Tag: Russia
Talk is cheap
Calls for negotiated solutions are all the rage. Secretary of State Kerry wants one in Syria. The Washington Post thinks one is possible in Bahrain. Everyone wants one for Iran. Despite several years of failure, many are still hoping for negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ditto Israel/Palestine. Asia needs them for its maritime issues.
It is a good time to remember the classic requirement for successful negotiations: “ripeness,” defined as a mutually hurting stalemate in which both parties come to the conclusion that they cannot gain without negotiations and may well lose. I might hope this condition is close to being met in Syria and Bahrain, but neither President Asad nor the Al Khalifa monarchy seems fully convinced, partly because Iran and Saudi Arabia are respectively providing unqualified support to the regimes under fire. Ripeness may well require greater external pressure: from Russia in the case of Syria and from the United States in the case of Bahrain, which hosts the US Fifth Fleet.
It is difficult to tell where things stand in the Afghanistan negotiations. While the Taliban seem uninterested, Pakistan appears readier than at times in the past. The Americans are committed to getting out of the fight by the end of 2014. President Karzai is anxious for his security forces to take over primary responsibility sooner rather than later. But are they capable of doing so, and what kind of deal are the Afghans likely to cut as the Americans leave?
Israel and Palestine have one way or another been negotiating and fighting on and off since before 1948. Objectively, there would appear to be a mutually hurting stalemate, but neither side sees it that way. Israel has the advantage of vast military superiority, which it has repeatedly used as an alternative to negotiation to get its way in the West Bank and Gaza. A settlement might end that option. The Palestinians have used asymmetric means (terrorism, rocket fire, acceptance at the UN as a non-member state, boycott) to counter and gain they regard as a viable state.
The Iran nuclear negotiations are critical, as their failure could lead not just to an American strike but also to Iranian retaliation around the world and a requirement to continue military action as Tehran rebuilds its nuclear program. The United States is trying to bring about ripeness by ratcheting up sanctions pressure on Tehran, which fears that giving up its nuclear program will put the regime at risk. It is not clear that the US is prepared to strike a bargain that ensures regime survival in exchange for limits on the nuclear program. We may know more after the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) meet with Iran February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
Asia’s conflicts have only rarely come to actual violence. China, Korea (North and South), Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and India are sparring over trade routes, islands, resources and ultimately hegemony. This risks arousing nationalist sentiments that will be hard to control, driving countries that have a good deal to gain from keeping the peace in some of the world’s fastest growing economies into wars that the regimes involved will find it difficult to back away from. Asia lacks an over-arching security structure like those in Europe (NATO, OSCE, G8, Council of Europe, etc) and has long depended on the US as a balancing force to preserve the peace. This has been a successful approach since the 1980s, but the economic rise of China has put its future in doubt, even with the Obama Administration’s much-vaunted pivot to Asia.
This is a world that really does need diplomacy. None of the current negotiations seem destined for success, though all have some at least small probability of positive outcomes. Talk really is cheap. I don’t remember anyone complaining that we had spent too much money on it, though some would argue that delay associated with negotiations has sometimes been costly. The French would say that about their recent adventure in Mali.
But war is extraordinarily expensive. Hastening to it is more often than not unwise. That is part of what put the United States into deep economic difficulty since 2003. If we want to conserve our strength for an uncertain future, we need to give talk its due.
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This week’s peace picks
1. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?. Tuesday February 19, 10:00 AM-11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC 20036
Speakers: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Thomas Pickering, Kenneth M. Pollack
After several years of increasingly punishing sanctions against its economy, there is hope that Iran is now prepared to resume negotiations with the international community to reach a solution to the ongoing nuclear standoff. Many experts fear that Iran is quickly approaching the nuclear threshold, and that 2013 could be the last chance to avoid this outcome. If the international community cannot seize that opportunity, it may be left only with much worse alternatives.
