Tag: Russia

Moscow can deliver Damascus

Edward P. Joseph, my colleague here at SAIS and in the Center for Transatlantic Relations, offers:

US policy towards Syria rests on the premise that Russia can deliver the Assad regime to surrendering its chemical stockpile and to hoped-for talks in Geneva for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While much has been said about Russia’s willingness to press Damascus, Moscow’s ability to bring its influence to bear has received less scrutiny.

While the subject is clouded in secrecy, there is every reason to believe — based on the dynamics of patron-client relationships — that Moscow does, in fact, command substantial, even decisive influence in Damascus.

Consider America’s own relationship with a Middle East client: Egypt. As was abundantly clear during the military’s ouster of then-President Morsi, Washington danced an awkward line, refraining from labeling the military action a “coup” because this would trigger a mandatory cut in substantial US foreign assistance to Egypt. Instead, Washington expressed its concern over Cairo’s anti-democratic direction in gingerly fashion, by delaying the delivery of four F-16.  This was a symbolic step, but hardly one that inflicted serious hardship on the military-led government. Egypt faces serious internal security issues, especially in the Sinai, none of which are amenable to attack by the latest fighter aircraft.

There was no mystery why Washington didn’t take a harder line. Had it cut foreign assistance, Cairo could plausibly have turned to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. The Saudis — animated by the departure of the despised Muslim Brotherhood — pledged to make up any cuts to Egypt by both the US and EU. Riyadh proved to be as good as its word, putting together a total aid package with other Gulf States topping $12 billion. In other words, the client, Egypt, held an (oil) barrel over the head of its American patron, thanks to the availability of an alternative, namely, Gulf states flush with cash.

Who can Damascus turn to if Moscow decides to amp up the pressure or ramp down support? Answer: no one, including Iran. Tehran is itself  attempting to emerge from international isolation and internal weakness.  Besides, it does not hold a permanent seat on the Security Council. Iran can continue to supply cash, personnel, materiel and regional support (directly through Hezbollah and indirectly through Baghdad), but in no way, shape or form can Tehran substitute for the support that Russia can provide. Russia provided Syria this spring with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, designed to complicate potential Western military action such as a no-fly zone. Russia is the ‘sole source protector’ of Syria at the strategic level; Iran operates mostly at the regional level.  

Cautious China has shown no willingness to overstep Moscow’s high-profile role on Syria, preferring to follow its lead in the Security Council.  Beijing shares Moscow’s allergy to military intervention, particularly where democratic uprisings are involved.  But Beijing does not share the array of compelling interests that make Syria a significant Russian client.

Therefore the regime in Damascus, which is locked in a fight for its life, must listen carefully to the directions of its Russian patron. Does that necessarily translate into absolute, instant remote control from Moscow? Of course not. Perhaps like President Karzai in Afghanistan, Assad understands that his patron’s interests are tethered to his or at least his regime’s survival. But unlike either Cairo or Kabul, Assad has in Moscow a patron far less encumbered than Washington. Vladimir Putin does not need to worry about congressional oversight or even public opinion in his dealings with a petty foreign client like Syria. Indeed, Putin has shown utter ruthlessness dealing with domestic opponents, so why would he suddenly find scruples in dealing with Assad?

Syria is a long-standing client of Russia’s. This means that Putin, who hails from the KGB, has penetrating insight into the dynamics within the regime and what they mean for Assad’s own internal vulnerabilities, facilitating the exercise of Russian influence.  Moscow can avoid clumsy threats in favor of a more precise pressure points. If we believe that Moscow has, in certain instances, been demonstrably unable to get the Assad regime to do what it wants, we should ask if and how it pressured him to do so.

To believe that Moscow cannot, in the end, have its way in Damascus is to call into question the whole rationale of partnering with the Russians in the first place. If Russia cannot deliver the Syrians, then we are engaged in a colossal waste of time and effort. Empirical evidence tells us that this is not so. Assad himself in the span of 24 hours went from evading the question of chemical weapons with Charlie Rose to accepting (nominally, at least) international control of his stockpile after an apparent snap Russian decision.

