Tag: Russia
Droning on at home and abroad
On Thursday, June 11, the Project for the 21st Century hosted The Future of Drones with panelists Erik Lin-Greenberg, former US Air Force Officer and PhD candidate at Columbia University, and Lisa Ellman, Counsel for McKenna Long and Aldridge LLP and member of the firm’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Practice Group and Public Policy and Regulatory Affairs practice. The event was moderated by Ryan Hagemann, Civil Liberties Policy Analyst at the Niskanen Center and adjunct fellow at TechFreedom, specializing in robotics and automation.
Lin-Greenberg clarified the commonly misunderstood concept of drones. These aircraft are otherwise known as remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) whose pilot undergoes the same training as a pilot flying a manned aircraft. Often, large military aircrews operate a drone, as opposed to one person operating it. Furthermore, drone operations fall under two broad categories—Title 10 missions for military use and Title 50 missions for covert action (not necessarily flown by the military crew).
The use of drones today, however, is moving in a completely uncharted direction. Ellman explained there is a growing field of commercial drone operations in which companies use drones for deliveries, crop dusting, providing internet service and taking aerial photos of properties for sale. Currently, the commercial use of drones is illegal in the US. The only way one can circumvent the law is through special permission from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). However, drones for recreational purposes are legal, i.e. the law permits a hobbyist to fly drones in an open air space.
Other countries are ahead of the US in the commercial use of drones, including pizza delivery in England and crop dusting in Japan. The data on the safety of commercial drones is however still scant, which makes policy formulation difficult. The US has the most complex airspace in the world. Other countries have a lot more free airspace. The FAA must regulate “as if drones might fall from the sky” because its objective is to prevent accidents.
The potential commercial and widespread use of drones also introduces questions on privacy. Companies often want to use drones but don’t want others’ drones to spy on them. The critics’ response to this argument is that other technology, such as satellites and helicopters, can already do what commercial drones will do. This begs the question of whether the US must formulate drone-specific rules or can utilize existing general privacy rules.
Lin-Greenberg noted that drones still do not have the payload of manned aircraft. Nevertheless, drones’ tactical effectiveness in minimizing collateral damage could mean that RPA use will continue to increase. The State Department has also relaxed rules on RPA exports, which will limit the clientele that buys Russian and Chinese drones and will allow the US to leverage more influence on foreign buyers, she suggested.
The future of drones remains uncertain, but in order to sustain progress, it is imperative policymakers maintain pace with technology . Industries should begin moving towards commercial drone use, while safety and privacy issues continue to inform the policymaking process.
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Why critics of the nuclear deal are wrong
Max Fisher offers Mike Doran a platform for his case against the nuclear deal with Iran. Here are ten ways in which Mike is mistaken:
1. MD: Detente is the strategic goal, and arms control is the means to achieve it.
President Obama has made it clear he would welcome a broader detente with Iran, but he has also made it clear the nuclear deal has to be judged on its own merits. I don’t see any evidence that he is prevaricating, but if that is Mike’s claim he should produce the support.
2. MD: I don’t think it [preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon] is achievable without a significant coercive component. I think this is one of the most faulty assumptions of the administration.
Trouble is, the Obama Administration does not make that faulty assumption. It has done much more than any prior administration to increase the sanctions pressure on Iran, far more than the Administration for which Mike worked.
3. MD: [The Iranians] want sanctions relief and they’re going to get it, and they see that they’re going to get it, and they will stick with this process as long as they get direct, immediate, and very desirable benefits from it.
That is precisely the point of the negotiations: to provide sanctions relief provided Tehran gives up its nuclear weapons ambitions for at least ten years and moves itself back from a “breakout” of two or three months to a “breakout” time of a year. This is not an argument against the deal. It’s an argument for it.
4. MD: In fact, the starting point is that the Iranians want hegemony in the region, and they’re reading American policy with respect to their regional aspirations. The goal of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is not to defend against the United States or Israel — it’s to advance its regional agenda.
That’s right, and it is also a very good reason for halting Iran before it gets nuclear weapons. Again: a very good argument for the deal.
5. MD: I’m in favor of a vigorous containment program across the board, and I’m also in favor of a policy that says we have all options on the table and we mean it. The president says all options are on the table, but he doesn’t actually mean it, and I think we should mean it.