On February 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion to examine strategies for resolving the nuclear standoff. Panelists will include former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-founder of The Iran Project, who will present the organization’s latest set of recommendations for addressing the nuclear issue, and Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
Website: here
2. America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Tuesday, February 19, 1:00 PM- 3:00 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC
Speakers: Daniel Kurtzer, Willian Quandt, Shibley Telhami, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen
Please note: This event has been rescheduled for February 19th, from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m. If you plan to attend on this rescheduled date, please RSVP here.
As President Barack Obama embarks on his second term and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu builds his coalition government, many warn that time is running out for the two-state solution. On the occasion of its publication, David Ignatius will join three of the authors of ‘The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace’ and USIP’s Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen to discuss their own views on whether and why that door is closing, and what the next Obama administration can do to keep it open.
‘The Peace Puzzle’ was written by Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telhami and co-published by USIP Press and Cornell University Press. It offers a uniquely objective account and assessment of the American role in the peace process over the last two decades, concluding with 11 recommendations for the next administration to strengthen its role in resolving the conflict. While the tone of the book remains optimistic, the authors question whether the ‘determined, persistent, creative, and wise’ American diplomacy and leadership that have ushered in breakthroughs in the past can be recaptured and whether the lessons learned from two decades of failures will be embraced.
Please join us for this discussion with David Ignatius on the prospects for a breakthrough in the peace process and the lessons offered in ‘The Peace Puzzle.’
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/americas-quest-arab-israeli-peace
3. A National Security Strategy for Lebanon, Wednesday, February 20, 12:30-2:00 PM, Aspen Institute
Venue: Aspen Institute, One Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 700, Washington DC 20036
This event will feature a panel of experts to explore the challenges facing Lebanon’s national security and promote actionable recommendations for a solvent national security strategy for the country going forward, especially as it relates to US-Lebanese relations, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.
Website: http://www.aspeninstitute.org/events/2013/02/20/national-security-strategy-lebanon
4. Arab Perspectives on Iran’s Role in a Changing Middle East, Thursday February 21, 10:00 AM-12:00 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Speakers: Kristin Lord, Shibley Telhami, Michele Dunne
This meeting is co-sponsored by the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the United States Institute of Peace.
While there is much talk of an ‘Arab’ view of Iran, there are in fact significantly divergent views on Tehran’s role, even among rulers in the region. Additionally, despite the Sunni-Shiite divide, Arab public views of Iran and of its regional role are far more complex than-and often at odds with-the views of their leaders. Even those Arab governments that fear Iran most and, in some cases, support American military actions to weaken Iran’s influence, differ markedly from Israel’s calculations and expectations.
Shibley Telhami will present his analysis and paper on this subject on February 21, 2012 from 10:00am to 12:00pm. This is the second in a five-part series co-sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the Wilson Center’s Middle East program on ‘The Changing Security Architecture in the Middle East.’
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/arab-perspectives-iran-s-role-in-changing-middle-east
5.Women in Combat: The Changing Roles of Women in the US Military, Thursday February 21, 12:00 PM- 1:15 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Truman National Security Project & Center for National Policy- Capitol Hill Office, 1 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC, Suite 333
Speakers: Michael Breen, Kayla Wiliams, Scott Bates
On January 24th, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced the elimination of the ground combat exclusion rule for women in the military. Panetta stated his desire to move forward with a plan to eliminate all gender-based barriers to service. Join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel as they discuss the effects Secretary Panetta’s decision will have on current, and future generations of service-members, as well as which barriers will be the most challenging to overcome.
