Tag: Russia
The Russians are coming
Of course they’ve already been present in Syria for decades and throughout the current civil wars. They have been holding on tight to their naval facilities at Tartus, supplying Bashar al Assad’s forces with weapons, training Syrian forces, and protecting Syrian diplomatic interests, in particular at the United Nations. But now Moscow seems to be constructing a base for a thousand or so troops at on air field outside Latakia, 50 miles to the north of Tartus. What are they up to? What does this move signify?
Building a base of these dimensions is a serious deepening of Russian commitment to the Syrian regime. Secretary Kerry called it escalation. But it betrays the weakness of the regime more than its strength. Latakia is the heartland of Alawite support for Bashar al Assad. If it requires Russian troops for its defense, the regime is either in deeper trouble along the coast than many had imagine, or perhaps preparing to relocate Assad from Damascus. Either way, it wouldn’t be necessary if things were going well for Bashar. Those who had hoped (I once counted myself among them), that Moscow would realize the folly of its support for him are going to be disappointed.
The Russians have reason to be concerned. Syrian government forces have palpably weakened over the last two years. Regime-organized militias (National Defense Forces) and Lebanese Hizbollah, sometimes under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps command, are now doing much of the fighting, as the regular army is disintegrating. The opposition has taken Idlib, 80 miles or so from Latakia, and much of the surrounding countryside.
They are within striking distance of Latakia, though the topography and demography will make getting there difficult. Alawite militias as well as Syrian regular forces, Hizbollah and now the Russians will defend Latakia and its approaches with vigor.
Moscow will portray whatever it is doing as support to a legitimate government fighting off a terrorist assault. The Russians I’ve talked with about Syria are fully committed to killing as many Sunni extremists as they can abroad, before they get to Mother Russia. The Islamic State has significant Chechen support. Moscow figures it is better to kill them in Syria than to risk their coming home to roost. The parallel with Bush Administration rhetoric should be noted.
Neither the regime nor Moscow will, however, make much distinction between the Islamic State and other more moderate forces that have taken up arms against Bashar al Assad. Their efforts on behalf of the regime are likely to radicalize the majority Sunni population of Syria further and help the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra recruit cadres. Russian escalation will also sink American diplomatic efforts to bring about a political solution in Syria. Neither the regime nor Moscow has ever shown interest in a solution that displaces Bashar, which Washington regards as a sine qua non, in order to convince at least some of the rebels to stop fighting.
Moscow will enjoy acting to fight ISIS in defiance of the Americans, whose anti-ISIS Coalition has had only a modicum of success. The situation in Syria is the mirror image of the situation in Ukraine, where the Russians are supporting insurgents and the Americans are supporting a legitimate government. Great powers, Putin feels, can do as they like, not least because that is how he thinks the Americans behave. The many differences between the trumped-up rebellion in eastern Ukraine and the all too genuine (and initially peaceful) uprising in Syria are of little interest to Putin.
So rather than just an escalation, it is better to see the Russian base-building as a further deterioration of the Syrian situation. It means heightened fighting, more displaced people and refugees, and less hope for a political solution. Europe had better brace itself for a much greater flow of what it prefers to call migrants, especially in anticipation of winter. The Russians are coming is not good news.
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Peace picks August 24-28
1. Promoting Nuclear Safety Cooperation in Northeast Asia | Tuesday, August 25th | 12:00-1:30 | East-West Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China, Japan, and South Korea all have deep experience with nuclear energy and large commercial nuclear power sectors, and the use of nuclear power is expected to continue to expand, mostly driven by growth in China. There have been calls over the years to increase regional nuclear safety cooperation, and the need for such cooperation has been highlighted by the Fukushima accident in Japan, the fake parts’ certificates scandal in South Korea, and rapid reactor construction in China. The most recent proposal for strengthening regional nuclear safety cooperation came in South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). NAPCI envisions addressing “soft” issues, including nuclear safety, in order to build deeper regional cooperation on “hard” security issues, similar to the integration process in Europe, and Park has specifically cited the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as a model for Northeast Asia. Yet, is EURATOM an appropriate model for Northeast Asia? Can NAPCI’s call for regional nuclear safety cooperation actually be realized, and what would effective cooperation look like? Strong, enduring commitment to nuclear safety cooperation by all regional actors will be necessary for NAPCI or any other initiative to succeed. This seminar will examine the current state of nuclear safety cooperation in Northeast Asia and offer a view to the future. Speaker: Dr. James E. Platte, Non-Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow, Pacific Forum, CSIS.