This confidence that his opponents know better than what the president says is laughable. The debate over destroying the Iranian nuclear program has clarified the limited gains it would provide: only two or three years of setback and an enormous incentive for Iran to redouble its efforts. But the notion that showing resolution by sabre-rattling would improve the prospects for a good deal is simply wrong.
6. MD: For a time the Iranians certainly believed all options were on the table. They abandoned their weaponization program, or they put it on hold, in 2003. Well, what happened in 2003? The United States went into Iraq, and I think they were probably very concerned at that point about all options being on the table.
The Iranians were concerned then about an American invasion, which is no longer a viable threat no matter who is president. But they spent the rest of the Bush Administration building and spinning thousands of more centrifuges, a fact Mike conveniently forgets.
7. MD: The very process of the negotiation is destroying the sanctions regime we established, which is the greatest nonmilitary instrument we have for coercing them.
This is laughable. The process of negotiation is absolutely vital to building and maintaining the multilateral sanctions regime. Without negotiations, the Europeans, Russians and Chinese would not be on board for sanctions.
8. MD: Iran’s status in the international community is going to be greatly improved, and then there’s going to be an international commercial lobby and a diplomatic-military lobby, which includes the Chinese and the Russians, in favor of the new order in which Iran is a citizen in good standing in the international community that they can do business with.
This is true, but misleading. That “international commercial lobby” already exists. If no agreement is reached, the sanctions are mincemeat. The notion that we can continue to hold on to them indefinitely is nonsense.
9. MD: The key question in that regard is, “When did he start to see Iran as a partner in Iraq?”
When the whole question of the status of forces agreement in Iraq was alive in 2010, [former CIA Director and Secretary of Defense Leon] Panetta and [Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton and David Petraeus and everybody are saying, “Keep forces on the ground in Iraq,” and the president had a different inclination. Well, if the United States is not going to be directly involved in Iraq, then who is going to protect our interests and protect stability in Iraq? And I think that, although he’s never admitted this, he assumed the Iranians would play that role for him.
I would say it was the Bush invasion of Iraq that gave Iran its big opening in Iraq. But leaving that aside: George W. Bush, not Barack Hussein Obama, negotiated the agreement for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. It was signed before he left office. What Mike is talking about here is an attempt to renegotiate that agreement, which the Obama Administration did pursue. But the Iraqis weren’t willing to give the US juridiction over its troops in Iraq and we weren’t willing to stay without it.
10. MD: If the Iranian regime — and I do believe they are rational — were truly put before the choice, if Ali Khamenei was put before a choice of “Your nuclear program or absolutely crippling, debilitating economic sanctions,” he would think twice. I think if he were put before a choice of “Your nuclear program or severe military strikes,” he would think twice.
So how do you get those crippling economic sanctions, whichc have to be multilateral, if you are not also negotiating with Iran? Absolutely no realistic proposal.
Here at last, the true agenda: get us into war with Iran, but note no mention of the only temporary setback to the Iranian nuclear program (and consequently the need to intervene repeatedly every couple of years), no mention of the likelihood the Iranians would redouble the efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, no consideration of the impact on the world economy, or secondary consequences (relations with China, Russia, the Europeans, Iranian responses in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, maybe also Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE).
Here is the kicker: if you really want to go to war with Iran, you’ll be much better off doing it because they violated an agreement than just doing it. So a nuclear deal is a good idea if that is your objective as well.
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What’s wrong, and not, with the nuclear deal
I don’t know any honest analysts who don’t credit the “framework” agreement outlined in a White House fact sheet with going further than in restraining Iran’s nuclear program than most expected. It is truly unprecedented in several respects: it would reduce the amount of enriched uranium in Iran, limit the production (and prohibit the reprocessing of) plutonium, and put out of commission most of Iran’s enriching centrifuges for 15 years. It would also provide for intrusive inspections beyond those any other state is obligated to.
But there are still aspects to be questioned. It is at best unclear who has signed up to the items in the fact sheet. The Iranians deny they have, and the French have their differences as well. In light of the controversy following its publication, it is best to regard the White House version as an American wish list, based on the current state of the negotiations. I imagine the American negotiators had some basis for believing the Iranians would sign up to these things, because otherwise the White House has made John Kerry’s job extraordinarily difficult. But it is also fair to say that the fact sheet was intended to fend off calls in Congress for tighter sanctions and Congressional approval of any final deal. We’ll just have to wait and see whether the American negotiators can deliver what they have promised.
