Tag: Russia
Peace picks November 10-14
- Ukraine, Russia and the West—The Way Forward Monday 10 | 9:00 am – 4:00 pm Georgetown University; Copley Formal Lounge, 37 St NW and O St NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Georgetown University is holding a conference to take stock of Ukraine’s domestic situation, its relations with the West and with Russia and to discuss how the crisis might be dealt with going forward. Speakers include Stephen Kotkin, Andreas Umland, Anders Aslund, Olexyi Horan, Eric Rubin, and Matthew Sagers.
- Gaza from the Ground Monday 10 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am New America Foundation; 1899 L St, Suite 400, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND New America and the Foundation for Middle East Peace will hold a conversation with Alice Rothchild, author of On the Brink: Israel and Palestine on the Eve of the 2014 Gaza Invasion, and New America Jacobs Foundation Fellow Brian K. Barber, who has been researching the dynamics of Palestinian families since the First Intifada, as they discuss their recent reporting trips to Gaza and the impact of conflict from the ground. The discussion will be moderated by journalist Samer Badawi, who covered the latest round of conflict, Operation Protective Edge, for +972 Magazine.
- Post-ISIS Iraq: Challenges and Prospects Monday 10 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Abbas Kadhim, fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, will discuss this topic.
- The Ebola Crisis: U.S. Leadership and International Response Wednesday 12 | 3:30 pm – 5:30 pm Brookings Institution; 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Brookings will host a discussion on the current state of the Ebola crisis, featuring a conversation with USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, who will detail his recent trip to West Africa and the U.S. response to the crisis. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will moderate the discussion. Shah will also discuss USAID’s new effort, “Fighting Ebola: A Grand Challenge for Development,” aimed at generating new ideas to fight Ebola. This discussion will then be followed by a panel discussion with Brookings Senior Fellows Elizabeth Ferris, Amadou Sy, and Michael O’Hanlon, who will outline the humanitarian, economic, political and security dimensions of the crisis.
- 4th Annual Walter Roberts Lecture with Ambassador Robert S. Ford Wednesday 12 | 6:00 pm – 7:30 pm Elliott School of International Affairs; 1957 E St NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Frank Sesno, director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, will hold a conversation with Ambassador Robert Ford about the current crises in Syria and Iraq, the Obama Administration’s strategy for fighting terrorism in the region, and the role of social media and digital diplomacy in the war with ISIS.
- Combating the ISIS Threat: A Path Forward Thursday 13 | 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm Elliott School of International Affairs; 1957 E St NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Stephen Biddle, former senior advisor to General Petraeus’ Central Command Assessment Team, and Marc Lynch, director of the Project on Middle East Political Science at George Washington University, will hold an in-depth discussion of the Obama administration’s current strategy toward the ISIS threat, the evolving security situation on the ground in Syria and Iraq, and next steps for regional and global stakeholders.
- After the Gaza Conflict: Hamas’ Goals, Military Capabilities, and Financial Networks Friday 14 | 11:00 am – 1:00 pm Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Russell Senate Office Building, Constitution Ave and 1st St NE, Kennedy Caucus Room REGISTER TO ATTEND FDD will be holding a panel discussion and conversation to discuss the capabilities of Hamas two months after the ceasefire with Israel. The panel will include Matthew Levitt, director of The Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Dan Moger, former Assistant Director in the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, Jonathan Schanzer, Vice President for Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Samuel Tadros, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom, and Jeffrey White, defense fellow at The Washington Institute. Registration will begin at 10:45 am | Lunch will be served. Advance RSVP and confirmation required.
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Aye, there’s the rub
A nuclear deal with Iran is looking more likely than ever before. The P5+1 or EU3+3 (either way it is the US, Russia, UK, France, China and Germany) are making progress on issues related to enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing. Verifying that fissile material, which can be used in an atomic bomb, is not diverted from those processes is a routine responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). If Iran will agree to limits on the number of its centrifuges, the degree of enrichment and the quantity of plutonium produced as well as fulfill its Safeguards commitments, the IAEA can verify that the limits are not exceeded and material is not diverted to a weapons program. If Iran were nevertheless to decide to “break out,” it would require six months to a year for it to do so, leaving time for both diplomatic and military efforts to prevent it from doing so.
The crunch issues lie in a different direction: undeclared nuclear material and the related question of possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s past nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been making little progress getting from Tehran clarification of past activities that appear to have aimed at design of high explosives and other research on initiation of a nuclear explosion. Nor has it been able to ascertain that there are no nuclear materials lying outside its purview. The IAEA concluded in September (and repeated Friday, despite recent meetings at which PMDs were discussed):
the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
In other words, a nuclear deal–even one with tight constraints on known facilities–could leave material and activities unaccounted for that are directed specifically at building a nuclear weapon in secret. Construction activity at a suspected site of clandestine nuclear activities (Parchin) has raised suspicions that Tehran is covering up past nuclear weapons research.
