Tag: Russia
Hobson’s nuclear choices
No one seems overwrought that the latest nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (that’s US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) ended inconclusively yesterday in Almaty, Kazakhstan. An agreement on the eve of Iran’s presidential election campaign (voting is scheduled for June 14) was not likely. Iran is looking for acknowledgement of its “right” to enrich uranium, even if it limits the extent of enrichment and the amount of enriched material. The P5+1, led by European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, are looking for strict limits on enrichment (to 5% or below, with most more highly enriched materials shipped out of the country) and tight international inspections without acknowledging Iran’s right to enrich. They are also looking for suspension of enrichment at Iran’s underground facility at Fordo and a strict accounting for past activities, which appear to have included some nuclear weapons development.
There are related non-nuclear issues on which the gaps may be greater. Iran wants sanctions relief up front as well as cooperation on Syria and Bahrain. The Western members of the P5+1 want to maintain sanctions until they have satisfactory commitments and implementation that prevent Iran from ever having a nuclear weapons program. They are not willing to soften their support for the revolution in Syria against Iran’s ally Bashar al Asad or for the Sunni minority monarchy in Bahrain, which faces a Shia protest movement that Iran supports.
The Israelis are the only ones who seem seriously perturbed:
“This failure was predictable,” Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs, said in a statement. “Israel has already warned that the Iranians are exploiting the talks in order to play for time while making additional progress in enriching uranium for an atomic bomb.” He added, “The time has come for the world to take a more assertive stand and make it unequivocally clear to the Iranians that the negotiations games have run their course.”
But there is precious little they can do about the situation. An Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will do relatively little damage but will end the prospect of a negotiated solution and make Tehran redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons. President Obama is in no hurry to do the more thorough job the Americans are capable of. He seems satisfied that there is still time. The Iranians have in fact been slowing their accumulation of 20% enriched uranium by converting some of it to fuel plates for their isotope production reactor, which makes the material difficult to enrich further. The Israelis may not like it, but it looks as if everyone will hold their breath until after the Iranian election, when the question of further meetings and a possible agreement will arise again.
In the meanwhile, the Iranians will be watching North Korea closely. It has tested several nuclear weapons and presumably made more. Pyongyang is sounding committed not just to keeping them but to acquiring the missile capability to deliver them. While the press makes a great deal of Kim Jong-un’s threats against the United States, he represents a much more immediate threat to South Korea and Japan. If he manages to hold on to his nuclear weapons and thereby stabilizes his totalitarian regime, the Iranian theocrats will read it as encouragement to continue their own nuclear quest.
With the “sequester” budget cuts forcing retrenchment on many fronts, Washington is trying for negotiated solutions and hesitating to enforce its will that neither Iran nor North Korea acquire serious nuclear capabilities. It is hoping the Chinese will help with Pyongyang, which nevertheless seems increasingly committed to maintaining and expanding its nuclear capabilities. Tehran has slowed its accumulation of nuclear material but is expanding its technological capability to move rapidly if a decision is made to move ahead. President Obama could soon face a Hobson’s choice in both cases: either act militarily, despite the costs and consequences, or accept two new nuclear powers, despite the costs and consequences.
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Irregular triangle: Turkey-Iran-Russia
Turkey, Russia and Iran are key players in the Middle East. Understanding their relations is important background to the current Middle Eastern turmoil, in particular the war in Syria. Differences over Syria threaten to disrupt Turkey’s relations with both Russia and Iran, while the Iran-Russia relationship is bound to suffer from mutual historical suspicions and conflicting long-term interests.
These were among the conclusions from a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) event this week focused on the “the Turkey-Iran-Russia nexus.” The panel featured CSIS’s:
- Bulent Aliriza, Director of the Turkey Project;
- Stephen Flanagan, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security;
- Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Project; and
- Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program.
The event drew on an abbreviated version of the panelists’ joint publication The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies. The information in this post draws both from the panelists’ comments, the publication distributed at the event, and Flanagan’s The Turkey-Russia- Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power Dynamics.
Aliriza explained that Turkey’s policy of “zero problems” with its neighbors, and ambitions to become an energy hub between the East and West, shape its relations with the other two countries. Seeking greater regional influence, Turkey wants to expand trade and economic cooperation with both Iran and Russia, taking advantage of its geostrategic location at the heart of Eurasia. The panelists agreed that the Iran-Turkey and Russia-Turkey relations were the most developed. The Russia-Iran relation is largely political and lacks a strong economic and energy dimension. Overall the CSIS discussion concluded that differences over Syria threatened to rupture the Turkey-Iran/Turkey-Russia relationship, while the Iran-Russia relationship was bound to suffer from the historical mutual suspicions and conflicting interests in the long term.
Turkey-Russia: a more tactical than strategic partnership
The current Turkish government has prioritized strengthening ties with the Kremlin. Understandably cool during the cold war, Russo-Turkish relations warmed up in the USSR’s last decade, when economic and energy ties combined with agreements to cease support of their respective separatist movements, leading to greater cooperation between Moscow and Ankara.
