Tag: Russia
Schizoeurope
Britain and France have collaborated in getting the European Union to lift its arms embargo on Syria, opening the possibility of shipping arms to the opposition starting in July. But key European thinktanks are very much opposed to the idea: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) wants de-escalation and Christopher Phillips of Chatham House criticizes what he regards as Britain’s flawed logic.
I have a hard time understanding their objections. Why would Syria’s arms suppliers (Russia and Iran principally) reduce the flow unless they see the real possibility that escalation will favor the opposition? Opening the possibility of future arms shipments will do more to give the Asad regime something to worry about than it will do to harden the opposition’s resistance to negotiation. It is far more likely that offering weapons conditional on their unified participation in negotiations (and being prepared to shut off the flow if they fail to participate seriously) will work.
Nor am I all that worried about weapons ending up in the wrong hands, so long as they are used to counter the regime. The neat distinction between jihadists and moderates is at least in part a figment of Western imaginations. However hard we try, some weapons will end up in the wrong places. Given the current political atmosphere in the US, better that happen to the Europeans than to us. We don’t need “fast and furious” on steroids.
Then there is the question of the Russia’s decision to export a new generation of air defenses to Syria, apparently decided in response to the European Union ending the embargo. If the Russians go ahead and if the Israelis fail to attack them before they are operational, they would presumably make it more difficult to impose a no-fly zone, if that were President Obama’s intention. But despite news reports, there is no real indication that the Americans are willing to patrol a no-fly zone, and the Israelis have good reasons to prevent the new air defenses from becoming operational, something that would take months if not years in the best of conditions. It is amusing to see people who oppose a no-fly zone worrying about the Russian move and premature to worry too much about an Israeli-Russian war, though the Israelis should certainly be concerned about how far Russia is prepared to go in arming Syria and Iran.
While in my view wrong about the impact of arming the revolutionaries, or more accurately opening up the future possibility of arming them, the ECFR offers a “strategy for de-escalation” worth looking at:
- a set of guiding principles
- a wide enough coalition committed to de-escalation, and
- a diplomatic strategy to get Geneva II off the ground.
The principles they draw from the Geneva I communique:
- All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence
- No further further militarization of the conflict
- The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected
- The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing bodyexercising full executive powers. It could include membersof the present Government and the opposition and othergroups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent
- The Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting
The most controversial is that fourth point, as it implies to the opposition and its supporters that Bashar al Asad will step aside while the regime and its supporters oppose that. Squaring that circle will be worth a Nobel Prize. But the Geneva I communique was not agreed by either the opposition or the regime, so getting them to sign up to something like these five points would be an important step forward.
The ECFR description of a possible de-escalation coalition is reasonable. The diplomatic strategy beyond that is brief and vague, basically proposing that Russia and the US bring the rest of the P5 on board for a non-Chapter 7 UN Security Council resolution.
The ECFR paper offers one particularly interesting idea on cessation of armed violence: this might be done in specific geographic areas, “rolling and expanding pockets in which ceasefires hold.” This of course would enable both sides to concentrate their forces in areas where there are no such ceasefires, intensifying the conflict in some areas even while de-escalating in others. The idea could have the great virtue of opening up more of the country to humanitarian relief and beginning the re-introduction of international monitors, assuming there is someone out there ready to take on that role.
Fight and talk
The date hasn’t even been set yet for next month’s “Geneva II” conference, but we are in full pre-negotiation mode in Syria. This means instensification of the fighting, ratcheting up of the assistance flowing from outside, and anxious efforts to get the opposition to hang together, lest they hang separately (in the immortal words of Benjamin Franklin).
For the moment, the fighting is still focused on the ill-fated town of Qusayr, which is one of the keys to controlling the highway that links Damascus to Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. But the big news came Saturday from nearby Lebanon, where Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah announced publically his group’s undying commitment to keeping the Asad regime in power in Syria and fighting the Sunni “takfiris” there. A Shia neighborhood in Beirut was ineffectively rocketed in response.