While we must remain ever vigilant about Russian intentions, we should presume — remaining open to well-founded evidence to the contrary — that Russia does indeed hold sway in Damascus. When it comes to Syria, the general rule should be that what counts is Russia’s will, not its ability, to direct its Syrian clients.

 

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Peace Picks, September 23-27

1. Peace and War: The View from Israel

September 23, 2013 // 3:00pm — 5:00pm

Wilson Center, 6th Floor

The Middle East seems permanently in crisis. Join us for a  analysis of Israel’s view of the region, its challenges and opportunities—and the U.S.-Israeli relationship from two former Israeli officials deeply involved in matters of negotiations and national security policy, with comments from Doran and Miller.

Event Speakers List: 

Aaron David Miller // Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar

Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003.

Gilead Sher // 

Head of the Center for Negotiations, the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv and former Israeli Chief Peace Negotiator

Amos Yadlin // 

Director of the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv and former chief of Israeli military intelligence

Michael Doran // 

Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center, Brookings Institution

RSVP: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/rsvp?eid=28667&pid=112 Read more

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Heartbreak and loveless marriages

Wedenesday morning’s event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was yet another panel focused on Syria, focused on the interests and perspectives of the domestic and international parties currently involved in the crisis.  Moderated by Marwan Muasher of the Carnegie Endowment, the discussion included Ambassador Nasser al-Kidwa, deputy to Arab League Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi, Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment, Paul Salem of the Carnegie Middle East Center, and Andrew Weiss also of the Carnegie Endowment.

Ambassador al-Kidwa focused his remarks on the future of negotiations in Syria. He believes the Geneva Communiqué drafted last June is still relevant today and provides practical solutions for Syria. The US decision not to strike on Syria but rather focus on placing Syria’s chemical weapons under international control shows its commitment to the Geneva Communiqué. The framework agreement on chemical weapons between the US and Russia is a positive development.

The UN is currently working on a resolution that will mostly likely incorporate much of the strong language used in the US-Russia agreement. Al-Kidwa believes that it will be adopted under Chapter 7 with some language regarding using necessary force if there is no compliance from the Assad regime. He sees a real possibility for negotiations between the opposition and the Assad government.  He argues that regional players and the international community have an unusually important role. Read more

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Out in the cold

Reuters published this piece today, under the title “What is next for Syria’s opposition?”:

The Syrian regime is crowing victory. The Russians are satisfied at preventing an American military intervention. President Obama is glad to have avoided a Congressional vote against it. Israel is pleased to see Syria’s chemical weapons capability zeroed out, provided the framework agreement reached last week is fully implemented. Even Iran is backing it, while continuing to deny that the regime was responsible for using chemical weapons.

What about the Syrian opposition?

The agreement on chemical weapons leaves them out in the cold. Bashar al-Assad is now vital to implementation of the agreement and will procrastinate implementing it for as long as possible. While destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capability is supposed to be completed by mid-2014, the logistical challenges involved are colossal. Just accounting for and collecting the 1,000 tons of material will be an enormous task, before getting to deployment of observers and physical destruction, which will likely require shipping the material out of Syria to Russia. Wartime conditions will double the difficulties and prolong the process, even if the regime decides to cooperate fully. That’s unlikely. Read more

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Peace picks, September 16-20

A busy week ahead in the Nation’s Capital:

1. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and the American Strategy

Monday, September 16, 2013 | 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM EDT

Brookings Institute, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036

REGISTER TO ATTEND

Lying behind the turmoil over Syria is another, greater challenge. It is the challenge of a nuclear Iran, which already haunts our Syria debate. President Rouhani’s election has revived the hope of many that a negotiated resolution of this issue is still possible. However, the history of U.S.-Iranian relations leaves room for considerable skepticism. Should these negotiations fail too, the United States will soon have to choose between the last, worst options: going to war to prevent a nuclear Iran or learning to contain one. A nuclear Iran is something few in the international community wish to see, but many fear that a choice will have to be made soon to either prevent or respond to that reality. Can the U.S. spearhead a renewed international effort to prevent a nuclear Iran, or will it be forced to do the unthinkable: to determine how to contain a nuclear Iran?