Website: http://cnponline.org/ht/display/EventDetails/i/41816
6. The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Group in Russia’s Volga Region, Thursday February 21, 3:00 PM-5:00 PM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW Washington DC 20006, Basement Level Conference Rooms A & B
Speakers: Sergey Markedonov, Gordon M. Hahn, Andrew C. Kuchins
In the two decades since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian and Western experts, human-rights activists, and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. Recent tragedies in Russia’s Volga region suggest that this sort of violence – and the Islamist terrorists who perpetrate it – may not be confined to the Caucasus. This has raised a question: how likely is it that the North Caucasus scenario will be repeated in the Volga region? Any attempt to answer this question is complicated by the variety of non-official Muslim groups of both local and international origin active there and the complex set of linkages between them.
This report sheds light on the ideological sources and resources of radicalism in the Volga region, nonofficial Islamic movements’ support among the regional population, and opportunities for the potential growth of different forms of Islamist activities. It describes the origins of different nonofficial Islamic movements as well as their post-Soviet development, ideology, and relationship with the authorities and official Muslim clergy. The report also offers practical approaches both for Russian domestic policy and for the U.S.-Russian security cooperation agenda.
Website: http://csis.org/event/rise-radical-and-nonofficial-islamic-groups-russias-volga-region
7. Tunisia: Are Economic Decline and Political Violence Prevailing?, Thursday February 21, 5:30 PM- 7:30 PM, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS-Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC, Room 812
Speakers: Mustapha Kamel Nabli, Emauele Santi, Stephen McInerney, Alexis Arieff, Daniele Moro
Mustapha Kamel Nabli, governor of the Central Bank of Tunisia and senior adviser to the World Bank chief economist; Emanuele Santi, principal country economist at Tunisia African Development Bank; Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy; Alexis Arieff, an analyst in African Affairs at Congressional Research Services; and Daniele Moro (moderator), visiting scholar in the SAIS African Studies Program, will discuss this topic.
8. The Middle East: What’s Next? With General James Mattis, Thursday, February 21, 6:00 PM- 7:30 PM, Young Professionals in Foreign Policy
Venue: Russel Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenues and 1st street, NE, Kennedy Caucus Room (SR-325)
Speakers: Gen. James N. Mattis
As the Middle East continues to undergo tectonic political, social, and economic change, the future of the U.S role in the region seems ever-more complex and uncertain. General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, will share his analysis of the ongoing impact of the Arab Spring, long term American strategy in Afghanistan, U.S.-Pakistan relations, troubles with Iran, the future of Iraq, and the shifting balance of power within the Middle East. Gen Mattis will also discuss his perspectives on what Middle Eastern issues are likely to consume the attention of the next generation of foreign policy leaders.
9. Eastern Congo: Changing Dynamics and the Implications for Peace, Friday, February 22, 10:00 Am-11:30, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC
Speakers: Raymond Gilpin, John Prendergast, Bennett Freeman, Ida Sawyer, Sasha Lezhnev
Unrest in northeastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to claim lives, disproportionately target women, fuel the illicit economy, constrain development and undermine prospects for peace. Mediation efforts by the United Nations and the DRC’s neighbors have yielded few tangible results and mistrust is rife. Major issues include the role of the M23 in the peace process, widespread gender-based violence and the resilient illicit economy (particularly in the mining sector).
The M23 rebel group was formed on 4 April 2012 when some 300 soldiers mutinied, citing poor conditions in the army and the government’s unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal. They seized control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in November 2012 and have been involved in regionally-brokered mediation efforts since being forced out in December.
On February 5, the South African government arrested a group of 19 Congolese belonging to a shadowy group called the Union of Nationalists for Renewal, who were allegedly plotting a violent coup in the DRC. This further complicates an already dire situation and injects an added sense of urgency. In light of these developments, peacebuilding in the DRC requires a nuanced assessment of conflict dynamics and creative strategies to leverage windows of opportunity.
