Tag: Russia
The street called straight
It would be a mistake for anyone to extrapolate from the current situation in Syria to an outcome. It is, after all, in Damascus that the once main street (الشارع المستقيم) is only called straight. But we are now approaching a denouement, however many more deviations may still occur.
The indicators are both internal and external. You know your regime is in trouble when you can’t get to the capital’s main airport without going through rebel checkpoints, most of the border crossing points with Turkey and several important northern army bases are also in insurgent hands and the revolutionaries have grounded or destroyed something like 100 of your air force’s planes and helicopters. It’s also trouble when the Americans start talking about the consequences if you use weapons of mass destruction and Jim Dobbins publishes a piece in the Financial Times suggesting ways in which intervention could be justified. UN Envoy Brahimi’s recent tête-à-têtewith the Russian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State should also give you pause.
Washington and Moscow are now concluding that they really do share a common interest in preventing a radical Islamist takeover in Syria. It’s about time. Moscow has been unwise to continue to bank on Bashar al Asad as a bulwark against Sunni extremism. Washington has been unwise to think it could steer the revolution in Syria in a democratic direction without making any major commitment in arms or military action. If they can find common cause now, they may still have time and influence enough to prevent the worst from happening.
Pretty much the only important political document Moscow and Washington have agreed on since the Syria rebellion began is last June’s “action group” communiqué. That will be at least part of the basis for the current talks. It foresees a Syrian state that
• Is genuinely democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also means that the commitment to multi-party democracy must be a lasting one, going beyond an initial round of elections.
• Complies with international standards on human rights, the independence of the judiciary, accountability of those in government and the rule of law. It is not enough just to enunciate such a commitment. There must be mechanisms available to the people to ensure that these commitments are kept by those in authority.
• Offers equal opportunities and chances for all. There is no room for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.
How to get there from here is hard to picture, but the goal is admirably clear. The action group statement is also admirably clear on the steps to be taken to achieve a transition to such a state:
• The establishment of a transitional governing body which can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place. That means that the transitional governing body would exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent.
• It is for the Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All groups and segments of society in Syria must be enabled to participate in a National Dialogue process. That process must not only be inclusive, it must also be meaningful—that is to say, its key outcomes must be implemented.
• On this basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the legal system. The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular approval.
• Once the new constitutional order is established, it is necessary to prepare for and conduct free and fair multi-party elections for the new institutions and offices that have been established.
• Women must be fully represented in all aspects of the transition.
It is that first step in the process that is both crucial and problematic: the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers. What this suggests is an interim government fully empowered even with Bashar al Asad still in Damascus, as this “action group” transition plan makes no reference to his stepping aside (a key demand of the Syrian opposition and source of friction between Washington and Moscow). This is not only hard to picture, but so far as I am aware has never been successfully attempted in the past. I asked a knowledgeable person recently: he could not think of an example. The best I can come up with is the current coalition arrangements in Zimbabwe, where President Mugabe is still in place but a good deal of governing authority is in opposition hands. That is not an encouraging precedent.
There are other problems with the idea of a negotiated transition. Jebhat al Nusra, the Al Qaeda in Iraq franchise that operates in Syria, will not be interested in one. They have two strong points: lots of weapons and a reputation for fighting the regime (and avoiding exploitation of the population) that appears unequaled. It will be hard for the Washington-favored Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces to compete with the more radical Sunni extremists who have been in the vanguard of the fight against Asad, using weapons paid for by wealthy Saudis and Qataris.
One thing might level the playing field: an international intervention force, which the UN is just beginning to think about. That is what was lacking in Libya, allowing extremists a much freer hand there than has been healthy either for American diplomats or the political transition. But who would be willing to send troops into Syria at the end of this horrendous civil war, when revenge killing, the struggle for power and disorder will be at their peak? Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been willing to pump money and arms to their favorites, but they are hardly suitable as impartial peacekeepers. Turkey and Iran are viewed as protagonists within Syria, the former in favor of the rebellion and the latter against it. Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Tunisia are hardly in a position to embark on a difficult foreign venture. Europe and the United States do not want their own boots on the ground and will oppose Russian and Chinese troops in Syria.
