Tag: Russia
Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe
This past Tuesday I moderated the Q and A for a Middle East Institute presentation by Baroness Valerie Amos, the UN’s Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, on “The International Response to Syria’s Humanitarian Catastrophe.” Here is the video, which is also up on the MEI website:
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Syria: is there hope?
Salon.com asked me to review recent events in Syria and their significance. They published it today under the heading “Has the Syria threat cooled?”:
Watching Syria is like looking through a kaleidoscope. The picture seems to change dramatically in response to the slightest jolt, but the components remain the same. The past week has seen lots of jolts, but no real change in the elements that make up the sad picture.
Inside Syria, the regime’s forces have started an ethnic cleansing campaign in the west intended to clear Sunnis from areas its Alawite supporters want to secure for themselves. The regime has also successfully pushed south toward the Jordanian border. In much of the rest of the country, there is lots of fighting but only marginal changes in the confrontation lines, which run through many urban areas, or between the urban centers and the countryside. Almost 7 million Syrians are now thought to need humanitarian assistance. The number could rise dramatically during the rest of the year.
Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow this week revived, once again, hopes for a negotiated settlement. He and the Russians agreed to try to convene a conference, even before the end of the month, that would include both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime. The prospect of this conference will relieve President Obama of any need for a quick decision on unilateral action in Syria, since it would hardly be appropriate to preempt the conference. That is likely what both the Russians and the Americans wanted: more time.
Pressure had been building for action, including possible direct American shipment of arms to the opposition, safe areas for displaced people, a no-fly zone, or an attack on Syria’s air force and missiles, which are being used against civilians. Evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons put President Obama on the spot, as he has several times said that crossing this red line would change his calculus. American credibility, some thought, was at stake.
The ink was barely dry on the allegation of chemical weapons use when Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a U.N. human rights inquiry for Libya, suggested that she knew of evidence that chemical weapons were used by the opposition rather than the regime. This allegation has little credibility, not only because of the technical difficulties involved but also because Del Ponte has a record of sensational allegations that are difficult to prove (or disprove).
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Syria: conference time
Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow has yielded a proposal for a Syria “peace conference,” to be held as early as the end of this month. This is significant in at least two ways:
- the Russians and Americans both still prefer a negotiated transition (often misleadingly referred to in the press as a “peaceful” one);
- any dramatic increase in US assistance to the Syrian opposition will likely have to wait until the conference is held, or proves to be a mirage.
What are the prospects for success of this initiative? Not good unless Moscow and Washington are prepared not only to convene the event but also strongarm their respective friends (the regime and the opposition) into attending and settling. I am reminded of the interminable series of conferences on Yugoslavia that the European Community, as it was then known, convened in the early 1990s. The warring parties all showed up, if I remember correctly. But little was accomplished on the main issues until the Americans twisted President Izetbegovic’s arm at Dayton, compelling him to accept a peace agreement he thought unjust.
The main issue in the Syria conflict is power: who will control the government in Damascus? Russia and the United States a year ago agreed to a transition in which power would be delegated to a government with representation of both the Asad regime and the opposition. The American view is that this means Bashar al Asad would give up all power (and presumably opt to leave the country). The Russian view is that Bashar can stay and maybe even run in an election.
Sharp as this contrast is, the Americans and Russians have some common interests. Neither wants to see a victory for Sunni extremists. Both would want any opposition representation in a transition government to be predominantly moderate. Moscow and Washington will be particularly keen to emarginate Jabhat al Nusra, the Al Qaeda in Iraq affiliate that has established itself as a leader in the opposition fight against the Asad regime. Neither the Americans nor the Russians will want to see a post-Asad massacre of Syria’s Alawites and Christians, some of whom have been mainstays of the Asad regime. The Russians will want to maintain their port access in Syria. The Americans should be able to live with that. The Americans will want a more or less democratic outcome. The Russians will be able to live with that, so long as it does not open the door to haven for extremists who mount insurgencies in Russia’s Muslim-populated territories.
What would cause the regime and the opposition to agree to a negotiated settlement?
The opposition is having serious difficulties on the battlefield. Its fragmented forces are able to “clear” some countryside areas and parts of towns, but they are unable to “hold” and “build.” With 6.8 million Syrians now in need of humanitarian relief according to the UN, the opposition is simply overwhelmed. Air and artillery attacks on “liberated” areas make it impossible to meet the needs of non-fighting citizens. The regime intentionally targets hospitals, schools and bakeries, in an effort to demoralize people and get them to expel the rebel fighters. All the (necessarily non-extremist) opposition Syrians I’ve met from inside Syria support the idea of negotiating with the regime. In the parlance of conflict management, the secularists and moderate Islamists perceive the situation as “a mutually hurting stalemate” in which neither side can gain from continued fighting. The situation is therefore “ripe.”
