Tag: Russia
Peace picks, Sept 30 – Oct 4
Fine, timely events this week in DC:
1. Reform Under Rouhani: Assessing Positive Change in Iran
Monday, September 30, 2013, 9 – 10.30 a.m.
The Stimson Center, 12th Floor
1111 19th Street, NW, Washington , DC
Speakers:
Ramin Asgard, former U.S. diplomat and former director of the State Department’s Iran office in Dubai
Arash Ghafouri, consultant to presidential candidates in 2013 election
Opening remarks
Klaus Linsenmeier, Executive Director, Heinrich Boell Foundation North America
Moderator:
Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center
To RSVP for this event, please click here.
The election of President Hassan Rouhani has led Iran’s political leadership to indicate that reconciliation between the Islamic Republic and the United States could be a distinct possibility.
In the immediate aftermath of talks at the U.N. General Assembly, please join the Heinrich Boell Foundation North America and the Stimson Center for a discussion on the positive social and political changes in Iran, the role of the Iranian youth in changing the political culture, and the implications of the Rouhani presidency on the future of US – Iran relations. Read more
Moscow can deliver Damascus
Edward P. Joseph, my colleague here at SAIS and in the Center for Transatlantic Relations, offers:
US policy towards Syria rests on the premise that Russia can deliver the Assad regime to surrendering its chemical stockpile and to hoped-for talks in Geneva for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While much has been said about Russia’s willingness to press Damascus, Moscow’s ability to bring its influence to bear has received less scrutiny.
While the subject is clouded in secrecy, there is every reason to believe — based on the dynamics of patron-client relationships — that Moscow does, in fact, command substantial, even decisive influence in Damascus.
Consider America’s own relationship with a Middle East client: Egypt. As was abundantly clear during the military’s ouster of then-President Morsi, Washington danced an awkward line, refraining from labeling the military action a “coup” because this would trigger a mandatory cut in substantial US foreign assistance to Egypt. Instead, Washington expressed its concern over Cairo’s anti-democratic direction in gingerly fashion, by delaying the delivery of four F-16. This was a symbolic step, but hardly one that inflicted serious hardship on the military-led government. Egypt faces serious internal security issues, especially in the Sinai, none of which are amenable to attack by the latest fighter aircraft.
There was no mystery why Washington didn’t take a harder line. Had it cut foreign assistance, Cairo could plausibly have turned to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. The Saudis — animated by the departure of the despised Muslim Brotherhood — pledged to make up any cuts to Egypt by both the US and EU. Riyadh proved to be as good as its word, putting together a total aid package with other Gulf States topping $12 billion. In other words, the client, Egypt, held an (oil) barrel over the head of its American patron, thanks to the availability of an alternative, namely, Gulf states flush with cash.
Who can Damascus turn to if Moscow decides to amp up the pressure or ramp down support? Answer: no one, including Iran. Tehran is itself attempting to emerge from international isolation and internal weakness. Besides, it does not hold a permanent seat on the Security Council. Iran can continue to supply cash, personnel, materiel and regional support (directly through Hezbollah and indirectly through Baghdad), but in no way, shape or form can Tehran substitute for the support that Russia can provide. Russia provided Syria this spring with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, designed to complicate potential Western military action such as a no-fly zone. Russia is the ‘sole source protector’ of Syria at the strategic level; Iran operates mostly at the regional level.
Cautious China has shown no willingness to overstep Moscow’s high-profile role on Syria, preferring to follow its lead in the Security Council. Beijing shares Moscow’s allergy to military intervention, particularly where democratic uprisings are involved. But Beijing does not share the array of compelling interests that make Syria a significant Russian client.
Therefore the regime in Damascus, which is locked in a fight for its life, must listen carefully to the directions of its Russian patron. Does that necessarily translate into absolute, instant remote control from Moscow? Of course not. Perhaps like President Karzai in Afghanistan, Assad understands that his patron’s interests are tethered to his or at least his regime’s survival. But unlike either Cairo or Kabul, Assad has in Moscow a patron far less encumbered than Washington. Vladimir Putin does not need to worry about congressional oversight or even public opinion in his dealings with a petty foreign client like Syria. Indeed, Putin has shown utter ruthlessness dealing with domestic opponents, so why would he suddenly find scruples in dealing with Assad?
Syria is a long-standing client of Russia’s. This means that Putin, who hails from the KGB, has penetrating insight into the dynamics within the regime and what they mean for Assad’s own internal vulnerabilities, facilitating the exercise of Russian influence. Moscow can avoid clumsy threats in favor of a more precise pressure points. If we believe that Moscow has, in certain instances, been demonstrably unable to get the Assad regime to do what it wants, we should ask if and how it pressured him to do so.
