avoid responsibility for Gaza or Gazans. Jordan will likewise hesitate. The King has his hands full at home. The Gulf countries may be willing to foot the bill, but they won’t provide the personnel.
Even the local troops and police are an issue. All the readily available Gazans will have served in the Hamas brigades and police. Israel won’t want them re-empowered. The Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has only 10,000 police of its own. Neither Israel nor the PA will want half of them transferred to Gaza. The Gazans might not welcome them given the long contention between the PA and Hamas.
The local option
This forces us to consider the local option. Perhaps we can do without troops on the assumption that the Israelis won’t allow re-armament, even of people not previously affiliated with Hamas. UNRWA, the PLO, and nongovernmental organizations they cooperate with in Gaza should have a pretty good idea of who is who and what they are capable of. At least in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, they could provide relief and begin the process of rebuilding education and health care. They could also start to reconstitute a Gazan police force.
The Israelis will be suspicious of UNRWA, the PLO, and their colllaborators. This issue might be alleviated if a good deal of the humanitarian supplies were provided by Israeli nongovernmental organizations committed to coexistence and ready to collaborate with legitimate, non-Hamas, Gazan counterparts. That would complement the usual flow of humaniarian goods from Egypt through the Rafah crossing. Gazans would understandably be hesitant at first about humanitarian supplies from Israel. But the idea would be to flood the zone with clean water (much of Gaza’s water already comes from Israel), food, medical and sanitary supplies, temporary shelters and other vital commodities. That would be hard to resist.
None of this can happen, until…
None of this will happen soon. The war is still raging. There is no sign of the mutually hurting stalemate or the mutually enticing way out that are the classic conflict management conditions for a successful negotiation, starting presumably with a ceasefire.
Israeli goals are clear: to obliterate Hamas’ capacity to attack Israel and compel Hamas to give up the more than 200 hostages it still holds. Some Israeli officials cite even broader objectives: to destroy Hamas’ governing capacity and to eliminate its ideology. But I doubt Israel is willing to lose its own citizens in pursuit of those broader objecdtives.
Hamas’ objectives are less clear. Some of its leaders are telling the New York Times that it wants to create a permanent state of war with Israel. If that is true, we won’t have to worry about the day after for a long time. Others believe the near-term objective is release of all Palestinians in prison in Israel. A hostage/prisoner exchange is certainly within the realm of possibility within months, if not weeks.
Consider the alternative
None of this is edifying. But consider the alternative. If the war ends with no clear plan for reconstruction, the Iranians and Russians will be glad to pitch in. Their resources are limited. But Iran will be glad to let loose the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to help resuscitate something much like Hamas, Hizbollah, or the Houthis. The Wagner remnants would be glad to help arm and train them.
Far better than that would be a Gaza that could join the West Bank in negotiating statehood with Israel. Reconstruction should proceed with that goal in mind. Netanyahu aimed to split the Palestinans between the West Bank and Gaza. That strategy to postpone the Palestinian state is at the end of its useful life. It is time for those who support the Jewish state to welcome Palestinian aspirations for one of their own.
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