The regime is less inclined to see things that way. It still has ample Russian and Iranian support. It is able to deliver humanitarian assistance to much of the territory it still controls. Valerie Amos, the UN’s humanitarian chief, noted yesterday at a Middle East Institute event that some opposition family members move to government-controlled areas when their (mostly) men go off to fight against the regime, because they are safer and food is more available. The Syrian army is exhausted, but the elite forces that do most of the fighting are not flagging, as they are mostly Alawite and view this struggle as an existential one.
So we do not have here a “mutually hurting stalemate,” even if some on one side perceive the situation as ripe (and likely many citizens sitting on the fence would too). Nor do we have a sense on both sides of a “way out.” Much of the opposition may be willing to talk, but they don’t want a negotiated solution that leaves Bashar al Assad in place. The regime stalwarts see no negotiated solution without him.
If you want a negotiated solution, which Moscow and Washington both prefer because it will give them more control over who gains power, what you’ve got to do is get the regime to perceive it cannot gain from continuing the fighting while not giving the opposition so much encouragement that it decides to continue. There are many ways Washington and Moscow can do this. But we’ll save the options for another day. We’ll also need to discuss who speaks for the opposition and for the regime, which is a non-trivial issue that will need to be resolved before any conference has a chance of success.
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Still the beginning
A lot of the news today about Syria is not only about Syria. Keeping your eye on Syria means watching:
- Russia: Secretary Kerry will be in Moscow this week trying to close the gap with the Russians, who have not wanted a political solution that begins by requiring Bashar al Asad to step down. It would be hard to do better for Russia experts than Michelle Kelemen’s piece this morning on NPR, but I confess they did not hit hard on what I think is the best bet for Kerry. Russia and the United States share an interest in preventing an extremist Sunni takeover of Syria. The longer the violence persists, the more likely that outcome is. A concerted, UN Security Council push for a political settlement that moves definitively to a post-Asad regime would not only help the Russians save face but also provide the best chance of blocking extremists.
- Israel: The Israelis have conducted more air raids into Syria, ostensibly to stop war materiel from shipment to Hizbollah. The Syrian government, which in the past has not acknowledged Israeli attacks, denounced them on Sunday, thus providing an opportunity to claim Israel is in cahoots with Syria’s revolutionaries and also raising the odds on retaliation. It would appear the air strikes did not trigger Syria’s much-vaunted, Russian-supplied air defense system. Some say that is because the Israelis entered Syria from Lebanon. Whatever. It still suggests that Syria’s air defense capabilities are over-rated. The US should be able to do at least as well as the Israelis.
- Jordan: The Syrian border with Jordan is now largely in revolutionary hands and refugees are pouring across into a country that was already under severe internal strain from political protests and economic downturn. The UN is projecting a million Syrian refugees in Jordan by the end of the year. Many wonder whether Jordan’s monarchy can meet the challenges.
- Lebanon: Israeli entry into Syria from Lebanese airspace gives Beirut something all parties can denounce, but at the same time it illustrates all to starkly the parlous state of Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanese Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are already killing each other inside Syria. They also clash occasionally inside Lebanon. Hizbollah has made it absolutely clear that it regards preservation of the Asad regime as vital to its own existence.
- Turkey: There are already something like half a million Syrian refugees inside Turkey, which is now blocking them at the border. The Turks have wisely reached a ceasefire agreement with their own Kurdish (PKK) rebellion, thus limiting the damage Damascus can do by supporting Kurdish militants. NATO exercises at Incirlik, close to the Syrian border, were presumably scheduled some time ago, but they occurring now and signal that Turkey has backing in preventing spillover from Syria. But Turkey still faces dissent from its anti-Asad posture from its own Turkish-speaking Alevi population (second cousins to the Arabic-speaking Alawites of Syria).
- United Nations: Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a UN inquiry commission into human rights violations, suggested yesterday that it was the rebels, not the government, that had used sarin gas in Syria. The former prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal concerned with war crimes in former Yugoslavia, she has a previous record of making controversial statements that are difficult to confirm or deny. Best to wait for the UN chemical weapons experts to pronounce on the subject.
I’ll be posting later today on how the Syria crisis affects different political forces inside Iraq. Suffice it to say: the news is not good there either.
Inside Syria, the regime has been ethnically cleansing western parts of the country, presumably in preparation for making them an Alawite stronghold.
What we are seeing are developments–refugees, military exercises and operations, political maneuvering, ethnic cleansing, chemical weapons allegations–that challenge the state structures in the Levant and put many of them under severe strain. The strain is likely to get much worse, as there is little evidence of anything that would prevent a further slide. We are still at the beginning of this tragic story, not near its end.
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The Americans are coming
President Obama, bless his heart, is sending John Kerry off to Moscow next week to convince the Russians that something needs to be done about Syria’s use of chemical weapons. Yesterday’s leak that the President is considering supplying weapons directly to the opposition is presumably intended to strengthen Kerry’s hand in what must be an uphill push.
