Tag: Russia
You break it, you buy it
I spent a frustrating half hour on Warren Olney’s fine show “To the Point” yesterday. Frustrating largely because my phone connection was bad, which meant I had to switch lines, limiting the time I had to intervene. But the show was a good one, with Danielle Pletka, Steve Simon and Amr al Azam.
The main point I wanted to make is that the Administration’s decision on arming the revolutionaries is part of an effort to gain a political settlement. Obama not only wants Asad out but also Sunni extremists blocked from taking over. The Americans also want to limit their engagement to the minimum necessary. Continuing escalation will not serve the purpose of a political settlement or allow them to get off cheaply. Read more
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At last
In a statement this evening, deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said:
Following a deliberative review, our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. Our intelligence community has high confidence in that assessment given multiple, independent streams of information. The intelligence community estimates that 100 to 150 people have died from detected chemical weapons attacks in Syria to date; however, casualty data is likely incomplete. While the lethality of these attacks make up only a small portion of the catastrophic loss of life in Syria, which now stands at more than 90,000 deaths, the use of chemical weapons violates international norms and crosses clear red lines that have existed within the international community for decades. We believe that the Assad regime maintains control of these weapons. We have no reliable, corroborated reporting to indicate that the opposition in Syria has acquired or used chemical weapons.
The consequences that follow from this are, however, not yet clear. Ben said this much:
Put simply, the Assad regime should know that its actions have led us to increase the scope and scale of assistance that we provide to the opposition, including direct support to the [opposition] Supreme Military Council. These efforts will increase going forward.
The rest is left vague:
The United States and the international community have a number of other legal, financial, diplomatic, and military responses available. We are prepared for all contingencies, and we will make decisions on our own timeline. Any future action we take will be consistent with our national interest, and must advance our objectives, which include achieving a negotiated political settlement to establish an authority that can provide basic stability and administer state institutions; protecting the rights of all Syrians; securing unconventional and advanced conventional weapons; and countering terrorist activity.
That last bit in governmentese is the “end-state” we seek. It is important, as courses of action are designed with the end-state as their target.
Rumint (or maybe I should call it pressint, but I’m not providing a link because I despise the Wall Street Journal pay wall) has it that Washington is contemplating both arming the opposition and establishing a no-fly zone in northern Syria, along the Turkish border. These are the two options least likely to provoke the Russians and Chinese. Certainly maintaining their participation in the P5+1 talks with Iran is an unstated part of the end-state Obama seeks.
I’m not sure what to make of this statement being put out by Ben, who is close to the President but a couple of steps down in the White House pecking order. I imagine someone higher up didn’t want the privilege, since the steps to be taken are still not fully defined. Certainly the president could not have put out a statement of this sort without being ridiculed for indecisiveness, lack of resolve and being behind the curve. It may well be that Ben pushed for something to be said and ended up with the not entirely edifying responsibility.
The reluctance to act is palpable. But we are on what some think of as a slippery slope. The question is how far we will go. Only time will tell.
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Power, Power and Rice
While some are predicting (or hoping for) big changes in American foreign policy in the liberal interventionist/human rights first direction with the appointments of Susan Rice as national security adviser and Samantha Power as UN ambassador, I doubt it.
Both have already left marks on US foreign policy, Samantha through the Atrocities Prevention Board and Susan in the Libya intervention and many other efforts at the UN, including the successful use of its Human Rights Commission to report on atrocities in Syria. I wouldn’t suggest these are enormous departures from the past, but they certainly reflect the view that saving foreigners from mass atrocity has its place in US p0licy and needs to be given due consideration along with more traditional national interests of the military, political and economic varieties.
The main “to intervene or not” issue today is Syria. Susan and Samantha have both already been involved in internal debates on Syria, where President Obama ignored the advice of Hillary Clinton, David Petraeus and Leon Panetta. They all advised a more interventionist stance. It is the president, not the advisers, who is choosing not to try to stop the Syrian civil war, largely because of issues unrelated to Syria: Russian support on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, not to mention the American public’s war weariness and the parlous budget situation. No doubt someone at the Pentagon is also telling him that allowing extremist Sunnis and Shia to continue killing each other in Syria is in the US interest. Read more
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Schizoeurope
Britain and France have collaborated in getting the European Union to lift its arms embargo on Syria, opening the possibility of shipping arms to the opposition starting in July. But key European thinktanks are very much opposed to the idea: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) wants de-escalation and Christopher Phillips of Chatham House criticizes what he regards as Britain’s flawed logic.
I have a hard time understanding their objections. Why would Syria’s arms suppliers (Russia and Iran principally) reduce the flow unless they see the real possibility that escalation will favor the opposition? Opening the possibility of future arms shipments will do more to give the Asad regime something to worry about than it will do to harden the opposition’s resistance to negotiation. It is far more likely that offering weapons conditional on their unified participation in negotiations (and being prepared to shut off the flow if they fail to participate seriously) will work.