As it has from the beginning, Syria poses far more problems than the international system can answer. The guys with guns will control the transition in Syria, with consequences that could take the country far from the democratic transition that the action group would prefer. Moscow and Washington will need to cooperate and exert a lot of influence to prevent that from happening.
PS: Having violated my general rule of always reading Mike Eisenstadt before publishing, the best I can do now is cite his piece on what a hard fall might look like.
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Consequences
The NBC report that Bashar al Asad is preparing chemical weapons for use has generated a contradictory response: President Obama, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen have all warned there will be consequences. My Twitterfeed concurs that use of chemical weapons would be “suicidal” for Bashar.
But there is little that can be done once these weapons are out of their storage sites and loaded on airplanes or missiles, as the report ambiguously suggests might be the case. The numbers of troops required to secure the Syrian chemical weapons stocks is on the order of 75,000. It is clear enough that U.S. troops have not yet been deployed in these numbers anywhere near Syria in preparation for their seizure.
That wouldn’t be a sufficient or appropriate response in any event. It would put a substantial number of American troops in harm’s way without any guarantee of success. So what might we be thinking of doing?
My guess–but it is only that–is regime decapitation. Any order to use chemical weapons will have to come from the top. If the Americans have done nothing else in the almost two years of killing, they should at least have discovered Bashar’s hiding places. Using cruise missiles, the U.S. can destroy dozens of sites with extraordinary precision. Whether or not Bashar himself is hit (remember how many times we missed Qaddafi?), his ability to continue in command is likely to be severely degraded, as they say.
Another thought is to pour arms into the revolutionary forces in the hope that they will be able to seize the remaining chemical weapons. But without specialized training and equipment, that really would be a suicidal course of action. It is far more likely that chemical weapons will scare a large part of the population out of Syria, creating enormous problems for its neighbors, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan.
The problem with either proposition is that we have no idea what would come next. Decapitation would precipitate a rush both within the regime and from the outside to try to seize control of the state apparatus. The most likely winners are guys with lots of guns. That includes the Syrian security forces as well as the more heavily armed and capable revolutionaries, who come from the Sunni Islamist end of the political spectrum. If neither wins a definitive victory, the civil war would intensify, with terrible consequences both inside Syria and in the region. There is a real risk that punishing Asad will generate an outcome even more inimical to U.S. interests.
There is still a real possibility that reports of imminent chemical weapons use are false or exaggerated. But if they are true, someone had better be thinking of a better idea than I’ve had about what “consequences” are appropriate, feasible and productive. Bashar al Asad and lots of other autocrats will notice if he uses chemical weapons and there is no reaction. That would further undermine U.S. and NATO credibility, which is already at a perigee.
There is a report today that the Russians and Americans are meeting hastily to discuss Syrian chemical weapons. If the possibility of their use pushes Washington and Moscow together to a political solution, that would be a really good outcome for all concerned, except Bashar al Asad and his regime.
PS: Ambassador Ford says it is above his paygrade to decide what is to be done in the event Syrian uses chemical weapons. Certainly the implication of American military action is strong.
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This week’s peace picks
It’s a relatively light week for foreign policy events with all eyes focused on the US elections.
1. Political Shiism in the Arab World: Rituals, Ideologies, and Politics, Monday November 5, 9:00 AM – 11:30 AM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Arlington Campus, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 2201, Truland Building, Room 555
Speakers: Jana al Horr, Solon Simmons, Terrence Lyons
Researchers and experts on Arab politics have often debated the role of political Shiism as a source of regional instability and conflict following the 2003 U.S-Iraq war. Some argue that the expansion of political Shiism in the Arab world is a quest for political leadership resulting from a long-standing conflict with Sunnis, coupled with centuries of Shiite political and economic marginalization. Other argue that political Shiism holds revolutionary elements that can be re-interpreted to fit any political context that Shiites perceive as threatening. This view perceives that Shiite religious elements can be made to fit the current needs of various political contexts and are the main drivers of political mobilization and ultimately conflict. Both these views offer a narrow and restricted description of political Shiism; hence, the literature on political Shiism lacks a systematic understanding of the phenomenon. To address this gap, the research asks the following questions: (1) What is political Shiism? Is it monolithic? What are its forms? And who are its ideologues?; and (2) How do Arab Shiites mobilize for political protests?