In 2010 the two countries launched a “strategic partnership” consisting of a high-level cooperation council, annual summits, and a joint strategic planning group. Trade, investment, and tourism also greatly increased in the past decade. After the EU bloc, Russia ranks as Turkey’s leading trade partner. In 2012 total bilateral trade amounted to $33 billion, with Turkish energy imports accounting for 80% of trade volume.
Bilateral energy trade relations represent both an area of mutual interest and an area of competition. Turkey aspires to balance becoming a vital energy transit point for Eastern oil to the West, with securing energy supplies from Russia. At the same time Turkey is aiming to reduce its heavy dependence on Russian energy through diversification. Russia’s efforts to control the flow of energy from the Black Sea and Caspian conflict with Turkey’s ambition to becoming a key player for the East-West energy corridor. These conflicting interests have stalled plans for projects such the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.
Despite the increased economic and energy ties, tourism, and high-level political meetings between the two countries, Flanagan argues that insulating the energy and economic relationship between Turkey and Russia from the sharp differences over Bashar al Asad will become increasingly difficult. Unless Moscow decides to cooperate with the international community on Syria, act more constructively in the Eastern Mediterranean, and establish clear rules in the Caucasus, the Russo-Turkish relationship will suffer. Despite the “strategic” veneer of the relationship, the partnership remains largely tactical because the two countries lack a common political agenda and too many conflicting interests.
Iran-Turkey: on the rocks
According to the panelists, historical rivalry, mutual suspicion and sectarian differences limit this relationship, which has experienced ups and downs. The Turks engage in trade (especially energy) and investment with Iran, hoping to keep their competition peaceful. Iran leverages Turkey’s energy needs to prevent further political isolation. But Turkey is disappointed and frustrated, prompting Ankara to seek alternative partners.
Still Iran ranks as Turkey’s fifth-largest trading partner. Total bilateral trade increased from $1.05 billion in 2000 to $16 billion in 2011, with Iranian exports (mainly energy) constituting $12 billion. Travel also represents a significant area of growth in economic relations. Thanks to visa-free travel Iranians constitute the fourth largest group of foreign travelers to Turkey. Investment is also growing. Iranian firms increasingly operate in Turkey to gain access to international markets. In 2010 1,470 Iranian firms operated in Turkey, up from 319 in 2002. Turkish banks also serve as international intermediaries for financial transactions between Iran and states that fear antagonizing the US by engaging directly with Iran.
The Turkish and Iranian governments have attempted to expand energy trade since 1996. Despite failures to meet its commitments, Iran now ranks as Turkey’s second-highest supplier of natural gas. Turkish energy planners, however, increasingly prefer Azeri, Turkmen and Iraqi gas to Iran’s high-priced and unreliable supply. Turkish and Iranian interests contrast in regards to gas transit and the development of the Caspian basin. While Turkey hopes to serve as a transit corridor for Caspian, Central Asian and Iranian gas and oil, Iran opposes building the trans-Caspian pipeline because it favors Middle Eastern routes to Europe.
Iran and Turkey also diverge sharply on issues regarding the Arab Spring and in particular Syria. Iran’s insistence on manipulating Sunni-Shia’ tensions to expand its influence in the Middle East perturbs Turkish officials. Turkey continues to engage Iran diplomatically, hoping to convince Iran to take a more pragmatic stance on both Syria and the nuclear program, but Syria risks rupturing upsetting the pragmatic economic and energy relations put into place in recent year. Tehran hopes Turkey’s need for energy will sustain the relationship. But Aliriza believes Iran needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Iran.
Iran-Russia: a political relationship
The Iran-Russia relationship remains more political than economic. Russia sees in Iran a potential counterweight to US and Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moscow does not view Tehran as an immediate security threat. Iran has supported Russia in its larger strategic goal of promoting a multi-polar world. Iran and Russia find commonalities in opposing the US. There is not much personal affinity between Putin and Ahmadinejad. But as differences with the US grow over arms control, missile defense, Syria, and the larger Middle East, Iran and Russia have found more reason to cultivate their relations.
Although bilateral trade between the two countries tripled in the past ten years, Kuchins argues the volume remains insignificant. Russia represents 1.8% of Iran’s foreign trade, while Iran only accounts for 0.5% of Russia’s. There is little quantifiable energy trade and no joint commercial production in the Caspian, despite a 2008 treaty on cooperation in development of Iran’s gas and oil. Moscow and Tehran disagree on demarcation of the Caspian, but both oppose the trans-Caspian pipeline. The two view themselves as competitors for the European market in the longer-term. Alterman went so far as to suggest that containment of Iran plays to Moscow’s advantage, as otherwise it would have to compete with Iran for the European market.
The panel argued that in the short term the Middle Eastern turmoil serves both Moscow and Tehran. But continued support of Asad, and late diplomatic engagement with new Arab governments, may put them at a disadvantage later. Although Russia and Iran are bonding over shared energy and political goals, age-old suspicions and competing commercial interests will limit the alignment’s durability.
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Can Syria be saved?
I spoke yesterday on “Can Syria Be Saved” at the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI). I was honored at the last minute by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Staffan de Mistura, who joined the event and provided some comments. Here are the notes I used, amplified with Stefano’s comments and a bit of the Q and A:
1. The situation inside Syria
Military: The regime can clear, but less and less; the revolution can clear more and more. Neither can hold securely or build without the other being able to strike. This is the significance of air power and Scuds, which prevent consolidation of rebel control.