Some would like to forget about Iran’s past misbehavior, which reportedly stopped in 2003 in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq (when at least some in Tehran thought the Americans might come their way next). Ignoring past behavior and the possible existence of undeclared nuclear material would be unwise. Judging from past performance in other countries, development of nuclear weapons is far more likely to take place in parallel, secret efforts than in nuclear plants and activities under IAEA surveillance. If Iran wants the rest of the world to believe that it has seriously and permanently foresworn nuclear weapons, it needs to convince everyone that it either never did have a clandestine program or had one and gave it up.
This is difficult for Iran because of its government structure. President Rouhani is responsible for the nuclear negotiations. But the most likely sponsor of a clandestine nuclear program (past, present or future) is Supreme Leader Khamenei, who controls ample resources for such a purpose, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That’s why President Obama writes Khamenei secret letters. The Supreme Leader has reportedly forsworn nuclear weapons in a fatwa:
the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.
The trouble is Islamic jurisprudence allows a fatwa, which generally has no official written form, to be changed or reinterpreted. This one was published in an official government press release in 2005 that has evaporated from the worldwide web. That does not inspire confidence. So one well-connected Iranian commentator living in the US suggests it be “secularized” as a criminal statute. Of course that could be changed as well, but the notion of getting Iran to pledge formally that it will not seek nuclear weapons could certainly be part of a nuclear deal.
It would not substitute for what some might regard as impossible: proving the negative proposition that Iran does not have clandestine nuclear materials or a clandestine nuclear research program. “Coming clean” about past nuclear activities would certainly help. Continuing to stiff the IAEA on PMDs and the construction (now stopped) at Parchin does not. President Obama is presumably ready to justify to Congress and the American people a nuclear deal with Iran that allows it to continue peaceful activities (including enrichment) under tight IAEA surveillance, but he won’t get far unless he can also persuade them that there are no clandestine nuclear activities in progress. That’s what will give him pause.
PS: Tony Cordesman discusses in detail the difficult issues associated with clandestine research and development for nuclear weapons here.
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Russia in the Balkans
Fatjon Prroni of the Turkish Andalou agency asked, so I replied:
– Is Balkans endangered from a rising Russian influence as senator Chris Murphy said after his week-long visit in the region? Do you think that the shift of U.S. focus from Balkans plays an important role?
DPS: I think there is some risk in specific places in the Balkans like Serbia and Bosnia that Russia will do things that America won’t like, including not agreeing to the extension of EUFOR, encouraging South Stream and helping people in Republika Srpska who say they want to secede from Bosnia. The rest of the Balkans is already inoculated against Moscow’s pathologies. Montenegro, Kosovo, Croatia and Macedonia all know that their future lies in the West.
– How far can Russian involvement in the region go and which are the most important sectors that Russia possibly aims to be involved in Balkans?
DPS: Energy is really the only commercial sector in which I see Russian economic involvement in the Balkans as a problem, in particular in Serbia. Europe does not want to proceed with South Stream. For Belgrade to do so will I imagine hurt its European prospects.
– Can we expect changes in NATO’s and EU’s policies (acceleration membership process) toward the region in the face of rising Russian influence?
DPS: So far, NATO has hesitated and the EU has been indifferent, but I think in the future things might change. Russian behavior in Ukraine should make both NATO and the EU move as quickly as possible to make it clear they will expand whenever a state meets the membership criteria and political conditions within the EU and NATO allow expansion. That is already the case for Montenegrin membership in NATO.
– How much important is, in you opinion, the Albanian PM’s visit to Belgrade this month? Are there real chances that this visit to improve bilateral relations?
DPS: There is no reason for relations between Tirana and Belgrade not to improve. The big problems are behind us. It is time for both capitals to look forward. Both are involved now in the EU accession process, which should give them a lot to talk about.
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Geopolitics of lower energy prices
Oil prices are down by about 20% from their recent peak (or 15% from their three-year plateau around $100 per barrel) and likely to stay low for months if not years. Downward pressure will continue unless the Saudis are prepared to rein in their production (no sign of that yet) or prices decline enough (to $70 or less) to turn off the flow of tight oil and gas in the US, which has become a major factor on world markets.
There is a lot of benefit to be seen from lower oil prices. From the US perspective, cutting revenue flow to the governments of Russia, Iran and Venezuela is a big plus. Putin, who is already feeling substantial pressure from European Union and US sanctions, faces serious financial difficulties. Iran, likewise hurt by sanctions, will find it difficult to generate anything like the revenue it needs to fund economic recovery, even if sanctions are lifted. Venezuela was already headed towards a financial crisis. Its budget is almost entirely dependent on oil revenue.