The single most glaring weakness in the fact sheet is the failure to make any visible progress on “possible military dimensions” (PMDs). The International Atomic Energy Agency has been asking for explanations of these apparently nuclear-weapons-related activities for years, without making significant progress. The Iranians are stonewalling, presumably because the explanations will suggest that Iran really did have a nuclear weapons program at one time. Proving that it no longer does is difficult. The IAEA questions are the nuclear equivalent of “have you stopped beating your wife? Can you prove it?”
It is difficult and embarrassing to reply, but the answers are important, as no nuclear weapons state has achieved that status in an overt, IAEA-safeguarded program, or by diversion of material from such a program. Clandestine is always the preference. Why would Iran be different? Secrecy is far more difficult if you have admitted cheating once before.
A third shortcoming of the framework agreement outlined in the fact sheet is time frame. The unprecedented constraints would expire, even if verification provisions do not. But this critique doesn’t hold up. Surely it is better to face an Iran that is unconstrained in a decade or more rather than one that is unconstrained right now and could produce the material for a single nuclear weapon within two or three months.
But critics of the framework don’t want to compare the agreement with no agreement. They want to compare it with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s imaginary “better agreement,” which would eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure entirely. I admit it is possible John Kerry and his team could have negotiated a better agreement, but there is no reason to believe that anything like Netanyahu’s dream could come true. Iran has only amped up its nuclear program during the many years in which we insisted on its giving up its nuclear program and imposed sanctions. If the framework agreement fails, I expect them to continue in that direction.
Tightened sanctions are Netanyahu’s answer. What he and his supporters fail to explain is how sanctions can be tightened. Will Russia, China and the Europeans go along? Sanctions brought Tehran to the table because they were multilateral. Any unilateral sanctions move by the US at this point would destroy the negotiations and push the other members of the P5+1 in the direction of ending the existing sanctions, or at least failing to enforce them as fully as has been the case in the recent past.
Domestic critics want President Obama to threaten use of force. But overt threats of force don’t always help at the negotiating table, because they elicit responses in kind. Iran is already doing harm to US interests in the Gulf, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. Even the threat to do more would cause oil prices to rise (to Tehran’s own benefit and to the detriment of the US economy).
Even if the Iranians don’t believe Obama would ever use force, they can be pretty sure his successor (of either political flavor) will be more likely to do so. The US will be far better off if force is triggered some day by Iranian violations of something like the framework agreement, not by a unilateral decision undertaken in desperation as sanctions fray.
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Tighten your seat belts
Yesterday’s unprecedented framework for a nuclear accord with Iran sets back the clock in two different ways: it would put Iran a year away from accumulating the fissionable material needed for a nuclear weapon (as opposed to the current two-three months) and it would maintain tight constraints for at least 10 years (and in some areas 15), in addition to permanent verification procedures. In return, Iran would get still unspecified sanctions relief, presumably timed to implementation of the nuclear parts of the agreement.
What does this mean for US/Iran relations, the region and the rest of the world?
It puts the US and Iran on course for intense interactions for a decade or more to come. This is a sharp break with the sporadic and often hostile relations they have endured for more than 30 years. Negotiation of the final details and implementation of the nuclear agreement will not necessarily be a friendly affair. There is lots of room for frictions and misunderstandings to develop over one or another aspect of Iran’s far-flung nuclear program. But we are going to need a dedicated group of nuclear and Iran savvy diplomats to ensure that all the t’s are crossed and the i’s dotted. It would clearly be best if these people were located in Iran or nearby, which raises the question of reopening an American diplomatic facility in Tehran. A bridge too far for the moment, but something to keep in mind.
Iran’s regional behavior will ensure that future relations with Washington are not entirely friendly. Tehran vaunt strong influence over four Arab capitals today: Damascus, Sanaa, Baghdad and Beirut, in addition to Gaza. This influence has been acquired by force of arms, mainly through aggressive action by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies.