Civilian: The government is doing all right in areas that are loyal, but not gaining and under severe economic pressure. The revolution is unable to supply many areas outside government control and therefore unable to consolidate control and support.
2. Who is doing what outside Syria
There is no sign of the Russians or Iranians abandoning Assad, despite some change in Russian rhetoric. Russian arms supplies continue. Iranian forces are active within Syria, as is Hizbollah. Arms are flowing to the opposition, but unevenly and not always what they need.
The June 2012 Geneva communique, which provides for a fully empowered transition government approved by both the regime and the opposition, is still the only agreed diplomatic route. Brahimi is quiet, which is the best way to be until he has something definite. The Americans are exasperated but unwilling as yet to send arms. The naming of a prime minister this week should bring more civilian assistance, which is already topping $400 million from the US.
3. Why Obama hesitates to intervene more decisively, why Putin backs Assad
President Obama’s hesitation has little to do with Syria. He recognizes full well that a successful revolution there will be a blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but even an unsuccessful one is bleeding them profusely. The main issues for Obama are the Northern Distribution Network, which is vital for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He does not want to risk alienating the Russians on either front.
For the Russians, the main issues are no longer the port and arms sales, if ever they were. Now the question is one of prestige and power. Putin is defining his Russia in explicitly anti-Western terms, all the more so since what he portrays as Western trickery during the Libya intervention.
For Iran, the issue is an existential one. Loss of Syria would disable the connection to Hizbollah and isolate Iran from the Arab world, with the important exception of Iraq. This would be a big loss to a country that thinks of itself increasingly as a regional hegemon. The Islamic Republic would regard the loss of Syria as a big blow.
4. Options for the US and Europe
Britain and France are considering supplying weapons. That is unlikely to buy much allegiance. The best that can be hoped for is to strengthen relatively secularist and pro-Western forces, but that is going to be diffficult given the good military and relief performance of the Islamists, including those the US regards as extremist and even linked to Al Qaeda.
The US hesitates about arms transfers because of “fast and furious,” a US government scheme to track weapons transferred to the Mexican cartels. One of the weapons was used to kill an American border patrol agent. If an American-supplied shoulder-fired missile were to bring down a commercial aircraft, the incident would have major domestic political repurcussions.
Washington is instead focusing on enabling the civilian side, in particularly the newly named Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and whatever interim government he cobbles together. This should certainly include ample humanitarian assistance and operating expenses.
It might also include military intervention, since the Hitto government won’t be safe inside Syria if Assad continues to use his air force and Scuds. The idea gaining ground outside the US administration is to destroy as much of that capability as possible while it sits on the ground. No one in Washington wants a no-fly zone that requires daily patroling. This is also a possible response to chemical weapons, whose possible use was mentioned during the IAI event but the facts were still very unclear (as they still are today so far as I can tell).
5. Possible outcomes and their implications
The fall of Bashar will be a beginning, not an end. It is not clear that the state structure in this Levant will hold. Lebanon is clearly at risk. You’ve got Kurds in Syria and Iraq who want to unite, in addition to an ongoing if somewhat sporadic Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey. You’ve got Sunnis in Iraq fighting in Syria who might eventually turn around and fight again in Iraq. You’ve got Alawites, Druze, Christians and others who will want to protect their own communities, isolated from others in enclaves.
Even if the state structure holds, there are big questions about the future direction of Syria. Will Islamists triumph? Of which variety? Will secularists do as badly in a post-war transition as they have in Egypt? The opposition in Syria agrees that the state should remain intact, but will it be able to under pressure from a “stay-behind” insurgency like the one that Saddam Hussein mounted in Iraq?
I also ran quickly through the options for post-war Syria that I’ve already published.
Staffan reacted underlining the importance of continuing to talk with the Russians, who are convinced that the intervention in Libya has opened the door to Al Qaeda extremism in Mali and Syria. He also underlined the importance of the opposition forming an inclusive and cohesive government that enunciates a clear plan for how to deal with the previous regime, including an exit for Bashar al Assad, and how to provide guarantees to the Alawites. He underlined that we should be putting together an international peacekeeping force now. We should not be tricked into international intervention by allegations of chemical weapons use.
I’ll stop my account there, as I’ve already gone on too long. It was a stimulating discussion. Many thanks to my hosts at IAI!
