Tag: Russia
Grading assistance to Ukraine
Larry Summers, not my favorite public persona but a savvy economist to be sure, offers sage advice on aid for Ukraine. But he fails to consider how we are likely to measure up to his “lessons for the design of support programs,” so here are my guesstimates (the proposals in bold are his, the rest is mine):
1. Immediate impact is essential. While Congress has acted quickly to approve $1 billion in loan guarantees and the European Union has in principle approved $15 billion, the International Monetary Fund has not yet acted. Odds are it will take time, not only for the IMF to extract reform promises from Ukraine but also for the bureaucratic arrangements to be made by the EU and US. And the total amount is likely to fall far short of the $35 billion Ukraine says it needs.
2. Avoid “Potemkin money.” I wonder if loan guarantees fall in the category of Potemkin money, as I imagine it is difficult to know how much new money they make available. Perhaps a reader or two who are expert can enlighten me. EU money is rarely quick in my experience. IMF money is real but takes time to get approved. Months rather than weeks before they write a check. Potemkin-like in the meanwhile.
3. Be realistic about debts. Summers wants us to consider rescheduling or restructuring, which is something often done after a revolution (but never quick–it often takes years). Relief from official and private sector debt is often in the 35-60% range. Uniquely Iraq got 80% off its official debt at the Paris Club. Post-Communist Poland got 40% off. But of course much of Ukraine’s debt is owed to Russia, which is unlikely to be cooperative in any effort to reduce, reschedule or restructure. The usual consensus is not likely to be available, unless we strike a deal with Moscow that is likely to be inimical to Ukraine’s interest in Crimea.
4. Honest management is as important as prudent policy. We don’t want the Ukrainians stealing the money we send them, and we should want to recover as much as possible from past abuse. Lots of luck on the latter. Yanukovich and his cronies will have squirreled away a lot of money in difficult to trace places. Some of Ukraine’s wealthy tycoons are prominent supporters of the post-Yanukovich regime. It will not be easy to prevent problems in the future either, as Ukraine clearly lacks the mechanisms required for serious transparency and accountability. Sure we should insist, but it will take legislation and courage to put them in place. Recovery of ill-gotten gains takes years, as does establishment of institutions designed to prevent theft.
5. Countries need to pursue broad polices in a way that benefits Ukraine. There is a pretty good chance the Obama administration will do the right things on the IMF and on energy policy by building the Keystone pipeline and approving natural gas exports. Europe is also likely to do at least some of the right things: continue to pay for the gas it receives through Ukraine, so long as the Russians continue to send it, and help Ukraine develop alternative energy sources for its own use, reducing its dependency on Russia.
The big problems are with immediacy and impact. Ukraine needs a lot of money quickly, much faster than it will get honest management or debt reduction. Washington and Brussels look likely to have won the tug of war for Kiev and any other parts of Ukraine that remain attached to it. They need to do everything they can to avoid financial implosion of their prize.
Vladimir Putin and Chris Hayes are wrong
Isidora Kranjcevic of the Belgrade daily Blic asked me this morning to comment on Russian President Putin’s remark:
Generally, I believe that only residents of a given country who have the freedom of will and are in complete safety can and should determine their future. If this right was granted to the Albanians in Kosovo, if this was made possible in many different parts of the world, then nobody has ruled out the right of nations to self-determination, which, as far as I know, is fixed by several UN documents.
What is Putin trying to do here? Read more
Observers, aid, energy and elections
Much as I am entertained by explanations of Russian behavior based on Western decline and claims that Vladimir Putin is delusional, responding to the seizure of Crimea and threats against the rest of southern and eastern Ukraine requires a finer brush. How can Russia be prevented from occupying other Russian-speaking areas and how might the occupation of Crimea be reversed? Those are the objectives Kiev, Washington and Brussels should be setting.
Kiev is one key to preventing Russia from taking over other Russian-speaking areas of southern and eastern Ukraine. It has already done well to block (with a veto by the speaker of parliament) a law that would have denied Russian the status of an official language in those areas. It has also appointed new governors, including at least two wealthy oligarchs. How well they manage to respond to pro-Russian protests, avoiding violence while reasserting a modicum of Kiev’s authority, will be the primary determinant of whether things get out of hand or continue to calm. Putting in international observers to report on the situation and highlight any abuses is a good idea. Putin already has his hands full in Crimea. He doesn’t really need to take on additional burdens elsewhere in Ukraine, provided Russian speakers aren’t clamoring for intervention to protect them from the depredations of Kiev. Read more
Putin speaks
President Putin today finally addressed some of the issues Russian behavior in Ukraine has raised. I can find neither video nor transcript so far,* so I am relying on the RT account, which is ample but certainly not complete.
Putin’s main point is that Russia has the right to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s east:
If we see this lawlessness starting in eastern regions, if the people ask us for help – in addition to a plea from a legitimate president, which we already have – then we reserve the right to use all the means we possess to protect those citizens. And we consider it quite legitimate.
Putin makes clear his distaste for deposed Ukrainian President Yanukovich and shows no inclination to restore him to power, but at the same time he thinks his removal was not legitimate:
I strictly object to this form [of transition of power] in Ukraine, and anywhere in the post-Soviet space. This does not help nurturing a culture of law. If someone is allowed to act this way, then everyone is allowed to. And this means chaos. That’s the worst thing that can happen to a country with an unstable economy and an unestablished political system.
So what we’ve got here is a claim to legitimacy based on protection of ethnic Russians and rejection of the overthrow of an elected president. Putin would have us believe that he is at least as justified as the United States was in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Read more
Money talks
Charles King (not further identified) says in this morning’s New York Times:
Mr. Putin used a novel justification for his country’s attack on a neighboring state: protecting the interests of both Russian citizens and “compatriots” — code not just for ethnic Russians but for anyone with a political or cultural disposition toward Russia.
Novel is in the eye of the beholder. Only someone unaware of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s could call this notion novel. And only someone unfamiliar with the doctrine of responsibility to protect could call it R2P, as King does. Strategic interest is far more important to Putin than protection of civilians, no matter what their nationality. Crimea may be an ethnic mosaic to King, but it offers a nice warm water port with a mostly friendly local population to Putin.
The question is Lenin’s: what is to be done? In the Administration they are concluding correctly that there is little the West can do to reverse the situation in the near term. None of the tough talk includes tough action. Kicking Russia out of the G8, canceling trade missions, travel bans, visits to Kiev and consultations with allies are all more symbol than substance. Even reviving missile defense is not something that will force Russia out of Crimea any time soon. The offer of European observers to protect the Russian-speaking population of Crimea is clever–because Putin will reject it, thereby undermining in Western eyes his rationale for sending in troops–but it will do nothing to alter the situation on the ground. Russian troops are in Crimea to stay for the foreseeable future. Read more
Putin has put Obama on the spot
Though events have moved quickly, it is already apparent that there is little the United States can do to get Russia to leave Crimea any time soon. The proposals from left and right for action are nowhere near sufficient to get Vladimir Putin to reverse his successful military seizure of the province’s vital security and governance installations. American military action is not in the cards. While the West notes Russia’s inconsistency in violating the principle of sovereignty, Putin even claims legal justification: the province’s prime minister asked for help, which he says is permissible under Russia’s security agreements with Kiev.
The most immediate requirement is not to push Russia out of Crimea, which may take a decade or more. Washington lacks non-military means capable of doing it, and no one is advocating war with Russia over Ukraine. But Moscow, successful in Crimea, may well be thinking of similar takeovers in other southern and eastern provinces with large Russian-speaking populations that voted for Viktor Yanukovich: Read more