Tag: Russia
Crisis breeds strange ideas
Secretary of State Kerry today floated the idea that has been kicking around: Bashar al Asad can avoid an American attack if he gives up his chemical weapons, within a week. The Secreatary was quick to add that he does not expect Asad to do this. Now the Russians are suggesting that Syria’s chemical weapons be put under international control.
Does the idea have virtue?
Not on the face of it. There are lots of chemical weapons and precursors in Syria, perhaps as much as 1000 tons according to French intelligence. Moving even one ton of such material securely in the conditions that prevail in Syria at the moment would be a challenge. Moving hundreds of tons would take months. Where would you move them to? A special facility would have to be built to destroy the material. I somehow doubt any of the neighbors is prepared to host it, and store the stuff until the facility can be built.
The Russian proposal focuses not on moving the material but putting it under some as yet undefined international control. I suppose that means international observers or inspectors to watch the chemical weapons stockpiles and report if they are used. The difficulties of doing this even in peacetime conditions are apparent from the difficult history of nuclear inspections in Iraq. How would anyone know that all the chemical weapons stocks had been reported? But doing it under wartime conditions seems truly impractical. I don’t think I’d want to be the international inspector embedded with Syrian forces protecting the chemical weapons stockpiles and trying to ensure they are not used.
German intelligence is suggesting that Bashar al Asad did not himself authorize the chemical attack on August 21. But that contradicts what Bashar al Asad has said to Charlie Rose: Bashar claimed that any such chemicals, if they existed, would be firmly in centralized control. That is surely true, as these weapons exist above all to protect the regime and to strike at Israel in a regime-threatening situation. If control of the chemical weapons has loosened to the point they can be used without the regime’s approval, things are worse in Syria than we had imagined. Intervention might be justified on that score alone, though it could not be limited to air attacks.
The main virtues of John Kerry’s floated idea, and the Russian proposal, are to delay further the prospect of an attack and to demonstrate that the Obama Administration is prepared to go the extra diplomatic mile to avoid military intervention. The time may well be needed to twist arms in the House of Representatives, which is playing its assigned role by reflecting the reluctance in the American population. The extra diplomatic mile is needed to show that there is no alternative to military action, or to provide a face-saving alternative if the Administration fails to get Congressional approval.
On the diplomatic front, the US needs to go, once again, to the UN Security Council to lay out its case and seek its concurrence in military action. The Russians and Chinese will not go along, but there is really no harm in demonstrating to Moscow and Beijing, and to the world, that they do not control the use of American power any more than we control the use of theirs, which Moscow has used against Georgia and Beijing uses often to assert its territorial claims against American allies in the East and South China Seas.
But going that route requires prior approval of military action in the US Congress. That seems a tall order at the moment. John Kerry is trying to convince us that the effort will be a small one:
We will be able to hold Bashar al-Assad accountable without engaging in troops on the ground or any other prolonged kind of effort in a very limited, very targeted, short-term effort that degrades his capacity to deliver chemical weapons without assuming responsibility for Syria’s civil war. That is exactly what we are talking about doing – unbelievably small, limited kind of effort.
The trouble with that argument is it is inconsistent with going to Congress for approval and with the notion that Syria’s use of chemical weapons puts American security at risk by breaking an international taboo. Nor is there any guarantee that things can be kept small. The enemy has a vote. If Bashar escalates, we’ll need to respond.
Bashar giving up his chemical weapons, putting them under international control, a small intervention to solve a big problem. Crisis breeds strange ideas.
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Too narrow broadens
The Syria war resolution approved in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee goes a long way to correcting the problems in the original draft. The too narrow definition of American goals has been broadened to include changing the momentum on the battlefield. It looks as if the Administration has the votes to get this version approved in the Senate, provided it is not filibustered.
The question will be whether the broader definition of American goals is just too much for the House, where the increasingly isolationist Tea Party is strong among Republicans and more liberal Democrats likewise oppose getting involved abroad. It is one of the ironies of this Administration that it is paying the cost of George W. Bush’s mistake in going to war in Iraq. The House Republican leadership, while supporting the resolution, will not impose party discipline to ensure its passage, leaving voting entirely up to individual members. Minority leader Nancy Pelosi, who has come out swinging for the resolution, faces a tough uphill battle to get an overwhelming majority of Democrats to support the resolution. That won’t be easy.