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Peace Picks March 18-March 22
A very busy spring break week in DC:
1. Overcoming Obstacles to Peace, Monday March 18, 10 AM- 11:30 AM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington DC, B203-204
Speakers: James Dobbins, Laurel Miller, William Durch, Joe Collins
How can societies build enduring peace? This is a simple question that the international community has tried to answer from a variety of different perspectives and efforts. A new book, “Overcoming Obstacles to Peace,” finds evidence that international interventions can in fact build more peaceful nations. Using thorough research supported by metrics, authors James Dobbins and Laurel Miller of the RAND Corporation demonstrate how 16 out of 20 selected conflicts over the past 25 years affirm the international community’s role and effectiveness in building stable nations.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the RAND Corporation in this important discussion on March 18, 2013 from 10-11:30 AM at the U.S. Institute of Peace Headquarters.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/overcoming…
2. Obama to the Middle East: Expectations and Implications, Monday March 18, 12 PM- 2 PM, Washington Institute of Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute of Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, D.C. 20036, Stern Library and Conference Room
Speakers: Dennis Ross, Michael Singh,and David Makovsky
President Obama embarks on the first foreign travel of his second term next week, and despite talk of a tilt toward Asia and disengagement from Middle East wars, he is headed into the heart of the region, visiting Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank. To discuss why he is visiting the Middle East, what his priorities are for the trip, and what implications it may hold for such key policy issues as the Iran nuclear challenge, the worsening Syria crisis, and the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, TWI will host a Policy Forum luncheon with Dennis Ross, Michael Singh, and David Makovsky.
Ambassador Dennis Ross is counselor to The Washington Institute. Previously, he served on the Obama administration’s National Security Council staff as senior director for the Central Region, responsible for U.S. policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.
Michael Singh, the Institute’s managing director, served in the George W. Bush administration as senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council.
David Makovsky, the Institute’s Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process, just returned from a trip to Israel and the West Bank.
3. Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries: Can Partners Help?, Monday March 18 12 PM- 1:45 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Marwan Muasher, Uri Dadush, Ibrahim Saif, Jean-Pierre Chauffour, Nemat Shafik
More than two years after the outbreak of democratic revolutions in several Arab countries, the economic situation in the region remains precarious. Progress in restoring confidence as well as sustainable and rapid economic growth will depend overwhelmingly on internal forces and the return of political stability. However, external partners can also play a role in helping normalize and eventually improving the underlying growth fundamentals of these economies. How will the Arab economic outlook evolve? What more can the United States and Europe-the region’s largest trading partners-do to support democratic transition and economic liberalization in the countries affected? What is the respective role of trade and aid?
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
4. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Monday March 18 12:30 PM
Venue: Cato Institute 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001Hayek Auditorium
Speakers: Fred Kaplan, Spencer Ackerman, Janine Davidson, Christopher Preble
In “The Insurgents”, Fred Kaplan tells the story of how a small group of soldier-scholars revolutionized the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight a new kind of war in the post-Cold War age: small wars in cities and villages, against terrorists and insurgents. These would be wars not only of fighting but of nation building, often not of necessity but of choice.
Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered their ideas about counterinsurgency – or COIN, for short – through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists – today’s best and brightest – can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. By adapting the U.S. military to fight the conflicts of the modern era, they also created the tools – and made it more tempting – for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.
If you cant make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Featuring the author Fred Kaplan, War Stories Columnist, Slate, with comments by Spencer Ackerman, National Security Correspondent, WIRED; and Janine Davidson, George Mason University; moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
Website: http://www.cato.org/events/insurgents…
5. Ambassador Marc Grossman on the Campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Monday March 18 3 PM-5 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Ambassador Marc Grossman, Jessica Tuchman Mathews
In his first public event since stepping down as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Marc Grossman will discuss efforts to reach a political settlement and the future of American diplomacy in the region. Carnegie’s Jessica T. Mathews will moderate.
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
6.Afghanistan in Transition: A Trip Report, Tuesday March 19, 9:30 AM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Anthony Cordesman
CSIS Burke Chair Anthony Cordesman will discuss his recent trip to ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan, and the prospects for a U.S. transition. This event will also launch the Burke Chair’s latest report, a complete analysis of the Afghan transition.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
9:30 am – 10:30 am EST
B1 Conference Center
CSIS 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Please click here to RSVP
Follow @CSIS for live updates
Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contact imisadmin@csis.org
Website: http://csis.org/event/afghanistan-tra…
7. A Delegation of Syrian Opposition Leaders, Tuesday March 19 10:00 AM, National Press Club
Venue: National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20045, Zenger Room
Speakers: Haytham Manna, Rim Turkmani, Riad Drar Al-Hamood
A delegation of Syrian opposition leaders critical of President Bashar al-Asad, and which opposes foreign intervention and Saudi Arabian-backed ‘rebels’ in the current situation,
The speakers will discuss creating sufficient political momentum for a negotiated settlement to the present Syrian Crisis, and moving toward a democratic, secular future for the country.
Contacts:
National Press Club: PETER HICKMAN
301/367-7711 (c), 301/530-1210 (t), 202/662-7540 (NPC),pjhickman@hotmail.com
Speakers (Global Policy Forum):
DAVID GRANT
david67grant@gmail.com, 202/577-3145
MEL DUNCAN
mduncan@nonviolentpeaceforce.com, 651/245-8706
Website: http://www.press.org/events/delegatio…
8. Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis, Tuesday March 19 10 AM, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Venue: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, DC Room 419
Speakers: The Honorable Anne C. Richard, The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg, Mr. Tom Malinowski
Website: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearing…
9. US Policy in the Middle East on the Verge of Obama’s Trip, Tuesday March 19 12 PM- 1:30 PM, Center for American Progress
Venue: Center for American Progress, 1333 H Street NW, 10th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Rudy deLeon, Martin Indyk, Bruce Jentleson
On March 20 President Barack Obama will arrive in Israel in the first part of a regional visit that includes the West Bank and Jordan. The President’s trip to the region comes at a time of change in Israel and the region. On his upcoming trip, President Obama will face a full slate of challenges and opportunities, including concerns over Egypt’s continued political transition, Syrias civil war, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and the threats posed by Iran.