Major oil and gas producers in the Gulf will be hit as well. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates , Kuwait and Qatar as well as Iraq will feel the pinch. They are far more likely to cut their spending on various international causes than risk austerity at home. That could mean scarcer resources for the restored military autocracy in Egypt, Yemen’s besieged government and Syria’s opposition. It could also mean less revenue for Islamist extremists of various stripes, including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, for which oil sales are a significant portion of revenue.
Lower oil prices will also give a boost to global economic growth, particularly in the US and Europe but also in China and India. The Economist worries that the lower prices may be due to slack economic growth and that lower prices will do little for consumers, but then it gives ample evidence that the lower prices are in fact due to higher production. If past patterns hold, global economic growth could gain by a significant 1% over current 3.3% predictions for 2015.
What has happened in the past couple of weeks is part of a broader secular trend that will have profound impacts on geopolitics and economics for a long time to come. Production of oil and gas is rising sharply in the Western Hemisphere, especially in the US, Canada and Brazil. Demand is rising principally in the East, where economic growth is strong, the economies are still heavily dependent on energy, and energy resources are scarce. This trend has implications for future security risks and burden sharing: it will not make much sense for the US to carry most of the burden of ensuring the security of the strait of Hormuz when 90% or more of the oil shipped through this classic “choke point” is going to India, China and other Asian consumers.
Asian consumers should be stocking 90 days of imports, as members of the International Energy Agency are required to do. They should also be providing some of the naval assets to protect the strait of Hormuz. That will require a major rethink on the part of the US, as well as creation of a multinational force that the Asians can feel comfortable joining.
There are calls in Congress to curtail the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is slated for use in an oil supply disruption. That would be an unwise move, as a major disruption of oil markets anywhere means a hike in prices everywhere. The US may be much less dependent on the Middle East in the future, but it will still be vulnerable to the economic damage of an oil supply interruption.
We have tended to view the rise of Asia as a challenge. But of course it is also an opportunity. The US will soon be the world’s largest oil and gas producer. If the Washington can continue to moderate American demand and in addition decides to allow oil and gas exports, the assumption of its declining influence could soon be proven, once again, a mirage.
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Inane but serious
Tuesday saw a soccer brawl between the Serbian and Albanian teams, precipitated by a drone carrying a flag described as portraying “Greater Albania.” Last weekend, vandals scrawled graffiti on the walls and a gate of the Serb Orthodox monastery at Decani, as well as elsewhere in Kosovo later in the week.
These are silly but destructive demonstrations of Albanian ethno-nationalism. But they are also serious, because of the reaction they provoke. A visit of Albanian Prime Minister Rama to Belgrade is said to be in doubt due to the soccer incident, perturbing relations that had been relatively smooth. Serbs in Kosovo fear that the graffiti are prelude to much worse.
They are also serious because of the political message they send. There are Albanians who would like to re-open what the 19th century knew as the Albanian question: will Albanians live in one country, or in several? There are Serbs who would also like to re-open the Serbian question: will Serbs live in one country or in several?
The Balkan wars of the 1990s and the international community gave unequivocal answers to these questions: both Albanians and Serbs will live in several countries. Many Serbs today live not only in Serbia, where they are a numerical majority, but also in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo. Many Albanians live not only in Albania and Kosovo, where they are a numerical majority, but also in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The formerly internal borders of Socialist Yugoslavia, and Albania’s international border, were not redrawn to reflect ethnic lines but instead kept where they lay at the time of the fall of the Berlin wall.
Milosevic tried to redraw those borders. He lost that bid at war in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.
Albanians who imagine they can re-open the border question now are favoring a solution that Milosevic wanted. Moreover, their effort comes at a time when the international community is fighting a war in Iraq and Syria to prevent a redrawing of borders that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) would like to impose. It would also come at a time when the West is trying to prevent Russia from redrawing the borders of Ukraine to accommodate ethnic differences. Albanian ethno-nationalists can expect zero sympathy in the international community and a lot of resistance to their harebrained ideas.
Lots of such ideas survive however. It is up to Albanians who realize how dangerous and destabilizing they are to prevent them from spreading.
Russian President Putin is today enjoying an official visit to Belgrade in the midst of the Ukraine debacle, something that will annoy both Washington and Brussels. Albanians in Albania and Kosovo will do much better to focus on what really counts–qualifying for the EU accession that will one day make their borders invisible–than doing inane things that will alienate their friends in America and the European Union.
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Where strong men rule
I spent most of last week in Moscow talking with Russian Middle East experts. It was a deeply saddening experience. Not because of the Middle East: that is a gloomy subject even in Washington DC. It was above all Ukraine, but more broadly Putin’s Russia that darkened the mood.
