Tag: Russia
Should the US save Syria?
While the situation in Syria worsens and the death-toll rises, there is no consensus in Washington on whether the US should intervene to put an end to the Syrian humanitarian crisis. The McCain Institute this week launched its “Debate and Decision Series” by gathering four experts on the Middle East and US foreign policy to debate “Should the United States Save Syria?”
The “yes camp,” which supported US intervention, included Robert Kagan and Leon Wieseltier. The “no camp,” which believed US intervention would be a grave mistake, included Joshua Landis and Aaron David Miller. CNN’s Elise Labott moderated and Senator McCain’s offered a short introduction, reiterating his belief that the Syria crisis will strong affect the region.
The “Yes Camp”:
Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at Brookings’ Center on Foreign Policy, member of the Foreign Affairs Policy Board of Secretary Clinton, and a regular columnist for the Washington Post, underscored the importance of the Syrian crisis to the US. While past US interventions were motivated either by strategic interests or on humanitarian grounds, Syria is a place where strategic interests and humanitarian purposes converge. If the US does not intervene, the cost will be very high since new threats to US national security will emerge. Failed states have become breeding grounds for terrorism:
the consequence to us [the American people], directly, of Syria becoming a failed state has huge costs.
Leon Wiesletier, the editor of The New Republic, said the US cannot afford Obama’s policy of transforming the US into a “non-internationalist state.” Not only does the Syrian crisis involve US responsibility to end a deep humanitarian crisis, but lack of intervention will also put US values into question. In strategic terms,
there could be no bigger strategic blow to Iran and its allies than the overthrow of the Assad regime.
The US should intervene to overthrow of the Assad regime and stop the genocide, prevent the jihadists from winning, and arm the secular opposition.
The “No Camp”:
Joshua Landis, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and a frequent blogger on the Syrian crisis, strongly opposed US intervention on several grounds:
- America should not involve itself in what has become an ethnic war since “a new ethnic balance is taking place in the Middle East,” and it should not “pick winners especially in ethnic wars;”
- Only Syrians can save Syria from radicalization. The US failed in Iraq and Afghanistan when it tried to nation-build in those countries;
- If the US intervenes and then leaves, as in previous cases, the situation will just get messier;
- Decapitating the Assad regime now would destabilize Syria; it is not clear that earlier intervention would have avoided the current difficulties.
Aaron David Miller, former negotiator and advisor on Middle East issues in the Department of State under several administrations, said the US must realize that it cannot do everything and that it will be incapable of managing intervention in Syria. He highlighted the risks of getting itself in a crisis that might not end as planned:
there is a correlation between our miscalculated adventures and our own broken-house.
If Washington intervenes to ensure that a pro-US government emerges in Syria, this will delegitimize the new regime. The Arab Spring is legitimate because it is controlled by the Arabs themselves. Besides, Aaron said,
so much blood has flowed that it is impossible to think of a negotiated settlement now.
The Rebuttals and Conclusions:
Kagan found Landis’ argument that decapitating the Assad regime would “destabilize Syria” to be illogical since the situation is already unstable. He criticized the latter’s focus on US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan as a measure for future US failures. US history extends before 2001 and 2003; it has a “mixed record,” just as any great power does. Kagan rejected Landis’ claim that the ethnic nature of the conflict will inevitably mean American failure. US intervention in Bosnia has led to stability. Kagan claimed that doing something is better than nothing. The US should not wait till Assad deploys his chemical weapons against the Syrian people.
Wiesletier attacked Landis’ claim that the US should not get itself into a conflict that the Syrians should resolve by saying that “other powers are already in the middle:” Russia and Iran are already determining the outcome.
Landis rebutted the arguments of the “yes camp” by stating that contrary to Wiesletier’s claim that US intervention would prevent the jihadists and help advance the secular, pro-Western opposition, the US is incapable of placing whom it likes as the leaders of any new regime that will emerge. The Islamists are on top. The “Harvard-educated opposition” will not take the lead.
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What Obama should do for Syria
President Obama in an interview with The New Republic published yesterday, discussed in more explicit terms than usual how he makes foreign policy decisions. Commentary has focused on what academics are interested in: is he a realist or an idealist? I see no evidence in what he said to suggest that he should be put in exclusively either category. Dan Drezner does (“national interest and security trumps liberal values every day of the week and twice on Sundays”), but then his own editor appends a note that this is a false dichotomy. The editor is correct.
The far more interesting part of the President’s interview includes his comments on Syria:
…I have to ask, can we make a difference in that situation? Would a military intervention have an impact? How would it affect our ability to support troops who are still in Afghanistan? What would be the aftermath of our involvement on the ground? Could it trigger even worse violence or the use of chemical weapons? What offers the best prospect of a stable post-Assad regime? And how do I weigh tens of thousands who’ve been killed in Syria versus the tens of thousands who are currently being killed in the Congo?
