Tag: Russia
Big surprise is no surprise
The Middle East Institute published my piece this evening:
The Iran nuclear deal has only one big surprise: it is consistent with the April 2 “parameters” that preceded it and contains no surprises. No one caved. Nothing got walked back.
But there are some interesting additions. One is this: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” This is a written confirmation of the Supreme Leader’s controversial “fatwa” against nuclear weapons. It was not so long ago that Iran’s critics in the United States were complaining that the fatwa was only oral and not written. I have not noticed anyone welcoming the written version.
The “reaffirmation” wouldn’t be worth the paper it is printed on except for the detailed limits and intrusive inspections that the agreement provides. No softie on Iran, Dennis Ross confirms that these fulfill previous Iranian commitments to limit centrifuges, enrichment, and enriched uranium; end all plans for separating plutonium; and no longer engage in any research and development related to a nuclear explosive device. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring will be more comprehensive and intrusive than for other countries. While no system is foolproof, nuclear weapons have never been developed within an IAEA safeguarded program.
That leaves the possibility of a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA. There is reason to believe that Tehran had such a program until 2003, when it was allegedly stopped. Iran, which previously stonewalled IAEA inquiries on this subject, has now committed in the nuclear deal to clarifying its past nuclear activities with “possible military dimensions” by October 15, with a final assessment due from the IAEA on December 15. This will be an important early milestone in implementation (or not) of the nuclear deal. It is not the first time the Iranians have promised clarification. Beyond that date, the IAEA can request access to locations of concern. Iranian objections can be overridden by five of eight members of a joint commission overseeing implementation of the agreement. That joint commission includes five Western members (the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the EU) as well as Russia, China, and Iran.
The agreement provides for sanctions to be lifted once Iran implements its obligations or passes certain time limits in compliance with the agreement. No sanctions get lifted without implementation, and some—like the arms embargo—remain in place for five or eight years (depending on the weapons involved). While most restrictions are lifted within 15 years, some remain in place in perpetuity, including strict IAEA safeguards and the prohibition on nuclear weapons research and development.
The question is what happens if one or another obligation is breached. There is an elaborate, but quick-paced (I count 35 days), dispute resolution mechanism. At that point, UN Security Council sanctions would be reinstated, unless the Council votes within 30 days to continue lifting them. This is a “snapback” mechanism, unprecedented so far as I know in the Security Council. It would give the United States (and other permanent members) a veto over sanctions lifting. Iran has stated that it would treat reinstatement of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments.
So, is this agreement a good thing or a bad thing?
It depends on what you think the alternative might be. At worst, it would be no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program, no IAEA monitoring, and no multilateral sanctions, as the EU and China are champing at the bit to do business with a cash, oil, and gas-rich Iran. At best we might in the absence of an agreement be able to sustain the sanctions for a while but not likely the IAEA monitoring and technological constraints, giving others in the region reason to initiate their own programs to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. War might set back the Iranian nuclear program for a few years, but it would also give them incentive to finish the job and unleash even more chaos than the region is currently enduring.
Relief from sanctions will unquestionably provide the Iranians with resources. Tehran is owed upward of $100 billion that will flow into its coffers, in addition to whatever its renewed exports will bring in today’s bearish oil market, likely to go down further because of Iran’s reentry into it. The Islamic Republic is a profoundly anti-Western regime that even without much available cash has managed to contribute to instability in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Its anti-Americanism may sound hollow after this agreement, which engages Iran in a continuing process involving the United States and three of its allies as well as the European Union, but unless there is a dramatic and unexpected change of heart at the top in Tehran we can anticipate more trouble from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies in the region and even beyond.
America’s friends in the Gulf will therefore be nervous about the implications of this agreement, though the United Arab Emirates was quick to say it welcomed it. Israel denounced it even before the ink was on the page. But soon enough both the Gulf states and Israel will become keen about insisting on fulfilling its every letter, as they have with the interim agreement currently in effect.