Nor am I all that worried about weapons ending up in the wrong hands, so long as they are used to counter the regime. The neat distinction between jihadists and moderates is at least in part a figment of Western imaginations. However hard we try, some weapons will end up in the wrong places. Given the current political atmosphere in the US, better that happen to the Europeans than to us. We don’t need “fast and furious” on steroids.
Then there is the question of the Russia’s decision to export a new generation of air defenses to Syria, apparently decided in response to the European Union ending the embargo. If the Russians go ahead and if the Israelis fail to attack them before they are operational, they would presumably make it more difficult to impose a no-fly zone, if that were President Obama’s intention. But despite news reports, there is no real indication that the Americans are willing to patrol a no-fly zone, and the Israelis have good reasons to prevent the new air defenses from becoming operational, something that would take months if not years in the best of conditions. It is amusing to see people who oppose a no-fly zone worrying about the Russian move and premature to worry too much about an Israeli-Russian war, though the Israelis should certainly be concerned about how far Russia is prepared to go in arming Syria and Iran.
While in my view wrong about the impact of arming the revolutionaries, or more accurately opening up the future possibility of arming them, the ECFR offers a “strategy for de-escalation” worth looking at:
- a set of guiding principles
- a wide enough coalition committed to de-escalation, and
- a diplomatic strategy to get Geneva II off the ground.
The principles they draw from the Geneva I communique:
- All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence
- No further further militarization of the conflict
- The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected
- The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing bodyexercising full executive powers. It could include membersof the present Government and the opposition and othergroups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent
- The Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting
The most controversial is that fourth point, as it implies to the opposition and its supporters that Bashar al Asad will step aside while the regime and its supporters oppose that. Squaring that circle will be worth a Nobel Prize. But the Geneva I communique was not agreed by either the opposition or the regime, so getting them to sign up to something like these five points would be an important step forward.
The ECFR description of a possible de-escalation coalition is reasonable. The diplomatic strategy beyond that is brief and vague, basically proposing that Russia and the US bring the rest of the P5 on board for a non-Chapter 7 UN Security Council resolution.
The ECFR paper offers one particularly interesting idea on cessation of armed violence: this might be done in specific geographic areas, “rolling and expanding pockets in which ceasefires hold.” This of course would enable both sides to concentrate their forces in areas where there are no such ceasefires, intensifying the conflict in some areas even while de-escalating in others. The idea could have the great virtue of opening up more of the country to humanitarian relief and beginning the re-introduction of international monitors, assuming there is someone out there ready to take on that role.
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Fight and talk
The date hasn’t even been set yet for next month’s “Geneva II” conference, but we are in full pre-negotiation mode in Syria. This means instensification of the fighting, ratcheting up of the assistance flowing from outside, and anxious efforts to get the opposition to hang together, lest they hang separately (in the immortal words of Benjamin Franklin).
For the moment, the fighting is still focused on the ill-fated town of Qusayr, which is one of the keys to controlling the highway that links Damascus to Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. But the big news came Saturday from nearby Lebanon, where Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah announced publically his group’s undying commitment to keeping the Asad regime in power in Syria and fighting the Sunni “takfiris” there. A Shia neighborhood in Beirut was ineffectively rocketed in response.
Then Monday the European Union decided to let its self-imposed arms embargo on Syria lapse at the end of the month, opening the possibility of Britain and France deciding to arm the opposition. While Secretary Kerry seems to think this will help rebalance the military situation, it is far more likely the delayed prospect of European arms for the opposition will cause the Asad regime to accelerate its efforts to consolidate as much control as it can over the Damascus/Mediterranean corridor, which is vital both to the regime’s survival. The port at Tartus is where the Russians deliver their heavier arms to the regime, and the coastal area has a substantial concentration of Alawite supporters of the regime.
Meanwhile the opposition has been meeting in Istanbul. It needs to sort out its leadership mess. Moaz al Khatib, who has resigned as the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) president chaired at least part of the meeting, George Sabra is supposedly the temporary leader, and Michel Kilo is supposed to take over but was apparently blocked from doing so at a meeting that is continuing in Istanbul. The SOC also needs to broaden its base to include more people from inside Syria as well as representatives of Free Syrian Army units. It would help of course if the Saudis and Qataris, presumably the main suppliers of money and arms to the opposition, would sing from the same songsheet.
The regime, meanwhile, is making happy noises about participating in a dialogue that its Moscow patrons likely see as a way keeping Asad in power even if the Americans would like it to be the first step on the way to his removal. Moscow is using the time to beef up Syria’s air defenses, having already moved to strengthen its shore defenses and deploy the Russian navy to Syria’s coast. Those still arguing for “safe corridors” and the like need to take note. The Americans are uninterested in fighting a war in Syria, especially one that might show Russian military hardware off to good advantage and provide the Iranians with up-to-date data on American aerial performance.