I find the reference to Afghanistan particularly telling. What’s that about?
It’s about the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistical network that enables a substantial supply of material to U.S. forces in Afghanistan from the north (without going through Pakistan). It is also important to the withdrawal of U.S. forces and their extraordinary volume of stuff. The NDN depends on Russian cooperation, which the President clearly fears will be restricted or even ended should he take a more proactive stance on Syria.
The President’s other concerns are also valid. In particular the aftermath of military intervention is precisely what he should worry about, given the course of post-war events in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
What he does not mention, but I am certain is on his mind, is Iran. The civil war in Syria is in some ways a proxy war between the West (counting Turkey as in that category) and Iran, which is Bashar al Asad’s most important ally (more important even than Russia). The United States from this persepective is “bleeding” Iran in Syria, where Tehran is compelled to commit men and money to prop up Bashar. For Washington to commit military force in Syria would risk the loss of Russia’s support not only for the NDN but also in the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran and call into question U.S. commitment to military action against Tehran in case those talks fail. The President is keeping his powder dry while watching Iran weaken itself. That’s not a bad course of action both from a realist and an idealist perspective.
What it does not do however is explain the ineffectiveness of American civilian assistance to the Syrian opposition, amply discussed on NPR this morning:
This is absurd. The President needs to refocus his attention on the civilian side of America’s engagement with Syria. He may well be right to hesitate in using military force. But there is no excuse for failing to provide 100% support to the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Washington helped to create.
If, like me, you are wondering if the 60 Minutes interview with the President and Secretary of State Clinton provides more enlightenment, you’ll be disappointed. It’s just a hug fest.
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Masterful
Secretary of State-designate John Kerry was masterful today in his Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing. It wasn’t so much the details of what he said, but the breadth and depth. This is a guy who really knows international affairs.
His prepared statement was notable for some high points: the emphasis on the importance of American economic health in determining the country’s role abroad, the clarity about preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons and the vigor of his defense of the State Department budget. I would also note that John Kerry regards USAID, whose functions he mentioned but not its name, as an integral part of the State Department.
Then Kerry showed a lot of agility in dealing with not only the questions but also a demonstrator, expressing respect for her cries to be heard. He defended Secretary of Defense-designate Hagel’s views on getting rid of nuclear weapons, which he said was an aspiration for a world different from the one we live in today. He described his own changed view of Syria’s President Asad, whom he now hopes to see go soon.
He showed his clear commitment to maintaining the high priority Secretary Clinton has given to gender issues. He was non-committal on the Keystone pipeline, deferring to the official process under way. He was gentle with the Russians, citing their cooperation on particular issues (other than Syria). He was supportive of American anti-corruption and human rights efforts abroad. He showed he knows what is going on in Sudan’s Blue Nile and South Kordofan provinces. He parried accusations about Benghazi.
Of course part of the reason for this masterful performance is the attitude of the questioners, who showed enormous respect for their long-standing colleague. Gone was the idiot questioning of yesterday’s hearing with Secretary of State Clinton on the Benghazi murders. There was little “gotcha.” Certainly had the President nominated Susan Rice, who is far more combative, the tone if not the substance of the hearing would have been different. In a week’s time the Hagel hearing may be far more contentious, even if Hagel himself comes close to matching Kerry in knowledge and equanimity.
On Syria, Kerry advocated changing Bashar al Asad’s calculations, but he was unclear about the means to achieve that. He wants an orderly transition. The Russians appear willing, but differ on the timing and manner of Bashar’s departure. Kerry fears sectarian strife, implosion of the Syrian state and what they might mean for chemical weapons.
The Syrian opposition has not been ready to talk, Kerry said. In a sentence he struck–one of his few moments of hesitation in this long hearing–he started to say that we need to increase the ability of the opposition to do something unspecified. I’d sure like to know how that sentence was supposed to end: increase their ability to negotiate? increase their ability to strike the regime militarily? There’s a big difference. It sounded to me more like he wanted them to be more flexible on negotiations, but I’m not certain.
Kerry hit a lot of other subjects. On Afghanistan, he put his chips on a good April 2014 presidential election, which has to provide legitimacy to Karzai’s successor. Kerry wants “a metric” for stopping infiltration and attacks on Americans from Pakistani territory. He noted China is “all over” Africa (and America has to get into the game). Al Qaeda has dispersed at the urging of Osama bin Laden and is now a threat in the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb, where the solution is not only drone strikes but (unspecified) civilian efforts. We don’t like what Egyptian President Morsi says about Jews, but we need him to maintain the peace treaty with Israel. On Israel/Palestine, Kerry was cagey and refused to be drawn out, except to reiterate commitment to the two-state solution. The solution to climate change is energy policy, which will enable job growth. The “war on drugs” is ill-conceived. We need to do more on the demand side.
