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Stiffening the approach to Serbia

Kosovo police and NATO forces in the Serb-majority north of the country over the weekend foiled an armed uprising. One Kosovo policeman and three terrorists were killed and others arrested. But most seem to have escaped. Serbia and its Srpska Lista political proxies in Kosovo have declared a day of mourning. That confirms their support for the insurrection. The little green men appear to have found safe haven inside Serbia.

Serbian President Vucic met subsequently with the Russian Ambassador. Vucic complained about “brutal ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, for which there is no evidence. We have no confirmation that Vucic ordered the armed uprising. But one of his mainstays in northern Kosovo was involved. Such things don’t happen without Belgrade’s knowledge. Vucic could have stopped it in advance or denounced it after the fact. He did not do either.

What this incident tells us

This incident is confirmation that Vucic does not intend to normalize relations with Kosovo. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue with that objective is a cover for his real goal. He wants separation of the four northern Serb-majority municipalities. He would prefer de jure partition and hopes that Russian success in annexing parts of Ukraine will validate that objective. But he would settle, for now, for de facto separate governance, in the form of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.

Pristina has demonstrated that its police can handle, with NATO backing, a heavily armed group of several dozen determined militants. But it is just as clear that Serbian armor could move into Kosovo with ease. It is less than 25 miles, maybe an hour’s tank drive, from the nearest Serbian border crossing to north Mitrovica. NATO has recently beefed up its forces in Kosovo. But it is not clear whether they are equipped or trained for anti-armor warfare.

American and European diplomats think Serbia will not attempt such a move because of the political consequences. But Vucic knows better. He is trying to convince the world that Serbs are being ethnically cleansed from Kosovo. That could validate a claim his tanks protect civilians. That is why he repeatedly claims, without evidence, that such ethnic cleansing is ongoing, as he did yesterday in a meeting with the Russian Ambassador.

The American and European response

The Western response has been weak so far. Brussels and Washington have appealed to “both sides” to prevent further violence and escalation. This implicitly equates the sterling performance of the Kosovo police with an illegal armed uprising that could have caused instability throughout the Balkans. Those responsible for Balkans policy in both capitals are unwilling to admit failure of their efforts to lure Serbia westward. Instead, they are urging a quick return to “the dialogue.”

An alternative approach would denounce Belgrade’s support for the armed uprising, labeling it a terrorist act and levying sanctions against Vucic and his defense and national security officials. NATO would prepare its forces in northern Kosovo for defense against an armored invasion. The West would praise the Kosovo police and urge a fair and speedy trial for the perpetrators in Kosovo courts. Ambassadors to Belgrade would be withdrawn for consultations.

A new policy is needed

They could be sent back quickly with a single message: the era of appeasement is over. If Belgrade wants EU membership, Serbia needs to quickly:

• arrest and turn over the terrorists to the Kosovo authorities.

• drop its insistence on separate governance of Serbs in Kosovo.

• align with Ukraine sanctions on Russia.

• support Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the United Nations.

If Belgrade refuses, the EU should announce it is freezing accession talks. The US should suspend military cooperation with Serbia, including cooperation with the Ohio National Guard.

Washington and Brussels should also prepare to spur Pristina to reach out to northern Serbs to find alternatives to Srpska Lista. In addition, Pristina should seek to ensure that there are no anti-Serb incidents throughout Kosovo, in order to invalidate Vucic’s claims of ethnic cleansing. Pristina should promptly investigate any incidents that do occur. The courts should promptly try perpetrators.

It is time to reconfigure Western policy on Serbia and Kosovo. Renewal of the current approach will bring new failures. A firmer approach with Belgrade is the necessary first step.

A fruitless approach that will continue

• It is a great pleasure to be able to participate in this launch of the New Lines Western Balkans Observatory. I am an admirer of New Lines, which has brought fresh thinking to Washington, especially but not only on Middle East issues.
• I hope to see the same devotion to new perspectives, deep analysis, and trenchant critiques from the Balkans New Lines.
• However I am an old Balkans hand. I fear I will not live up to my own expectations.
• I see in the Balkans today more of the same ethnic nationalist ambitions that haunted the region in the 1990s. The homicidal will and capacity have declined.
• But the effort to channel politics towards enabling autocrats to exploit the region’s ethnic polarization is all too familiar.

Belgrade’s ambitions

• The most ambitious effort of this sort is headquartered in Belgrade. Backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian security services allied with Russia, Alexandar Vucic is aiming to make himself an elected autocrat and the godfather of Serbs throughout the region.
• In Bosnia and Herzegovina, he does this by seeking full control of Milorad Dodik, who is struggling to maintain his autonomy. But Dodik needs Serbia’s financial and ideological backing.
• In Montenegro, Vucic does it through recently victorious and willing electoral proxies. These include both President Milatovic and Prime Minister-designate Spajic.

