Tag: Russia
Landslide
According to exit polls, Ukrainians Sunday gave Petro Poroshenko a landslide mandate in the presidential poll. While voting in the eastern provinces of Donbas was sparse, turnout elsewhere was high and the margin over also-ran Yulia Tymoshenko was so wide that it is difficult to see how even Russian President Putin could question the legitimacy of the result. The Ukraine crisis is not over, but Poroshenko’s election could open the way to a negotiated political settlement, which is his often expressed preference. Poroshenko has not favored NATO membership for Ukraine and has pledged to protect the rights of Russian speakers, but he also favors stronger ties to the European Union.
Russian President Putin has reason to be content. His red line is NATO membership for Ukraine. Poroshenko has indicated he will not cross it, though he occasionally suggests Russian intransigence will make him reconsider the proposition. Putin will plump for maximum self-governance in Donbas, to allow Russian speakers the kind of de facto ethnic independence Serbs have in Bosnia. He will also want Poroshenko to attract lots of money from the EU and the International Monetary Fund, so that Russia will get back the money it loaned Poroshenko’s predecessor.
While likely to oblige Putin’s interest in getting his money back, Poroshenko has his work cut out for him. He has pledged to visit Donbas first, including to thank the Ukrainian security forces who have tried–without much success–to restore order there. Parliamentary elections are not due until 2017. There appear to be no plans to bring that date forward. The parliament has been an important player since previous President Yushenko abandoned his post. Its slate of priorities will be daunting: Ukraine needs to phase out its expensive energy subsidies, attract private investment, end oligarchical cronyism and cut back on corruption.
Europe has some serious thinking to do in light of the Ukraine crisis. Its dependence on Russian natural gas, its weak military forces and its diplomatic clumsiness–all closely related–should make not only Brussels but the 28 member state capitals think harder about what it takes to sustain a coherent and successful foreign and security policy.
If in fact the Ukraine crisis now heads in the direction of a peaceful denouement, the Obama administration will have reason to boast that its low-key diplomatic approach has produced a decent result. Particularly important was the decision not to listen to experts who advised agreeing with Putin to postpone the election.
But even if things go well now with Ukraine, Washington needs to rethink policy towards a Russia bent on expanding its hegemony in what it considers its “near abroad.” NATO expansion in particular needs presidential attention: Montenegro and Macedonia are technically qualified and could be admitted at the Summit in Cardiff, Wales in September, but Macedonian membership will require President Obama to deliver bad news to Athens. A broader package of moves closer to NATO would be ideal, one that includes Kosovo, Bosnia, Sweden and Finland. I am hesitant about Georgia, a country NATO is in no way capable of defending. But letting Putin know that NATO is determined to expand to those countries that it can defend, that meet the membership criteria and that want to join will limit his ambitions and encourage those who seek a democratic future.
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This is important
Russia’s President Putin says he will respect the outcome of Sunday’s presidential election in Ukraine. This is important, if true.
There is good reason to doubt his word. Moscow in general and Putin in particular have prevaricated throughout the crisis in Ukraine. Underhanded would be a compliment to the stealth Russian takeover and eventual annexation of Crimea. Russian troops remained on the border with Ukraine, despite Putin’s insistence that they were withdrawn. His security services have sometimes led and often fed the takeover of government offices in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, where he could readily create disorder this weekend. His policy has essentially been one of promoting disorder, then complaining about it and portraying Russia as the only hope for preventing harm to Russian speakers.
Why might Putin behave differently this time around? It is hard to know exactly who is saying what to whom, but it appears that the Europeans and Americans have mounted a reasonably credible threat of more severe financial sanctions if Russia or its surrogates disrupt the election. Putin has acknowledged that the targeted sanctions already imposed have hurt Russia. Sentiment in Donbas, as the most affected provinces are known, is mixed, with considerable loyalty to Ukraine.
Both the leading candidates, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, were rivalrous protagonists in the post-Orange Revolution scandals of 2005. Both also supported the pro-European Union popular uprising that chased former President Yanukovych from office. Putin never had much use for him and has kept him at arm’s length since he abandoned his post in Kiev.