The debate in Congress will be vigorous. Most Republicans and a good number of Democrats will oppose the deal on the grounds that it licenses Iran to become a nuclear threshold state, ignoring the Obama administration’s conviction that this would happen faster and with fewer controls in the absence of an agreement. But the opponents are unlikely to muster the two-thirds majority in both houses required to override a presidential veto. The Supreme Leader is thought to have given the green light for this deal, but he has not yet pronounced on it. Assuming he says a dramatically reluctant “yes,” the Iranian Majlis will not block it.
The saga of implementation has not yet begun. It will last 10-15 years. If the agreement holds and prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it will have made an enormous contribution to peace and stability. If it fails, we will have to deal with the ugly consequences: war or a nuclearized Middle East.
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Two unexpected wars
On Tuesday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a talk entitled Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS with Brigadier Ben Barry, the Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the IISS.
Barry discussed the conflicts separately but drew some parallels between them on the level of military strategy.
Both the conflict in Ukraine and the war against ISIS came as a shock to the US. The conflict in Ukraine began with a Russian campaign in Crimea led by elite units and complemented by propaganda. The Russians made good use of special forces, electronic warfare and deniability. In Crimea, both sides sought not to use lethal force. The ability of the Russian military to restrain its use of lethal force shows that it is better trained than when it fought in Afghanistan or Chechnya. The Russian military has a cadre of strategic planners and an aptitude for deception.
According to Barry, the insurgency of pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine has exploited grievances against the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of investment in recent years. They have made little effort to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign against the separatists. Last summer, they had some success in pushing the separatists back, but were stopped by Russian intervention, including professionally applied indirect fire. Both the separatists’ own artillery, as well as the Russian artillery that intervened, are skilled. The Ukrainian Air Force has been stymied by the separatists’ air defenses. The separatists have also made effective use of SIGINT and drone intelligence to call in strikes. Russia has improved its military readiness, as the conflict in Ukraine attests.
With regard to the fight against ISIS, according to Barry, Maliki’s 2010 election victory was followed by his attempt to consolidate power by marginalizing Sunni and Kurdish politicians. Meanwhile, the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq fought Assad in Syria and renamed themselves ISIS. They rebuilt their networks in Iraq among discontented Sunni tribes and used sophisticated propaganda to gain volunteers and donations. They then launched their assault on Fallujah, followed by their capture of Mosul. In Mosul, the majority of 3 or 4 Iraqi divisions disintegrated in the face of ISIS’s onslaught. The Iraqi army had suffered from Maliki’s attempt to assert direct control over it and replace capable commanders with politically loyal ones.
ISIS has used both insurgency tactics and conventional forces. The high water mark of ISIS offensives in Iraq came in the fall of 2014. After this point, ISIS still counterattacked at vulnerable spots and conducted offensives in Syria simultaneously. ISIS is now on the strategic defensive in Iraq, but this has been an active defense. To take Ramadi, ISIS used diversionary attacks to distract the Iraqi forces. They may have also conducted the attack under the cover of a sandstorm to stymie coalition airstrikes.
Barry described the sequence of an ISIS attack:
1. Indirect fire.
2. En masse suicide bombings.
3. Captured armored bulldozers are used to breach Iraqi army berms.
4. Close assault including cameramen to document the carnage and subsequent executions.
The fall of Ramadi played into ISIS’s narrative of defending the borders of the Caliphate and mounting counterattacks. These facts on the ground inspire recruits and cause other groups to declare allegiance to ISIS.
According to Barry, ISIS has two main vulnerabilities:
1. In a successful, sustained offensive against it, ISIS would have to move a large numbers of fighters, unmasking them and rendering them vulnerable to attack.
ISIS could, however, move large numbers of civilians at the same time to complicate an attack.
2. If the Sunni tribes in Iraq turn on ISIS, this would be a significant blow.
At first glance, these two conflicts have little in common but Barry drew a few parallels between them:
1. Both conflicts show the importance today of winning the information war. Military operations will increasingly be used for their propaganda effects.