In order to answer these questions, the research provides an examination of rituals, ideologies, and speeches of political Shiism embedded in the historical and geographical context of the Arab region in specific, and the Middle East in general, during the last century. Following a combination of methodological approaches, the research will first examine the centrality of Ashura rituals and celebrations in political Shiism; second, the research will explore the plurality of political Shiism thought in the twentieth, its progression from quietism to activism, and the influence of regional politics on its development; third, through analyzing current speeches of Shiite leaders in Lebanon and Iraq, the research will shed light on contemporary political Shiism language, its themes that mobilize the masses, and its connection to past ideologues previously examined.
The research seeks to extend the debate over the forces of mobilization of political Shiism, and contribute to a more constructive and coherent understanding of Shiite political actions in the Arab world. It confirms that the transformation of political Shiism from quietism to activism can be traced back socio-political changes that occurred in the early twentieth century. Additionally, it identifies how conflict associated with political Shiism is not linked to the Sunni-Shiite schism. Instead, the divide between the Arab world and the West is at the heart of political Shiism. Furthermore, the research highlights the importance of Ashura in political Shiism, but it is the rituals coupled with local and regional political events that create mobilization.
One important contribution of the dissertation is that it offers an inside descriptive look into the formation of political Shiism, its main ideologues, and issues that distinguish political Shiism as one of the main forces for political mobilization in the Arab world. The research aims at providing a broader understanding of political Shiism to address the gaps that exist in the current literature, and offer a new way of thinking about this rising religio-political phenomenon.
2. The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in the Arab World, Monday November 5, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steven Heydemann, Robert Perito, Querine Hanlon, Daniel Brumberg, Manal Omar
If the first season of the “Arab Uprisings” brought hope, the second season has illustrated many hard challenges, not least of which is restructuring the military, policy and intelligence services of Arab states. Even in Tunisia, where the military played a crucial role in supporting the “Jasmine Revolution,” the ultimate loyalty of the security services remains an open question. To examine this issue, USIP will convene a panel of experts on Monday, November 5, 2012 from 9:30am-11:30am to discuss the institutional, economic and political challenges posed by the quest to remake security sectors into allies of pluralistic democratic change. Please join us for what promises to be a revealing and provocative discussion.
Register for this event here.
3. Turkey in the Middle East: Role, Influence, and Challenges, Monday November 5, 6:00 PM – 7:15 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: Omer Taspinar, Bulent Aliriza, Edward Skip Gnehm
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, Turkey is a major player in the Middle East. Turkey’s active involvement in the Syrian crisis, rivalry with Iran, and outspoken advocacy of Palestinian statehood place Turkey at the center of regional events. The panelists will examine Turkey’s rising role in the region, addressing regional opportunities as well as domestic politics.
Register for this event here.
4. Aiding Conflict: The Impact of U.S. Food Aid on Civil War, Tuesday November 6, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, Hall of Government, 2115 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Kendrick Seminar Room, Room 321
Speaker: Nathan Nunn
This paper examines the effect of U.S. food aid on conflict in recipient countries. To establish a causal relationship, we exploit time variation in food aid caused by fluctuations in U.S. wheat production together with cross-sectional variation in a countrys tendency to receive any food aid from the United States. Our estimates show that an increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence, onset and duration of civil conflicts in recipient countries. Our results suggest that the effects are larger for smaller scale civil conflicts. No effect is found on interstate warfare.
Register for this event here.
5. Post-Election Day Analysis – What Happened and What Comes Next?, Wednesday November 7, 10:00 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Attendance by webcast only.
Speaker: Benjamin Wittes, William A. Galston, Robert Kagan, Thomas E. Mann, Isabel V. Sawhill
This year’s presidential and congressional elections are likely to be close—perhaps very close. They will have a profound impact on the nation’s future course in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres. The outcome of the November 6 election will raise important policy and political questions: What was key to the winning presidential candidate’s success, and what do the results reveal about the 2012 American electorate? In what direction will the new administration take the nation? What might a lame duck Obama administration and Congress look like—and how will the negotiations over the fiscal cliff proceed? What will be the congressional dynamics? What are the incoming administration’s policy prospects during the 113th Congress? And what are the consequences for U.S. foreign policy?