Putin’s acceptance of the outcome of Sunday’s voting would pull the rug out from under the pro-Russian separatists, who conducted an ambiguous “referendum” on the political status of Ukraine earlier this month. But it would only be the start of a long and difficult transition in Ukraine, which is a semi-failed state. Since 1989, it has done not much better than mark time, with an economy that shrank in the 1990s, grew until 2007 and then struggled again. This year will be awful. Energy subsidies and lack of domestic production from ample resources have made Ukraine heavily dependent on Russian natural gas and transit fees for gas shipped to the west.
Governance is even worse than the economic figures suggest. Corruption is rampant. Yanukovych is widely believed to have stolen billions. The administration is still highly centralized, but without the capacity to govern effectively or deliver services in the provinces. The authorities, especially in the relatively industrialized east and south, lack legitimacy with a population that feels deprived and alienated.
The International Monetary Fund and the European Union are stepping in with substantial funding, but they risk throwing good money after bad if they don’t insist on reform. Tymoshenko on this score was an enormous disappointment during her time as prime minister. She is unlikely to win the election. Chocolate King Poroshenko is believed to be the front runner, with some possibility of meeting the 50% threshold required to be elected in the first round.
Putin can live with Poroshenko, who would hopefully attract enough Western support to enable Ukraine to pay its substantial debts to Russia. Moscow will press for constitutional reforms that allow Donestsk and Luhansk to establish themselves as an autonomous region, akin to the all-but-independent Republika Srpska in Bosnia. That would be going too far for the EU and US, but ample decentralization on a non-ethnic, geographical basis is certainly part of the solution in Ukraine. The West will prescribe national dialogue, constitutional reform and parliamentary elections, staples of today’s efforts to re-establish legitimate authority in failed and failing states. That is not an easy road, but if Sunday’s election embarks Ukraine on that path it will be doing far better than if Putin diverts it to more instability and conflict.
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Ukraine: civilian instruments fall short, again
The presidential election May 25 will be decisive for Ukraine. The main presidential candidates are Petro Poroshenko, a chocolate magnate with high-level government experience, and Yulia Tymoshenko, a heroine of the Orange Revolution and former prime minister with a reputation for corruption and extreme pragmatism, including cooperation with Vladimir Putin. Poroshenko is believed to be in the lead.
The outcome of the presidential election that day is not as important as whether the election occurs in the eastern and southern provinces where pro-Russian paramilitaries have taken over government facilities. Two oblasts (Donetsk and Luhansk) supposedly voted May 11 in referenda on autonomy, but both the opaque (and illegal) process and vague referendum proposition cast doubt on their significance. A decent election May 25 would confer at least a veneer of legitimacy on the government in Kiev, which was installed after the president fled and parliament took over in February.
The prospects are not good. A successful election would at least temporarily hinder Russia’s ambitions in the eastern and southern provinces and provide an opportunity for Kiev to negotiate an accommodation with at least some of the political leadership there. Few doubt that decentralization and strengthening of local and provincial governance is part of the solution in Ukraine. But getting there from the current tense and polarized standoff between a government in Kiev anxious to assert its authority and Russian-speaking rebels in eastern Ukraine will not be easy.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is supporting a national dialogue process led by former Presidents Kuchma and Kravchuk that had a rough start yesterday. OSCE has also deployed 230 human rights monitors (with authorization to more than double that number) as well as 100 election monitors, with more on their way. Russia, which is an OSCE member, could conceivably exploit its presence to try to ensure correct treatment of the Russian speakers in Ukraine and end the current crisis.
I’m not holding my breath for that. While President Putin has turned down the rhetoric in the last week or so, his objective is all too clearly to make eastern and southern Ukraine come under Moscow’s umbrella, even if they remain formally outside of Russian sovereignty. He has not moved Russian troops away from the border with Ukraine. Many of the rebels in Ukraine appear to be getting Russian support and encouragement sub rosa. Some are Russian officials. Putin’s maneuvers may be reactions to a rapidly evolving situation, but Russia’s 2013 foreign policy concept makes it clear Ukraine was slated for a key role in reviving Moscow’s influence in the former Soviet states.
European and American sanctions have already done some damage to the Russian stock market, currency and investment flows. Moscow will hesitate to do anything overt to disrupt the election in order to stave off tightening and broadening of the still finely targeted sanctions. But so long as it can plausibly deny a hand in any disruption of the May 25 election, it can bank on European hesitation to bite the hand that sends money and natural gas west.