2. The Russian separatists and ISIS leverage superior military leadership against the Ukrainian government and the Iraqi military, respectively.
3. Without airpower, the anti-ISIS coalition would be far worse-off than it is. In Ukraine, we can see how the Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of airpower.
4. Artillery is key in both conflicts. Indirect fire is normally the cause of the majority of casualties in war, and this is likely true in both Iraq and Ukraine. Western militaries have reduced their use of indirect fire, but Russia and China still have extensive indirect fire capabilities.
5. Both conflicts demonstrate the need for the US and NATO to assess which of their allies are vulnerable to hybrid warfare.
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Yes, a nuclear deal means trouble
I am a proponent of a good nuclear deal with Iran. But I have taken some time this week to appreciate Israel’s perspective. Here is what I have understood and how I react.
The Israelis are concerned with the geostrategic impact of a deal with Iran that will accept and thereby legitimize its enrichment program. Other countries in the region that have in the past been constrained from pursuing enrichment will now proceed, in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Whereas Turkey may be a more or less consolidated democracy, it is unpredictable who might come to power in the Kingdom or Egypt and what they might do with nuclear technology.
At the same time, Iran’s pernicious proxies in the region–until now deterred by Israel’s military capabilities–will be emboldened and enriched with resources once multilateral sanctions are lifted. Iran doesn’t much care about US sanctions. The ideology of the regime requires that the US remain an enemy. It will be sufficient for Europe, Russia and China to begin doing business with Tehran to put lots of money in its pockets. Any help the US gets from Iran and its proxies in fighting the Islamic State will be short-lived.
Everyone in the region, not just Israel, will feel less secure. An arms race will ensue. The buying spree will put advanced weapons into the hands of regimes that are not stable or reliable. No one knows where they will end up.
American reassurances are dubious. One hundred per cent access to Iranian facilities is impossible. No country has ever provided it. Iran won’t either. Nor can sanctions “snap back.” Neither the Russians nor the Chinese will agree to a mechanism that they are unable to block.
In my view, these preoccupations all have their validity. The trouble is the outcomes feared are likely whether there is an agreement or not. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are already under no legal restraint from enriching uranium whenever they please. Multilateral sanctions are unlikely to survive much longer, due to Chinese and European hunger for oil and gas as well as their interest in exporting to Iran. Arms have been pouring into the Gulf countries as well as Egypt and Jordan for years. There is already no lack of advanced equipment in hands that may or may not be reliable.
On top of all that, no agreement means no inspections and no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program. That is worse than the ample access to Iran’s nuclear program, and serious constraints, that an agreement will have to provide.
It is hard not to see the Israeli preoccupations as nostalgia for a region that they dominated for decades. Iran was marginalized, the Arabs were under America’s thumb, and Israel could do, and did, as it liked.
But that is not the eternal order in the Middle East. There is no way to keep Iran in its diminished position, much as we might like to try. Nor are the Arabs inclined to remain under American control. The prospect of a nuclear deal is ironically inclining them more than ever before to make common cause with Israel against Iran, whatever the Americans think. Just think what would happen if the Israelis were to settle with the Palestinians!
The bottom line: Israel wanted Iran to be forced to give up enrichment and will be satisfied with nothing less. But that was unlikely at best and impossible at worst.
Provided the verification mechanisms in any nuclear deal reached in the next few days are robust, including accounting for past military dimensions, all of us will need to learn to live with a still non-nuclear-armed Iran that is less constrained and more flush with cash than in the recent past. We’ll also need to be prepared to deter and counter its troublemaking, at least until someone who doesn’t see America as an enemy governs in Tehran.
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Is there still independent media in Russia?
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Endowment for international peace hosted A Conversation with Alexei Venediktov, the editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow, often described as Russia’s last independent journalism outlet.
Venediktov began by describing the state of US-Russia relations. There is still no direct conflict between the citizens of Russia and the citizens of the US, but approximately 78% of Russians now view the US as an enemy, compared with 50% only a few years ago. Any sanctions against Russia and negative statements by American journalists about Russia are viewed as a challenge.
