Tag: Russia

Still righting the balance

These are my speaking notes for the talk I gave last night at the DC World Affairs Council on my book,
Righting the Balance (Potomac, 2013).  I’ve added a bit about Ukraine, which is in part an instance of state weakness.  It also illustrates the limited usefulness of conventional military instruments in meeting asymmetrical challenges, a key theme in the book.  Click there on the right to order your own copy!

1. It is truly an honor to present here at the World Affairs Council. The 98 World Affairs Councils throughout this country play a key role in generating and sustaining the kind of citizen engagement in foreign policy that I think is so important in today’s increasingly interconnected world.

2. As I am going to say some harsh things about the State Department and USAID, and even suggest they be abolished in favor of a single Foreign Office, I would like to emphasize from the first that I have enormous respect for the Foreign Service and the devotion of its officers to pursuing America’s interests abroad. I feel the same way about the US military.

3. But I don’t think the Foreign Service is well served by the institutions that hire, pay and deploy our diplomats and aid workers. And I don’t think our military should be called upon to make up for civilian deficiencies.

4. My book, Righting the Balance, is aimed at correcting those imbalances. But it does not start there.

5. It starts with the sweep of American history, which has given our military a leading role in America’s foreign affairs since at least the French and Indian war.

6. Americans think of their country as a peaceful one, but in fact we have had troops deployed in conflict zones for more than a quarter of our history—not even counting wars against native Americans and pirates—and every year since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

7. With each of those wars, we improved our technology and expanded our reach, becoming by the end of the 20th century the world’s only remaining superpower.

8. We have a strong, well-exercised military arm for projecting power. It is so strong that it is reaching a point of diminishing returns: every additional dollar buys miniscule improvement.

9. But our civilian capacities are more limited. This was glaringly apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan, where State and AID struggled, and all too often failed, to meet the requirements.

10. It has also been glaringly apparent during the Arab uprisings, which not only caught our diplomats by surprise but left them puzzled about what to do.

11. These failures are more important than ever before. The enemies who cause us problems today are not often states: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq fell quickly, as did the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

12. We won the wars. We lost the peace.

13. The main threats to America today come not from other strong states but from non-state actors who find haven and support in fragile, weak and collapsing states.

14. Even in Ukraine, the Russians are not using the full weight of their armed forces but rather relying on disruption in challenging the legitimacy of Kiev’s government and its control over territory in the east and south.

15. National security, always more than a military mission, now requires conflict prevention and state-building capacities that are sorely lacking in both State and AID. They have scrambled hard to meet the needs in Bosnia, Kosovo, South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are not much better configured than when I arrived in Sarajevo for the first time in November 1994.

16. Some of you will be thinking, that’s OK, because we never want to do this state-building stuff again.

17. It’s not only my colleague Michael Mandelbaum who thinks that way. Each and every president since 1989 has resisted getting involved in other countries’ internal politics, and each one has discovered that it is far easier to go to war and kill enemies than it is to withdraw, leaving behind a collapsed state that will regenerate those enemies.

18. Unless you are willing to fight on forever—even longer than the “long war”—you need to build capable states that protect their citizens reasonably well.

19. We are discovering this today in Yemen, where the drone war appears to have created more terrorists than it has killed. This is one of the main reasons President Obama has avoided military intervention in Syria, but the post-war effort there will still be a major one, even if is not primarily a U.S. responsibility. The same is true in eastern DRC and in Colombia, where peace is threatening to break out after decades of war.

20. America won’t be able to avoid being engaged when North Korea or Cuba collapses. Nor will we stay aloof if nuclear-armed Pakistan starts coming apart. Let’s not even think about Iran. If Ukraine is to be kept whole and independent, it will need a far better state than the one that has performed so badly since the Orange Revolution of 2005.

21. So my view is that we need to prepare for the day, not continue to delude ourselves that we will never do it again.

22. But I would be the first to admit that post-war state-building, a subject I teach at SAIS, is hard and expensive. Anticipation is cheaper and better. We need civilian foreign policy instruments that will take early action to prevent states from collapsing and help initiate reforms.