My guess is that the key to success or failure lies with, whether you like it or not, Israel. Some think the Israelis are ambivalent about removing Bashar al Asad. Their politicians may be. But their intelligence apparatus has concluded that Bashar has to go sooner rather than later, to better the odds of preventing an extremist takeover. The Israelis have been smart to keep their mouths shut in public, but they are no doubt lobbying hard in private for vigorous military action that would reinforce the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons as well as help to end the war. Failure of the US Congress to approve military action, or hesitation by the President to take it, would reduce the credibility of an American military threat against the Iranian nuclear program, as Secretary of State Kerry made eminently clear in his testimony in the Senate.
The President can take military action without Congressional approval, but failure of the Congress to act would make an already messy process incomprehensible to most of the world and further reduce the likelihood of finding support among friends and allies. The Arab League, while denouncing the use of chemical weapons, has so far not called for military action. With the United Kingdom restricted from participation by its parliament and Germany and Italy reluctant as usual about military action, European support essentially comes down to France and maybe a few smaller countries. Plus Turkey, whose interests clearly lie in the earliest possible end to the war in Syria.
Russia remains adamantly opposed to military action, even if President Putin is sounding Moscow’s usual meaningless grace notes about not necessarily standing forever with Bashar al Asad and wanting to discuss the matter with President Obama. Iran is in an tough spot. It is a diehard opponent of chemical weapons use, as Saddam Hussein gassed Iranian forces in the 1980s, during the Iraq/Iran war. But its high officials, echoed by Moscow, are still insisting the August 21 attack came from the Syrian opposition, not the regime. This creates an opening. If the Americans can present Russia and Iran with detailed, incontrovertible evidence that the regime was responsible, logic would dictate that they at least stop their extensive military support to Bashar al Asad and his Hizbollah allies. But of course logic doesn’t necessarily govern situations like this one.
The action this week will be first and foremost in the House and then in Saint Petersburg, where the world’s major economic powers will be meeting at the G20 Summit. If and when a resolution passes in the House, there will be a moment–likely less than a day–for a quick diplomatic maneuver by Russia and Iran to agree to a diplomatic conference that would remove Bashar and save Moscow and Tehran from the embarrassment of an American air attack like the ones in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan that altered the military balance on the ground. If the diplomacy fails at that point, it will have another chance, but only after whatever happens happens. The law of unanticipated consequences will then be in full force.
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Peace picks, September 3-6
It was Labor Day in the US yesterday and Rosh Hashanah (New Year’s) for Jews worldwide Thursday evening, Friday and Saturday. So a quiet week in DC:
1. The Need for Speed? Debating Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment
September 3, 2013 Washington, DC
12:30 PM – 2:00 PM EST
The long-held U.S. goal of striking distant targets with non-nuclear weapons in just minutes has always been controversial. In the current fiscal environment, however, an impending decision to acquire Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) weapons will be especially hotly debated. While the conversation surrounding CPGS has largely focused on one particular risk—the possibility of Russia’s misinterpreting a prompt conventional weapon as nuclear-armed—the program raises a much broader set of issues that merit debate, from the need to respond to adverse changes in the security environment to the management of escalation in a serious conflict.
James M. Acton will examine the big picture by exploring the full range of questions—military, strategic, technological, and financial—raised by CPGS. The discussion will also mark the release of Acton’s new report Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike. George Perkovich will moderate.
Copies of the report will be available.
2. Narrative Roundtable: From Narratives of Violence to Narratives of Peace: The Renunciation of Violence as a Discursive Phenomenon, George Mason University
Tuesday, September 3rd, 2-4pm
The Metropolitan Building
3434 N. Washington Blvd
5th Floor, Room: 5183
Refreshments will be served
Much work has been done on the prevention of violence, but less focus has been granted towards encouraging individuals already affiliated with violent organizations to leave. One reason may be the inherent difficulty of getting people who have already formed an identity around violence to change. However, such change does occur among some individuals, and this roundtable will explore how we can understand—and encourage—this transformation through the lens of narrative dynamics.