2. Peace, Conflict, and the Scale of the Climate Risk Landscape | Tuesday, August 25th | 1:15-2:45 | Webinar Sponsored by the Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Climate risks have the potential to affect every natural and social system, to harm populations, disrupt economic systems, and contribute directly or indirectly to conflicts within and across jurisdictional borders. The Global Climate Security webinar series convenes global thought leaders to seek pathways to improve responses to destabilizing climate risks. The opening webinar will examine the security implications of climate risk and will provide a context for the subsequent place-based and sector-based webinars. This session will address climate risk and security on all fronts from the risk assessment perspective (impacts on governance, economic vitality, national, regional and international security) to potential solutions (risk management, policy, and technical). Participants will hear from experts from the national intelligence and climate impact communities who will address the scale of the risks. The first webinar will set up the remaining webinars, which in turn will address how to respond in four sectors (national & subnational, industry, defense and global policy) based on risk assessment and responses commensurate with the risk. The intent is to examine steps to bridge the risk – policy analysis gap. Speakers include: Joshua Busby, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin Marc Levy, Deputy Director, Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Earth Institute, Columbia University, Mathew J. Burrows, Director, Strategic Foresight Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, and Nadya T. Bliss, Director, Global Security Initiative, Arizona State University.
3. Iran: What Next After the Nuclear Deal? | Tuesday, August 25th | 6:30-8:30 | Located at OpenGov Hub and sponsored by PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After last month’s Iran nuclear deal, what next for the Islamic Republic? Will the easing of sanctions bring it more into the diplomatic and international mainstream? Or will the new economic growth create a more assertive Iran that further antagonizes the rest of the region? What will the domestic consequences be of Tehran’s new openness to the outside world? And what, if anything, will happen to the nuclear program? Panelists include: Ariane Tabatabai, Visiting Assistant Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Reza Akbari, Senior Program Officer, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, and Sam Cutler, Policy Advisor, Ferrari & Associates, P.C. Moderator: Negar Razavi, PhD candidate, University of Pennsylvania and Global Fellow, PS21.
4. International Youth Month Breakfast Briefing: “Young Democracy: Engagement as a Deterrent to Radicalization” | Wednesday, August 26th | 9:30 – 11:00 | Located at the Rayburn House Office Building and hosted by IFES | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join IFES for a breakfast briefing on how involving young people in constructive democratic processes can serve as a potential deterrent to radicalization. This panel will discuss engagement both before and after the age of enfranchisement, with a special emphasis on the political participation of young women and girls. Discussants will offer examples of programmatic work from multiple regions and countries, including Bangladesh, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Syria and Yemen. This event will be co-hosted by the office of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18). Speakers include: Matthew Cohen, Program Officer, Africa, IFES, Jessica Huber, Senior Gender Specialist, IFES, Juliette Schmidt, Deputy Regional Director, Asia and the Pacific, IFES, and Ambar Zobairi, Deputy Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa. Moderated by Augusta Featherston, Youth Adviser, IFES.
5. The Economic Impact of Lifting Sanctions on Iran | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00-11:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A new World Bank report assesses that the removal of economic sanctions against Iran could significantly boost economic growth in Iran—including $15 billion in annual oil revenue—while potentially reducing global oil prices as much as 14 percent in the short run, depending on OPEC’s response, and opening up a significant market for exports. Drawing from the report’s systematic and comprehensive analysis, Shantayanan Devarajan will discuss the economic and geopolitical implications of Iran’s potential reentry into the global economy. Carnegie’s Uri Dadush will discuss the economic consequences and Karim Sadjadpour will moderate. Speakers include: Shantayanan Devarajan, chief economist, MENA region, World Bank and Uri Dadush, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment. Moderator, Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment.