23. We’ve been reasonably successful at allowing this to happen in much of Latin America and East Asia, where recent decades have seen many countries turn in the direction of democratic transition. Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Indonesia are sterling examples of transitions that the United States allowed, nurtured and encouraged.

24. That’s what we failed to do effectively in the Arab world, with consequences that are now on the front pages every day. We failed to anticipate the revolution in Tunisia. In Libya we failed to help the new regime establish a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. That failure cost us an ambassador and three of his colleagues and has left Libya adrift.

25. In Egypt, we’ve been inconstant, supporting whoever gains power. The result, as I observed during the constitutional referendum in January, is a restoration of the military autocracy, with voters intimidated into staying home rather than voting against the new constitution and human rights advocates imprisoned along with the Muslim Brotherhood leadership.

26. In Syria, we failed to support moderates, only to see them displaced and replaced by extremists. The result is a daily catastrophe of truly genocidal dimensions.

27. The specific areas I describe as lacking in today’s State and AID are these:

• Mobilizing early, preventive action
• Reforming security services
• Promoting democracy
• Countering violent extremism
• Encouraging citizen and cultural diplomacy

28. These are all efforts at the periphery of traditional diplomacy, and I readily admit that the last three are better done mainly outside government while the first two are more inherently governmental.

29. But I don’t think we can get them done with our current institutions, which were designed for different purposes in other eras. Inertia and legacy are too strong.

30. The State Department, originally the Department of the State, is now a conventional foreign ministry with a 19th century architecture: most Foreign Service personnel serve abroad in static embassies and other missions servicing agencies of the US government other than the State Department. Legacy and inertia, not current needs, dictate where it has people stationed and a good deal of what they are doing.

31. USAID was founded with a poverty alleviation and economic development mission to help fight the Cold War. Few of us still think that US government programs can fix poverty at home, much less overseas.

32. There have been a lot of proposals for reform. Let’s recall Condoleezza Rice’s transformational diplomacy and Hillary Clinton’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, now being reprised. None of these efforts have gained more than temporary traction.

33. What we need to do is conduct what scientists call a thought experiment: knowing what we do about the challenges we now face, what kind foreign policy instruments do we need?

34. The answer is nothing like what we’ve got.

35. My book doesn’t offer a detailed design, but it does suggest that we need a single Foreign Office with a national security focus as well as a much-enhanced nongovernmental effort, operated at arms’ length from officialdom but with much greater Congressional funding than it has today.

36. I am not however prepared to propose, as so many have before me, that this new Foreign Office be funded by passing up an F22 or two. I think State and AID have the resources needed, but unfortunately tied up in those elephantine embassies supporting other US government agencies.

37. Shrinking these dramatically would provide the funds for a much sleeker and more effective Foreign Office, including a corps of several thousand people able and willing to deploy, with or without US troops, to difficult environments to take on the hard work of conflict prevention and state-building where required.

38. What we need is a far more agile, anticipatory and mobile Foreign Service, one built for a world in which virtually everyone will soon be connected to worldwide communications at reasonable cost and ordinary citizens, including you, count for much more than ever before in world history.

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Ukraine: expect worse

After many declarations of its intentions, Kiev is now trying to reassert by force its authority in eastern and southern Ukraine.  It is moving gradually and slowly, trying to avoid both a popular backlash and intervention by Moscow, which has massed troops and has threatened to use them to protect Russian-speakers inside Ukraine.

This map from the Washington Post illustrates the military deployments, which heavily favor Moscow in both quantity and quality:

Ukrainian and Russian force deployments

But those smooth curvy lines with arrows at the end are misleading.  A conventional force-on-force conflict has not started, yet.  Moscow is trying to achieve its purposes with more or less local forces, who have been setting up checkpoints and seizing government centers.  A clash at one of these Friday killed dozens of insurgents when their Kiev-loyal antagonists set the building they took refuge in on fire.  This followed the downing of two Ukrainian military helicopters, at least one by a surface to air missile not available at your local grocery, President Obama averred.  Another Ukrainian helicopter was shot down yesterday.