Here is the lengthy (four hours?) video of the hearing:
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Next steps in Syria
Many observers regard appointment of an interim government by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as a key next step in trying to supplant Bashar al Assad, who shows no signs of stepping aside. I would not ordinarily count appointment of a committee to consider the matter and report back in ten days as progress, but all things in diplomacy are relative. Maybe it is. The National Coalition reports after its most recent General Assembly meeting:
The General Assembly of [the] coalition agreed to form a committee to communicate with political and revolutionary forces inside Syria, and with international organizations and governments to assure support for the interim government. The chair of this committee is Mr. Ahmed Maaz Al-Khateeb, president of the National Coalition Syrian, and includes Mr. George Sabra, Mr. Mustafa Sabbagh, Professor Bourhan Galion, Dr. Ahmed Syed Yusuf and Mr. Ahmed Al-Jerba. The Committee was asked to complete its mission in 10 days and send a report to the General Assembly. A decision to form the interim government will be made then.
Obviously appointment of the interim government is not proving easy. It can’t be, since it will determine an initial distribution of power that may be hard to overturn. The luminaries named to the committee are key leaders of various opposition efforts, past and present. They are also notably all male.
But the idea of consulting before acting is not a bad one. One of the supposed advantages of the National Coalition over the previous umbrella opposition organization, the Syrian National Council, is its connections to the revolutionary forces inside Syria. If an interim government fails to acquire legitimacy there, including with the Free Syrian Army factions, it won’t be worth much.
Where progress is even less evident is in Washington. There are lots of ideas being put forward for more vigorous action on Syria. Here’s my informal tally sheet:
- Use the Patriot missile batteries in Turkey to enforce a no-fly zone inside Syria along the border.
- Send U.S. military and intelligence equipment and/or training to the opposition.
- Outreach to Alawites and other minorities, to compensate for Sunni domination of the Coalition.
- Intensified engagement with the Russians to convince them to abandon Assad.
- Increase assistance to local liberated communities, especially those willing to help find and neutralize chemical weapons.
- Deploy air and other military assets prepared to strike or seize chemical weapons depots.
But if President Obama is seriously considering any of these, he did not give a hint of it in his Inauguration speech. Nor did I detect any sign of it meeting last week with Syria-focused people in the U.S. government.
The Russians though have begun to evacuate some of their citizens. This is a preliminary signal. A more definitive one would be closing of the Embassy in Damascus. Tehran is also sounding alarmed, and Bashar’s mother is thought to have left Damascus.
The regime still shows no sign of crumbling, only cracking. The opposition reports today the defection of 450 soldiers, but high-level defections (especially of key Alawite officers) are few and far between. A stalemate seems to be emerging. A “mutually hurting stalemate” is precisely the precondition for a negotiated outcome. A good negotiated outcome would be one in which Bashar al Asad steps aside and the regime gives up power, not one in which it is given another lease on murdering Syrians. UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is presumably hard at work trying to get to yes on that.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testifies today in both the Senate and the House on the Benghazi attack in September that killed the American ambassador to Libya and three of his colleagues. She has reason to be relieved that Syria is not the focus, since the Administration has so far failed in its indirect efforts to collapse the Asad regime. Maybe tomorrow’s Senate confirmation hearing for Senator John Kerry will provide an opportunity for questioning about that. Or is the American political class going to skip altogether opportunities to examine whether we could, and should, be doing more to stop a slaughter that has now taken more than 65,000 lives?
PS: The Benghazi incident evoked this rather trenchant response from the Secretary this morning:
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Peace picks this week
A light week after the Inauguration, with back-to-back discussions Thursday of the Israeli elections:
1. Legacies of a Lost Empire: Unresolved Territorial and Identity Problems in the Post-Soviet Era
Date and Time: Tuesday, January 22 / 12:00pm – 1:00pm
Address: Woodrow Wilson Center
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speaker: Pilar Bonet (Chief Correspondent in Moscow, in charge of the Russian Federation, CIS countries, and Georgia, El País)
Description: More than twenty years after the collapse of the USSR, a number of frozen conflicts dating from the collapse persist to this day. They endure as hostages to geostrategic thinking, and are fueled by ethnic and identity contestation on the ground. Pilar Bonet, Chief Correspondent, Moscow, El Pais, former Title VIII-supported Research Scholar and Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar has covered many of these conflicts, and will concentrate her discussion on the cases of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.