PC: Eddie Grove
6. The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTRATION CLOSED- WATCH ONLINE | Please join us for the release and discussion of a new CSIS Europe Program report, The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic, which examines Russia’s economic, energy, and security strategies and aspirations in the Arctic, and the evolution of the Kremlin’s Arctic policies over the past decade. On the eve of President Obama’s and Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Anchorage, Alaska where they will convene Arctic and non-Arctic leaders to discuss climate impact and resilience, and global leadership in the Arctic, it is a timely moment to better understand the
largest and most dynamic Arctic actor and to assess whether the Arctic will remain a cooperative region or succumb to geopolitical tensions. Report author Heather A. Conley and project consultant Dr. Marlène Laruelle will examine the significant changes in Russia’s Arctic policies and rhetoric – particularly since President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 – and offer their insights on Russia’s military posturing in the region, as well as how to develop new collaborative thinking to preserve and protect international Arctic cooperation. New York Times correspondent Steven Lee Myers, who has written about and traveled frequently to the Russian Arctic, will offer his reflections on the report and assess whether the
development of a 21st century “ice curtain” is realistic. The panelists will also preview the upcoming August 31st meeting in Alaska and assess the impact of the potential attendance of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. Speakers include: Dr. Marlène Laruelle, Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University and Steven Lee Myers, Correspondent, The New York Times. Introduced and moderated by Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic, CSIS Europe Program.
7. A Normal Nuclear Pakistan | Thursday, August 27th | 12:30-2:00 | Stimson | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A commercial pathway for Pakistan to join the mainstream in the global nuclear order is highly unlikely. Pakistan’s leaders must therefore consider nuclear weapon-related initiatives that could facilitate mainstreaming, while also strengthening nonproliferation norms, bolstering global disarmament hopes, and setting the bar higher for new entrants into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This presentation will discuss a new report by the Stimson Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,” co-written by Toby Dalton (Co-Founder and Senior Associate, Stimson) and Michael Krepon (Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). The report takes a hard look at Pakistan’s nuclear weapon-related programs and its ambitions to be viewed as a normal state possessing advanced nuclear technologies.
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დავითი and Голиаф (David and Goliath)
On Wednesday, USIP hosted a talk by the Defense Minister of Georgia, Tinatin Khidasheli, entitled Seeking Security: Georgia Between Russia and ISIS. William B. Taylor, Executive Vice President, USIP, moderated. Khidasheli made a forceful argument that NATO membership or at least a path to NATO membership for Georgia would help deter Russia and maintain NATO credibility.
In his introductory remarks, Taylor noted that Georgia is a strong US ally that has demonstrated its military and diplomatic capabilities. Georgia is committed to integration with the West and NATO.
Khidasheli said Georgia proves success for a former Soviet Socialist Republic is possible without Russia in charge. This is why Russia fights everything they do. Putin is trying to recover from the weakness of the Yeltsin era. He won’t let any country in Russia’s immediate neighborhood have a say without Russia’s permission.
The European Neighborhood’s Eastern Partnership started with six countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, at the 2015 Riga Summit, only Georgia was fully present. This was disappointing.
Khidasheli cited two motives for her trip to DC:
- To strengthen Georgia’s partnership with the US and achieve more tangible results and military cooperation.
- To seek advice on Georgia’s path to NATO membership.
NATO needs Georgia more than Georgia needs NATO, she said, in order to maintain its mission and credibility. The Alliance has been talking for years about its commitment to partners and its open-door policy. It must prove it is still a courageous organization. Some argue that expanding NATO will force Russia to act, but after NATO made it clear in 2008 that it wasn’t expanding, Russia invaded South Ossetia. By 2009, the West viewed Russia as a partner again, but Russia’s actions in Ukraine made it clear that is not true.