Then Monday the European Union decided to let its self-imposed arms embargo on Syria lapse at the end of the month, opening the possibility of Britain and France deciding to arm the opposition. While Secretary Kerry seems to think this will help rebalance the military situation, it is far more likely the delayed prospect of European arms for the opposition will cause the Asad regime to accelerate its efforts to consolidate as much control as it can over the Damascus/Mediterranean corridor, which is vital both to the regime’s survival. The port at Tartus is where the Russians deliver their heavier arms to the regime, and the coastal area has a substantial concentration of Alawite supporters of the regime.
Meanwhile the opposition has been meeting in Istanbul. It needs to sort out its leadership mess. Moaz al Khatib, who has resigned as the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) president chaired at least part of the meeting, George Sabra is supposedly the temporary leader, and Michel Kilo is supposed to take over but was apparently blocked from doing so at a meeting that is continuing in Istanbul. The SOC also needs to broaden its base to include more people from inside Syria as well as representatives of Free Syrian Army units. It would help of course if the Saudis and Qataris, presumably the main suppliers of money and arms to the opposition, would sing from the same songsheet.
The regime, meanwhile, is making happy noises about participating in a dialogue that its Moscow patrons likely see as a way keeping Asad in power even if the Americans would like it to be the first step on the way to his removal. Moscow is using the time to beef up Syria’s air defenses, having already moved to strengthen its shore defenses and deploy the Russian navy to Syria’s coast. Those still arguing for “safe corridors” and the like need to take note. The Americans are uninterested in fighting a war in Syria, especially one that might show Russian military hardware off to good advantage and provide the Iranians with up-to-date data on American aerial performance.
None of this bodes well for Geneva II. There is no “mutually hurting stalemate” in Syria. Both sides are still willing to fight. The catastrophe they fear most would come from stopping the fighting, not continuing it. The regime figures that would expose the Alawites to mass murder. The opposition, while struggling for the moment, figures the setbacks are temporary and the right response is to redouble its efforts. Anyone who has seen what Asad is capable of would fear losing this war. If Geneva II happens, it is likely to happen in the context of heightened conflict, not the kind of mutual exhaustion that lends itself to political settlement.
That does not however mean that talking is a bad idea. “Ripeness” for a settlement sometimes happens suddenly. Best to be ready when it does. Being ready can mean many things: making the needed contacts between opposing forces, testing propositions, developing principles that can be applied when the situation warrants, gaining intelligence on the warring parties and their leadership structures, cultivating constituencies for peace on both sides.
“Fight and talk” is not new. The European Community (as it was then) convened many conferences on the wars in former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, when war was in raging in Croatia and Bosnia and repression in Kosovo. The meetings never produced a peace agreement, or even a ceasefire that held. That was left to the Americans at Dayton. But they did produce the Community’s criteria for recognition of the separate republics as independent states as well as the state succession plans, both of which were used to what I would call good effect.
In the best of all possible worlds, we are heading for fight and talk in Syria. Wisdom lies in using the opportunity well and trying to end a war that is clearly threatening state structures in the Levant and may collapse them in chaos.
180 miles from disaster
Yesterday’s Friends of Syria meeting occurred in Amman, just 180 miles from the battle for Qusayr, a Syrian town located just off the road from Damascus through Homs to Alawite-populated areas of the west. If the opposition can hold Qusayr and Homs, it will split Damascus from the west. If it can’t, Bashar al Asad will have what he needs to maintain a regime axis that splits the liberated areas of the south from the liberated areas of the north. Either way, the outcome is likely to be a disaster for someone.
The Qusayr fighting involves Lebanese Hizbollah fighting with the Syrian army against mostly Sunni rebels, including Jabhat al Nusra. It naturally has echoes inside Lebanon, where Alawites and Sunnis have clashed in Tripoli. There is a real risk of spillover. While some in Washington may wonder why we should worry about Hizbollah and Sunni extremists associated with Jabhat al Nusra kill each other, it is important to widen the aperture a bit: state structures in Levant are at risk. Were they to collapse, the chaos could be widespread. Syria never has been comfortable with Lebanon as a separate state and established diplomatic relations with it only in the last few years.
