Tag: Russia
The better answer to the Dayton question is bankruptcy now
Thank you for the map, Gerard Toal!
Last week I engaged in the following exchange with Marko Atila Hoare (@markoah). He knows much more about Bosnia and Herzegovina than I ever will:
Marko: But do you think additional EUFOR troops would be a good thing ? I am concerned that if and when R[epublika S[rspska] finally secedes, EUFOR troops would protect it from pro-state BiH forces (in the name of ‘peace’). Even if they just reinforced the Dayton order, that would not be good.
Me: Dayton>secession, at least for now
Marko: Yes; maintenance of Dayton, potentially indefinitely, is a worse danger than an RS secession bid, which could at least be resisted and would allow BiH to repudiate the Dayton straitjacket. Better that RS becomes Transnistria than that it remains a pillar of an apartheid BiH.
We are now in the third decade since then of efforts to govern Bosnia and Herzegovina through dysfunctional powersharing arrangements. It is reasonable for people to ask whether continuing is better than the alternative.
The Dayton question
That is the Dayton question. Is it better to maintain the peaceful but unsatisfying status quo? Or would it be better to let Dayton go and see what will happen? The RS has already salami-sliced its way more than halfway there. It recently passed a law negating the authority of Bosnian Constitutional Court.
Of course the RS might not become a new Transnistria. It might instead become independent or the westernmost province of Serbia. Its secession might also precipitate a series of ethnic rebellions in Kosovo, Macedonia, and even in Serbia. That could be disastrous.
But the more immediate question is what would happen inside Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Brcko
The northeastern town of Brcko was the center of gravity of the last Bosnian war. The reason there was a Dayton negotiation was that the US forced a ceasefire to prevent the Bosnian Federation (Bosniak and Croat) forces from taking it in the fall of 1995. Banja Luka was about to fall. Ten days more would have decided the fate of Brcko.
Answering the Dayton question requires imagining what would happen with RS secession. My guess is that the RS sooner rather than later will try to take over Brcko, because it can’t survive intact without the northeast Bosnian town that links its two wings.
The EUFOR troops responsible for preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity lack the capability to prevent an RS takeover. It is not clear whether forces loyal to the Sarajevo government would be able to do so. That is a vital factor. If they can, then the RS will suffer a terminal defeat and a new negotiation for a more functional constitution would become feasible.
If Sarajevo can’t prevent an RS takeover of Brcko, the RS could secede but the World Bank, IMF, Western governments and investors would cut it off, forcing it into bankruptcy and further into the arms of Russia and Serbia. That would be a source of Schadenfreude for some, but it is not what I would call a winning wicket.
Win win
Far better would be an outcome that blocks secession but still forces a renegotiation of the Dayton agreements. The West should bankrupt the RS before it secedes rather than after. All Western assistance to the RS should come to a halt until all RS moves towards secession, including its law negating the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, are reversed. That would open an opportunity for a rescue effort, executed through Sarajevo, on condition that the constitution be renegotiated.
The EU and US would need to insist on a new constitution that eliminates the elaborate powersharing arrangements in the Dayton version. One person one vote and strong protection for individual political and economic rights are the ideal. But a new constitution should also provide strong protection for group rights when it comes to education, language, religion, and culture. I might prefer a constitution that eliminates the two entities and cantons in the Federation, but that is for Bosnians to decide.
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Montenegro’s long day’s journey into night
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montenegrin Helsinki Committee. He continues his observations on his country’s current political course:
Post-election political chaos in Montenegro continues.
A winning “Europe Now!” Movement – which controls 24 out of 81 seats in Parliament – has announced the start of negotiations with the pro-Russian/pro-Serbian coalition “For the Future of Montenegro. ” These are the parties of the former “Democratic Front.” Their leaders are still faced with a pending second trial for their alleged participation in failed 2016 coup d’etat, backed by Russia.
That is no surprise. Europe Now! has repeatedly stated that no negotiations with the former ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) would be possible. That pledge was an important element of their election campaign. That is the first contradiction of the current Montenegrin political constellation: the DPS, which is clearly pro-European, i.e. in favor of EU integrations, cannot be the partner of Europe Now! whose public political program is focused on EU membership.
Three consequences
The option to invite pro-Russian parties to join the new government has provoked three immediate negative consequences.
The first problem already exists. In two governments since the fall from power of DPS there have been no ethnic Montenegrins, a detriment largely ignored by the US and EU. The Serb nationalist narrative prevails.