As soon as the Riga summit ended in disappointment, Russia started actions in Georgia. There are daily Russian movements on the artificial border with South Ossetia. The Russians sometimes advance up to a kilometer or two. Georgia won’t be provoked and won’t allow war on its territory. The checkpoints that Russia has marked are now just .5 km from Georgia’s main East-West highway. Is Russia targeting it or trying to distract Georgia?
NATO will hold its Warsaw Summit in July 2016. Georgia will hold parliamentary elections in October 2016. A bad outcome at Warsaw won’t make Khidasheli’s voters fall in love with Russia, but it could decrease their turnout, leading to a more pro-Russian parliament. The situation in Ukraine is adding to doubts about Georgia’s integration into NATO and the EU. There are two possible outcomes of the Warsaw summit:
- NATO allows Russia a veto over new members, rejects expansion and cedes additional areas to Russian dominance.
- NATO pursues enlargement, sending a clear message to Russia that partners matter as much as members.
NATO brings peace. It is the only reason the Baltics are currently safe. The current situation won’t deter Russia. The world hasn’t been able to stop the war in Ukraine.
The dominant argument from the Kremlin now favors a strong Russia. Putin has no trouble presenting the West as the enemy. But sanctions alone against Russia won’t help and will play into Putin’s “evil West” narrative. The West needs to understand that Russia is a country where people ate rats and cats in World War 2 and still won. Western notions of hardship and happiness aren’t relevant there.
Khidasheli recognizes that a realistic outcome of the Warsaw Summit won’t be NATO membership but an intermediate step towards membership. Georgia wants a statement that it is on a membership track.
While Georgia recently acquired an air defense system from France, Khidasheli did not specify how Tbilisi plans to deter Moscow or draw red lines. Georgia will make decisions about whether to shoot down a Russian plane violating Georgian airspace based on the threat level. With respect to Russia’s creeping annexation policies, Khidasheli reiterated that Georgia won’t be provoked. Georgia will not make a decision regarding countering Russia without its partners.
Russia is trying to use soft power to influence Georgia through NGOs and the media. There are political parties that openly align with Russia, including a former parliamentary speaker.
Khidasheli also spoke briefly about the problem of ISIS recruitment in Georgia, especially in the Pankisi Gorge. This poses a great danger. Georgia has failed to pay enough attention to the problems in this region. More integration, education and targeted employment programs are needed to decrease the feelings of isolation and abandonment among locals. The government must also examine other areas of Georgia where the demographics suggest future problems and address those issues now.
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Tehran calling
Unlike many colleagues around Washington, I have decided to talk with and answer questions from Iranian media willing to publish them. I think it important for Americans to try to be understood in Iran. Certainly Tehran is making big efforts to be understood in the US. While I find some of what the Iranian media broadcast objectionable and even odious, most of the questions they ask me are straight up, like these from Hamid Bayati, published this morning in the Tehran Times:
Q: As you know Iran and Russia begin new initiative to bring peace to Syria, so how do you evaluate these efforts?
A: There really is nothing to evaluate yet. The Iranian four-point proposal, which has been public for some time, requires a good deal more detail before it can be evaluated. The key question is how the transition will be handled. No political solution will work that keeps Bashar al Assad in power, because the Syrian opposition will continue fighting.
Q: Some experts believe that after nuclear deal reach between Iran and world powers, Western countries especially the US begin to cooperate with Iran in regional issues such as Syria, and a new era begins in Middle East. Do you agree with this view?
A: Not really, even if I would like to see it happen. Iran with the nuclear agreement will have substantial resources. The question is how it will use those resources. Hardliners in Tehran will presumably argue for more support to Iran’s allies in the region: Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, Houthi forces in Yemen and Hamas. The US and Europe will not welcome moves of that sort. There will be enormous pressure on the US administration to push back, especially against Hizbollah.
Q: Turkey launches airstrikes against ISIL and PKK positions in Syria and Iraq, are these acts helpful to peace process in Middle East or not?