In 2000, Venediktov and Putin talked for a couple of hours after a press conference about the future of media in Russia. Putin described two adversaries:
- enemies, who you fight with, make truces with, and then fight with again and
- traitors, who you think are on your side and then backstab you.
Putin asserted that he has no mercy for traitors, but Venediktov is just an enemy, and not a traitor.
Venediktov believes that the confrontation between the US and Russia was inevitable under Putin, who spent his younger years as a KGB officer, where there were clear-cut friends and enemies. Perestroika unsettled him because it blurred these lines. Now he is back to the days of his youth again. The enemies and the battle lines are clear. This is his comfort zone.
Putin has aptly converted foreign policy into domestic policy. The main claim against him is that he opposes competition in all aspects of life. He is against political, economic, social, and moral competition. Russia is becoming a nation incapable of competing and will therefore lag behind again.
The two main groups in Russia today are nationalists, who believe in the superiority of Russian ethnicity, and post-imperialists, who believe in restoring what they view as the greatness of the Soviet Union. The post-imperialists encompass not only ethnic Russians, but also Tatars, Chechens and Ukrainians. This is a pro-Putin movement. He appeals to young people who want Russia to be rich, powerful, respected and feared once again.
Venediktov discussed the murder of Boris Nemtsov, stating that the investigators proved through technical means that those whom they arrested were the perpetrators. He does not believe that someone ordered the crime at a high level. Venediktov believes that the perpetrators felt that by killing an enemy of Putin that they would be treated with leniency. However, Putin knew Nemtsov personally and had a lenient approach to him. When Nemtsov was killed, Putin was outraged.
Venediktov speculated that it may ultimately be shown that the CIA or the Ukrainian intelligence services ordered the murder to shake Putin’s grip on power, but there is currently no evidence to suggest this. Venediktov has bodyguards because he has been declared an enemy of Islam and of Chechnya.
Venediktov believes that the conflict in Ukraine will not end in the next ten years. It will become like the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There will be daily casualties. Venediktov believes that separatists shot down MH17 by accident but that we will never know for sure. He noted that before MH17 was shot down, Western rhetoric against Russia was not militant but that it became militant afterward.
Venediktov stated that of the hundreds of POWs captured by the Ukrainian Army, only two have been Russian personnel, and they were intelligence officers, not soldiers. He believes we need to be cautious in assessing the extent of Russian military involvement in Ukraine. Venediktov also believes that relations with Georgia will continue to deteriorate because Russia will annex South Ossetia. This will lead to a rise in anti-Russian discourse in Georgia.
Asserting that ISIS is considered to be the top security threat by the Russian government, Venediktov said a high-level dialogue between US and Russian officials regarding ISIS is ongoing. Putin recently held a press conference in which he devoted 3/4 of the time to discussing ISIS. Ukraine is more about public relations.
An audience member if Venediktov is truly an enemy of Putin, or more of a Putin apologist, given some of his positions. Venediktov replied that he is just a journalist, not a politician. He opposes Putin’s policies and he is the only journalist that Putin publicly criticizes. He joked that it would be easier to present Putin with horns and a tail to this audience, but all journalists have horns and a tail so that would just make Putin one of them. Venediktov stated that Echo of Moscow is an open forum for diverse opinions. As such, it attracts criticism from much of the political spectrum.
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The slough of despair
The Wilson Center Tuesday hosted a panel on Ukraine and its challenges. Speakers included former Ambassador to Lithuania John Cloud, now Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, his colleague Professor Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center, who also moderated the event.
Rojansky shared insights from his recent travel to Ukraine. He warned that the media’s portrayal of Ukraine is different from events on the ground. From the Ukrainian point of view, the conflict is about values and the survival of Western civilization. There is a culture war between neo-Soviet culture and the resurgence of Western Ukrainian ideas and history.