On February 22, the U.S. Institute of Peace will convene an event on recent changes in the war in eastern Congo and their implications for peace. Panelists will share insights from recent trips to the region, examine opportunities and risks for advancing a meaningful peace process, and highlight lessons from other relevant peace processes potentially applicable to the Great Lakes.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/eastern-congo-changing-dynamics-and-the-implications-peace
10. Is there a Widening Sunni-Shia Schism?, Friday February 22, 2:00 PM- 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington DC, 20036
Speakers: Durriya Badani, Suzanne Maloney, Geneive Abdo, Bruce Riedel
An upswing in sectarian violence in Pakistan, Bahrain and elsewhere in recent months highlights the historic tensions, and contemporary political importance of schisms between Sunni and Shia communities across the Muslim world. Why is the level of violence rising and what regional and internal factors are influencing it? What are the implications for these countries should the relationship between the two sects continue to deteriorate? What role does the U.S. or other external actors play in shaping these developments and what could they do to alleviate tensions?
On February 22, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings will host a discussion to explore the factors behind this apparently worsening conflict between Sunni and Shia communities. Panelists will include Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, and Geneive Abdo, fellow at the Middle East program at the Stimson Center and author of a forthcoming Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings paper examining sectarianism in the context of the Arab Awakening. Durriya Badani, deputy director of the Project, will offer welcoming remarks. Brookings Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney will moderate the discussion.
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Keeping an eye on Asia
Trying to catch up on my Asia reading, as things are heating up there:
- The Japanese scrambled jets last week in response to a Russian violation of airspace over the Kuril Islands.
- China has been pressuring North Korea not to conduct an announced nuclear test.
- Tokyo is complaining that Chinese radar “locked on” to Japanese ships, a step generally associated with initiating an attack, in the East China Sea (where the two countries dispute sovereignty over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands).
The smart money is still betting that China and Japan won’t go to war over uninhabited islands that Japan administers but China claims. There have been recent rumblings of a possible accord between Russia and Japan on the Kurils. It is of course welcome that China should restrain its North Korean friends from defying the UN Security Council again with another nuclear test. It is unclear whether Beijing will succeed.
The US Navy, facing budget and reducing its presence in the Middle East, has found a useful “hegemon” and bully in China. In the mist of preparations for the Quadrennial Defense Review, naval advocates would like to regain at least some of the budget momentum they lost when Mitt Romney–a strong naval advocate–was defeated for the presidency.
But that doesn’t mean the needs are not real. America’s ships are vulnerable, even to Iranian never mind Chinese cruise and other missiles. Washington has a lot of obligations in Asia: to Japan, to Taiwan, the Philippines, to South Korea. It also has some relatively new friends to oblige: Vietnam and Burma in particular. It is not going to be easy to meet all the needs in a severely constrained budget environment.
Those who complain about US inattention to Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and even the Balkans need to remember how many other commitments need to be fulfilled. Asia represents an important slice of the future of world economic growth. It also represents a serious risk of armed conflict on a scale that would have global consequences. We may not all be able to pivot to Asia, but we should keep an eye on it.
And I just realized: I am in Asia today, in Antalya, Turkey. Maybe that’s why my eyes have turned east, though the East I am writing about here lies thousands of miles away. Here’s the scenery from my hotel room:
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Finitiatives
Ammar Abulhamid writes:
Not too long ago, Assad issued a “Finitiative,” that is, an initiative to end all initiatives, calling, allegedly, for dialogue with the opposition. Now, opposition leader Moaz Alkhatib has repaid Assad in kind by issuing his own “Finitiative” calling, purportedly, for dialogue with the regime. Both finitiatives were clearly designed for purposes other than those declared and were meant primarily as acts of continued defiance, even if some failed to detect the defiance involved in Alkhatib’s finitiative
….Assad’s finitiative was meant to rally troops and consolidate support and control rather than enter into any real dialogue with the opposition, Alkhatib’s came as a revolutionary act meant to break a political stalemate in the ranks of the international community and to push for a real policy to help resolve the situation in Syria in a way commensurate with the expectation of the majority of average Syrians from all communal and political backgrounds. Assad’s finitiative was, then, a defensive act, a last stand of sorts. But Alkhatib’s finitiative marked the opposition’s first real offensive on the political front.