On November 7, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will host a final forum analyzing the election’s outcomes and how these results will affect the policy agenda of the next administration and Congress. Panelists will discuss the approach of the incoming administration, the political makeup of the new 113th Congress and the prospect for policy breakthroughs on key social, fiscal and foreign policy issues.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience. Participants may follow the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag #BI2012.
6. Syria: The Path Ahead, Thursday November 8, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Room
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Michael Doran, Salman Shaikh
As the Syrian conflict approaches its twentieth month, fears are mounting that Bashar al-Assad’s regime may stay in power or that Syria will collapse into sectarian war. An enduring conflict in Syria will have far-reaching consequences for the region, could threaten key U.S. partners, and may require urgent decisions. Has the struggle for democracy in Syria been lost? Is there more the United States could do to influence events there? What steps could the international community take to prevent strife and sectarianism from spreading throughout the region?
On November 8, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will explore these and other questions about the conflict in Syria. Panelists Mike Doran, the Roger Hertog senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Director of the Brookings Doha Center Salman Shaikh, appearing by video conference, will discuss policy options for the U.S. and international community, with a focus on Shaikh’s recently authored paper, “Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It).” Daniel L. Byman, senior fellow and research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will moderate the discussion.
Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #SavingSyria. After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.
Register for this event here.
7. Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, Conciliation, Thursday November 8, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs
Venue: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University, 3307 M Street, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200
Speakers: Eric Patterson, Timothy Shah, John P. Gallagher
Why don’t wars “end well?” From Rwanda to Colombia to Afghanistan, it seems that modern wars drag on and on, with terrible costs for civilians and their neighbors. In his new book, Ending Wars Well, Berkley Center Senior Research Fellow Eric Patterson argues that just war principles can provide a framework for bringing wars to modest yet enduring conclusions. More specifically, he criticizes grandiose peace schemes that are not rooted in the realities of security and political order. In contrast, he proposes a model that begins with investment in Order as a practical and moral imperative. This provides a foundation for Justice (e.g. punishment, restitution) and Conciliation in unique situations.
Patterson uses Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, East Timor, the Camp David Accords, and the US Civil War as test cases for this model. The Berkley Center’s Timothy Samuel Shah will moderate Patterson’s discussion with LtCol John Gallagher, a former West Point professor and current staff officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Register for this event here.
8. Anti-Extremism Laws in Russia, Pakistan, and China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Thursday November 8, 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM, Freedom House
Venue: Freedom House 1301 Connecticut Ave. NW 4th Floor Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: David Kramer, Virab Khachatryan, Peter Roudik, Aleksandr Verhovsky, Laney Zhang
Freedom House is pleased to host a roundtable with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on the anti-extremism legal frameworks in China, Pakistan, and Russia. Moderated by Freedom House President David Kramer, the on-the-record roundtable will provide an opportunity for participants to engage experts and authors of The Law Library of Congress’s report Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism. The participants will compare and contrast the differing approaches to anti-extremism laws in China, Pakistan, and Russia. The round table comes at an important time as repressive regimes are developing anti-extremism laws and implementing them in broad terms to suppress criticism.
Register for this event here.
9. Afghanistan 2014: What Happens Next? A Discussion with the Former Ambassador of Afghanistan Said Tayeb Jawad, Thursday November 8, 7:30 PM – 9:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Henry Harding Auditorium, Room 213
Speaker: Said Tayeb Jawad
Delta Phi Epsilon Professional Foreign Service Sorority and the Afghan Student Association proudly present “Afghanistan 2014: What Happens Next? A Discussion with the Former Ambassador of Afghanistan, Said Tayeb Jawad.” The Ambassador will discuss the future of Afghanistan with the scheduled U.S. withdrawal and the 2014 Afghan elections.
Register for this event here.