It is hard to be optimistic about the preparations for next month’s Syria peace conference. Apart from the parlous military situation in Qusayr, Moscow is insisting not only that Iran be present but that the Syrian opposition come to the table without preconditions (in particular that Bashar al Asad step aside before any political transition). Then and only then is Moscow willing to set a date for the conference.
Iran’s presence is certainly necessary if the conference is going to produce anything like a political solution. The Russians are not wrong about that. Its fighters, and Hizbollah fighters it supports, are very much engaged in Syria. As for Moscow’s pre-condition that there not be pre-conditions, I suppose George Sabra–the current, interim head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition–will figure out a way to fudge that, perhaps by noting the Coalition’s acceptance of the formula already accepted last year at the Geneva conference: a transitional governing body that would exercise full executive powers “formed on the basis of mutual consent.”
More problematic is the Russian transfer of major new weapons systems to Syria and its deployment of warships off the coast. Russian thinktankers claim
non-intervention is now a basic Russian principle…
but that is neither true nor new. Russia is certainly intervening in the Syria conflict on the side of the regime it considers the legitimate sovereign. And it intervened on behalf of rebel forces in Georgia, when that suited its preferences. Russian policy might better be stated as preventing Western intervention in areas it regards as within its sphere of influence. We would no doubt return the favor if they were to muck in the Gulf.
The most sensible comment yesterday comes from Salim Idris, titular head of the Free Syrian Army. He is quoted as saying in a letter to Secretary Kerry:
For the negotiations to be of any substance, we must reach a strategic military balance, without which the regime will feel empowered to dictate … while fully sustained logistically and militarily by Russia and Iran…Such untenable situation requires that the Unites States, as the leader of the free world, provide the Free Syrian Army forces under the Supreme Military Council with the requisite advanced weapons to sustain defensive military capabilities in the face of the Assad forces.
He is said to be seeking anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. He is correct that a mutually hurting stalemate, which the opposition has not so far been able to reach, is needed before the Syrian regime will negotiate seriously. If Bashar thinks he can do better by continuing the fighting, he will.
Secretary Kerry has limited himself so far to feints: he said yesterday Friends of Syria would consider arming the opposition and supported an effort to lift the European Union arms embargo. He is a man used to the niceties of the US Senate, where sparring is a verbal activity. The Russians, Iranians and Syrians certainly understand what he is threatening, but they doubt he is willing to do it or that his doing it will be effective in the time frame available.
President Obama is fond of saying he doesn’t bluff. It is time for him to play a stronger hand, one way or another.
Odd duck
I livetweeted Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s appearance in Washington at SETA (a Turkish thinktank for political, economic social research) yesterday, but the performance merited more. Maybe my numerous Turkish readers will find it interesting, even if the Americans don’t. I rarely attend such high-level public events, as little new gets said.
But Erdogan did not disappoint. Speaking in Turkish (I was listening to the simultaneous translation), his main theme was this:
no justice means no humanity, no dignity, and no peace.
He went on to talk about the “bottom billion” living on less than $1 per day, most of whom are innocent children, as well as the suffering in Somalia and Darfur. Personally moved by starvation and circumcision done with a simple knife on several children, he underlined the injustice of racism and discrimination, referring in particular to violence against Muslims in Myanmar.
Lack of justice in one place is a threat to justice elsewhere. Palestine is not a territorial issue but a justice issue. Israeli settlements are making a two-state solution impossible. Israel should release Palestinian prisoners and end the blockade. Hamas will have to be at the negotiating table. It was elected and then denied the right to govern. Israel has apologized for its raid on the Turkish aid flotilla. Compensation is under discussion. Then Turkey will press for an end to the occupation.