A: The Americans think more Turkish help against ISIL is vital. The US and Turkey have different opinions about the Kurds in Syria, though at this point PKK attacks inside Turkey are making that irrelevant.
Q: How do you evaluate the US-led Coalition against ISIS after one year of its creation? Does this Coalition reach its goals?
A: The Coalition has not reached its goals, but it has blocked ISIS advances and has rolled them back in some areas (Tikrit, Kobane, Tal Abayd). Without a better formula for who will govern in ISIL-controlled territory, I don’t see how the Coalition can “win.”
Q: As you know US congress is reviewing the Iran nuclear deal and it is possible US lawmakers will kill this deal. If this event happen what will we have after that?
A: It is possible but not likely that US lawmakers would kill the deal, but in order to do so they would need a 2/3 majority in both houses of Congress. That will be difficult to get. If they do kill the deal, Iran and the P4+1 will have some important decisions to make. Do they abandon the deal completely, or do they implement it without the US? If the deal is abandoned, what will Iran do?
Q: In an interview aired Sunday on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS,” Obama said the United States’ role in global politics could be affected by the deal, how do you explain this sentence?
A: Defeat of the deal would separate the US from its allies and undermine confidence in American leadership in many countries. It would be like the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations almost 100 years ago, a move that isolated and weakened the US.
Q: If US congress kills the deal, is it possible United States and EU continue a different strategy toward Iran? I mean is it possible they have different relations with Iran and EU that don’t follow US policy?
A: It is possible, though the US might try to apply “secondary” sanctions by barring European companies from doing business with the US if they do business with Iran. That would create big problems with America’s closest allies.
Q: It seems European countries have been more eager than US to revive their relations with Iran, how do you explain this view?
A: Europe needs Iranian oil and gas much more than the US does. Our companies are far less interested in doing business with Iran than some European countries. Geography is destiny I’m afraid.
As I failed to respond adequately to his question about the PKK, Hamid sent more, which were not published with the rest of the interview:
A: What do you think about Turkey military attacks on PKK positions? Some experts said these attacks are because the AK party lost in elections. Some experts said Turkey attacks the PKK because Turks don’t want Kurds to be strong, what do you think about it?
Q: The PKK made the mistake of ending the ceasefire with the Turkish government, which reacted forcefully. Some think this was the result of a split among the Kurds between those who did well in recent elections and the military component, which feared irrelevance.
It might have been better for the Turks to escalate more slowly; some think Erdogan may be seeking to regain some of the popular support he has lost recently by vigorously responding to every Kurdish provocation. But the PKK is a terrorist organization that attacks the Turkish state and can’t expect safe haven in Iraq or Syria. Iranian support for the PKK is a big concern for Turkey.
The complication of course is that the most effective Syrian fighters against ISIL include Kurds affiliated with the PKK. The Americans prioritize the fight against ISIL, which is an international threat. The Turks prioritize the fight against the PKK, which is a domestic threat. Iran does likewise when it faces a domestic threat of the PKK variety. The US and Turkey will work out their differences in dealing with the Kurds. I’m less sure that Iran and the US, or Iran and Turkey, will do likewise, though it would be desirable.
