Tag: Russia
The Cory Remsburg metaphor
The President’s State of the Union speech last night broke little new ground on foreign policy. He is pleased to be finishing two wars and will resist getting the United States involved in other open-ended conflicts. He may leave a few troops in Afghanistan to train Afghans and attack terrorists. Al Qaeda central is largely defeated but its franchises are spreading in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Mali. He will limit the use of drones, reform surveillance policies and get us off a permanent war footing. He wants to close Guantanamo, as always, and fix immigration, as always.
He will use diplomacy, especially in trying to block Iran verifiably from obtaining a nuclear weapons and in resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, but also in destroying Syria’s chemical weapons capability. He will support the moderate Syrian opposition. He will veto new Iran sanctions in order to give diplomacy a chance to work, maintain the alliance with Europe, support democracy in Ukraine, development in Africa, and trade and investment across the Pacific. America is exceptional both because of what it does and because of its ideals.
The President didn’t mention Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Russia or Japan. He skipped North Korea too. His mother must have taught him that when you don’t have anything nice to say you shouldn’t say anything at all. Those countries might merit mention, but all have in one way or another been doing things that we prefer they not do. He mentioned China, but only as an economic rival, not a military one. He skipped the pivot to Asia as well as Latin America. For my Balkans readers: you are not even on his screen. Read more
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We are not there yet
Word from Geneva this morning suggests that the Syria peace talks are deadlocked over the issue of forming a transitional government with full executive powers, which is the key goal set in a June 2012 UN communique’. This is no surprise. Bashar al Asad shows no sign of stepping down, aside or out. His Iranian and Russian supporters, while claiming they are not wedded to him, are still not prepared to compel him, or even provide incentives. They continue to provide ample military and financial support.
The opposition is no readier to make peace. Its negotiators went to Geneva 2, as these talks are known, in parlous shape. The regime has been pressing its military advantages near Damascus and in Homs. The opposition military forces are fragmented and fighting each other. The negotiators representing the opposition in Geneva have precious little control over the armed revolutionaries, who are fragmented and fighting with each other. There was also a significant political minority within the Syrian Opposition Coalition, which leads the delegation in Geneva, that opposed going to the talks.
Given these disadvantages, it is remarkable that things have gone pretty well for the opposition in Geneva. Unforced regime errors are part of the explanation. Its chief negotiator, Foreign Minister Moallem, came out of his corner overly aggressive, not only against the opposition but also against UN Secretary General Ban. Beating on the referee is not a good way to win a boxing match. Moallem essentially rejected the notion that the talks aim at forming a transitional government. The regime prefers to forge ahead with spring elections at which Bashar al Asad is guaranteed victory. Read more
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The merits don’t count
The UN invitation to Iran now withdrawn because it failed to acknowledge the June 2012 Geneva 1 communique call for a transitional governing body with full executive powers, the Geneva 2 peace conference began today in Montreux with “bitter speeches.” While the acidity is unusually high in this instance, most peace conferences begin with this kind of venting. The Syrian government representative was anxious to establish Bashar al Asad’s legitimacy while the opposition focused on his atrocities, newly documented in a frightening graphic report purporting to include official photographs of torture victims.
Can anything good come of this Montreux opening and the next few days of meetings? The primary candidates are a prisoner exchange and humanitarian access. The former is much more likely to come off well than the latter.
Holding prisoners is not easy or rewarding. Their usefulness as sources of information declines rapidly after their capture. In addition, warring parties face strong pressure from families and fighters on their own side to get at least an accounting for prisoners, if not also their freedom. It is hard to maintain morale if your people know you can’t even get their comrades and relatives back from the opponent. Supervision of such prisoner exchanges, usually by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is a well practiced art. Read more
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Peace picks, January 13-17
A bit late, but as good as ever:
1. Battlefield Earth: Reassessing U.S. Responses to Terrorist Threats
Monday, January 13 | 12:15 – 1:45pm
New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW Suite 400
In 2001, the U.S. Congress authorized the president to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.” This Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) set no limits on time, location, or target.
In just the last 12 months, the AUMF was invoked in support of the war in Afghanistan, but also unconventional operations in Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and possibly elsewhere — operations such as targeted killings using drones, raids and captures by U.S. Special Forces, and, in all probability, cyber warfare.
As Heather Hurlburt writes in “Battlefield Earth” in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas’ Winter 2014 issue, out this month: “public debate over the use of force in Syria and the revelations concerning National Security Agency surveillance suggest that Americans are increasingly uncomfortable with actions being undertaken in their name. President Obama appeared to acknowledge this reality in May [2013] when he said he looked forward ‘to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.’”
With combat in Afghanistan winding down at the end of the year, does the AUMF continue to authorize force against any terror suspect linked to al-Qaeda, anywhere? Will Congress or the Administration move to “refine” or “repeal” it, and if so, how?