Please join the Center for American Progress for a keynote speech by Sandy Berger, chair at the Albright Stonebridge Group and former national security advisor to President Bill Clinton, previewing President Obamas trip to Israel and the regional challenges that face him there. Following his keynote speech, Berger will join a panel discussion with Rudy deLeon, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy at CAP and former deputy secretary of defense, who just returned from a CAP delegation to Israel and the West Bank; Martin Indyk, vice president and director of foreign policy at Brookings and former assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs; and Bruce Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science at Duke University and an expert on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
As part of this event, the Center for American Progress will release findings from a report based on discussions with Israeli and Palestinian officials during a recent visit to the region by members of the National Security and International Policy team.
Website: http://www.americanprogress.org/event…
10. After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I), Tuesday March 19 1:00 PM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Seth G. Jones, Kimberly Kagan, Peter Bergen, Daniel S. Markey
Chairman Chabot on the hearing: “U.S. national security interests in South Asia are both dire and immediate. The 2014 withdrawal plan from Afghanistan is strategically risky and threatens to plunge Afghanistan into a state in which terrorists will once again thrive. At the same time, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated dramatically and falters over Pakistan’s involvement with terrorist organizations and the drone war in the tribal bad lands. While Islamabad claims U.S. and Pakistani interests can be brought into alignment, we must remain skeptical of its internal divergent interests that risk undermining U.S. interests, the relationship with India, and the chance for a stable, peaceful, and independent Afghanistan. This hearing is an important opportunity to examine the President’s hasty withdrawal plan from Afghanistan and evaluate how events in Pakistan over the next year may affect U.S. national security interests throughout the entire region.”
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen on the hearing: With President Obama’s announcement last month that the U.S. will draw down our forces in Afghanistan by the end of this year without a clear withdrawal plan, it is necessary to have a hearing that will examine the security implications of this decision and analyze the capacity of the Afghani and Pakistan government to address crime and corruption while ensuring secured territories in their countries. This is imperative particularly in light of recent inflammatory accusations made by Afghani leader Hamid Karzai which have further strained U.S. – Afghanistan relations and put our troops at greater risk. We must do everything we can to prevent al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist militants from taking over and undoing the efforts and sacrifices made by the U.S. and our allies for over a decade.
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
11. Iraq, 10 years later: A conversation with Senator John McCain, General Jack Keane, and Frederick W. Kagan, Tuesday March 19 3:30 PM- 4:30 PM, American Enterprise Institute
Venue: American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Frederick W. Kagan, General Jack Keane, John Mccain
Ten years ago, the United States entered Iraq and in a few short weeks ended Saddam Hussein’s reign of tyranny. What followed — wild swings between victory and defeat, liberation and occupation — and ended with President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw all US forces from Iraq in 2011, is likely to be a source of contention for years to come.
As we approach the anniversary of the beginning of the Iraq War, many questions remain: Is Iraq a success? What role will Iran and al Qaeda play in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of American forces? Were the war and the liberation of 25 million Iraqis worth the high price Americans paid in blood and treasure? Please join us as we reflect on a conflict that helped shape the beginning of the 21st century in American foreign policy. Senator John McCain will be joined by a panel featuring General Jack Keane (ret.) and AEI’s Frederick W. Kagan.
If you are unable to attend, we welcome you to watch the event live on this page. Full video will be posted within 24 hours.
Website: http://www.aei.org/events/2013/03/19/…
12. Crisis in Syria: The US Response, Wednesday March 20 9:45 AM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Robert S. Ford, Anne C. Richard, Nancy E. Lindborg
Chairman Royce on the hearing: “Unfortunately, we are watching conditions in Syria continue to deteriorate precipitously. The Assad regime has killed tens of thousands of Syrians. Millions more have been displaced or have fled to neighboring countries increasingly strained by their influx. This is a regional crisis. It’s time for the Obama Administration, which has struggled on Syria, to present and defend its policy on all fronts, including its humanitarian efforts. The Committee will focus on how the U.S. can best protect its vital national interests and effectively promote a stable and peaceful Syria.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
13.Changing Challenges for the Gulf States- A Panel Discussion, Wednesday March 20 12:00 Pm- 2: 00 Pm, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052Lindner Family Commons
Speakers: Christopher Davidson, Kristin Smith Diwan, Gwenn Okruhlik, Marc Lynch
Christopher Davidson, Reader in Middle East Politics, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University
Kristin Smith Diwan, Assistant Professor, Comparative and Regional Studies, School of International Service, American University
Gwenn Okruhlik, President, Association for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies
Moderated by:
Marc Lynch, George Washington University
Three leading political scientists will discuss the current challenges facing the Gulf States.