The IRGC and other Iranian security agencies do what they think they can get away with to subvert the Sunni Arab monarchies in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Iranian threats against Israel continue unabated. While claiming to be non-sectarian in outlook and providing support to Hamas (a Sunni Arab organization), Tehran has done a good deal to polarize the Middle East between Sunni and Shia, in particular by supporting Shia militias in Iraq, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the nominally Shia Alawite leadership in Syria.
At the same time, Iran is a serial human rights violator at home, where it keeps a tight lid on dissent. It is an autocracy, not a dictatorship, one that relies on elections in which candidates are screened and debate is circumscribed even if vigorous. The country’s biggest internal threat is ethnic strife, since barely more than 50% of the population identifies as Persian. Just yesterday there was trouble from Arab separatists in Khuzestan, a particularly sensitive area on the Gulf adjacent to Iraq. But Iran has also seen a broad-based, non-ethnic, pro-democracy movement that it crushed violently in 2010.
The US and Europe cannot ignore the misbehavior of Iran both at home and abroad. As sanctions are lifted, Tehran’s capacity for trouble making will increase with its oil exports, though perhaps not as much as expected because Iran’s renewed production may drive prices down further. Iran would be wise to spend any increased revenue on improving the lot of its own population, which has suffered big declines in standard of living.
But if Tehran chooses instead to unleash the IRGC even further to help Bashar al Asad, to counter the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen or to make trouble for Israel, the West needs to be prepared to respond. It may have been wise to isolate these issues from the nuclear talks until now, but it would be a mistake to allow Iran to use the resources it gets from the nuclear deal to further roil the region.
America’s friends and allies in the region, both Sunni Arab and Israeli, will rightly not let us forget that Iran continues to try to export its Islamic revolution. They regard the end of sanctions on Iran and its return to a more normal international status as strengthening the Islamic Republic. They at times seem more concerned with this return to normality than with the far greater strengthening that would result from Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. But there are real issues: Russia, for example, may transfer advanced air defenses to Tehran once sanctions are lifted. The conventional military balance in the Gulf favors the Sunni Arabs and Israel, but the end of sanctions may enable Iran to improve its standing.
No good deed goes unpunished. Iran and the US are at best at the beginning of a long road. It is not clear where the road leads. There will be many bumps along the way. Tighten your seat belts.
PS: Here is President Obama’s defense of the pending agreement.
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Deal or no deal
Everyone is anticipating a nuclear deal with Iran today, or not. Either way it is the big news.
I’d bet 60/40 on a “framework” political commitment that lays out some basic and well-known parameters: limits on enriching and stockpiling uranium, slowing of plutonium production, lifting of sanctions and limits over a decade or more, and International Atomic Energy Agency verification.
I don’t expect much on what I regard as the most critical question: answers to the IAEA questions about “possible military dimensions.” No IAEA-safeguarded nuclear program has ever generated the material used in a nuclear weapons program. All proliferation has been accomplished in secret. Iran has still not clarified some of its past activities, but that issue is treated separately between Tehran and the IAEA, not in the P5+1 talks.
Any agreement is going to be difficult for both the US and Iran. Hardliners abound in both countries. Distrust is the rule, not the exception. President Obama needs to be able to argue credibly that framework agreement will in fact prevent Iran from gaining the material needed to make a nuclear weapon in less than a year, as well as ensure that we will know if a decision to produce nuclear weapons is made. President Rouhani will have to be able to argue credibly that Iran’s basic rights have been respected and sanctions significantly alleviated.
Both Tehran and Washington will need to be able to argue that a deal is better than no deal. Washington’s argument will include the inevitable fraying of the sanctions regime if there is no deal. Tehran’s argument will include the inevitable additional damage to Iran’s economy and the (unmentioned but still important) possibility of domestic instability. Both will want to avoid war, which would be devastating for Iran but also embroil the US in still another Middle Eastern conflict, without setting the Iranian nuclear program back more than a few years.
Within the P5+1 team, China and Russia will weigh heavily towards a deal that is generous to Iran. The UK, France and Germany will be closer to the US position, with France apparently arguing for a tougher stand on sanctions than the US. These other participants will be able to influence the shape of what is proposed, but it will ultimately be up to Iran and the US to accept or reject it.
I won’t be surprised if there are last-minute hitches that extend the negotiations, at least for a few hours. That is common in all international negotiations, not least because officials in capitals–in this case Presidents Obama and Rouhani as well as Supreme Leader Khamenei–will need to give a final green or red light. But it is also true that the temptation to throw in a last demand at midnight is great, since the other side by that time is anticipating a result.