This makes a lot of good sense to me as an interpretation of what is happening, but Khatib’s challenge is greater than Asad’s: to hold the opposition together as he undertakes his “finitiative.” The regime, so far at least, has had relatively little difficulty maintaining cohesion, at least at its core. The cracks are many. But I’ve seen some ancient vases with a lot of cracks and no real breaks.
The opposition seems less intact, because it never was united. Khatib’s initiative took at least some people by surprise, which is not a good way of maintaining support from people who might already be less inclined than desirable to follow your lead. It is still not clear whether Khatib’s move will weaken or strengthen his position, but the uncertainty is itself debilitating.
As for the international community, it still looks unlikely that a breakthrough is imminent. Despite much chest beating, Washington seems as committed as ever to not taking military action. The Russians and Iranians seem wedded to Bashar, even if they claim it isn’t true. Brahimi is active, but so far to no good effect.
The war drags on, with something like 200 civilians killed each day. Atrocities are documented but not prevented. The regime is still able to use its air force to disrupt areas outside its control. The revolutionaries are likewise able to strike in Damascus and other areas of regime dominance. Fatigue–absolutely vital to the “mutually hurting stalemate” that opens up the possibility of successful negotiation–is setting in for many. But neither the regime nor the most avid of the revolutionaries appears to have concluded that they can gain more by talking than by fighting.
A lot of people in the middle concluded that long ago. The Khatib and Asad initiatives are designed to appeal to them. But it is the guys with guns who get to determine what happens. They still seem content to battle on.
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Adagio
There is slow movement, adagio not andante, on two fronts, Syria and the Iran nuclear issue:
- Syrian opposition leader Moaz al Khatib’s proposal for conditional talks with the regime has elicited some interest on the part of Syria, Iran and Russia.
- The P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China + Germany) have agreed to meet with Iran to discuss nuclear issues February 25 in Kazakhstan. The US and Iran are indicating willingness to meet bilaterally as well.
There is no breakthrough here. These are small steps forward at the glacial pace that often characterizes diplomatic moves. But given how frozen things seemed on both fronts even a few days ago, this is progress.
On Syria, Khatib’s proposal was a personal one, made initially on his Facebook page without approval of his Coalition. It reflects in part the view of the National Coordination Committee, which is an inside Syria opposition group that has long wanted to start a dialogue with the regime. The expatriate opposition was not pleased with the proposition. My guess is that the Americans are okay with it, even though they continue to insist that Bashar al Asad step aside.
Dialogue could lead to a split in the regime between hawks who want to continue the crackdown and doves who see promise in talking with the opposition. Of course it could also lead to a similar split in the opposition, with hardline Islamists opting to continue the fighting and relative moderates interested in talking. The key issue is whether Bashar is prepared to leave power. If not, dialogue with the regime is likely to become a snare and a delusion, wrecking the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Khatib leads.
On Iran’s nuclear program, the outline of a deal is increasingly clear:
- limits on uranium enrichment (e.g., an end to Iranian enrichment above 20%, shipment out of the country of stockpile uranium enriched beyond 5%, and likely also something restricting plutonium production, which has not been much of a public issue so far);
- a serious, verifiable and irreversible commitment not to develop nuclear weapons (including “coming clean” on past nuclear weapons-related activities);
- an end to American and multilateral economic and financial sanctions.
It is the sequencing of the many steps that need to be taken to get to this result that has caused so much difficulty. The Americans and Europeans want the nuclear commitments implemented up front. The Iranians want sanctions relief first. Lack of trust makes compromise difficult, but it would not seem completely out of reach, provided Iran is prepared to make a serious and verifiable commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.