The twentieth century was one of war and injustice. The twenty-first century should be one of peace and justice. Turkish policy is based on justice and humanity. This is why Turkey supported the people in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria. But the UN Security Council is doing nothing. The system is blocked, and wrong. Humanity cannot be in the hands of one or two countries; the system has to be changed. Events like those of the 1990s in Bosnia and Rwanda are happening again, but the Security Council is doing nothing.
A world in which babies are slaughtered is not a religious world. This is not honorable and it makes me mad. When you witness things of this sort, you have a responsibility. Why is the media not covering the slaughter in Banias (Syria)? The babies dying are not only their parents, but also ours. You have to act. You have to stop these things. Society shares responsibility for this evil. There is a need for global conscience and justice. We have to see that the elements bringing us together are stronger than those that drive us apart. We have to help the poor and the weak. We cannot step on each other and remain connected to our ideals and faith.
Somewhere around this point, Erdogan took a diversion that I wasn’t able to capture tweeting but I’ll try to reproduce here. God’s justice, he said, is ever present but manifests itself at different times and places. He reminded the audience of the Koranic phrase
Bismillah al rahman al rahim
This is generally translated
In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate
But, Erdogan said, its real meaning is that God has two aspects. The first he shows to everyone on earth during their lifetimes. This is the same for everyone (most Gracious). The second is reserved for the faithful in the afterlife (most Compassionate). I’m no theologian, but this struck me as a millenarian concept rather similar to that of the raptured Christians or the Puritans’ “elect.” No ecumenism in this second aspect. Only true believers enter heaven.
I imagine some aide in the front row was figuratively urging him to move on at this point, which is what he did. Turkey will fulfill its obligations, Erdogan said. We want to see more countries concerned about Syria, where the regime does not control much of the territory but uses its weapons to fire on the population. Asad has fired hundreds of missiles and used sarin gas.
President Obama is trying to do the right thing, but what is needed is UN Security Council action, which would accelerate the process. Russia needs to step forward. Turkey will continue to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
In the Q and A, Erdogan said he would go soon to Gaza and the West Bank (he did not mention Israel). He is against war, but sometimes justice requires it. The clergy should help us avoid getting to that point by reaching across borders. An EU/US trade agreement is a fine idea, but it will need to take into account Turkey’s interests, as Turkey has a customs union with the EU. Turkey will continue to press China on respecting the rights of the Uighurs.
The session ended without questions about Kurds inside Turkey, imprisonment of journalists or other human rights violations. As questions were submitted in writing, the moderator presumably tossed those.
This is an odd duck: a religious and social conservative who has instituted vigorous free market economic reforms but also holds liberal internationalist views on the world, while ignoring those views when it comes to internal politics and human rights.
Ten things the president should be doing
Herewith my short list of ten international issues more worthy of presidential attention than the issues that are getting it this week:
- Drones: Apparently the President is preparing to address how and why he uses them soon.
- Syria: Secretary of State Kerry and the Russians are ginning up a peace conference next month, while Moscow strengthens Syrian defenses against Western intervention.
- Iraq: The Syrian war is spilling over and posing serious challenges to the country’s political cohesion.
- Egypt: President Morsi is taking the Arab world’s most populous country in economically and politically ruinous directions.
- Israel/Palestine: With the peace process moribund, the window is closing on the opportunity to reach a two-state outcome.
- Libya: The failure to establish the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force leaves open the possibility of further attacks on Americans (and on the Libyan state).
- Afghanistan: The American withdrawal is on schedule, but big questions remain about what will be left behind.
- Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif’s hat trick provides an opportunity for improved relations, if managed well.
- Iran: once its presidential election is over (first round is June 14, runoff if needed June 21), a last diplomatic effort on its nuclear ambitions will begin.
- All that Asia stuff: North Korean nukes, maritime jostling with China, Trans-Pacific Partnership, transition in Myanmar (how about trying for one in Vietnam?), Japan’s economic and military revival…
In the good old days, presidents in domestic trouble headed out on international trips. Obama doesn’t seem inclined in that direction. He really does want to limit America’s commitments abroad and restore its economy at home. Bless him. But if things get much worse, I’ll bet on a road trip.