The smart money is betting the Russians won’t budge. I’m not so certain, but in any event Obama is doing the right thing to pursue them. He may eventually have to act without Russian concurrence, in order to maintain American credibilty in the eyes of the Iranian and North Korean regimes. But it would be far better reach a political accommodation that ends the Asad regime with the Russians on board, so as not to endanger their cooperation in the nuclear talks with Iran or the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Obama needs Moscow for both.
Kerry’s push could get some help from unexpected quarters. Missiles were fired yesterday at a Russian civil aircraft flying over Syria. There is no reason to believe the opposition has the capability to target aircraft at an altitude anywhere near 9000 feet. If they did, they would surely use the capability against the Syrian air force. The Russians were already busy denying that they were urging Hizbollah to withdraw from Syria. Someone in Moscow has to be scratching his head and asking if Russia is on the right side in Syria.
Russia need not change its mind and come over to the opposition. Great powers rarely do that. Russia wants to convince the world it is again a great power. A wink and a nod would suffice. That’s what Moscow did in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security Council resolution legalizing that intervention passed after the war.
The really vital interest for Russia in Syria is to avoid a Sunni extremist takeover, which Moscow fears would infect its restive Muslim population in places like Chechnya and Dagestan. Here Obama and Putin are in the same sinking boat. What they’ve done so far has increased the likelihood of an extremist takeover in Syria, not decreased it. If Russia is serious about dealing a blow against jihad in Syria, it is becoming eminently clear that Bashar al Asad is not the guy to do it.
The Russians do not believe that Asad has used chemical weapons. I trust Kerry will be going to Moscow with a gaggle of intel analysts in tow to make the case. It will not be easy. The Russians don’t trust anything we say. Our record, from the Tonkin Gulf to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, is not a great one. Let’s leave aside “Remember the Maine!”
But I think there is good reason to believe chemical weapons have been used in Syria, likely to test our reaction to their use. If we don’t react, they’ll be used a bit more, slowly erasing that (red) line in the sand.
Obama might like to just ignore the challenge, as chemical weapons are no better at killing people than conventional arms and a good deal more difficult to handle. That’s where Iran and North Korea come in. If he fails to react to Syria’s use of chemical weapons, how will he convince Tehran or Pyongyang that there is a credible threat of military action against their nuclear programs? That threat is vital to any possibility of diplomatic success with either of them.
This gloomy picture could change dramatically if Moscow decides it has bet on the wrong horse and decides to abandon Asad. It’s not likely, but it’s highly desirable. Obama and Kerry are right to try.
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The dark side is the bright side
Here is my answer to the silly Benjamin Alter and Edward Fishman “The Dark Side of Energy Independence” published in the New York Times yesterday. They consider all the bad things that could happen in producing countries if oil prices decline to $50 per barrel because of increasing US production. Let’s leave aside the improbability that such a fall would be caused by relatively high-cost US oil and gas production, or the likelihood that Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers would restrict their output to boost global prices. Sure, a fall to $50 is possible, especially in a period of slow economic growth.
Let’s instead remember that prices averaged around $60-65 per barrel as recently as 2009. In 1998, they were under $20 per barrel, having declined from nearly $100 (in today’s dollars) in 1980/81. So we have seen in the past even more dramatic oil price declines than Alter and Fishman are projecting. Did anything like the political consequences they dread come about? They predict instability in the Persian Gulf monarchies, especially Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and trouble for Vladimir Putin, who they say might turn to bullying his neighbors.
The short answer is “no.” The Persian Gulf monarchies have survived, and thrived, through many ups and downs in global oil prices. Putin has been at least as inclined to bully his neighbors (and defy the US) with oil prices high than when they were low.
More important: the United States should welcome a situation in which both the Gulf monarchies and Russia need to pay more attention to their populations’ discontents and less to where to invest the mountains of cash they are building up. Alter and Fishman acknowledge this with respect to Russia:
In the long run, of course, America would welcome a Russia that is more beholden to its people’s wishes than to fluctuations in energy markets. Washington should be under no illusions, however, that the transition to that point will be either smooth or linear, and it should prepare for turbulence along the way.
It seems to me it is Moscow that should prepare for turbulence along the way, not Washington. Manama and Riyadh should also worry.
What we should be doing is preparing for the next increase in oil prices, which is inevitable even if unpredictable. This means refilling at lower prices the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and maintaining our focus on energy conservation (especially fuel efficiency standards for cars) and non-hydrocarbon alternatives. It also means convincing Gulf producers to circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz with pipelines, including from Iraq’s southern oil fields to the north and west and across Saudi Arabia. And it means building the Keystone pipeline, with whatever safety measures are required to ensure environmental protection.
The United States has endured decades of increasing oil imports. Paying for them has weakened our position in the world and enriched antagonists. The only dark side to oil independence we should worry about is letting down our guard. I hope never again to see us pandering to Moscow or Riyadh because dependency on oil imports.
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