What we’ve got here are two instances of coercive diplomacy, where outside powers are bringing pressure to bear in order to end one regime and to curtail fundamentally the options available to another one. The odds of success are not high, since the regimes involved have a good deal at stake (and are allied with each other). Bashar al Asad would have to come to the conclusion that his life is worth more than his position. Tehran would have to come to the conclusion that regime survival is more likely if it accepts limits on its nuclear program than if it rejects them.
On the other side, the key ingredient is credibility.
The Americans and Europeans need to convince Bashar that they are fully committed to end his rule. To do so, they need to back more fully and visibly Khatib’s Coalition, making it a serious governing alternative to the Syrian regime. This is more important now than arms supplies, which seem to be reaching the rebellion in substantial if not overwhelming quantities.
Washington and Brussels also need to convince Tehran that they will tighten sanctions further if there is no nuclear deal. And Washington needs to make the threat of military force more credible than it appeared at former Senator Hagel’s confirmation hearing last week.
Even if talks with the Syrian regime and with the Iranians begin soon, at this pace we still have a long way to go before we can be certain of acceptable outcomes on either front. But slow movement is better than none.
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Grasping at last straws
UN Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is said to have offered the UN Security Council on Thursday a “Plan C” for Syria along the following lines:
1. Syria’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be preserved.
2. A recognition that ultimate objective is for Syrians to have a full say in the way they are governed.
3. The formation of a transition government with “full executive powers.” Brahimi says he believes that means President Bashar al Assad “would have no role in the transition.”
4. Both sides would need to be represented by broad group of opposition leaders and strong military-civilian delegation from the Syrian government.
5. Negotiations should occur outside of Syria, and conform with a timetable setting out a speedy path towards elections, constitutional reform, and a referendum. He raised the prospect of moving from a presidential system of government to a parliamentarian system.
6. He urged the U.N. Security Council to unequivocally express support for the right of each citizen in Syria “to enjoy full equality before the law irrespective of gender, religion, language or ethnicity.”
This is more a slight elaboration last June’s Geneva communiqué than it is a new plan.
The leader of the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Moaz al Khatib, appeared open to this when he let it be known that he would be prepared to meet with Syrian government representatives in one of a number of Middle East capitals, provided political prisoners were released and Syrians abroad permitted to renew their passports. His Coalition was not happy though and has instructed him not to agree to anything without their approval.
So it is no surprise that meetings of some sort will occur on the margins of the “Wehrkunde” (Munich Security) conference on Saturday involving the al Khatib, Brahimi, the Russians and the Americans. But it would be foolish to express any optimism that a political solution will be found. The disappointments–Kofi Annan’s as well as Brahimi’s–have been many.
The vital question remains whether the Russians are willing and able to push Bashar al Asad aside and open the door to a democratic transition that he does not control. There are doubts on both scores. While Moscow officials often claim they are not trying to protect Asad, President Putin seems unwilling to give him a shove. This could reflect incapacity, or at least fear of it. But I doubt that. If the Russians were to cut off arms supply, financing and diplomatic support, Bashar would be unlikely to last long. More likely, it reflects Russian unwillingness to let the transition in Syria get out of Moscow’s grasp.
While nominally there is still a debate in Washington about intervention, I am still not seeing signs that the Obama Administration is seriously considering upping its game in Syria. I suppose we really need to see the new Secretaries of State and Defense in place before we can be sure, but both have given every indication in their confirmation testimony that they are likely to be at least as cautious about U.S. military action as their predecessors. Boots on the ground have long been ruled out, but Kerry and Hagel don’t seem likely to me to go for a no fly zone or even direct U.S. military supplies.
I still hope they will however see their way to strong political and financial support for the Syrian Coalition. Al Khatib has stuck his neck out in an effort to give Brahimi something to work with. The Americans and Europeans should be helping him to preserve his leadership role by giving him the resources needed to set up a transition government that can carry out the dialogue he said he was open to. If we fail to support him, we’ll regret it. The alternatives are far more hardline. And continuation of the war in Syria is not in our interest.
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