What we’ve got here are escalating low intensity clashes between the Kiev government’s forces and local insurgents backed by Russia.

What counts in a clash of this sort is legitimacy.  War is always politics by other means, but especially so when major conventional armed clashes are avoided.  Moscow is denying the legitimacy of the Kiev government, claiming it was installed in a coup (even if approved in parliament) and trying to demonstrate that it lacks control over the national territory.  Kiev is denying the legitimacy of Moscow’s complaints about treatment of Russian-speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine and trying to reassert territorial control.

The Odessa fire, which killed dozens, is significant even beyond the number of lives lost because it undermined Kiev’s claims that Russian-speakers are safe in Ukraine and supported Moscow’s complaints.  I have no reason to believe the fire was set by government authorities.  It seems to have been the act of people supporting Kiev, provoked by attacks earlier in the day.  But the inability of the government to protect all its citizens detracts substantially from Kiev’s claim of legitimacy.

Still, the situation of Russian speakers in Ukraine is nowhere near what would be required to justify foreign intervention.  Moscow has made virtually no effort to ensure their safety and security by non-military means.  The OSCE observers sent with that mission were held captive and not allowed to observe anything but the facilities they were held in against their will.  They have now been released, on orders from Vladimir Putin, which suggests how independent of Moscow the insurgents in Ukraine really are.

Kiev’s best hope for a restoration of its legitimacy may lie in the May 25 presidential election.  Petro Poroshenko, a billionaire “Chocolate King” who has served as Foreign Minister Minister as well as Minister of Trade and Economic Development and Chair of the central bank, is the current front runner in the polls.  With more than two dozen candidates, a second round may well be needed for someone to get over the 50% threshold.  Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister, is trailing and thought to be trying to get the election postponed until the fall.

The Russians will not want a successful election in eastern and southern Ukraine that would confirm Kiev’s legitimacy.  We can expect a concerted effort to prevent it from happening, and to disrupt it where it does.  While the administrative apparatus of the Ukrainian state still appears to be operating in many Russian-speaking areas, Moscow has already shown that it can shut down what it wants pretty much when it wants.  It would be prudent to expect a crescendo of violence and disruption as the election approaches, with Kiev trying to use its forces to restore order and ensure the election can proceed and Moscow plus Russian-speaking Ukrainians trying to prevent it.

 

 

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The Israel we need is not the one we’ve got

Yoram Peri, an Israeli patriot who has fought in three wars for his country and now directs the University of Maryland’s new Institute for Israel Studies, gave a post-service talk Friday night at our local synagogue.  His family has lived in Palestine and Israel since the 1860s.  What he had to say about the collapse of the Israel/Palestine peace talks and Israel’s politics may interest readers.  Here is what I remember of his impassioned presentation.*

Contrary to what has been reported, Yoram understands that Mahmoud Abbas was prepared to make major concessions in the US-sponsored negotiations.  Palestine would be demilitarized.  Eighty per cent of the Jewish population living beyond the wall would remain in placed.  Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem would not be disturbed.  Israeli troops would remain in the Jordan River valley for five years and then be replaced by American troops for another five years.  Israel would decide how many displaced and refugee Palestinians would be able to return to Israel proper.

Abbas was asking in return that Israel specify within a few months exactly where the border would lie (presumably based on swaps for land in the West Bank kept by Israel).  Jerusalem would be Palestine’s capital.  If Yoram mentioned other important Palestinian requirements, I am not remembering them.

Netanyahu rejected this offer.  His coalition has too many hardline settler supporters to allow him to accept.  Nor is he himself interested in making peace.  He is more comfortable talking about the Holocaust.

But when Abbas made a strong statement on the Holocaust to mark Yom HaShoah, Netanyahu rejected it as public relations.  Likewise, Netanyahu has complained for years that Abbas can’t deliver on peace with Israel because the Palestinian Authority he leads does not control Gaza.  Now that Hamas, which does control Gaza, has pledged to join a Palestinian Authority government consisting of “technical” ministers, Netanyahu says he won’t negotiate because then the Palestinian government will include terrorists.