*A light lunch will be served.*
RSVP: tinyurl.com/a6tvn2m
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Website: http://www.elliottschool.org/events/c…
14. Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat, Wednesday March 20 1:30 Pm, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Will Fulton, Matthew Levitt, Roger Noriega
Chairman Poe on the hearing: “Next week, the TNT Subcommittee will bring together experts to discuss the evolution of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has historically been a terrorist organization whose activity has been isolated in the Middle East. Hezbollah is the puppet of Iran worldwide. Under the guidance of the Iranian regime, this jihadist group has expanded its reach and shifted its strategy to operate in virtually every corner of the world including Latin America and Europe. I look forward to hearing testimony about the relationship between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, how this threat has grown in recent years, and what implications this dangerous alliance has for U.S. national security.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
16. The Muslim Brotherhood and the West, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 4:00pm, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Venue: Reserve Officers Association, 1 Constitution Ave NE Washington, DC
Speakers: Lorenzo Vidino, Abdullah Bijad Alotibi, Joseph Braude, Sam Helfont
Few observers foresaw the Arab Spring, but it should not have surprised anyone that the Islamist movements the most organized movements in the Arab world became the main beneficiaries of the turmoil that ensued. Islamism, in its gradualist and pragmatic approach embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots worldwide, seems ready to reap the rewards of its three decades-old decision to abandon violence and focus on grassroots activities. This monumental change has created many concerns among liberals, religious minorities and, more generally, all non-Islamists in the countries where Islamists have won. In addition, Arab states ruled by non-Islamist regimes have expressed concern. The former worry that Islamist ideology even in its more contemporary, pragmatic form remains deeply divisive and anti-democratic, often at odds with their values and interests. The latter believe that on foreign policy issues, most of the positions of various Brotherhood-inspired parties are on a collision course with the policies of established regimes in the region.
In association with Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre (based in the United Arab Emirates), the Foreign Policy Research Institute has just published as an E-Book The West and the Muslim Brotherhood After the Arab Spring, edited by Lorenzo Vidino. The book provides an overview of each of eight countries’ policies towards Islamism, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, and Israel. In this program, Vidino highlights the key lessons of the volume, and comment is offered by Abdullah Bijad Alotibi and Joseph Braude.
Website: http://www.fpri.org/events/2013/03/mu…
16. The Petro-politics of Azerbaijan, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:00pm, Institute of World Politics
Venue: Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW Washington, DC
Speakers: Vilen Khlgatyan
This lecture is part of a series on the Intermarium, organized by the Kosciuszko Chair of Polish Studies at IWP.
Mr. Khlgatyan will discuss the role Azerbaijan’s oil and gas reserves have played in attracting the Oil Majors to the region, and how this in turn has helped and hindered Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign politics. Moreover, with Azerbaijani oil reserves having hit their peak in 2010-2011, what does the future hold?
Vilen Khlgatyan is Vice-Chairman of Political Developments Research Center (PDRC), a virtual think tank based in Yerevan, Armenia.
He attended Webster University, where he double majored in International Relations and International Business, and graduated in Spring 2010. He spent a semester studying in Vienna, Austria, where he also attended OPEC and OSCE workshops.
His studies at IWP have focused on national security and the geopolitics of energy. He is writing his honors thesis on the ‘Geopolitics of Energy in the South Caucasus.’
Mr. Khlgatyan was a campaign staffer for Congressman Russ Carnahan of Missouri’s 3rd District, who sat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Important note: Attendance at all IWP events requires an RSVP in advance. In addition, prospective attendees must receive an e-mail confirmation from IWP indicating that seating will be available for them at the event. A government-issued ID that matches your name on the confirmed attendee list must be presented at the door for admission to any event. The use of photographic and/or recording equipment is prohibited except by advanced permission from IWP, the event organizer, and the speaker(s). IWP is a private organization; as such, all attendees are guests of the Institute.
Website: http://www.iwp.edu/events/detail/the-…
17. The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:30pm, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Bulent Aliriza, Jon B. Alterman, Andrew C. Kuchins, Stephen J. Flanagan
CSIS scholars will present the key findings of their 18 month project that has examined the forces and interests driving relations among Turkey, Russia, and Iran and the strategies that these governments are pursuing to manage differences and sustain economic and energy cooperation. They will also discuss how complex and often contradictory interactions among these three countries are shaping regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, and Central Asia, as they have for centuries. The nexus of the three pairs of relations are also influencing each country’s dealings with the other two as well as with the United States, and are being whipsawed by recent events. Starkly differing policies toward the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring have strained Ankara’s relations with Moscow and Tehran. Understanding these dynamics is essential to avoiding a wider war in the Middle East, renewed conflict in the Caucasus, and instability in Central Asia following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
Please Click Here to RSVP online or email us at KissingerChair@csis.org.
(Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register online. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contactimisadmin@csis.org).
Website: http://csis.org/event/turkey-russia-i…
18. The Struggle for Democracy in Tunisia, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:30pm – 5:00pm, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: John Hopkins SAIS- Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036Kenney Auditorium
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 2:30pm ET on March 20, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast.