The second concerns the Albanian, Bosniak, and Croat minority parties, which have 10 seats in parliament.* It is not yet clear whether they will lend their support to a government that denies the Srebrenica genocide, negates Montenegrin identity, and supports Russian aggression in Ukraine. But it is highly unlikely they would participate in a government which (re)confirms the political platform that the Serbian Orthodox Church, backed by Aleksandar Vučić regime, has promoted since 2020.
The third consequence concerns the international community’s Quint (US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy) diplomatic representatives in Montenegro. They continue to hesitate to voice public opposition to participation of pro-Russian parties in the next Montenegrin government. The Ambassadors remain attached to the formula “stable government with clear EU orientation.” Their inertia gives encouragement to pro-Serbian/Russian nationalists.
A serious and present danger
The statements of the Quint do not disturb “Europe Now!” because they fit well with its lip service to EU integration and allow room to include in the government those who have for decades obstructed Euro-Atlantic integration. Still, the unofficial prime minister-designate Milojko Spajić, President of Europe Now!, has been unable to say how many MPs or even parties will support his government, nevermind name a cabinet.
Because of loopholes in the Montegrin constitution, this hiatus allows the “technical” Prime Minister Abazović, to continue in office. His “out-going” mandate has lasted almost a year, despite the lack of accountability for dubious deeds. One of the rare points of consensus (minus Serbia and Russia) is that Abazović should go as soon as possible.
Wrong direction
But that would not suffice to calm the situation. Instability and uncertainty loom over the smallest country in the Western Balkans. Without a clearer and more precise position of the Quint, Montenegro will continue to face enormous problems. It will likely revert to negative and destructive political developments, with implications for the economy and security.
Montenegro continues its long journey in wrong direction. Where and when it may arrive to the point of no return is not only a rhetorical question, but a serious and clear danger.
* This sentence has been corrected from the original, which had omitted the Croats and cited 11 rather than 10 minority seats.
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Stevenson’s army, July 26
This is the 70th anniversary of the armistice which suspended combat in the Korean war. I guess that’s a pretty good example of a frozen conflict.
– Biden wants Chollet for OSD Policy
-FP’s China Watcher analyzes the ouster of the Chinese FM
– Megatrends: NYT shows world demographic changes; WaPo notes study warning of Gulf Stream tipping point.
– WSJ analyzes effects of Ukraine stalled offensive.
– UVa law prof urges Hughes-Ryan approach for national security AI.
– UNC prof says Trump wasn’t a fascist, but could be.
– History lesson: when Congress “expunged” a censure of a president.
– Jonathan Chait debunks conservative claim of long march to liberal domination.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, July 25
-WaPo has story based on comments by “officials” on how Putin was paralyzed by Wagner mutiny.-
– Politico says Senate is avoiding House approach to NDAA.
– Biden threatens to veto House appropriations bills with deep cuts. [I hope he realizes he can’t succeed vetoing bills because of what’s not in them, only for what is in them.]
– Dan Drezner assesses NYT editorial on sanctions.
– WSJ says US might have deal with China over fentanyl.
– Hill compares Trump and DeSantis on military issues.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The West needs to rebalance Balkans policy towards tough love
The US Congress has now conducted hearings on the Balkans in both the Senate and House. Members from both sides of the aisle evinced discomfort with Biden Administration policy. It has leaned heavily towards appeasement of Belgrade and has failed to react strongly to secessionist moves in Bosnia. What is the alternative?
The US is oblivious to the obvious
Administration officials are fond of reiterating the laudable 1990s strategic objective: Europe “whole and free.” They are oblivious to the obvious. It is not happening anytime soon. President Putin has forced the drawing of a new line in Europe. The Russian-dominated parts Europe will remain for now on the Eastern side of the line. This includes Russia and Belarus as well as parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria). The remaining questions are about Ukraine and the Balkans. Will the line go through them, or will they join the West?
In Ukraine, conventional warfare will answer the question. In the Balkans, it is already decided. For the foreseeable future, there is no serious prospect that Serbia or Republika Srpska (the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia and Herzegovina) will join the West.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the RS, that is obvious. Its president, Milorad Dodik, is a wholly-owned Russian proxy. He is doing his best to end any accountability to the Sarajevo “state” government. The RS parliament has already passed legislation denying the validity of Constitution Court decisions. It is only a matter of time before it passes legislation claiming state property, which the RS needs as collateral for its international loans. The international community’s High Representative will presumably annul all secessionist legislation from now on, but how he will enforce his decisions is not clear.