Yoram thinks Hamas, as part of a unity government, will have to accept the “Quartet” (US, Russia, EU and UN) conditions for participation in the peace talks:  mutual recognition, acceptance of previous agreements, and ending violence as a means of attaining goals.  Abbas has also said as much.  If Hamas does accept these conditions, why wouldn’t Israel negotiate with it?  Yoram suggests there is no harm in talking with them to see what is possible.

Israel’s reluctance to accept a good deal with the Palestinians is rooted in the evolution of its politics.  The weight of the ultra religious has increased enormously.  And what the ultra religious want has also changed.  Whereas traditionally Jews are prohibited from praying on the Temple Mount (they pray only at the Wailing Wall at its base), some ultra religious militants are demanding not only to pray there but also to destroy the Dome of the Rock mosque and rebuild the ancient temple.  Only a few years ago, only fringe lunatics held such views.  Now they are entering mainstream discourse.

Israel officially accepts only Jewish orthodoxy as legitimate.  There are few reform synagogues.  Most of Israel’s Jews are either orthodox or secular.  They know nothing of the more liberal Reform Judaism practiced in the United States.  What is needed is a reverse birthright program:  one that brings young Israelis to the United States to learn about modern Jewish practices.

Ultimately, Yoram suggests the problem for Israel is the one John Kerry made recent reference to:  if it holds on to the West Bank, it cannot remain both democratic and Jewish.  The demography will require it to deny equal rights to the Arabs who live there, thus eventually meriting the appellation “apartheid.”  This is an opinion many Israeli leaders have expressed, so it is hard to understand why it caused such a furor recently in the US.

Israel faces a difficult future.  A third intifada is a possibility, though the Palestinians seem weary of the violence associated with the first two.  A nonviolent one is possible, a well-informed Arab journalist told me recently, but only after dissolving the Palestinian Authority, so it would not be faced with the difficulty of repressing the rebellion.  Yoram suggested the BDS (boycotts, disinvestment and sanctions) movement will grow.  Israel will increasingly stand alone against a world that regards it as extreme and uncompromising.  Rather than being a beacon of hope, it will be isolated in a hostile environment.

Asked about the future of Israel’s Arabs, Yoram suggested that its national anthem “Hatikvah” (the Hope) could be amended to be more inclusive.  This is the current version:

As long as deep in the heart,

The soul of a Jew yearns,

And forward to the East

To Zion, an eye looks

Our hope will not be lost,

The hope of two thousand years,

To be a free nation in our land,

The land of Zion and Jerusalem.

I have my doubts any amendment will satisfy Israel’s more than 20% Arab citizens, but the Israel that would at least give it a try would also be one that signed up for the deal Mahmoud Abbas was offering.  That unfortunately is not the Israel we’ve got.  But it is the Israel we need.

*Virtually all of what Yoram said about what the Palestinians were prepared to agree has now been published, based on American sources:  Inside the talks’ failure: US officials open up.

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Peace picks May 5 – 9

1. Russia in East Asia: History, Migration, and Contemporary Policy Monday, May 5 | 9 – 11am 5th Floor, Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW REGISTER TO ATTEND This talk explores Russia’s ties with East Asia through the lens of migration and policy. Russia spans the Eurasian continent, yet its historic and present connections with East Asia are often forgotten. At the turn of the 20th century, thousands of Asian migrants arrived in the Russian Far East, spurring fears of a “yellow peril.” A century later, the recent influx of new Asian migrants to Russia has generated similar sentiments. The talk discusses Asian migration in the context of cross-regional attempts to strengthen trade ties and diplomatic relations in the 21st century. SPEAKERS Matthew Ouimet, Public Policy Scholar Senior Analyst, Office of Analysis for Russia and Eurasia, U.S. Department of State. Alyssa Park, Kennan Institute Title VIII Supported Research Scholar Assistant Professor of Modern Korean History, University of Iowa   2. The Democratic Transition in Tunisia: Moving Forward Monday, May 5 | 10 – 11:30am Kenney Auditorium, The Nitze Building, Johns Hopkins University; 1740 Massachusetts Ave NW REGISTER TO ATTEND Mustapha Ben Jaafar, president of the National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia, will discuss this topic. Sasha Toperich, senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS, will moderate the event. Read more