Rojansky also emphasized the severe cognitive dissonance in the country, where there are people experiencing the impact of war every day, as well as those who are isolated from it. He claimed that macro-level psychological impacts, such as cognitive dissonance and untreated post traumatic stress, could be extremely unhealthy for Ukrainian society.
Cloud talked about his experience visiting bordering areas of Ukraine, near Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. He explained the slow and painful process of reforms, wracked by poor coordination. Reforms have been on and off for a long time with few concrete results, resulting in public distrust of the government.
The need for economic reform is acute, given Ukraine’s high levels of inflation and budget deficit. Oligarchs continue to do well and therefore are resistant to change. Cloud suggested three solutions:
- Prosecute or force the oligarchs to leave the county,
- Strike a deal with them, or
- Create a thriving middle-class, which is the hardest solution of the three options.
Cloud also discussed the European Union’s “donor fatigue.” Although Ukraine is only entering its second year of conflict since the revolution began, the EU has been assisting Ukraine for the past 24 years. The Commission has nevertheless put together a $1.2 billion macroeconomic assistance program—the largest such package the EU has ever provided.
This does not mean the EU has severed relations with Russia. The Union has made concerted efforts to keep Russia content, notably by inviting Russia to join discussions on the impact of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)—a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine.
Gvosdev described three important themes of the Ukraine-Russia crisis. First, he viewed the European conflict as a “crisis of rules,” in which the enforcement of EU rules is imposing a cost that the Europeans are unwilling to pay. He cautioned, however, against avoiding enforcement, as it carries a higher cost in the long-term.
Second, the EU lacks unity. The further west and south one goes in Europe, the less Ukraine is an issue. This disparity has made it difficult to create an EU framework agreed by both Poland and Spain. Building a unified response to Ukraine will require compromises and concessions from all EU member states. Another point of disagreement is the resettlement of migrants. Eastern European countries are very resistant to accepting Ukrainian migrants and worry about radicalized refugee flows.
Third are the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of the crisis. Geopolitically, Russia is challenging post-Cold War stability and threatening the current world order. Economically, many business interests are at stake, including the Asia-Pacific “Silk Road,” which will pass through Russia. Many businesses lack confidence in North America’s shale gas and would like to keep Russia as Europe’s energy supplier.
A huge sense of fatigue and pessimism casts a shadow on the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Gvosdev said that Euro-Atlantic solidarity is questionable and the US is unlikely to play a major role as it gets caught up in domestic politics with the nearing presidential elections.
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Grexit is no exit
Here is Greek Prime Minister Tsipras announcing Sunday his intention to default on the country’s International Monetary Fund obligations:
What? You didn’t hear the announcement? Welcome to the Greek hall of mirrors, where calling a referendum triggers default but is announced to the public as a necessary exercise in democracy, unjustifiably opposed by Eurocrats.
Timing isn’t everything in international affairs, but it does count. Had Tsipras wanted to go to a referendum, he needed to call it earlier than he did and schedule it in advance of the default deadline, which is today.
He is right, however, about fear. And Greeks have a lot to be afraid of. Their banks are closed and may never reopen in a euro-denominated economy. People are withdrawing as much as they can at ATMs. A “no” vote in the referendum will end Greece’s access to euros and force it to print drachmas again, which will plummet in value and impoverish the whole country. A “yes” vote may lead to fall of the government, an interim administration, and the austerity Tsipras was trying to avoid, with serious consequences for pensions and jobs.
I suppose Russia may come to the rescue with a big loan, but that is a fate I’m not sure I would wish on my worst enemy. Putin’s money comes freighted with conditions and cronyism. It also has to be paid back.
However this plays out, Greeks don’t get a way out of the predicament into which they have driven themselves. At best it will be years before a semblance of normality returns. Ordinary people who have worked hard and saved will pay the price. The politicians who created the problem and others who then failed to solve it will try to reap support from the resentment Greeks will justifiably feel. Greece may be leaving the euro (or not), but it has no way to leave its problems behind.
Grexit is no exit.
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