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Peace picks August 17-21
1. The Defense Economy and American Prosperity | Monday, August 17th | 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At just over 3 percent of gross domestic product, U.S. military spending totals more than $600 billion annually. A number of recent developments and long-term trends, however-including sequestration and contractor consolidation-threaten the health of the U.S. national security industrial base. The American defense industry is being squeezed on multiple fronts, but just how important is the defense sector to the overall strength of the American economy? Do specific cities or regions have more to worry about than others should defense spending continue to decline? What impact does defense spending have on regional and national job creation and technology innovation? On August 17, the Foreign Policy and Economic Studies programs at Brookings will host a discussion of the American economy and the role that defense industry could play in the nation’s continued recovery and economic health. Panelists include Ben S. Bernanke, Brookings distinguished fellow in residence, and Mark Muro, senior fellow and policy director of the Metropolitan Policy Program. Michael O’Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, will also participate and moderate the session. Following discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
2. Assessing Japan-Republic of Korea Relations after Prime Minister Abe’s Anniversary Statement | Tuesday, August 18th | 10:00-11:30 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s statement commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II has the potential to either repair or further impair Tokyo’s current strained bilateral relations with Seoul. In recent months, both countries have endeavored to repair the relationship by addressing and compartmentalizing historic issues. But real progress on the nascent rapprochement initiative remains dependent on Abe’s anniversary statement and President Park Geun-hye’s response. Strained relations between two critically important allies is of grave concern to Washington since it hinders U.S. security interests in Asia and constrains effective integrated responses to the North Korean military threat. Questions remain over what role the U.S. can play in helping Japan and the Republic of Korea achieve reconciliation. Speakers include: Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS, and Associate Professor, Georgetown, Evans J.R. Revere, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings and Sheila A. Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, CFR. Host: Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage.
3. Examining Arctic Opportunities and Capabilities: Does the U.S. Have the Infrastructure, Ships and Equipment Required? | Tuesday, August 18th | 1:30-3:30 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On April 24, 2015 the United States began a two-year term as Chairman of the Arctic Council. The Council is composed of eight Member States: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S. Clearly, the capabilities of these eight countries to operate in the Arctic differ quite significantly. As Arctic opportunities arise, so, too, has the interest of an increasing number of non-Arctic countries. Twelve countries have been deemed Arctic Council “Observers:” the People’s Republic of
China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Several of these “Observers” are also actively developing and advancing their potential Arctic operations capability. The United States, under its Chairmanship over the next 20 months, will have numerous policy questions worthy of examination and assessment. Can any Arctic policy be sustained without enduring U.S. capabilities? Does change in the Arctic region encourage other countries to become more actively operational in the area? While the U.S. has the capability to operate around much of the globe, does
it really have a robust ability to be a presence in the Arctic? How might the U.S. better operate side-by-side with Arctic allies? Are Arctic Council “Observer” nations already more capable of Arctic operations than the U.S.? Join us for a most timely and important discussion. Keynote speaker: Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., USCG (Ret.), Special Representative for the Arctic, U.S. Department of State. Host: James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, The Heritage Foundation. Other speakers include: H.E. Geir
Haarde, Ambassador of Iceland to the United States and former Prime Minister, Isaac Edwards, Senior Counsel for Chairman Murkowski, U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and Luke Coffey, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation. Moderator: James E. Dean, Manager, International and Diplomatic Programs, The Heritage Foundation.
4. China’s Missiles and the Implications for the United States |Wednesday, August 19th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While China’s ongoing island-building in the South China Sea has garnered headlines, Beijing has quietly continued a ballistic missile modernization program that increasingly threatens U.S. and allied naval vessels—and challenges existing U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense capabilities. The United States is particularly concerned about the development of the DF-21 “carrier killer” that is designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pacific. Additionally, the commander of the U.S. Northern Command, Admiral Gortney, confirmed in April that China has deployed three ballistic missile submarines capable of striking the U.S. homeland. On August 19th, Hudson Institute will host five noted experts for a discussion of China’s expanding missile arsenal and the role of that arsenal in Beijing’s broader strategic objectives. Trey Obering, Dean Cheng, Mark Schneider, and Bryan Clark will join Hudson Adjunct Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs to analyze China’s military capabilities, national strategy, and possible U.S. responses. Speaker: Henry A. “Trey” Obering III, Executive Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton. Panelists include: Dean Cheng, Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy, and Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Moderator: Rebeccah Heinrichs, Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute.
5. Seeking Security: Georgia Between Russia and ISIS | Wednesday, August 19th | 3:00 – 4:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As world headlines focus elsewhere, international security remains at risk in Georgia: Russian troops last month continued a creeping seizure of new Georgian territory, including part of a strategic pipeline. ISIS is recruiting fighters throughout the Caucasus for its war in Syria. Georgian Defense Minister Tinatin Khidasheli, in Washington to meet with top U.S. officials, will make her remarks at USIP August 19. She will discuss how her country is navigating regional security threats that have deepened in the 18 months since Russia attacked Ukraine.