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The perils of Sonja and Jelena

Ratko Dmitrović, Director and Editor in Chief of Serbia’s daily Večernje Novosti, writes (translation courtesy of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies):

How are the views of Kristijan Golubović [a convicted armed robber, extortionist, drug and arms trafficker] and his biography more dangerous for Serbian society than the views and biography of Sonja Biserko?

What are Sonja Biserko’s sins?  This is what Dmitrović cites:

…she testified at the Hague in order to prove the genocidal proneness of the State of Serbia, making lists snitching Serbian intellectuals, professors, public figures…

Dmitrović  puts Jelena Milic in the same category.  Her sins?  According to him, she

…claims that Serbia should have been bombed in 1999. That was, as she explains, the only way to prevent Milosevic’s crimes in Kosovo in 1998/1999.

These allegedly odious views make the two women as morally repugnant to Dmitrović  as Kristijan Golubović, a notorious convicted criminal. Dmitrović can’t abide the two women having more access to the media than Golubović does.

Let’s leave aside whether Jelena and Sonja, both of whom I know and esteem for their courage and conviction, actually did and said what Dmitrović claims.  They can answer better on that score than I can.  The question is whether the editor of a major Belgrade newspaper is unable to distinguish between the moral effect of criticizing the (Milosevic) government’s behavior and the violent criminal activities of Golubović?

I imagine he can.  But he doesn’t want to.   He is using his freedom of speech–to which he is as entitled as Jelena and Sonja–to make their lives even more perilous than they already are.  The implications seem clear to me.  If they are endangering Serbian youth, shouldn’t someone do something about it?  If they are more corrosive to Serb values, as he suggests, than the Russian-killing Rambo, shouldn’t someone stop them?  Dmitrović is not alone in thinking this way.   The Serbian People’s Movement Naši (NSP Naši) lists them among the 30 greatest Serb-haters and traitors among public figures.

I’ll leave it to the Serbian government and courts to decide whether these particular uses of constitutionally protected freedoms violate Serbian law.  They certainly violate American sensibilities, which makes little difference under the circumstances.  But both the international community and the Serbian government should be stating clearly that they dislike what Dmitrović is saying and regard the safety of Sonja and Jelena, both of whom live and work in Belgrade, as paramount.

Serbia has come a long way in the 13+ years since Milosevic fell.  The recent election confirmed its future lies in Europe, where those who know Jelena and Sonja regard them as among Belgrade’s finest.  They should not be made martyrs to a European Serbia, or asked to sacrifice their homes in order to be safe and secure.

PS:  For more on what Jelena’s organization has to say about Serbia’s relations with Russia, see this.  I find it amusing that a former prime minister has forgotten about Russia sanctioning Serbia, but I understand those who take it more seriously.

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Peace picks April 28 – May 2

1. American Energy Prowess in a Strategic Foreign Policy Perspective

Monday, April 28 | 12 – 4:30pm

12th floor, The Atlantic Council; 1030 15th Street NW

REGISTER TO ATTEND

The Atlantic Council and the Hungarian Presidency of the Visegrad Group invite you to an upcoming two-day conference titled American Energy Prowess in a Strategic Foreign Policy Perspective. The aim of the conference is to discuss and debate the strategic foreign policy aspects of the American shale gas revolution and its effect on the transatlantic relationship and the Central and Eastern European region. The Ukraine crisis has brought European energy security back into the forefront. The conference will bring together leaders from the US government, Central and Eastern Europe, and the energy industry to determine ways to strengthen European energy security and the transatlantic alliance through reinforced energy ties.

The conference begins with a luncheon discussion on Monday, April 28 at the Atlantic Council. The following day, participants will continue over breakfast on Capitol Hill to engage with key congressional decision-makers.

A full agenda of the event can be found here 

Read more

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