In Kosovo, Vucic’s focus is on the north

• I have been asked to focus on Kosovo. There Belgrade has continued to control the Serbs of the four municipalities north of the Ibar since the end of the war in 1999.
• Belgrade decides their cooperation and noncooperation with Pristina. North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvecan and Leposavic have little say.
• The refusal to accept Kosovo license plates, the boycott of the last municipal elections, the rioting against non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO soldiers, the kidnapping of Kosovo police in the north, and the refusal to guarantee participation in new elections have all been decided in Belgrade.
• The message is that Serbia will not allow the Serbs of the north to be governed within Kosovo’s constitutional framework unless they get—through the Association for Serb Majority Municipalities—virtual autonomy that removes them from that framework.

Russia likes it, but what about the EU and US?

• Either way, Pristina loses, de facto or de jure.
• It is clear why Russia would want this. Ethnic partition of Kosovo offers a precedent that could be useful for Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.
• It also undermines a Western achievement, the state-building project in Kosovo.
• Despite its many imperfections, Kosovo is the most successful of the democratic enterprises in the Balkans since 1995, and perhaps worldwide.
• It is less clear why the EU and US are backing this ethnonationalist ambition for separate governance in Kosovo.
• Of course, Brussels and Washington deny they support ethnic partition.

The facts belie the denials

• But have you heard a peep out of them about return of the Albanians and other non-Serbs to North Mitrovica, which was plurality but not majority Serb before 1999?
• Have they insisted Belgrade offer the same accommodations to Albanians in southern Serbia that they want for Belgrade in northern Kosovo?
• The Americans write op/eds about guaranteeing that the Association will not be allowed to become a second Republika Srpska. But are they prepared to commit the U.S. government in writing to precisely what that means?
• They cite arrangements similar to the Association that exist within the EU. But all those arrangements are between states that recognize each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• So why shouldn’t Serbia and the five non-recognizing EU states recognize Kosovo first, before creation of the Association ?

The EU is understandable

• The position of Brussels is, I fear, all too understandable.
• It is in the hands of a High Representative who has never been willing to see Kosovo recognized or enter the UN.
• With the UK gone, Germany distracted, Hungary and Croatia backing him, and five non-recognizers, Borell feels he has adequate support from the member states.
• I expect better of Miroslav Lajcak, who played a key role in the independence of Montenegro.
• However, he also promised when he first became Slovak Foreign Minister that Bratislava would recognize Kosovo. But he failed to deliver.

Washington is more mysterious

• The position of Washington is more mysterious. It seems to derive in part from people who have spent too much time listening to Serbs moaning about how the United States is unkind to Serbia.
• Some diplomats believe all Belgrade wants is a better deal for Serbs in the neighboring countries.
• It also reflects the ambition for a “Europe whole and free,” with Serbia in the West. With no evidence at all, American diplomats are claiming that Belgrade has embraced the West, even as it increases alignment with Moscow and Beijing.
• I have little doubt that whatever Serbian ammunition ends up in Ukraine more goes to Russia.
• Vucic’s summertime visit to President Zelensky aimed not to support Ukraine but to prevent Kyiv recognition of Kosovo.

The result is Kosovo isolation

• Kosovo is more isolated than ever. That is a problem.
• However much you oppose Serbia’s ethnonationalist ambitions, Pristina has lost traction with Brussels and Washington.
• It gets no credit, even when putting forward at last week’s dialogue with Belgrade a step in the direction of forming the Association. Albeit in accordance with Kosovo’s own requirements.
• I confess I do not know how to solve this problem. I thought the August letter from the American and European legislators urging a rebalancing of EU and US policy toward more evenhandedness was correct.
• But so long as current personnel are in place, I expect the biased, counterproductive, and wrong policies to continue.

Reset is needed

• The Biden Administration needs a policy reevaluation and reset. But that would require courage and tenacity. Someone would have to tell the Secretary of State that current policy is not working.
• That someone would also need to develop a new, more even-handed, and more effective approach.
• I am not expecting that kind of courage and tenacity in the leadup to a national election.
• I would however argue it could garner more Bosnian and Albanian votes in 2024 than it would lose among Serbs and Croats.

Ukraine is the best hope

• The best hope for the moment is Ukraine’s victory. That would end Russian territorial ambitions, take the wind out of ethnonationalist sails worldwide, and give Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo a leg up in contesting Serbia’s regional ambitions.
• But Ukrainian victory is not imminent.
• I conclude, sadly: we are going to have to continue to put up with a fruitless approach to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.