NATO is rightly not prepared to go to war to defend non-member Ukraine. The best it has been able to do is forward deploy some minimal forces to Poland, the Baltics and other concerned member states to signal determination to protect the Alliance, should it become necessary. This is one more crisis where military means simply do not fit the bill. The civilian means required look to be beyond current capabilities. The number of monitors required in a country with a population of 46 million is easily ten times the number currently authorized. OSCE is stepping up as best it can, but it will be no surprise if its best falls short. The lesson here is clear: we need to strengthen the available civilian instruments, not only in Europe but elsewhere as well.
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Peace picks May 12 – 16
1. Morocco’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism
Monday, May 12 | 12:30pm
Webcast only
Morocco’s traditionally strong counterterrorism efforts are now being challenged by the spread of terrorism to even the most stable parts of the region. At a time when al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is posing a formidable threat to the neighborhood, the crisis in Syria continues to serve as a magnet for aspiring jihadists, including Moroccans. Meanwhile, prisons in the region often facilitate radicalization rather than deter it, raising questions about how best to prevent and counter extremism and terrorism.
To discuss these and other aspects of Morocco’s threat environment, The Washington Institute is pleased to host a Policy Forum with Mohamed Salah Tamek.
Mohamed Salah Tamek is the delegate-general of Morocco’s Penitentiary and Reintegration Administration. Previously, he served as governor of the Oued Eddahab province, chief of staff to the interior minister, ambassador to Norway, and head of the security portion of the U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue.
2. Meet the Syria Opposition
Monday, May 12 | 3 – 4pm
New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW Suite 400
The Syrian conflict just entered its fourth year and according to some estimates the death toll is approaching 150,000 killed. A revolution that began peacefully has morphed into one of the most violent wars in recent memory, creating not just bloodshed but an unparalleled humanitarian crisis. “Victory” for any party remains elusive, the Geneva talks proved fruitless and the UN’s Syria envoy is preparing to leave the task for someone else. So what possible solutions exist for Syria? After years of fighting, a fractured society, unspeakable brutality and a lack of commitment from the international community, is Syria’s future anything but bleak?
Join us for a conversation with members of the Syrian opposition delegation currently visiting Washington, DC for meetings with senior U.S. officials. They will discuss the opposition’s vision for a new Syria and what solutions, if any, exist for the current impasse. In addition, they will address the growing global concern over the rising power of extremists and what efforts are currently underway to counter these trends. Finally, the delegation will provide the latest updates and developments from the field as well as a blueprint for the future.
PARTICIPANTS
Hadi al-Bahra
Chief Negotiator and Secretary General of Political Committee
Monzer Akbik
Chief of Staff, Office of the President of the Syrian Coalition
Rime Allaf
Advisor to the President of the Syrian Coalition
Moderator:
Adnan Zulfiqar
Fellow, Truman National Security Project
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Belgrade starts down a difficult path
After weeks of post-election negotiations, Serbia has a new government. Except for the addition of an ethnic Hungarian minority party – the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) – the ruling coalition essentially consists of the two major parties that formed the previous one: Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and Ivica Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). The most visible difference is that Vučić has replaced Dačić as prime minister, while Dačić will hold the positions of vice-premier and foreign minister.
While Vučić was de facto the most powerful figure in the previous government as well, the acquisition of almost two thirds of parliamentary seats through a sweeping electoral victory by his party allows him to formalize his status and continue the consolidation of power more freely. This has caused many to wonder why he nevertheless chose to incorporate SPS into the government even though SNS could have comfortably ruled alone.
Part of the explanation lies in the severity of proposed economic reforms. Vučić wants to reach as broad a political consensus as possible in order to neutralize potential opposition once the reforms start to hurt large portions of people. SPS would be a far more dangerous opponent than the Democratic Party (DS) or the New Democratic Party (NDS), not only because it enjoys considerably greater public support but also because DS and NDS are deeply embroiled in mutual rivalry, as they compete for more or less the same voters.
Despite his current popularity, Vučić is aware that he will be blamed if reforms fail to yield expected results. He also knows his popularity will inevitably decline with the implementation of each new unpopular measure. The only question is how much. The success of reforms does not depend solely on Vučić’s or anyone’s individual will but rather on a variety of impersonal factors, both internal and external.
In order for structural reforms to succeed, they have to be both comprehensive and carefully timed. Partial implementation, with too many compromises in the process, will not suffice. Positive effects will not be felt in the near term. It will take years before people see tangible improvement in their quality of life, and only on condition that the government does not give up in the meantime in the face of strong public resistance.