Dodik may not proceed all the way to declaring independence, as even Serbia would be reluctant to recognize the RS. But whether he does or not, RS will remain attached to the East so long as he is in power. The only hope for getting rid of him is to bankrupt the entity and bail it out with Western financing, conditional on his resignation and an end to secessionist ambitions. It is not yet clear whether Washington and Brussels have the stomach for that.
Serbia
Serbia is different. President Vucic is hedging between East and West. He plays Washington and Brussels off against Moscow and Beijing, hoping to get all he can from all four. Belgrade has a policy of military neutrality, for example, and conducts exercises with both NATO and Russia. Serbia buys weapons from both East and West. It ships weaponry to both Russia and Ukraine. Belgrade has refused to align with EU sanctions against Russia, but it votes against Russia on some General Assembly resolutions denouncing Russian aggression.
This Yugoslav-style “non-aligned” foreign policy is linked with ethnic nationalist domestic politics and ambitions for regional hegemony. Judging from ongoing anti-Vucic demonstrations, there are a lot of Serbs who aren’t happy with the current regime, which they view as violent, corrupt, and repressive. But the only viable electoral opposition to Vucic stems from his Serbian nationalist right. He has all but obliterated the liberal democratic opposition, which was weak to begin with. He controls most of the popular media and judicial system in addition to the executive. The Serbian security services and their allies in the Serbian Orthodox Church are wedded to Moscow.
In the region, Vucic aims to create the “Serbian world,” analogous to Putin’s “Russian world,” an idea that supported the invasion of Ukraine. In its weakest form, the goal is Belgrade political control over the Serb populations in neighboring states. Belgrade has already achieved that in Montenegro and Kosovo. In Bosnia, only Dodik, whose interests are not congruent, stands in the way. In its stronger form, the Serbian world entails annexation of territory Serbs occupy in neighboring countries and creation of Greater Serbia.
Rebalance the policy
Belgrade has not moved one inch closer to the West in the six years of Vucic’s presidency, despite consuming a truckload of diplomatic carrots. Strengthening of his links to Beijing has more than compensated for any weakening of his links to Moscow. The RS has spent 17 years moving towards secession. It is not going to reverse course without vigorous pushback. This situation requires a more realistic Western policy in the Balkans.
We need to lower expectations and raise incentives. Dodik’s RS and Vucic’s Serbia are not going to voluntarily embrace the West. The US, UK, and EU will need to starve the RS of all Western funds in order to end Dodik’s secessionist ambitions. They will also need to end Serbia’s immunity from Washington and Brussels criticism. Washington recently sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, Director of Belgrade’s Security Intelligence Agency, for corruption, drug and arms trafficking, and supporting Russia’s malign influence. That was a step in the right direction. The EU should do likewise. A public demand for Vulin’s removal as well as for the arrest and extradition to Kosovo of the thugs who attacked NATO peacekeepers in May would be another.
Possible benefits
Rebalancing toward Serbia and the RS would have the great virtue of testing not only their intentions, but also Moscow’s and Beijing’s. Moscow under current conditions is not going to want to increase funding to the RS. China hopes to use Serbia as an entry point to Europe. Beijing might think twice about investing in a Serbia that is on the outs with the EU. We could well be happily surprised if China and Russia decide to cut their losses and leave Serbia and the RS on the Western side of the new division of Europe. If they don’t, we will at least have saddled them with significant burdens.
Rebalancing could also help to revive the moribund dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Washington and Brussels have focused their pressure on Pristina, which has no hedging option and has traditionally bandwagoned with the West. There is a long history of Pristina responding better to carrots than sticks. Even longer is the history of Belgrade responding better to sticks than carrots. If Vucic saw Washington and Brussels coming after him with a stick rather than carrots, he would be inclined to hedge more in their direction. Tough love would bring better results than appeasement.
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Stevenson’s army, July 24
– WSJ says China has greatly reduced its FDI in the US
– Politico says China has sent a lot of military hardware to Russia.
– NYT calls Ukraine war a violent stalemate
– Spanish elections end in deadlock, not the right wing takeover predicted
Today is the 75th anniversary of Truman’s executive order desegregating the US armed forces. Yes, good policy can be good politics.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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