Tunisia’s 2010-11 ‘Jasmine Revolution’ ignited a flame of political rebellion that quickly spread to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. But as the ‘Arab Spring’ enters its third season, Tunisia’s struggle for democracy is beset by escalating ideological and even violent conflicts. What are the key challenges facing Tunisia? How can U.S. officials and nongovernmental organizations help Tunisians address mounting domestic and regional crises?
To discuss these and other questions, the United States Institute of Peace, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) are pleased to invite you to a public round-table featuring a delegation of prominent Tunisian political scientists on Wednesday, March 20, 2013 from 2:30pm to 5:00pm at SAIS. Members of the delegation will offer their perspectives on the situation and then participate in a frank question-and-answer session. We hope that you will be able to join us for this very special event.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/the-strugg…
19. Turkey’s Kurdish Question: A New Hope?, Wednesday, March 20 / 3:00pm – 4:30pm, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Speakers: Kemal Kirisci, Aliza Marcus, mer Taspinar, Gnl Tol
Turkey’s approach to dealing with its Kurdish minority-the Kurdish question-at home and in the region is once again at a critical juncture. From the prospects for a new constitution to Ankara’s Syria dilemma, virtually all the pressing issues facing Turkey have a Kurdish dimension. After the failure of the ‘Oslo process,’ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has initiated another round of negotiations, this time called the ‘Imrali process’ and directly involving the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan. The process has been challenging, but extremely cautious expectations and hopes are growing that the rejuvenated process will not succumb to the fate of the previous efforts at solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
Given past failures at dialogue and at finding a mutually-acceptable, peaceful, and democratic solution to the problem, how might the ‘Imrali process’ prove different? What do the Kurds of Turkey want? Is the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) ready to meet Kurdish demands? What is Erdogan’s objective? What are the regional implications? At a time when Syria is in turmoil and Iraqi is facing increasing domestic instability, is a major breakthrough possible?
On March 20, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a discussion to explore these and other important questions related to Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Featured speakers include Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Ömer Taspinar, author and journalist Aliza Marcus, and Gönül Tol of the Middle East Institute. Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirisci will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. The event is part of the TUSIAD U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.
Participants can join the conversation on Twitter during the event using #FPKurds.
Website: http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/Broo…
20. What Should Obama do on North Korea?, Thursday, March 21 / 9:00am, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Victor D. Cha, Walter L. Sharp
Please join us for a Korea Chair Platform event with Victor Cha, Walter L. Sharp, and Joseph R. DeTrani. In the wake of the December 2012 missile launch and the February 2013 nuclear test, our distinguished panelists will share their views on the road ahead and what President Obama should do on North Korea. We hope you can join us!
To RSVP for this event, please email KoreaChair@csis.org.
The Korea Chair Platform is made possible by the generous support of Samsung Electronics America.
Website: http://csis.org/event/what-should-oba…
21. The Rise and Fall of Democracies and Dictatorships: New Perspectives on Democratic Governance, Friday, March 22 / 9:00am – 11:00am, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Scott Mainwaring, Frances Hagopian, Steven Levitsky
Website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the…
22. Mapping Egyptian Politics: Where Is Egypt Heading and What Does That Mean for the United States?, Friday, March 22 / 10:30am – 12:00pm, RAND Corporation
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2168 Rayburn House Office Building
Speakers: Jeff Martini, Michele Dunne, Samer Shehata, Anne Gearan
Despite widespread unrest, continued wrangling over the election law, and threats of an opposition boycott, Egypt is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in the coming months. Egypt’s transition has already been punctuated by a series of Islamist victories at the polls. In this session, three Egypt watchers will take a closer look at what past electoral performance and the current political context say about the Islamists’ strength in Egypt and what it means for the United States.
Website: http://www.rand.org/events/2013/03/22..
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Delaying the inevitable
Blic Online late last night published what purports to be a draft text of a Pristina/Belgrade agreement, one supposedly agreed by the EU and Pristina. It seems to me, as one would expect, consistent with the Ahtisaari plan in many of its details, and it follows the spirit of the Ahtisaari plan in ending at least some of the Serbian campaign against Kosovo membership in “international bodies” with
economic, cultural, and social (including sporting) purposes. Serbia shall not block Kosovo’s membership in the OSCE.
But it falls short of Kosovo membership in the United Nations.
It is difficult to comment on a text that was likely prepared originally in English, translated by Blic and retranslated into English for me by a kind reader. Nor is it clear where the original came from or how close to a final agreement this text may be. Is it being published now to test Serbian and Kosovar reaction? Does it genuinely represent something Pristina can accept?
I don’t know. Nor am I likely to know, as the diplomats will not want to discuss in public the status of this text.
What it shows, however, is that the two sides, one way or the other, are dealing with key issues: how can the Serb population of northern Kosovo participate in Kosovo institutions and still avail itself of the Ahtisaari plan’s provisions for governing themselves? How can Kosovo’s interest in maintaining a single judicial and security framework be satisfied while allowing wide latitude to local governance in the other respects provided for by Ahtisaari?
