peacefare.net

What else we can do

The UN-led Syria peace talks known as Geneva 2 are scheduled to convene in Montreux January 22 for a public session and continue in Geneva with only the Syrian warring parties (regime and opposition), under the aegis of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi.  I’ve betrayed my lack of enthusiasm for Geneva 2, but it is legitimate to ask what else can be done, or what might be done at the talks that would be useful.  Let’s assume direct US military action is out of the question, because it is unless Al Qaeda manages to set up a haven in Syria used to launch attacks against the US or its allies.

First is to consider whether convening the talks on the date foreseen is a good idea.  The situation on the ground in Syria is in flux.  The regime and the opposition may have reached a kind of complex territorial equilibrium, in which neither side can gain much by further fighting.  But within the anti-regime forces a lot is happening.  The fog of war is still thick, but it appears more moderate Islamist and secular fighters are confronting and at least for the moment undoing the most extreme forces associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, sometimes ISIL for Levant), at the behest of the population in areas that ISIS has brutalized.  This development could solve one of Washington’s biggest problems:  it has hesitated to support the opposition with lethal assistance for fear it would fall into the hands of extremists, helping them to take control of a post-Asad Syria.  But the outcome of the fight is by no means certain and it may presage greater instablity or even extremist strengthening.

Wisdom suggests awaiting the result before proceeding with peace talks on what might turn out to be false premises.  Postponement for a month or so might be wise.  Timing is vital in diplomacy.  The situation on the ground–who holds power where–is a vital ingredient of any diplomatic resolution.  Trying get a resolution before the situation is clear can be a big mistake.

In the meanwhile, one possibility is to try for local ceasefires, since a country-wide ceasefire is bound to be violated quickly by armed groups not at the negotiating table.  Both sides of the fight are exhausted in Aleppo.  It may be possible to arrange for all sides to suspend the fight, provided the regime doesn’t wreck the prospect by bombing or rocketing.  The Russians would have to make it clear to Bashar that doing so would have consequences.  

Another possibility is to insist that the regime demonstrably implement freedom of the press and association before it gains the legitimacy that necessarily derives from its presence in Montreux/Geneva.  There are brave Syrians trying every day to exercise their rights.  Enabling them to do so was an integral part of Kofi Annan’s plan, observed more in the breach.  Moderate Syrians would pour into the streets if they thought they would be safe.

A third option would be to formally break diplomatic relations with Damascus and recognize the recently formed Syrian Opposition Coalition government as the legal representative of the Syrian state.  Only one or two countries have done this so far.  Washington could lead an effort in this direction, including a challenge to the Damascus’ credentials at the UN.

But if, as I suspect, no one at the State Department wants to go tell John Kerry that his hard-won initiative should be postponed, what can still be done constructively on January 22 and 23?

A step that would be much appreciated on both sides would be prisoner releases.  If the opposition negotiators can come home from Geneva 2 having arranged for several hundred of their compatriots to return to their families, that would remove at least some of the stigma associated with attending an international conference that will disappoint most Syrians.

The United States can make it clear that it backs a strict interpretation of the Geneva 1 communique, which provides for a transitional governing body with full executive authority (TGBFEA).  It won’t be possible to get that this month, but Washington should leave no one in any doubt that its strategic goal is removal of all power from Bashar al Asad, even if he nominally stays in office (which really isn’t possible once he loses control of the security apparatus).  The current wishy washy line is that we are starting a peace process that is intended to lead eventually to a TGBFEA.  That line undermines the opposition and encourages the regime.

The United States could put it bluntly to the Russians that they can’t support a peace process that leads to Bashar’s removal from power and arm the Syrian regime at the same time.  They need to choose.  If they choose to continue supplying weapons that are used against civilians, then the Americans should make it clear they will expand arming the opposition, trying of course to ensure that the weapons are not used against civilians.  It would also be possible to offer the Russians something they value in exchange for their defenestration of Bashar.  Some flexibility on anti-missile defense in Europe might go a long way.

Geneva 2 could also be an appropriate place to discuss humanitarian access, but the issue should be put clearly.  The regime is blocking humanitarian access, not the revolutionaries.  There should be no quid pro quo for allowing relief to reach civilians from all of Syria’s neighbors.  Both sides have been attacking civilian populations.  They should be told to stop, first in a communique from Geneva 2 but then in a vigorous UN Security Council resolution.

The predictable failure of Geneva 2 to move forward on creating the TGBFEA puts the opposition in a difficult spot.  Only Bashar stepping aide or down would justify attendance in the eyes of most of the opposition, but the more moderate figures associated with the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Free Syrian Army will have no choice but to attend if they want to get continuing American support.  One option is a walkout, coordinated with Washington (or at least foreshadowed to Washington).  This could save face for those opposition moderates who feel compelled to attend in Geneva but worry about how it will weaken their standing inside Syria.  Some lower-level officials might be left behind to deal with humanitarian issues, which could benefit from detailed coordination.

The purpose of a meeting like Geneva 2 should not merely be negotiation, or to start a process.  Washington needs to think hard about what can be achieved that will improve the situation.  It needs clarity about its goals and the means it will bring to bear to achieve them.