What me worry?
I have a skeptical reaction to the current Washington scandals. The editing of the Benghazi talking points strikes me as unworthy of a news story on an inside page. Why is the Internal Revenue Service’s close scrutiny of a flood of patriotic “tea party” registrations not viewed as a rigorous effort to carry out its mandate in the face of potentially fraudulent tax exemptions? How come politicians who called for vigorous prosecution of the AP leak of information about a foiled terrorist plot are now upset that the Justice Department is pursuing the investigation with vigor?
These are not Watergate-league affairs, yet. No one has connected the President to any of them. He referred to the Benghazi incident as a terrorist attack the next day. The inspector general at the IRS found no evidence of White House involvement, even if Washington-based political appointees did know about the matter. The AP investigation is a Justice Department responsibility, from which the Attorney General recused himself because the FBI had at one point questioned him as a possible source of the leak.
The IRS affair is potentially the most serious of these scandals. The inspector general’s report documents mismanagement in responding to a sharp increase in applications for tax exemptions from Tea Party and other right wing groups. What it does not show is whether this response was out of the ordinary. Would a sharp increase in environmental organization applications for tax exemption have triggered a similar response? No one should be unhappy to see the IRS closely scrutinizing organizations that ask for tax exemptions. I might even crack a smile to hear tea partiers suggesting that the IRS should have hired more employees if it had trouble reviewing all the applications for tax exemptions. It is is the implied political bias, still unproven, that is most disturbing.
Massaging of talking points is a bureaucratic art unworthy of serious attention. Susan Rice should have known better than to use them.
The AP leak is troubling mainly because a government investigation of this sort could have a chilling effect on confidential sources for journalists. But I confess to surprise that confidential informants are still using telephones to spill the beans, or even to make appointments to spill the beans. And it would be best if the culprit were found.
No one is (yet) blaming the Administration for the military’s various sexual abuse scandals, which seem somehow to involve disproportionately those responsible for preventing sexual abuse. Fixing the culture from which these incidents grow will not be easy.
Yesterday’s international embarrassment came in Moscow. The Russians appear to have caught a CIA agent red-handed in an attempt to recruit a Russian agent of their Federal Security Service. Rarely does Moscow go so far as to release video of an agent with his bozotic tradecraft tools: wigs, eyeglasses, a map of Moscow. He lacked only false moustaches. This does not bode well for budding cooperation with the Russians on Syria, though it likely won’t derail their help with the withdrawal from Afghanistan or their participation in the nuclear talks with Iran.
The news media are delighted that so much is happening to embarrass the Obama administration at a time when other news is lacking. The president was already on the ropes. Gun background checks have failed in Congress, immigration reform at best is moving slowly, and the budget won’t be ripe for serious negotiation until the Feds bump up against the budget ceiling again in the fall. This is weeks later than anticipated, as revenues are running ahead of projections and the deficit falling more rapidly than anticipated. I’ll let you know when someone decides to celebrate that.
The international significance of all this is that it puts the administration off balance in dealing with foreign policy issues. A president who had convinced Congress to pass gun background checks, could be confident Congress would pass immigration reform and could hope for a budget deal would be in a stronger position internationally as well as domestically. It would be even better if the president were not defending himself from charges of downplaying terrorism, using the IRS to discomfit his domestic opponents and infringing on freedom of the press.
There are serious international questions out there requiring American leadership. Will it be possible to move ahead on a Middle East peace process that stalled in Obama’s first term? Will Russia and the US find a way to manage a political process to end the Syrian civil war? Can the administration bring to conclusion big Atlantic and Pacific trade agreements? Will Afghanistan survive the withdrawal of the Americans and their international coalition partners from combat roles? Can the administration somehow end nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran without military action?
So yes, I do worry, even if Alfred E. Neuman would advise against it.