The government plans to execute two sets of reforms. The first and more urgent pertain to fiscal consolidation aimed at preventing a looming financial default. The second, and in the long term more important, includes a radical change in business philosophy to make it much more friendly to private entrepreneurship. Adding to the complexity, economic reforms will have to be accompanied by a complete institutional overhaul, with emphasis on the judicial system.
On the foreign policy front, Kosovo will remain a top priority for Serbia’s European partners. In one way or another, the Brussels agreement will reverberate throughout the accession talks. With EU membership years away, Serbia’s formal recognition of its former province should not be expected any time soon. For one thing, Belgrade sees Kosovo as a useful lever in shaping its broader relationship with the West. The pace of Serbia’s EU integration will also hinge on how the lingering European crisis affects general sentiment within member states regarding enlargement policy.
On Ukraine, the government has tried to remain neutral. While analysts are warning that Serbia will not be able to maintain such a position for long, that may not necessarily be the case. The West is unlikely to place too much pressure on Belgrade for fear that it could undermine cooperativeness in dealing with Kosovo. Furthermore, even EU countries are divided on how to respond to Moscow’s latest actions. Last but not least, the EU understands Serbia’s vast energy dependence on Russia. Belgrade is particularly worried about the potential impact of the dispute between Russia and the West on the future of South Stream. Vučić’s government is pinning great hopes on the project, expecting the pipeline construction to boost economic activity and thus facilitate critically important job creation. However, if the crisis over Ukraine escalates further, pressure on Belgrade to take sides will grow accordingly.
The new government has chosen the path of serious reform. But given the challenges lying ahead, nothing can be taken for granted.
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Why Putin maybe blinked
It is easy to predict how many babies will be born next year. It is hard to predict who the individual mothers will be. That’s one of the important lessons in international affairs, where the decisions of unique individuals often matter.
Forty-eight hours after I posted that we should expect worse in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin decided to lower the tension. He claims to have withdrawn Russian troops from the Ukrainian border and to have asked the Russian-speaking insurgents in eastern and southern Ukraine not to conduct a May 11 referendum on independence. The US and NATO are saying they’ve seen no evidence of either claim. He is also sounding amiable about the May 25 presidential election that Kiev is organizing.
What made Putin blink? I don’t know. Maybe the significant declines in Russia’s credit rating, stock market and currency since he started up the Ukraine crisis. Maybe some of the sanctions are starting to bite. Maybe the withdrawals from his St. Petersburg economic forum weighed heavily. Maybe the Swiss President, who met with Putin just before he made his comments about Ukraine, said something about personal or institutional finance that gave the Russian President pause. Maybe it’s all a ruse to catch the West off balance and tomorrow he’ll invade.
Whatever his tactical maneuvers, Putin will not lose sight of his strategic goal: to dominate the Russian-speaking areas of eastern and southern Ukraine and deprive Kiev of the authority it needs to counter Moscow’s preferences, including its opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO and a closer relationship with the EU. The cheapest and easiest way to achieve his purposes is autonomy for the Russian-speaking provinces, and some sort of “entity” binding them together. He is all too familiar with recent precedents for this: Republika Srpska in Bosnia and the Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo.
No doubt some degree of decentralization will be part of the solution in Ukraine. It is not only American communities that want to run their own schools, provide services, maintain their own infrastructure and manage their own revenues. The Federal government has little to say about my daily life. I interact far more often with the District of Columbia, which collects much of its own revenue and in many respects governs itself, despite the residue of Congressional oversight that no state has to put up with.
What Kiev has to be careful about is to maintain its authority over foreign affairs, defense, the judiciary and at least some of the forces of law and order. It also needs a supremacy clause, like the one in the existing constitution, that enables it to override local decisions that threaten the integrity of the state, including the holding of referenda on independence.
Putin is not going to be interested in decentralization, which would block him from the kind of dominant position in Ukraine that he seeks. Decentralization to provincial administrations will make it more difficult for Russian-speakers to unify and fight Kiev, even if it enables them a wide margin of control over the services provided within the provinces.
My best guess is that Putin blinked to provide some time for negotiations to produce the result he wants. President Obama is not the only one who prefers not to use military force but instead accomplish his ends by diplomatic means.
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