Join the New America Foundation’s National Security Program and Democracy for a panel discussion assessing the politics, legal alternatives, and policy implications of a 13-year-old piece of legislation that makes the planet an open-ended battlefield.
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What else we can do
The UN-led Syria peace talks known as Geneva 2 are scheduled to convene in Montreux January 22 for a public session and continue in Geneva with only the Syrian warring parties (regime and opposition), under the aegis of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi. I’ve betrayed my lack of enthusiasm for Geneva 2, but it is legitimate to ask what else can be done, or what might be done at the talks that would be useful. Let’s assume direct US military action is out of the question, because it is unless Al Qaeda manages to set up a haven in Syria used to launch attacks against the US or its allies.
First is to consider whether convening the talks on the date foreseen is a good idea. The situation on the ground in Syria is in flux. The regime and the opposition may have reached a kind of complex territorial equilibrium, in which neither side can gain much by further fighting. But within the anti-regime forces a lot is happening. The fog of war is still thick, but it appears more moderate Islamist and secular fighters are confronting and at least for the moment undoing the most extreme forces associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, sometimes ISIL for Levant), at the behest of the population in areas that ISIS has brutalized. This development could solve one of Washington’s biggest problems: it has hesitated to support the opposition with lethal assistance for fear it would fall into the hands of extremists, helping them to take control of a post-Asad Syria. But the outcome of the fight is by no means certain and it may presage greater instablity or even extremist strengthening.
Wisdom suggests awaiting the result before proceeding with peace talks on what might turn out to be false premises. Postponement for a month or so might be wise. Timing is vital in diplomacy. The situation on the ground–who holds power where–is a vital ingredient of any diplomatic resolution. Trying get a resolution before the situation is clear can be a big mistake.
In the meanwhile, one possibility is to try for local ceasefires, since a country-wide ceasefire is bound to be violated quickly by armed groups not at the negotiating table. Both sides of the fight are exhausted in Aleppo. It may be possible to arrange for all sides to suspend the fight, provided the regime doesn’t wreck the prospect by bombing or rocketing. The Russians would have to make it clear to Bashar that doing so would have consequences.
Another possibility is to insist that the regime demonstrably implement freedom of the press and association before it gains the legitimacy that necessarily derives from its presence in Montreux/Geneva. There are brave Syrians trying every day to exercise their rights. Enabling them to do so was an integral part of Kofi Annan’s plan, observed more in the breach. Moderate Syrians would pour into the streets if they thought they would be safe.
A third option would be to formally break diplomatic relations with Damascus and recognize the recently formed Syrian Opposition Coalition government as the legal representative of the Syrian state. Only one or two countries have done this so far. Washington could lead an effort in this direction, including a challenge to the Damascus’ credentials at the UN.
But if, as I suspect, no one at the State Department wants to go tell John Kerry that his hard-won initiative should be postponed, what can still be done constructively on January 22 and 23?
A step that would be much appreciated on both sides would be prisoner releases. If the opposition negotiators can come home from Geneva 2 having arranged for several hundred of their compatriots to return to their families, that would remove at least some of the stigma associated with attending an international conference that will disappoint most Syrians.
The United States can make it clear that it backs a strict interpretation of the Geneva 1 communique, which provides for a transitional governing body with full executive authority (TGBFEA). It won’t be possible to get that this month, but Washington should leave no one in any doubt that its strategic goal is removal of all power from Bashar al Asad, even if he nominally stays in office (which really isn’t possible once he loses control of the security apparatus). The current wishy washy line is that we are starting a peace process that is intended to lead eventually to a TGBFEA. That line undermines the opposition and encourages the regime.
The United States could put it bluntly to the Russians that they can’t support a peace process that leads to Bashar’s removal from power and arm the Syrian regime at the same time. They need to choose. If they choose to continue supplying weapons that are used against civilians, then the Americans should make it clear they will expand arming the opposition, trying of course to ensure that the weapons are not used against civilians. It would also be possible to offer the Russians something they value in exchange for their defenestration of Bashar. Some flexibility on anti-missile defense in Europe might go a long way.
Geneva 2 could also be an appropriate place to discuss humanitarian access, but the issue should be put clearly. The regime is blocking humanitarian access, not the revolutionaries. There should be no quid pro quo for allowing relief to reach civilians from all of Syria’s neighbors. Both sides have been attacking civilian populations. They should be told to stop, first in a communique from Geneva 2 but then in a vigorous UN Security Council resolution.
The predictable failure of Geneva 2 to move forward on creating the TGBFEA puts the opposition in a difficult spot. Only Bashar stepping aide or down would justify attendance in the eyes of most of the opposition, but the more moderate figures associated with the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Free Syrian Army will have no choice but to attend if they want to get continuing American support. One option is a walkout, coordinated with Washington (or at least foreshadowed to Washington). This could save face for those opposition moderates who feel compelled to attend in Geneva but worry about how it will weaken their standing inside Syria. Some lower-level officials might be left behind to deal with humanitarian issues, which could benefit from detailed coordination.