None of this bodes well for Geneva II. There is no “mutually hurting stalemate” in Syria. Both sides are still willing to fight. The catastrophe they fear most would come from stopping the fighting, not continuing it. The regime figures that would expose the Alawites to mass murder. The opposition, while struggling for the moment, figures the setbacks are temporary and the right response is to redouble its efforts. Anyone who has seen what Asad is capable of would fear losing this war. If Geneva II happens, it is likely to happen in the context of heightened conflict, not the kind of mutual exhaustion that lends itself to political settlement.
That does not however mean that talking is a bad idea. “Ripeness” for a settlement sometimes happens suddenly. Best to be ready when it does. Being ready can mean many things: making the needed contacts between opposing forces, testing propositions, developing principles that can be applied when the situation warrants, gaining intelligence on the warring parties and their leadership structures, cultivating constituencies for peace on both sides.
“Fight and talk” is not new. The European Community (as it was then) convened many conferences on the wars in former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, when war was in raging in Croatia and Bosnia and repression in Kosovo. The meetings never produced a peace agreement, or even a ceasefire that held. That was left to the Americans at Dayton. But they did produce the Community’s criteria for recognition of the separate republics as independent states as well as the state succession plans, both of which were used to what I would call good effect.
In the best of all possible worlds, we are heading for fight and talk in Syria. Wisdom lies in using the opportunity well and trying to end a war that is clearly threatening state structures in the Levant and may collapse them in chaos.
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180 miles from disaster
Yesterday’s Friends of Syria meeting occurred in Amman, just 180 miles from the battle for Qusayr, a Syrian town located just off the road from Damascus through Homs to Alawite-populated areas of the west. If the opposition can hold Qusayr and Homs, it will split Damascus from the west. If it can’t, Bashar al Asad will have what he needs to maintain a regime axis that splits the liberated areas of the south from the liberated areas of the north. Either way, the outcome is likely to be a disaster for someone.
The Qusayr fighting involves Lebanese Hizbollah fighting with the Syrian army against mostly Sunni rebels, including Jabhat al Nusra. It naturally has echoes inside Lebanon, where Alawites and Sunnis have clashed in Tripoli. There is a real risk of spillover. While some in Washington may wonder why we should worry about Hizbollah and Sunni extremists associated with Jabhat al Nusra kill each other, it is important to widen the aperture a bit: state structures in Levant are at risk. Were they to collapse, the chaos could be widespread. Syria never has been comfortable with Lebanon as a separate state and established diplomatic relations with it only in the last few years.
It is hard to be optimistic about the preparations for next month’s Syria peace conference. Apart from the parlous military situation in Qusayr, Moscow is insisting not only that Iran be present but that the Syrian opposition come to the table without preconditions (in particular that Bashar al Asad step aside before any political transition). Then and only then is Moscow willing to set a date for the conference.
Iran’s presence is certainly necessary if the conference is going to produce anything like a political solution. The Russians are not wrong about that. Its fighters, and Hizbollah fighters it supports, are very much engaged in Syria. As for Moscow’s pre-condition that there not be pre-conditions, I suppose George Sabra–the current, interim head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition–will figure out a way to fudge that, perhaps by noting the Coalition’s acceptance of the formula already accepted last year at the Geneva conference: a transitional governing body that would exercise full executive powers “formed on the basis of mutual consent.”
More problematic is the Russian transfer of major new weapons systems to Syria and its deployment of warships off the coast. Russian thinktankers claim
non-intervention is now a basic Russian principle…
but that is neither true nor new. Russia is certainly intervening in the Syria conflict on the side of the regime it considers the legitimate sovereign. And it intervened on behalf of rebel forces in Georgia, when that suited its preferences. Russian policy might better be stated as preventing Western intervention in areas it regards as within its sphere of influence. We would no doubt return the favor if they were to muck in the Gulf.
The most sensible comment yesterday comes from Salim Idris, titular head of the Free Syrian Army. He is quoted as saying in a letter to Secretary Kerry:
For the negotiations to be of any substance, we must reach a strategic military balance, without which the regime will feel empowered to dictate … while fully sustained logistically and militarily by Russia and Iran…Such untenable situation requires that the Unites States, as the leader of the free world, provide the Free Syrian Army forces under the Supreme Military Council with the requisite advanced weapons to sustain defensive military capabilities in the face of the Assad forces.
He is said to be seeking anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. He is correct that a mutually hurting stalemate, which the opposition has not so far been able to reach, is needed before the Syrian regime will negotiate seriously. If Bashar thinks he can do better by continuing the fighting, he will.
Secretary Kerry has limited himself so far to feints: he said yesterday Friends of Syria would consider arming the opposition and supported an effort to lift the European Union arms embargo. He is a man used to the niceties of the US Senate, where sparring is a verbal activity. The Russians, Iranians and Syrians certainly understand what he is threatening, but they doubt he is willing to do it or that his doing it will be effective in the time frame available.
President Obama is fond of saying he doesn’t bluff. It is time for him to play a stronger hand, one way or another.
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