10. Cyber as a Form of National Power, Friday November 9, 5:00 PM – 6:30 PM, Institute of World Politics
Venue: The Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Samuel Liles
Dr. Samuel Liles is an associate professor at Purdue University West Lafayette in the Computer Information Technology Department of the College of Technology where he teaches computer forensics. Dr. Liles is a faculty member with CERIAS at Purdue University. CERIAS is known as the premier multidisciplinary academic center in information security and assurance, and has produced nearly half of the PhD graduates in that field in the US over the last 15 years. Previously he was a professor in the Information Resources Management College at The National Defense University in Washington DC, and prior to that the Computer Information Technology Department at Purdue University Calumet. As a researcher his interest is in cyber warfare as a form of low intensity conflict has had him presenting to audiences world-wide. Samuel Liles completed his PhD at Purdue University primarily studying cyber conflict, issues of cyber conflict, information assurance and security, and cyber forensics.
RSVP for this event to kbridges@iwp.edu.
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Follow the money
The real difference between the candidates on foreign policy issues is not what they say they would do but what they want to fund, which ultimately affects what whoever is elected can do. The Ryan budget proposal, which Romney has said he backs, cuts international affairs spending by almost 10% in 2013 and close to a quarter by 2016 while funding a giant military buildup (on top of the buildup that has occurred since 9/11). Obama does not propose cuts to military spending, but he is trying to keep it below previously projected levels. His “international affairs” budget proposal for 2013 would keep that category more or less at current levels, taking inflation into account.
The consequences of this difference between the candidates for American foreign policy are dramatic. We are already overusing our highly competent, effective and expensive military forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, they often substituted for far cheaper, but unavailable, civilians: the military provided not only humanitarian aid, which it is required to do in “non-permissive” environments, but also development and state-building assistance. I won’t be surprised if the U.S. military (along with the paramilitary parts of CIA) now has more foreign assistance money available than USAID. The Ryan budget proposal, if adopted, would dramatically increase reliance on the U.S. military for non-military aid, statebuilding, international law enforcement and other fundamentally civilian tasks.
This is not smart. At well over $1 million per deployed soldier (counting support and infrastructure costs), the U.S. military is a fabulously expensive way of getting things done. Relying on it for civilian tasks is the international equivalent of relying on emergency rooms for routine medical care. You may get it done, but only at a far higher price than providing the same care in doctors’ offices or community clinics.
The supposedly business-savvy Governor Romney is suggesting both health care in emergency rooms and use of our armed forces when civilians might suffice. Moreover, experience indicates that the existence of a strong military instrument without equally strong civilian instruments will get us into wars that we might otherwise avoid: need I mention Iraq? If anyone doubts whether our military has been thinking ahead to Iran, this map should be instructive:
I do not mean to suggest, as many of those publishing this map do, that we would be better off without these military installations. Clearly they lend credibility to the threat of force that will be essential if ever there is a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. And if diplomacy fails, the military option needs to be on the table.
But it is hard for me to imagine that we spend more 1 one-thousandth of the cost of these bases on the diplomatic effort with Iran. We may in fact spend significantly less. That means that a 1 one-thousandth chance of a diplomatic solution is worth pursuing. I would put the real odds of diplomatic success at more like 50/50 or maybe 25/75. Someone on the right might say the odds are 1/10. But what Ryan and Romney are proposing is that we cut the diplomatic effort and increase the military push. Does that make financial sense?
I hasten to note that Romney has also made some sensible proposals to use American foreign assistance money more effectively by focusing on rule of law and establishing conditions for successful private initiative. The trouble is there won’t be any money in the government kitty to do those things if he is elected and the Ryan budget adopted.
Iran is the odd problem these days. It may require a military solution, but that is unusual. China as a currency manipulator does not. Even Russia as a geopolitical threat, if you think it one, requires diplomacy more than military mobilization. George W. Bush, no retiring violet, did not try to respond militarily to Russia when it went to war with Georgia, a country he wanted to get into NATO. The list of problems not amenable to military solution is long: Pakistan’s drift toward extremism, Afghanistan’s corrupt government, the stalled Middle East peace process. It is striking that the international community is busy mobilizing an exclusively military response to Islamist extremism in Mali, where a more balanced approach that emphasizes local community economic development would be far more likely to succeed.
I know it won’t happen, but this is what the two candidates should be asked at the debate: given the strains on the U.S. military, what would you do to strengthen America’s civilian instruments of foreign policy and how are those priorities reflected in your budget proposals?