6. US-Israeli Relations After the Iran Deal | Wednesday, August 19th | 6:30-8:30 | Located at Thomson Reuters but sponsored by PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After July’s historic nuclear deal between the P5+1 great powers and Iran, what is next for relations between the United States and Israel? Moderator: Warren Stroble, Reuters DC diplomatic editor. Panelists: Alexandria Paolozzi, Senate Legislative
Director and Issue Specialist on Israel for Concerned Women for America (CWA). She visited Israel in September 2014 on a Millennial Leaders tour. She has organized Capitol Hill panels on religious freedom in the Middle East, rallies and demonstrations in support of Israel, and has lobbied on pro-Israel policies in the United States Senate. Dr. Guy Ziv is an assistant professor at American University’s School of International Service (SIS), where he teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy, the Middle East, and international negotiations. He is the author of the Why Hawks Become Doves: Shimon Peres and Foreign Policy Change in Israel. He is founder and director of the Israel National Security Project (INSP), a repository of statements by Israeli security experts concerning the strategic imperative of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ari Ratner is a former State Department official and current PS21 board member.
7. Cyber Risk Wednesday: Hacks, Attacks, and What America Can Do about It | Wednesday, August 19th | 4:00-5:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Two months ago, the OPM discovered the biggest breach of US government data in history, described by many as the long-feared “Cyber 9/11”, exposing sensitive information on millions of Americans. While the Obama administration has refrained from publicly attributing the attack, many officials have privately pointed the finger at China. In July, hackers penetrated the Joint Chiefs of Staff email network in what has been described as the “most sophisticated” cyber breach in the history of the US military. Although the investigation is still underway, suspicion has quickly fallen on Russia. And just days ago, news broke about Chinese cyber spies having had access to the private emails of top US officials since at least 2010. In light of the unprecedented scale and scope of these recent data breaches, the Obama administration faces difficult questions: Does political cyber espionage warrant retaliation? Would retaliating effectively deter US cyber adversaries? Or would it further escalate the conflict, especially as the United States itself has been caught spying on other nation states? To answer these questions and suggest a way forward for the US government, this moderated panel discussion brings together recognized cybersecurity and espionage experts Siobhan Gorman, Director at Brunswick’s Washington, DC office; Jason Healey, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative and Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs; and Robert Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow for Cyber Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
8. Taiwan’s China Tangle | Thursday, August 20th | 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm | Stimson | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Taiwan was a symbol of “Free China” during the Cold War era. Democratization and the rise of local identity after the 1990s transformed the nature of the society into an indigenous regime. Under the double pressure of globalization and the rise of China, Taiwan is searching for a new route to cope with increasing domestic and international challenges. This presentation by Stimson’s Visiting Fellow Dr. Tse-Kang Leng will discuss the impact of the “China factor” on Taiwan public opinion toward cross-Strait relations, Taiwan’s economic links with the Mainland, and Taiwan’s strategic positon in a globalizing world. Speaker: Dr. Tse-Kang Leng, Visiting Fellow, East Asia Program, Stimson Center, Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica (IPSAS), and Professor of Political Science, National Chengchi University. Moderator: Alan D. Romberg, Distinguished Fellow and Director of the East Asia Program, Stimson.
9. A New Kind of Conflict: Cyber-Security on the Korean Peninsula | Thursday, August 20th | 3:00-5:30 | SAIS- The Bernstein-Offit Building, Room 500 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | ‘A New Kind of Conflict’ is a simulation exploring a cyber-security incident between North and South Korea, with the goal of highlighting the gaps between modern capabilities and international legal frameworks designed to combat cyber-crime. Networking reception with food and drink will follow. Event starts at 3pm, check-in begins at 2:45pm. Seating is limited.
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The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
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