During this roundtable we will explore the complex process of how individuals who have renounced violence make sense of their transformation by framing their change as a process of narrative identity transformation. The presentation will be grounded in dissertation research that applied a morphological analysis of the narratives of former gang members, right-wing extremists, and terrorists. The findings will be explored to highlight possible ways this process of renunciation can be facilitated through the presence of specific discourses around transformation.
BIO:
Agatha Glowacki is currently a PhD Candidate at George Mason’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (SCAR). She has worked for various US government agencies on issues pertaining to terrorist radicalization, including extremist propaganda and programs to prevent violent extremism. Her work on terrorist disengagement inspired her dissertation research, which has focused on the narrative processes of renouncing violence. Agatha earned her Master’s degree in European Studies from Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland, where she was also a U.S. Fulbright Scholar. She received her BA in Government from Harvard.
3. After Snowden: The G-20 Forum and the Crisis in US-Russian Relations – What Next? Heritage Foundation, 12-1 pm September 4
The Kremlin delivered a diplomatic blow to U.S.–Russian relations when Moscow granted former NSA analyst Edward Snowden a temporary political asylum. Now, the White House has cancelled a U.S.–Russia summit that was scheduled for early September, and Obama’s Russian “reset” policy is facing its moment of truth. The crisis in Syria and the Snowden affair puts Russian President Vladimir Putin in the position of strength vis-à-vis Obama—which is where Putin wants to be in relation to foreign counterparts. As in the case with the Iran sanctions, Afghanistan transit, the Tsarnaev brothers information, the arms transfers to Bashar el-Assad, it is Putin who has something that America wants, and it is the U.S. that is coming to Russia to beg. With Putin in the strong bargaining position, the White House is maneuvered into the position of weakness, looking even worse than Jimmy Carter.
Yet it comes at a price. The U.S.–Russian relations are strained as never before, and any destabilizing factor creates a serious problem. While pragmatists believe that the White House and the Kremlin have too much to lose, the damage has been already done—and is getting worse. Of course, the U.S.–Russian relations are based on pursuit of national interest. However, they are increasingly poisoned by the ideological rejection of the West and the U.S. by the Russian ruling elite. The domestic crackdown, including anti-NGO legislation, the ban on orphan adoption to the US, prosecution of political opponents – all these complicate the ability of Russia and the US to do business together.
In addition, the G-20 gathering in St. Petersburg will be another photo-op event to discuss a wide range of international economic issues. Yet, a clear focus is needed not to repeat the debates in other fora. What should the US – and especially the US Congress – do to protect America’s interests and support our friends in Russia? What should the G-20 leaders do to restore economic growth? Join us for a discussion on the upcoming G-20 summit and U.S.-Russia bilateral relations.
More About the Speakers
Featuring Keynote Remarks by
The Honorable Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, United States Department of Defense
Followed by a Panel with
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation
Donald N. Jensen, Ph.D.
Resident Fellow, The Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University
Kyle Parker
Policy Advisor for Eurasia, The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
James M. Roberts
Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth Center for International Trade and Economics, The Heritage Foundation
Join the Arms Control Association (ACA) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for an assessment of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and the elements required for a deal that could provide both sides with a “win-win” outcome.
Copies of the newly updated edition of ACA’s 44-page briefing book on “Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle” will be available at the event.
Colin Kahl
Colin Kahl is an associate professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses on international relations, international security, the geopolitics of the Middle East, American foreign policy, and civil and ethnic conflict. He is also a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
David Albright
David Albright is founder and President of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He regularly conducts scientific research, publishes in numerous technical and policy journals, and is often cited in the media. His book Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies was listed by The Atlantic as one of the best foreign affairs books of 2010.
George Perkovich
George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation, with a concentration on South Asia, Iran, and the problem of justice in the international political economy.