The devil here is not so much in the details. It is in the broader context. While this text purports to be status neutral, it would in principle allow Kosovo to join a lot of international bodies, some of which are open to membership only to sovereign states. That is, so far as I know, the case for the 57-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Here there is a problem. The text obligates Serbia not to block (or encourage others to block) membership, but others would of course be free to continue to do so. The European Union has five non-recognizing states any one of which might block Kosovo membership. It is my hope that there is a clear and unequivocal understanding that none of the EU member states will block Kosovo membership.
That still does not solve the problem, because Russia could still be an obstacle where it is a member, including the OSCE. What this shows it seems to me is the difficulty of partial solutions that purport to be status neutral. Kosovo membership in the UN would end all discussion of its eligibility for membership elsewhere. Taking a step-by-step approach is fraught with difficulty, and inconsistent with the spirit of the original Ahtisaari plan, which foresaw universal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
The simple fact, recognized almost as much on the streets of Belgrade as on the streets of Pristina, is that Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia and will never again be. Delaying the inevitable may be the best that can be done right now, but it means a continuing uphill struggle for a state that needs to focus on other things: jobs and economic development, the fight against corruption and organized crime, proper treatment of its Serb citizens and other (numerical) minorities.
It would be far preferable–and less painful in the long run–to end Serbia’s empty sovereignty claim. There may be five non-recognizing EU members that can block Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, but there are 22 EU members that can block Serbia’s eventual entry into the EU. Delaying the inevitable makes life harder not only for Pristina, but also for Belgrade.
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Treachery could go a long way
With appreciation to the Etilaf (National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) media department, here is the Interim Political Advisory Committee “framework for any political solution.” It was adopted in Cairo last Friday. I am publishing it in full here because I haven’t seen it elsewhere:
The Interim Advisory Political Committee of the Syrian Coalition held its regular meeting to discuss the latest political and field developments. Members of the committee examined the domestic, regional and international developments that relate to the Syrian revolution. As the Syrian Coalition is keen on elevating the suffering of the Syrian people, the protection of Syria’s national unity, saving Syria from the crimes committed by Assad’s regime, and preventing foreign interference, the committee developed the following framework for any political solution:
1. Achieving the objectives of the revolution in achieving justice, freedom, and dignity, as well as sparing the country from any further devastation and preserving the unity of Syria in order to achieve a transition to a civil and democratic system that ensures equal rights for all Syrians.
2. Bashar Assad and security leadership who are responsible for the current destruction of the country are outside the political process and must be held accountable for their crimes.
3. All Syrians will be part of any future political solution, including those currently serving with the state institutions, Baathists, political, civil and social forces as long as they did not participate in any crimes committed against other Syrians.
4. Any acceptable political initiative must have a clear timeline and clearly stated objectives.
5. Member States of the Security Council, especially Russia and the United States of America, must secure appropriate international support and adequate safeguards to make this process possible. They should adopt such political initiative, which could result in issuing binding resolution from the UN Security Council.
6. We expect Russia to turn its statements about not adhering to having Bashar Assad into practical steps. Any agreement between Russia and Syrians must be done with legitimate representatives for the Syrian people. Such agreement will not be implemented as long as Assad and his regime are controlling the government.
7. The Iranian leadership must recognize that its support of Bashar Assad is pushing the region towards sectarian conflict, which is not be in the interest of anyone. Iranian government should realize that Assad and his regime have no chance to stay in power nor will they be part of any future solution for Syria.
8. The friends of the Syrian people should understand lasting political solution that ensures the stability of the region and preserves the institutions of the state will only take place through changing the balance of power on the ground which requires supporting the Syrian coalition and Joint Chiefs of Staff with all possible means.
I take this to be the political committee’s effort to reframe the proposal by the Coalition’s leader, Moaz al Khatib, for talks with the regime. That “personal” (i.e. uncoordinated) proposal was conditional on release of political prisoners and renewal of passports for expatriates, two conditions that were not met within the time limit al Khatib proposed.
Now we have this more elaborate, and more opaque, proposition from al Khatib’s followers. It does not suggest talks with the regime but rather an internationally sponsored political process backed by both the US and Russia and approved in a Chapter 7 resolution of the UN Security Council. While the details of that process are unspecified, the committee asks for a timeline and clear objectives, which clearly include a democratic Syria. Bashar al Asad is not to be part of the political process envisaged.
There’s the rub, the same as almost a year ago. So far, Asad has refused exclusion from the political process and backed his refusal with brutality. The regime has cracked but not broken. The Coalition is saying only a military response to its brutality (“changing the balance of power on the ground…with all possible means”) will enable a “lasting political solution.” But the Europeans yesterday refused to lift their arms embargo in order to help the opposition. The Americans are likewise still sitting on their hands.
Serious international negotiations don’t sound likely. Moscow and Washington are still unable to agree on a plan. But the interim political committee is correct that ultimately it will be conditions inside Syria, not the best laid plans of those outside, that will determine what happens. Both the expatriate opposition and the regime leadership are insulated from the violence, which is creating a much bigger humanitarian problem than has been acknowledged so far. My admittedly limited contact with opposition people inside the country suggests they are more inclined to negotiate, albeit not with Bashar. I can only hope that the same is true of some within the regime. Treachery could go a long way to ending this criminally violent regime.
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