First, the good news: Moscow looks good, the Russians I met were friendly and helpful, and the Bolshoi Opera is once again open. Contrary to my expectations, downtown the skyline has not changed much, Lenin is still in Red Square (though it is unclear how often his mausoleum is open or whether anyone bothers to visit it), and traffic is light compared other European capitals. Skyscrapers have not been allowed in the center. I saw them only at a distance from the Foreign Ministry, near the Arbat market. Most of the older buildings in the center are renovated, some like the GUM department store beautifully. Ditto the churches.
Walking streets lined with high-end fashion as well as low-end chic lace the center. As in the Gulf petro-states, the number of customers seems inadequate to support the investment. Recently enforced parking rules have cleared the streets of double parked cars and limited the number of people interested in paying a couple of dollars per hour for a space. Drivers are surprisingly respectful of pedestrians and each other. Public spaces (Red Square, parks, walking streets) are well-groomed. Security guards, private and public, are everywhere. Order prevails, at least in the center.
The smiling Moscow I found on the street evaporated quickly in the meetings I attended. Ukraine cast a long shadow. American and Russian leaders, the Russians said, are not communicating. There is a lack of trust. The media are biased. Russia has pursued integration with the rest of the world only to find itself blocked by sanctions, even after the recent ceasefire in Ukraine. US/Russia relations are at a nadir. Is it wise to sacrifice global issues for the sake of Kiev? Fascism is reemerging in Ukraine, which the West is using as a pretext for blocking Russia. All Russia wants is for Ukraine not to join NATO, for the Black Sea not to become a NATO lake threatening to Russia, and for the Russian navy to remain in Sevastopol. Crimea did not join Ukraine voluntarily. There is no reason why it shouldn’t return to Russia.
From the American perspective, the Russians are in denial. They deny their army has anything to do with the rebellion in Ukraine. They ask Americans to understand that Ukraine for them is an emotionally searing internal question, apparently unaware that this implies that they do not recognize the independence or sovereignty of their neighbor. They deny Ukraine the right to make a free choice about joining the European Union and NATO. They fail to mention the downing of the Malaysian airliner, the deaths of Russian soldiers, or the photographic evidence of Russian army tanks and other heavy equipment crossing the border. They insist that Russia is in no way involved in Ukraine, even while trying to justify anything Moscow and its proxies might be doing there.
The Russian attitude on Ukraine is linked to broader themes. The Russians I spoke with do not regard Moscow as having lost the Cold War. It liberated itself from the Soviet Union, defeated totalitarianism and initiated a democratic transition on its own. While this was achieved under Boris Yeltsin, no one has anything good to say about him. President Putin is viewed as the best available leader, attractive because of his efforts to restore Russian power. Nostalgia for that power is palpable: even a casual conversation produces admiration for the Soviet Union. Czarist Russia is not far behind in the memory pantheon. The opposition to Putin is all more nationalist than he is, claim his defenders. Americans should view Russia as an equal, a superpower that Washington should treat with caution and respect.
It is not easy to convey what the Russians had to say about the Middle East with this static in the air. Harking back to Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy,” we were told rigid American ideologically driven efforts to export democracy triggered the Arab uprisings, even though democracy is inappropriate for traditional societies in which family relations are predominant. The UN, the G7, the G8 and the G20 are all fronts for American ambitions, which are driven by an “energy elite” thirsting for hydrocarbons (no mention was made of America’s soaring energy production and reduced dependence on imports). Ukraine is part of the American democratization program. Ultimately, Washington aims at regime change in Moscow.
The Russians see what is happening in Syria as vindicating their support for Bashar al Assad, even as they repeat the refrain that they are not necessarily attached to him personally. The Russian port facilities at Tartous are not vital to Moscow. The Russians attribute the emergence of Islamic extremists, in particular the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to American mistakes and even to American assistance. At the root of the crisis is the American invasion of Iraq, which gave power to the Shia and incited the Sunni rebellion in both Syria and Iraq.
Fearing that it will eventually infect Russia’s Muslim population, the Russians want ISIS defeated. It will take a long time. The US should team up with Russia for the fight. Russia can be helpful in identifying and blocking foreign fighters, especially Chechnyans coming not only from Russia but also from Austria and other European countries. Bombing ISIS in Syria without permission of Damascus would be wrong and likely counter-productive. Arms sent to the opposition will end up in the hands of jihadists. Rejection of the election results in Syria while accepting them in Ukraine demonstrates America’s double standard. Assad has to play a role in the Syrian transition. Russia may prove useful in promoting intra-Syrian dialogue, though the regime has not yet accepted this idea.
My last night in Moscow was spent at a marvelous performance of Mussorgsky’s “Boris Godunov.” This iconic Russian opera features a guilt-ridden hero who rises to the throne by murdering the heir apparent. Guilt was not something I found in Moscow last week, but confidence in strong men was much in evidence.
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