Whatever is decided, or not, today or early tomorrow in Lausanne will need further technical elaboration in the months to come before the end-June deadline for a full agreement. Technical details are important. We can expect further drama in the weeks and months to come.
Iran and the US remain at odds on other Middle East issues, including most notably at the moment Syria and Yemen. Even in Iraq, where both are fighting against the Islamic State, their fundamental interests diverge. Even with a deal, peace is unlikely to break out. But a deal might well prevent things from getting much worse.
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Kerry’s hint
Secretary Kerry’s few words Sunday about negotiating with Bashar al Assad have roused the commentariat to hyperbole: Aaron David Miller says
…if…the U.S. comes to terms with Mr. Assad, then Washington will have achieved a horrible trifecta: legitimizing a mass murderer, feeding ISIS propaganda, and alienating its own Sunni allies.
That is eminently quotable. But the sentence that precedes it is more to the point:
If Russia and Iran would support a transition in Syria that forces Mr. Assad, his family, and the regime’s mafia from power; that includes Alawites, Sunnis, Christians, and Kurds in the new Syria; and that doesn’t open the door to further ISIS gains, the outcome could be fine.
The simple fact is that Washington has long been prepared to negotiate with Assad or his regime. It did so at the Geneva 2 talks in early 2014. I imagine it would do so again if it can move Assad aside or out. Kerry clearly intended this when he said yesterday:
To get the Assad regime to negotiate, we’re going to have to make it clear to him that there is a determination by everybody to seek that political outcome and change his calculation about negotiating.
This reminds me of Kerry’s apparently offhanded remark about Syria’s chemical weapons, which led to a diplomatic rather than a military initiative to remove them. That effort was not 100% successful, but it was easily over 75% successful. Kerry also went on to say:
That’s under way right now. And I am convinced that, with the efforts of our allies and others, there will be increased pressure on Assad.
This could be wishful thinking. But if he is hinting that Tehran and Moscow (those are presumably the “others”) are prepared to increase pressure on Bashar, we might well be within range of a 75% breakthrough along the lines of the one Miller described as acceptable.
What might that look like? It would have to involve the central premise of the 2012 Geneva communique: a transitional governing body with full executive powers. It is difficult for me to picture Assad staying in the country while that happens. His life would be in danger. He might remain nominally as president, but take a long vacation in Moscow or Tehran, with his family. Or perhaps in Latakia. Someone else would need to be put in charge, either as acting president or prime minister.
Who might that be? The current vice presidents of Syria are Farouk al Sharaa (despite frequent rumors of his defection) and Najah al Attar. Both are Sunni Muslims and loyalists to Assad, who appointed them after long service in the Ba’ath party and his government. Neither would be much welcomed among the externally based Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), but a constitutional succession (like the one in Yemen) would presumably preserve more of the Syrian state and its capabilities to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) than a violent overthrow of the regime.
More likely perhaps would be a military takeover, something that has happened frequently in Syria’s past. This would have to exclude Bashar’s younger brother Maher, who was a major protagonist of the crackdown on peaceful protesters and the subsequent civil war. He and the rest of the Assad family would have to join the President in exile, or decide to fight. That would make the current civil war in Syria deteriorate further, as the regular army (or a large part of it) supports the military takeover while the Alawite militias try to protect both the remaining Assad family members and the Alawite population, which is split between western Syria and Damascus.
That will not be the only complication. There will be nothing easy about a political settlement of the Syrian conflicts if Kerry is correct and one is in the offing. ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra and perhaps also some Kurdish forces will continue to fight whatever transition arrangement is made. Iran and Russia will continue to try to preserve their assets in Syria.
Tehran will be particularly keen on its Revolutionary Guard forces playing a major role, in order to guarantee continuation of Syria’s role as a bridge to Hizbollah, whose forces are also engaged there. Moscow will want its port access and strong military supply relationship with Syria preserved, but its main preoccupation will be to portray whatever settlement is reached as a triumph for Russian diplomacy and a defeat for the US, which it managed reasonably well in the case of chemical weapons.
Secretary Kerry may be hinting at something better than preservation of Assad in power, but implementation won’t be easy.
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