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How do you say fast and furious in Arabic?
I’m surprised the American-imposed limits on arms transfers to the Syrian opposition from Qatar and Saudi Arabia are front page news today in the New York Times. It has been common knowledge for some time that the United States does not want shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons (man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS) transferred to Syrian rebels. Anti-tank weapons are likewise blocked.
I thought it obvious why. But apparently not, so let’s review the merits of the case. These weapons pose a serious threat to commercial aircraft and other civilian targets. Washington does not want to transfer weapons that fall into extremist hands and are then used against Americans. “Fast and furious” comes to mind–the scandal surrounding a transfer of guns to Mexican drug cartels in order to track them that ended in the murder of American border patrol agent. So, too, does the Washington-sponsored mujahideen effort against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which armed radical Islamist forces that are now fighting against the Americans.
Rumint has it that there are hundreds of thousands of MANPADs already in circulation. If so, it is hard to understand how none have made it into Syria. I am told that American ones come with a difficult-to-replace 90-day battery. If effective, that would make them relatively unattractive. I don’t know whether Russian, Chinese, Iranian, British and other systems have similar immobilizing measures. There have been a number of incidents in which MANPADS have been used against civilian aircraft: in Rhodesia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Iraq. Some attempts were successful, others not. It does not take a lot of imagination to picture why officials in Washington would worry about MANPADS getting into the wrong hands.
Anti-tank weapons come in a bewildering variety, wire-guided and not. Some seem to have made their way to Syria, where the rebels have often destroyed the regime’s tanks. I have a hard time understanding why Washington would worry much about the transfer of these weapons, especially if they are already in theater. It would of course be wiser to transfer them to more reliable people, but war doesn’t allow a lot of fine distinctions to be made.
A birdie tells me that the Syrian opposition is getting all the AK-47s and other “light” weapons it needs. It is not doing them a whole lot of good. The Syrian army is using artillery, tanks, snipers and the occasional aircraft to project force far beyond the range the rebels can target effectively when they shoot back.
The real question for Washington at this point is whether to allow the Syrian opposition to get MANPADS, which it would use to enforce a de facto no-fly zone over the areas that it controls. This could level the playing field and allow the opposition to hold on to liberated areas. I haven’t been enthusiastic about the arming of the opposition, not the least because it strengthens extreme Islamist and other anti-democratic forces that should not inherit Syria from the Asad regime. But with the civic opposition yesterday demonstrating in favor of arming Free Syrian Army, it is hard to oppose a shift in Washington’s stance that would allow MANPADS with appropriate self-limiting technology and anti-tank weapons to reach it.
U.S. government officials have been insisting that they draw the line at “lethal” assistance, presumably to bolster their so far unsuccessful efforts to turn the Russians and Chinese around on Syria and allow a UN Security Council resolution with teeth to pass. But with Iran, Hizbollah and the Russians pouring arms and men into Asad’s efforts to crush the rebellion and Syria repeatedly firing artillery into the territory of NATO-member Turkey, isn’t it time to consider leveling the playing field, as the diplomats say?
If that shift takes place, we have to recognize that there is a real possibility that the weapons will some day be used us. How do you say “fast and furious” in Arabic?
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Obama’s second term international priorities
I admit to being cheered last weekend looking at the TPM Electoral Scoreboard. It has President Obama over the 270 electoral votes needed to win, counting only the states that strongly favor, favor or lean in his direction. All the toss-up states save North Carolina are showing thin margins in favor of the President. Key Senate races in Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Virginia are likewise showing small margins for the Democratic contenders. It is still a long time (and three nationally televised debates) to election day, but the drift for the moment is clear.
The President is also getting over 50 per cent approval for his handling of foreign policy. Far be it from me to want to rain on his parade, but I think he should do more and better on international issues in the future.
The President hasn’t had much to say about what he would do on foreign policy in a second term, apart from completing the U.S. turnover of security responsibility to the Afghans (as well as withdrawing more troops) and preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, preferably by diplomatic means but if necessary using force. He hasn’t said much on the Middle East peace process (such as it isn’t), maintained silence on Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s re-concentration of power, showed reluctance to do anything about Syria, hesitated to challenge China, and lacks new ideas on Pakistan and Russia.
I don’t say all this is wrong. Hesitation with China definitely beats Romney’s bellicosity, which will create the animosity we need to avoid. China has already revalued its currency significantly, something the President might want to take more credit for. It is not at all clear to me what he can do about Pakistan or Russia at this point. Maybe let them stew in its own juices for a while, until they soften up. The choices in Syria are difficult ones. Doing anything more will have real costs.
America needs, as the President never fails to say, to put its own house in order. Nation-building at home he calls it. But I would still like to know what his foreign policy priorities will be in 2013-17. The fact that Mitt Romney has failed to force Obama to specify more clearly his future foreign policy priorities is just one of the many shortcomings in a Republican campaign that will be remembered for its many unforced errors and lapses in good judgment.
But there are a few things even a convinced Obamista like me would like to see the President do or say. With no need to worry about re-election after November 6, I hope he’ll get tough with both Israelis and Palestinians. Admittedly he tried during the first term, insisting on a complete settlement freeze. But this was an ill-conceived formulation that led to intransigence on both sides rather than progress. The situation in Syria has deteriorated so badly that it may be worth another run in the Security Council at a no-fly zone. Once the Americans are down to whatever minimum numbers are required in Afghanistan, I hope Obama will find ways to toughen his stance with Pakistan. Iraq, too, needs a bit tougher love.
But none of these things comes close to the big one: avoiding a nuclear Iran and the proliferation of nuclear weapons it will precipitate. This is the overwhelming first priority, as it threatens a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East and a sharp increase in the risks of war, even nuclear war, there. Israel lacks the means to do serious and permanent damage to Iran’s nuclear program with conventional weapons, but it has all it needs to obliterate Iran with nuclear weapons.
If we fail to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, the prospects are grim. What do you think Israel is likely to do if it perceives that Iran is getting ready to launch a nuclear weapon targeted on Tel Aviv? Will it wait and see whether the Iranians are, as many people think, “rational actors”? Or will it try to ensure that none of Iran’s missiles will ever get to launch? Launch on warning, which is what the Israelis will most likely do, is inherently unstable.
Lots of my colleagues are having second looks at containment, because the prospects for conventional military action against the Iranian nuclear program look so limited. Admittedly, containment is the fallback position.
But containment with two convincing rational actors who have the better part of an hour to make decisions, the best conceivable communications with each other and no serious threat to regime survival other than a single adversary is one thing. Containment with two actors who each believe the other is irrational (both could even be right), one of whom has less than full confidence in regime survivability even without a war, maybe 10 minutes to make decisions, and no reliable communications is something else. Yes, India and Pakistan have survived almost 15 years without using nuclear weapons on each other, and the increasing trade between the two creates disincentives to war. But a nuclear exchange between the two is still far more likely than war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And we are a long way from trade between Iran and Israel as a barrier to conflict.
Andrew Sullivan, in a fit of hopefulness, comments:
To date, Obama’s response has been like Reagan’s: provide unprecedented military defense systems for Israel, deploy our best technology against Iran, inflict crippling sanctions, and yet stay prepared, as Reagan did, to deal with the first signs of sanity from Tehran. Could Obama find an Iranian Gorbachev? Unlikely. But no one expected the Soviet Union to collapse as Reagan went into his second campaign either, and it had not experienced a mass revolt in his first term, as Iran did in Obama’s. And yet by isolation, patience, allied unity, and then compromise, the unthinkable happened. I cannot say I am optimistic—but who saw the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1984?
Hope however is not a policy. What should Obama do to try to resolve the Iran nuclear issue in a second term?
The Administration has been understandably reluctant to put a serious package of incentives for Iran to forgo a nuclear weapon on the table before the U.S. election. Negotiating a deal with Iran is not going to help on November 6. But I hope after November 6 the Administration will make a direct and convincing offer to Tehran: temporary suspension of enrichment, a full accounting of past activities, tight and unfettered safeguards, no enrichment ever above 20%, no stockpiles of enriched uranium in a form that can be further enriched, and a permanent commitment not to seek nuclear weapons in exchange for full sanctions relief. That would be a policy, not a hope.
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