Daryl Kimball
Daryl Kimball has been Executive Director of the Arms Control Association since September 2001. Mr. Kimball is a frequent media commentator and has written and spoken extensively about nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. In 2004, the National Journal recognized Kimball as one of the ten key individuals whose ideas shape the policy debate on weapons proliferation.
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What’s wrong with ICG’s approach on Syria
The International Crisis Group yesterday published a statement on Syria. It has drawn plaudits from some and hisses from others. This is not surprising. The statement is a combination of ICG’s usually sharp analysis with its typically bad policy recommendations.
On the analytical side, ICG notes acerbically that any military strikes by the United States “will be largely divorced from the interests of the Syrian people,” as their purpose will be to “punish, deter and prevent use of chemical weapons.” Strikes would also aim to protect Washington’s credibility, another objective divorced from Syrian interests. This is all accurate as far as it goes.
Then comes the policy frame: “the priority must be the welfare of the Syrian people.” Hardly. The armed forces of the United States don’t exist for the welfare of the Syrians. Their use has to be in the interests of the American people. When that overlaps with the welfare of others, we often talk of “humanitarian intervention.” But there is no way to convince the American president, much less the American Congress, to use military force or other instruments of US power unless it demonstrably serves US interests, including of course commitment to US values and regional stability.
Then we are back to the analytical frame, with the best and most memorable line in the report:
To precisely gauge in advance the impact of a U.S. military attack, regardless of its scope and of efforts to carefully calibrate it, by definition is a fool’s errand.
But then ICG goes on to try to gauge in advance some of the possible impacts of a US attack, with no more success than its memorable line foreshadows.
Then we return to the policy frame, where ICG is not alone in calling for a diplomatic breakthrough based on a “realistic compromise political offer” and outreach to Russia and Iran. The devil is in the details:
The sole viable outcome is a compromise that protects the interests of all Syrian constituencies and reflects rather than alters the regional strategic balance;
This is sloppily over-generalized. Who are the Syrian constituencies? What regional balance? Is Al Qaeda a Syrian consitutency? Is Hizbollah? The regional balance of what? If it is conventional military balance, the US and Israel win hands down. If it is terror, advantage Al Qaeda or Iran. If commitment to a democratic outcome counts, I’d give the prize to Syrian civic activists who started the rebellion and have continued to try to make it come out right. All of the above? Show me the negotiating table that can accommodate them all and I’ll show you heaven on earth.
But this is what really annoys the Syrian opposition:
A viable political outcome in Syria cannot be one in which the current leadership remains indefinitely in power but, beyond that, the U.S. can be flexible with regards to timing and specific modalities;
True enough, but who is the US to decide the issue of how long Bashar al Asad stays in power? Suddenly ICG is no longer concerned with an outcome that satisfies the Syrian people. It is now all about the Americans, who are viewed as the obstacle to a reasonable interval in which Bashar stays in power. The Americans are by far not the greatest obstacle to that.
Then we are quickly back to ICG’s typical empty appeal to do the right thing:
Priority must be given to ensuring that no component of Syrian society is targeted for retaliation, discrimination or marginalisation in the context of a negotiated settlement.
No mention at all of accountability, since that is inconsistent with leaving Bashar in power and fulfilling ICG’s hopes for a kumbaya moment.
So convinced as I am by the need for a political solution, ICG has done precious little in this statement to suggest the ways and means to get one. That’s what’s wrong with ICG’s approach.
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Lemonade
President Obama has had more than his share of lemons lately:
- the British parliament defeat of participation in military action against Syria,
- Russian President Putin calling the conclusive report of the US intelligence community indicting Bashar al Asad for chemical the August 21 chemical attack “utter nonsense,”
- Congress asking good questions and pestering for more consultations, and
- the UN Secretary General asking that he await the report of the chemical weapons inspection team.
He has now surprised us all with the oldest trick in the book: when you have nothing but lemons, make lemonade.