Register for this event here: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/legacies-lost-empire-unresolved-territorial-and-identity-problems-the-post-soviet-era
2. Libya: A State in Search of Itself
Date and Time: Thursday, January 24, 2013
6:30 PM – 7:45 PM
Address: Lindner Family Commons, Room 602 , 1957 E Street NW
Speakers: Mary-Jane Deeb (Chief, African and Middle Eastern Division, Library of Congress), Karim Mezran (Senior Fellow, Rafiq Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council)
Moderator: Ambassador Edward Skip Gnehm, Director, Middle East Policy Forum
Description: Despite successful parliamentary elections in July 2012, Libya faces numerous obstacles to state development. Rife with internal divisions and regional tensions, Libya struggles to achieve national cohesion and advance the political process. Moreover, the country’s fractious and divisive political environment inhibits institution building and complicates efforts to restore internal security. In light of Libya’s institutional and security challenges, the panelists will discuss current developments and prospects for Libya’s political future.
Register for this event here: https://docs.google.com/a/aucegypt.edu/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dFJiRVdla1I1R2k2NE53NUYyaEhnc0E6MQ
3. The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?
Date and Time: January 24, 2013, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM
Address: Brookings Institution, Saul/Zilkha Rooms
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Speakers: Martin S. Indyk and Natan B. Sachs
Moderated by: Daniel L. Byman
Description: Israelis head to the polls next week, just one day after President Barack Obama’s second inauguration as the peace process remains stalled and changes sweeping the Arab world introduce new challenges for Israel. The tense relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, the projected winner of next week’s elections, raises questions as to how the two countries will cooperate in dealing with these challenges, and others, including Iran’s nuclear program. What do the election results tell us about Israel’s trajectory in the coming years? How will the United States and the region react to a new Israeli government? On January 24, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion on the election outcomes and their meaning for Israeli domestic and foreign policy and for the incoming Israeli government’s relationship with the United States. Panelists will include Brookings Fellow Natan Sachs, who has spent the last four weeks in Israel observing the election campaign, and Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings and former U.S. ambassador to Israel. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, Saban Center Research Director, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
Register for this event through sending an email to: events@brookings.edu
5. Elections in Israel
Date and Tme: Thursday, January 24, 2013 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM
Address: Lindner Family Commons, Room 602 1957 E Street NW
Speakers:Yoram Peri (Abraham S. and Jack Kay Chair in Israel Studies, University of Maryland) , Ilan Peleg (Charles A. Dana Professor of Government & Law, Lafayette College) , Gershon Shafir (Professor of Sociology, University of California, San Diego), Jonathan Rynhold (Schusterman Visiting Professor in Israel Studies, GW)
Moderated by: Marc Lynch
Description: Three leading political scientists will discuss the outcomes and implications of Israel’s January 2013 parliamentary elections.
Register for this event here: http://tinyurl.com/cqzscq3
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The Iran nuclear cliff
It isn’t often that Washington reaches a consensus on Iran, but that seems to be what is happening. Patrick Clawson urges a generous offer to Iran, to test definitively whether a deal stopping it short of nuclear weapons can be reached. Suzanne Maloney sees 2013 as the make or break year:
Dennis Ross, Trita Parsi, and Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett had long ago come to the conclusion a big package was needed to woo Tehran from its nuclear ambitions, from widely varying premises.
2013 is the make or break year for the same reason we faced a “fiscal cliff” crisis at the end of the last Congress: Washington has set itself up for a big decision. Either we get a deal that prevents Iran from getting nuclear weapons, or the Administration (with ample Congressional support) has committed the United States to go to war. Suzanne is surely correct that the American people are not “there” yet, but I see that as a good thing: it gives the Administration maximum negotiating leeway. Maximum but not infinite: Congress (Democrats and Republicans) will have to lift sanctions if a deal is reached. It won’t happen unless the majority is satisfied that the deal blocks Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.
International Atomic Energy Agency officials are in Tehran today trying to gain access to an Iranian site thought to have been used in the past for nuclear weapons research. The Americans regard Iran coming clean on those activities as vital to any deal that lets Iran off the sanctions hook. It is unlikely we’ll have a quick answer to the many questions about Iran’s past activities, but the talks today are important to opening the door.
At the same time, the P5+1 (5 permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) are haggling with Tehran over a date to continue the political-level nuclear talks, which are supposed to convene this month. The main issue seems to be whether sanctions relief will be on the agenda. The Americans in particular have wanted to reserve all but the smallest sanctions relief (parts for aircraft) for later on, after seeing real progress on nuclear questions. The Iranians want sanctions relief up front.
The emerging consensus in Washington in favor of a big package to test Iran’s intentions and reach a definitive conclusion could end years of uncertainty and haggling. But it also raises the very real possibility of going over the Iran nuclear cliff to war.
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