In his new book, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack tackles these daunting questions. Pollack delves deeply into what the U.S. can do to prevent a nuclear Iran, why the military options leave much to be desired and what the U.S. might have to do to make containment a viable alternative. On September 16th at 2:30pm, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack to discuss these sobering issues. Robin Wright, a United States Institute of Peace distinguished fellow and author of several highly-regarded books on Iran, will moderate the discussion, after which the author will take audience questions. Copies of the book will also be available for sale at the event.

 EVENT AGENDA

  •  Introduction

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy

@tcwittes

  •  Featured Speaker

Kenneth M. Pollack

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy

  • Moderator

Robin Wright

Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Read more

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Force and diplomacy aren’t antithetical

I’ve had a number of people ask in the past 48 hours whether proceeding on the diplomatic track to collect Syria’s chemical weapons will strengthen Bashar al Asad.

The answer in the short term is “yes.”  Whenever the international community negotiates with a ruler whose legitimacy is in question, it shores up his hold on power.  Especially so in this instance, as Bashar will soon be responsible for declaring, collecting and turning over Syria’s chemical weapons, making him appear indispensable to a process Russia and the United States have dubbed A number 1 priority.

Neither will want him pushed aside while this process is ongoing.  If he were to disappear suddenly, the process would at best come to a halt and at worst disintegrate, making accountability for the chemical weapons difficult if not impossible.  Even the Geneva 2 formula–full delegation of executive authority to a government agreed by both the regime and the opposition–might be a bridge too far so long as the chemical weapons are not fully under international control.

This of course means that Bashar, whether he intends to use the chemical weapons again or not, will want to prolong the process as much as possible.  The opportunities for footdragging are many.  He is already demanding that the US give up the threat to use force as a condition for his turning over the chemical weapons.  He can delay his accounting for the weapons and their locations for a month under the convention he has said he will sign.  He can stall the deployment of weapons inspectors.  He can claim that security conditions make collecting the weapons, said to be distributed to 50 or so sites, impossible.  He can make working conditions for the inspectors hellish.

It will be Moscow’s responsibility to deliver Bashar and ensure he performs.  I really have no doubt about Russia’s ability to do this.  Syria depends on Russian arms and financing.  Even a slight delay in deliveries of either would put Damascus in a bind.  But Moscow too will have reasons to delay and prevaricate.   The Americans, if they are to get anything like full implementation of a serious agreement on chemical weapons, will need to keep alive a credible threat to use force if Bashar fails to meet expectations.

This push and shove between the diplomacy and force is the rule, not the exception.  It went on for more than two years after the UN Security Council authorized the use of force in Bosnia.  It went on for months in the prelude to the Kosovo bombing, with several diplomatic failures to end the ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo preceding the eventual use of force.  Even in Afghanistan, the Taliban were given an opportunity to deliver Al Qaeda into the hands of the Americans.  Force was used only after diplomacy had failed.  President Bush’s supporters would claim this was also true for Iraq.

The problem in Syria is that the issues there go far beyond chemical weapons.  In addition to the mass atrocities committed with conventional weapons, there are two vital US interests at stake:  regional stability and blocking an extremist (Sunni or Shia-aligned) succession in Syria.  Secretary Kerry is trying hard to keep the door to a Geneva 2 negotiation open, because only a negotiated political transition has much of a chance of avoiding state collapse, which will threaten regional stability, and extremist takeover.

Russia and the United States share these interests in a negotiated political transition, but so far Moscow has remained wedded to Bashar al Asad, no matter how many times Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov claim they are not committed to him personally.  What Kerry needs to do is convince the Russians that Bashar remaining in power is a real and serious threat to Russia, as it will encourage jihadi extremists to extend their fight to the Caucasus and cause state structures in the Levant to fragment.

The military balance will be an important part of Russia’s calculations.  While President Obama has stayed largely silent on support for the Syrian opposition, frustrating Senator McCain and other Republicans who have wanted to see intervention, there are lots of indications that he is ratcheting up a military supply and training chain that moved slowly over the summer.  The faster the Syrian opposition can pose a serious military threat to the regime, the sooner Russia will be inclined to reexamine its support for Bashar and its hesistancy about Geneva 2.

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