This makes a lot of sense. Insisting on a Congressional resolution of approval puts the Congress on the hook and meets the letter and spirit of the law, which is what a University of Chicago constitutional law professor should want to do. A successful resolution will quiet his critics and compensate for the loss in London, putting the Brits and opponents in Congress to shame. The UN time line for completing its technical work seems to be less than two weeks, so its conclusions should give the lie to those who claim chemical weapons were not used. An opportunity to upbraid Putin during the G20 Summit in Saint Petersburg September 5/6 should be welcome.
Trouble is, lemonade is not what is needed in Syria. Bashar al Asad may well read delay as lack of resolve and even use chemical weapons again. What does Obama do then? Rush the resolution through Congress, or go ahead without waiting? The part of the Syrian opposition most friendly to US interests may be disquieted, while extreme Islamists profit from the US delay by pointing to American unreliability. While the President said nothing about it in the Rose Garden, he should be accelerating assistance to the Free Syrian Army in ways that give it more confidence of US backing.
Lemonade is also not what US credibility needed. This may be a temporary problem, so long as the Congress approves military action and the Administration delivers a serious blow. But friends and enemies in the region and beyond will be calculating what this means for them: the Israelis first and foremost, but also the Turks, Iranians, Russians and North Koreans. Friends will be discomforted. Enemies may take heart.
The President is also at risk. If the defeat in the British parliament dealt a blow to David Cameron, a defeat in the US Congress would pull the rug out from under Barack Obama. I trust he is confident he can win, but until he does his prestige is on the line. A loss would leave him hurting just as Congress turns to a budget fight that promises to be a real bruiser.
So turning to Congress is smart, even ingenious, but not without serious risks. But proceeding apace without satisfying Congress had serious risks as well. So lemonade is on the menu, whether it is what you wanted or not.
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This is awkward
British parliament disapproval of participation in a military attack on Syria leaves the US with only France and Turkey as seemingly willing allies in punishing Bashar al Asad’s regime for the use of chemical weapons. The rest of the world seems content to sit back and watch, commenting all the while and reserving the option to hiss and boo if things go badly and to applaud if they go well.
At the same time, there is a growing view in the commentariat that military intervention will have little positive impact, and may even cause Asad to escalate his chemical attacks, or lash out in with terrorist attacks. Narrowly targeted military action to deter use of chemical weapons in the absence of a broader political strategy is likely to be ineffective at best, counter-productive at worst. Even if it deters further use of chemical weapons, the regime has ample alternative means with which to kill Syrians, as it has demonstrated for more than two years.
The UN chemical weapons inspection team is returning from Damascus and will need to prepare a report on its findings. These will presumably demonstrate unequivocally that chemical weapons were used but likely not who used them, as that was never part of the inspectors’ mandate. The Administration therefore needs to clarify for the American public, which is thoroughly unconvinced of the need for the US to take military action, and the international community, including the UN Security Council, why it thinks the regime was responsible. I personally don’t have any doubt, but others do and are entitled to answers from a government that has proved unreliable, even untrustworthy, more than once (read “Gulf of Tonkin,” “WMD in Iraq”).
It will be early next week before a case can be made in the serious way the situation requires. At that point it makes more sense to wait until after Presidents Obama and Putin have a chance to discuss the issues on the margins of the G20 Summit (September 5-6) in Saint Petersburg. An American-led attack on Syria will be a serious embarrassment for Moscow, which will squeal loudly about the horrendous consequences for the Middle East and world peace but will mostly be chagrined that it has once again failed to block the Americans. If Moscow will agree to push Bashar al Asad aside, that would be reason enough to hesitate more.
My colleagues Ed Joseph and Elizabeth O’Bagy have tried to sketch what a serious diplomatic initiative might look like, putting the emphasis quite rightly on security. But they wave their magic wand and create UN peacekeepers who are nowhere on the horizon in the truly vast numbers that would be required (100k at a minimum). They also rightly (if regrettably) suggest some degree of sectarian and ethnic separation, which is occurring in any event. The trouble is that the confrontation lines in many parts of Syria are still intertwined and contorted. It will take a lot more violence to straighten them out. Doing it at the negotiating table will be an even lengthier process.
President Obama is an awkward spot. Damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t. It sure would be nice to find a diplomatic way out.
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