The purpose of a meeting like Geneva 2 should not merely be negotiation, or to start a process. Washington needs to think hard about what can be achieved that will improve the situation. It needs clarity about its goals and the means it will bring to bear to achieve them.
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The Geneva 2 Rohrschach
I spent yesterday listening to well-informed people talk (Las Vegas rules) about prospects for the January 22/23 Montreux/Geneva 2 peace talks. The UN faxed invitations Monday. The Syrian government has already named its delegation. The Russians are in. Iran is not invited to the multilateral opening day in Montreux, but John Kerry says it can hang around with everyone else while UN envoy Brahimi meets with the Syrian parties on the second day in Geneva. Faute de mieux, the Americans are committed to Geneva 2 and anxious that it begin a peace process, even if there is no hope it will conclude one. “What else can we do?” they ask plaintively.
The Syrian opposition doesn’t know if it is coming or going. Some portion of Etilaf, the Syrian Opposition Coalition that Washington and other capitals have accepted as the political representative of the Syrian people, is bound to give in to US pressure to attend, but no formal decision has been taken yet. The Syrian National Council component of Etilaf is against attending. So of course are the more extreme Islamists armed groups. Most moderate Islamist armed groups, organized now as the Islamic Front, are also opposed. The Free Syrian Army’s Supreme Military Council will have to go, since it gets a lot of assistance from the US.
Why would the opposition not want to attend? Let me count the reasons:
- There is no serious possibility of Geneva 2 implementing the Geneva 1 goal of a “transitional governing body with full executive authority,” since Bashar al Asad is clearly not prepared to step aside, down or up.
- Anyone from the opposition who attends will be regarded as a traitor by those who don’t, including armed groups with the capacity to do real harm.
- Even if the risks are not mortal, the political risk is significant.
- Attending will fragment the opposition even more and weaken it.
- The opposition does not trust the Americans and loathes the Russians.
- Whatever statement comes out of Geneva 2, it will have to be balanced between the Americans and Russians, which means it could imply support for the scheduled May elections, focus on fighting terrorism rather than ending Asad’s brutality towards the Syrian people and imply an obligation of those attending to cut off supplies of arms (thus obligating Saudi Arabia and Qatar but not Iran).
A ceasefire agreed at Geneva will be meaningless, as the extremist militias not present will violate it right away, with the regime responding in kind (if not pre-empting). The only real upside for the opposition at Geneva would be agreement on humanitarian access. But the opposition believes that could be agreed without negotiation between the warring parties, as it is a clear legal obligation for the government to allow relief to the civilian population.
One-third of Etilaf is already said to have resigned to protest against going to Geneva 2, which even the many fighters who want a political solution regard as an a snare and a delusion. Without changing the military balance on the ground, and without strong American backing, Geneva 2 will cause more fragmentation in the opposition. It will also weaken relative moderates within the opposition and strengthen extremists. The West is setting up the opposition for failure.
What will it do for the the regime, the Russians and the Iranians?
The regime looks to an international meeting like Geneva 2 for legitimacy, which it has never sought from the Syrian people. It will claim to have offered reforms and even amnesty, portray itself as a bulwark against extremism, denounce the international conspiracy against Asad and claim that what it has done on chemical weapons demonstrates its reliability. Disciplined and organized, it will present a clean face to the world in Montreux, even if barrel bombs are still falling on the civilian population of Aleppo.
Moscow’s main objective is to prevent chaos and the flow of extremists from Syria (where 5-600 Russian citizens are fighting against the regime), as well as to protect specific interests like port access and protection of orthodox Christians. It is difficult for Moscow to see how chaos can be avoided if the regime is removed. Russia doesn’t want to see Libyan-style chaos in Syria. In Moscow’s view, a majority of Syrians still supports Asad, who may well run for re-election in May. He is not creating the extremists, who would exist even if there were no war in Syria. The Sunni/Shia divide is exaggerated. It is strife within the Sunni community that is really important. Transitional justice in Moscow’s estimation should be postponed, as it has been in Cambodia. It claims to be ready for a peaceful transition to democracy, but there is no sign it is ready to cut off the weapons flow to the regime.
Nor is there sign Iran is ready to abandon Asad. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in particular the Quds Force, controls Iran’s policy on Syria, not President Rouhani. There is no open dissent from the official narrative: Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia are trying to remove Asad, so the “resistance front” (Hizbollah and the IRGC) needs to respond. They cannot be restrained without stopping the flow of extremists and Gulf financing to the opposition forces. Iran would like an invitation to Montreux, but not with conditions. It will not accept the Geneva 1 goal.
Tomorrow: I’ll attempt to answer that plaintive question: “what else can we do?”
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