To believe that Moscow cannot, in the end, have its way in Damascus is to call into question the whole rationale of partnering with the Russians in the first place. If Russia cannot deliver the Syrians, then we are engaged in a colossal waste of time and effort. Empirical evidence tells us that this is not so. Assad himself in the span of 24 hours went from evading the question of chemical weapons with Charlie Rose to accepting (nominally, at least) international control of his stockpile after an apparent snap Russian decision.
While we must remain ever vigilant about Russian intentions, we should presume — remaining open to well-founded evidence to the contrary — that Russia does indeed hold sway in Damascus. When it comes to Syria, the general rule should be that what counts is Russia’s will, not its ability, to direct its Syrian clients.
Peace Picks, September 23-27
1. Peace and War: The View from Israel
September 23, 2013 // 3:00pm — 5:00pm
Wilson Center, 6th Floor
The Middle East seems permanently in crisis. Join us for a analysis of Israel’s view of the region, its challenges and opportunities—and the U.S.-Israeli relationship from two former Israeli officials deeply involved in matters of negotiations and national security policy, with comments from Doran and Miller.
Event Speakers List:
Aaron David Miller // Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003.
Gilead Sher // Head of the Center for Negotiations, the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv and former Israeli Chief Peace Negotiator
Amos Yadlin // Director of the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv and former chief of Israeli military intelligence
Michael Doran // Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center, Brookings Institution
RSVP: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/rsvp?eid=28667&pid=112 Read more
Heartbreak and loveless marriages
Wedenesday morning’s event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was yet another panel focused on Syria, focused on the interests and perspectives of the domestic and international parties currently involved in the crisis. Moderated by Marwan Muasher of the Carnegie Endowment, the discussion included Ambassador Nasser al-Kidwa, deputy to Arab League Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi, Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment, Paul Salem of the Carnegie Middle East Center, and Andrew Weiss also of the Carnegie Endowment.
Ambassador al-Kidwa focused his remarks on the future of negotiations in Syria. He believes the Geneva Communiqué drafted last June is still relevant today and provides practical solutions for Syria. The US decision not to strike on Syria but rather focus on placing Syria’s chemical weapons under international control shows its commitment to the Geneva Communiqué. The framework agreement on chemical weapons between the US and Russia is a positive development.
The UN is currently working on a resolution that will mostly likely incorporate much of the strong language used in the US-Russia agreement. Al-Kidwa believes that it will be adopted under Chapter 7 with some language regarding using necessary force if there is no compliance from the Assad regime. He sees a real possibility for negotiations between the opposition and the Assad government. He argues that regional players and the international community have an unusually important role. Read more
Out in the cold
Reuters published this piece today, under the title “What is next for Syria’s opposition?”:
The Syrian regime is crowing victory. The Russians are satisfied at preventing an American military intervention. President Obama is glad to have avoided a Congressional vote against it. Israel is pleased to see Syria’s chemical weapons capability zeroed out, provided the framework agreement reached last week is fully implemented. Even Iran is backing it, while continuing to deny that the regime was responsible for using chemical weapons.
What about the Syrian opposition?
The agreement on chemical weapons leaves them out in the cold. Bashar al-Assad is now vital to implementation of the agreement and will procrastinate implementing it for as long as possible. While destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capability is supposed to be completed by mid-2014, the logistical challenges involved are colossal. Just accounting for and collecting the 1,000 tons of material will be an enormous task, before getting to deployment of observers and physical destruction, which will likely require shipping the material out of Syria to Russia. Wartime conditions will double the difficulties and prolong the process, even if the regime decides to cooperate fully. That’s unlikely. Read more
Peace picks, September 16-20
A busy week ahead in the Nation’s Capital:
1. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and the American Strategy
Monday, September 16, 2013 | 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM EDT
Brookings Institute, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Lying behind the turmoil over Syria is another, greater challenge. It is the challenge of a nuclear Iran, which already haunts our Syria debate. President Rouhani’s election has revived the hope of many that a negotiated resolution of this issue is still possible. However, the history of U.S.-Iranian relations leaves room for considerable skepticism. Should these negotiations fail too, the United States will soon have to choose between the last, worst options: going to war to prevent a nuclear Iran or learning to contain one. A nuclear Iran is something few in the international community wish to see, but many fear that a choice will have to be made soon to either prevent or respond to that reality. Can the U.S. spearhead a renewed international effort to prevent a nuclear Iran, or will it be forced to do the unthinkable: to determine how to contain a nuclear Iran?
In his new book, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack tackles these daunting questions. Pollack delves deeply into what the U.S. can do to prevent a nuclear Iran, why the military options leave much to be desired and what the U.S. might have to do to make containment a viable alternative. On September 16th at 2:30pm, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack to discuss these sobering issues. Robin Wright, a United States Institute of Peace distinguished fellow and author of several highly-regarded books on Iran, will moderate the discussion, after which the author will take audience questions. Copies of the book will also be available for sale at the event.
EVENT AGENDA
- Introduction
Tamara Cofman Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy
@tcwittes
- Featured Speaker
Kenneth M. Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Moderator
Robin Wright
Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace