Tag: Russia
Finitiatives
Ammar Abulhamid writes:
Not too long ago, Assad issued a “Finitiative,” that is, an initiative to end all initiatives, calling, allegedly, for dialogue with the opposition. Now, opposition leader Moaz Alkhatib has repaid Assad in kind by issuing his own “Finitiative” calling, purportedly, for dialogue with the regime. Both finitiatives were clearly designed for purposes other than those declared and were meant primarily as acts of continued defiance, even if some failed to detect the defiance involved in Alkhatib’s finitiative
….Assad’s finitiative was meant to rally troops and consolidate support and control rather than enter into any real dialogue with the opposition, Alkhatib’s came as a revolutionary act meant to break a political stalemate in the ranks of the international community and to push for a real policy to help resolve the situation in Syria in a way commensurate with the expectation of the majority of average Syrians from all communal and political backgrounds. Assad’s finitiative was, then, a defensive act, a last stand of sorts. But Alkhatib’s finitiative marked the opposition’s first real offensive on the political front.
This makes a lot of good sense to me as an interpretation of what is happening, but Khatib’s challenge is greater than Asad’s: to hold the opposition together as he undertakes his “finitiative.” The regime, so far at least, has had relatively little difficulty maintaining cohesion, at least at its core. The cracks are many. But I’ve seen some ancient vases with a lot of cracks and no real breaks.
The opposition seems less intact, because it never was united. Khatib’s initiative took at least some people by surprise, which is not a good way of maintaining support from people who might already be less inclined than desirable to follow your lead. It is still not clear whether Khatib’s move will weaken or strengthen his position, but the uncertainty is itself debilitating.
As for the international community, it still looks unlikely that a breakthrough is imminent. Despite much chest beating, Washington seems as committed as ever to not taking military action. The Russians and Iranians seem wedded to Bashar, even if they claim it isn’t true. Brahimi is active, but so far to no good effect.
The war drags on, with something like 200 civilians killed each day. Atrocities are documented but not prevented. The regime is still able to use its air force to disrupt areas outside its control. The revolutionaries are likewise able to strike in Damascus and other areas of regime dominance. Fatigue–absolutely vital to the “mutually hurting stalemate” that opens up the possibility of successful negotiation–is setting in for many. But neither the regime nor the most avid of the revolutionaries appears to have concluded that they can gain more by talking than by fighting.
A lot of people in the middle concluded that long ago. The Khatib and Asad initiatives are designed to appeal to them. But it is the guys with guns who get to determine what happens. They still seem content to battle on.
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Adagio
There is slow movement, adagio not andante, on two fronts, Syria and the Iran nuclear issue:
- Syrian opposition leader Moaz al Khatib’s proposal for conditional talks with the regime has elicited some interest on the part of Syria, Iran and Russia.
- The P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China + Germany) have agreed to meet with Iran to discuss nuclear issues February 25 in Kazakhstan. The US and Iran are indicating willingness to meet bilaterally as well.
There is no breakthrough here. These are small steps forward at the glacial pace that often characterizes diplomatic moves. But given how frozen things seemed on both fronts even a few days ago, this is progress.
On Syria, Khatib’s proposal was a personal one, made initially on his Facebook page without approval of his Coalition. It reflects in part the view of the National Coordination Committee, which is an inside Syria opposition group that has long wanted to start a dialogue with the regime. The expatriate opposition was not pleased with the proposition. My guess is that the Americans are okay with it, even though they continue to insist that Bashar al Asad step aside.
Dialogue could lead to a split in the regime between hawks who want to continue the crackdown and doves who see promise in talking with the opposition. Of course it could also lead to a similar split in the opposition, with hardline Islamists opting to continue the fighting and relative moderates interested in talking. The key issue is whether Bashar is prepared to leave power. If not, dialogue with the regime is likely to become a snare and a delusion, wrecking the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Khatib leads.
On Iran’s nuclear program, the outline of a deal is increasingly clear:
- limits on uranium enrichment (e.g., an end to Iranian enrichment above 20%, shipment out of the country of stockpile uranium enriched beyond 5%, and likely also something restricting plutonium production, which has not been much of a public issue so far);
- a serious, verifiable and irreversible commitment not to develop nuclear weapons (including “coming clean” on past nuclear weapons-related activities);
- an end to American and multilateral economic and financial sanctions.
It is the sequencing of the many steps that need to be taken to get to this result that has caused so much difficulty. The Americans and Europeans want the nuclear commitments implemented up front. The Iranians want sanctions relief first. Lack of trust makes compromise difficult, but it would not seem completely out of reach, provided Iran is prepared to make a serious and verifiable commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.
What we’ve got here are two instances of coercive diplomacy, where outside powers are bringing pressure to bear in order to end one regime and to curtail fundamentally the options available to another one. The odds of success are not high, since the regimes involved have a good deal at stake (and are allied with each other). Bashar al Asad would have to come to the conclusion that his life is worth more than his position. Tehran would have to come to the conclusion that regime survival is more likely if it accepts limits on its nuclear program than if it rejects them.
On the other side, the key ingredient is credibility.
The Americans and Europeans need to convince Bashar that they are fully committed to end his rule. To do so, they need to back more fully and visibly Khatib’s Coalition, making it a serious governing alternative to the Syrian regime. This is more important now than arms supplies, which seem to be reaching the rebellion in substantial if not overwhelming quantities.
Washington and Brussels also need to convince Tehran that they will tighten sanctions further if there is no nuclear deal. And Washington needs to make the threat of military force more credible than it appeared at former Senator Hagel’s confirmation hearing last week.
Even if talks with the Syrian regime and with the Iranians begin soon, at this pace we still have a long way to go before we can be certain of acceptable outcomes on either front. But slow movement is better than none.
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Grasping at last straws
UN Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is said to have offered the UN Security Council on Thursday a “Plan C” for Syria along the following lines:
1. Syria’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be preserved.
2. A recognition that ultimate objective is for Syrians to have a full say in the way they are governed.
3. The formation of a transition government with “full executive powers.” Brahimi says he believes that means President Bashar al Assad “would have no role in the transition.”
4. Both sides would need to be represented by broad group of opposition leaders and strong military-civilian delegation from the Syrian government.
5. Negotiations should occur outside of Syria, and conform with a timetable setting out a speedy path towards elections, constitutional reform, and a referendum. He raised the prospect of moving from a presidential system of government to a parliamentarian system.
6. He urged the U.N. Security Council to unequivocally express support for the right of each citizen in Syria “to enjoy full equality before the law irrespective of gender, religion, language or ethnicity.”
This is more a slight elaboration last June’s Geneva communiqué than it is a new plan.
The leader of the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Moaz al Khatib, appeared open to this when he let it be known that he would be prepared to meet with Syrian government representatives in one of a number of Middle East capitals, provided political prisoners were released and Syrians abroad permitted to renew their passports. His Coalition was not happy though and has instructed him not to agree to anything without their approval.
So it is no surprise that meetings of some sort will occur on the margins of the “Wehrkunde” (Munich Security) conference on Saturday involving the al Khatib, Brahimi, the Russians and the Americans. But it would be foolish to express any optimism that a political solution will be found. The disappointments–Kofi Annan’s as well as Brahimi’s–have been many.
The vital question remains whether the Russians are willing and able to push Bashar al Asad aside and open the door to a democratic transition that he does not control. There are doubts on both scores. While Moscow officials often claim they are not trying to protect Asad, President Putin seems unwilling to give him a shove. This could reflect incapacity, or at least fear of it. But I doubt that. If the Russians were to cut off arms supply, financing and diplomatic support, Bashar would be unlikely to last long. More likely, it reflects Russian unwillingness to let the transition in Syria get out of Moscow’s grasp.
While nominally there is still a debate in Washington about intervention, I am still not seeing signs that the Obama Administration is seriously considering upping its game in Syria. I suppose we really need to see the new Secretaries of State and Defense in place before we can be sure, but both have given every indication in their confirmation testimony that they are likely to be at least as cautious about U.S. military action as their predecessors. Boots on the ground have long been ruled out, but Kerry and Hagel don’t seem likely to me to go for a no fly zone or even direct U.S. military supplies.
I still hope they will however see their way to strong political and financial support for the Syrian Coalition. Al Khatib has stuck his neck out in an effort to give Brahimi something to work with. The Americans and Europeans should be helping him to preserve his leadership role by giving him the resources needed to set up a transition government that can carry out the dialogue he said he was open to. If we fail to support him, we’ll regret it. The alternatives are far more hardline. And continuation of the war in Syria is not in our interest.
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Should the US save Syria?
While the situation in Syria worsens and the death-toll rises, there is no consensus in Washington on whether the US should intervene to put an end to the Syrian humanitarian crisis. The McCain Institute this week launched its “Debate and Decision Series” by gathering four experts on the Middle East and US foreign policy to debate “Should the United States Save Syria?”
The “yes camp,” which supported US intervention, included Robert Kagan and Leon Wieseltier. The “no camp,” which believed US intervention would be a grave mistake, included Joshua Landis and Aaron David Miller. CNN’s Elise Labott moderated and Senator McCain’s offered a short introduction, reiterating his belief that the Syria crisis will strong affect the region.
The “Yes Camp”:
Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at Brookings’ Center on Foreign Policy, member of the Foreign Affairs Policy Board of Secretary Clinton, and a regular columnist for the Washington Post, underscored the importance of the Syrian crisis to the US. While past US interventions were motivated either by strategic interests or on humanitarian grounds, Syria is a place where strategic interests and humanitarian purposes converge. If the US does not intervene, the cost will be very high since new threats to US national security will emerge. Failed states have become breeding grounds for terrorism:
the consequence to us [the American people], directly, of Syria becoming a failed state has huge costs.
Leon Wiesletier, the editor of The New Republic, said the US cannot afford Obama’s policy of transforming the US into a “non-internationalist state.” Not only does the Syrian crisis involve US responsibility to end a deep humanitarian crisis, but lack of intervention will also put US values into question. In strategic terms,
there could be no bigger strategic blow to Iran and its allies than the overthrow of the Assad regime.
The US should intervene to overthrow of the Assad regime and stop the genocide, prevent the jihadists from winning, and arm the secular opposition.
The “No Camp”:
Joshua Landis, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and a frequent blogger on the Syrian crisis, strongly opposed US intervention on several grounds:
- America should not involve itself in what has become an ethnic war since “a new ethnic balance is taking place in the Middle East,” and it should not “pick winners especially in ethnic wars;”
- Only Syrians can save Syria from radicalization. The US failed in Iraq and Afghanistan when it tried to nation-build in those countries;
- If the US intervenes and then leaves, as in previous cases, the situation will just get messier;
- Decapitating the Assad regime now would destabilize Syria; it is not clear that earlier intervention would have avoided the current difficulties.
Aaron David Miller, former negotiator and advisor on Middle East issues in the Department of State under several administrations, said the US must realize that it cannot do everything and that it will be incapable of managing intervention in Syria. He highlighted the risks of getting itself in a crisis that might not end as planned:
there is a correlation between our miscalculated adventures and our own broken-house.
If Washington intervenes to ensure that a pro-US government emerges in Syria, this will delegitimize the new regime. The Arab Spring is legitimate because it is controlled by the Arabs themselves. Besides, Aaron said,
so much blood has flowed that it is impossible to think of a negotiated settlement now.
The Rebuttals and Conclusions:
Kagan found Landis’ argument that decapitating the Assad regime would “destabilize Syria” to be illogical since the situation is already unstable. He criticized the latter’s focus on US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan as a measure for future US failures. US history extends before 2001 and 2003; it has a “mixed record,” just as any great power does. Kagan rejected Landis’ claim that the ethnic nature of the conflict will inevitably mean American failure. US intervention in Bosnia has led to stability. Kagan claimed that doing something is better than nothing. The US should not wait till Assad deploys his chemical weapons against the Syrian people.
Wiesletier attacked Landis’ claim that the US should not get itself into a conflict that the Syrians should resolve by saying that “other powers are already in the middle:” Russia and Iran are already determining the outcome.
Landis rebutted the arguments of the “yes camp” by stating that contrary to Wiesletier’s claim that US intervention would prevent the jihadists and help advance the secular, pro-Western opposition, the US is incapable of placing whom it likes as the leaders of any new regime that will emerge. The Islamists are on top. The “Harvard-educated opposition” will not take the lead.
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What Obama should do for Syria
President Obama in an interview with The New Republic published yesterday, discussed in more explicit terms than usual how he makes foreign policy decisions. Commentary has focused on what academics are interested in: is he a realist or an idealist? I see no evidence in what he said to suggest that he should be put in exclusively either category. Dan Drezner does (“national interest and security trumps liberal values every day of the week and twice on Sundays”), but then his own editor appends a note that this is a false dichotomy. The editor is correct.
The far more interesting part of the President’s interview includes his comments on Syria:
…I have to ask, can we make a difference in that situation? Would a military intervention have an impact? How would it affect our ability to support troops who are still in Afghanistan? What would be the aftermath of our involvement on the ground? Could it trigger even worse violence or the use of chemical weapons? What offers the best prospect of a stable post-Assad regime? And how do I weigh tens of thousands who’ve been killed in Syria versus the tens of thousands who are currently being killed in the Congo?
I find the reference to Afghanistan particularly telling. What’s that about?
It’s about the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistical network that enables a substantial supply of material to U.S. forces in Afghanistan from the north (without going through Pakistan). It is also important to the withdrawal of U.S. forces and their extraordinary volume of stuff. The NDN depends on Russian cooperation, which the President clearly fears will be restricted or even ended should he take a more proactive stance on Syria.
The President’s other concerns are also valid. In particular the aftermath of military intervention is precisely what he should worry about, given the course of post-war events in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
What he does not mention, but I am certain is on his mind, is Iran. The civil war in Syria is in some ways a proxy war between the West (counting Turkey as in that category) and Iran, which is Bashar al Asad’s most important ally (more important even than Russia). The United States from this persepective is “bleeding” Iran in Syria, where Tehran is compelled to commit men and money to prop up Bashar. For Washington to commit military force in Syria would risk the loss of Russia’s support not only for the NDN but also in the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran and call into question U.S. commitment to military action against Tehran in case those talks fail. The President is keeping his powder dry while watching Iran weaken itself. That’s not a bad course of action both from a realist and an idealist perspective.
What it does not do however is explain the ineffectiveness of American civilian assistance to the Syrian opposition, amply discussed on NPR this morning:
This is absurd. The President needs to refocus his attention on the civilian side of America’s engagement with Syria. He may well be right to hesitate in using military force. But there is no excuse for failing to provide 100% support to the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Washington helped to create.
If, like me, you are wondering if the 60 Minutes interview with the President and Secretary of State Clinton provides more enlightenment, you’ll be disappointed. It’s just a hug fest.
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Masterful
Secretary of State-designate John Kerry was masterful today in his Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing. It wasn’t so much the details of what he said, but the breadth and depth. This is a guy who really knows international affairs.
His prepared statement was notable for some high points: the emphasis on the importance of American economic health in determining the country’s role abroad, the clarity about preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons and the vigor of his defense of the State Department budget. I would also note that John Kerry regards USAID, whose functions he mentioned but not its name, as an integral part of the State Department.
Then Kerry showed a lot of agility in dealing with not only the questions but also a demonstrator, expressing respect for her cries to be heard. He defended Secretary of Defense-designate Hagel’s views on getting rid of nuclear weapons, which he said was an aspiration for a world different from the one we live in today. He described his own changed view of Syria’s President Asad, whom he now hopes to see go soon.
He showed his clear commitment to maintaining the high priority Secretary Clinton has given to gender issues. He was non-committal on the Keystone pipeline, deferring to the official process under way. He was gentle with the Russians, citing their cooperation on particular issues (other than Syria). He was supportive of American anti-corruption and human rights efforts abroad. He showed he knows what is going on in Sudan’s Blue Nile and South Kordofan provinces. He parried accusations about Benghazi.
Of course part of the reason for this masterful performance is the attitude of the questioners, who showed enormous respect for their long-standing colleague. Gone was the idiot questioning of yesterday’s hearing with Secretary of State Clinton on the Benghazi murders. There was little “gotcha.” Certainly had the President nominated Susan Rice, who is far more combative, the tone if not the substance of the hearing would have been different. In a week’s time the Hagel hearing may be far more contentious, even if Hagel himself comes close to matching Kerry in knowledge and equanimity.
On Syria, Kerry advocated changing Bashar al Asad’s calculations, but he was unclear about the means to achieve that. He wants an orderly transition. The Russians appear willing, but differ on the timing and manner of Bashar’s departure. Kerry fears sectarian strife, implosion of the Syrian state and what they might mean for chemical weapons.
The Syrian opposition has not been ready to talk, Kerry said. In a sentence he struck–one of his few moments of hesitation in this long hearing–he started to say that we need to increase the ability of the opposition to do something unspecified. I’d sure like to know how that sentence was supposed to end: increase their ability to negotiate? increase their ability to strike the regime militarily? There’s a big difference. It sounded to me more like he wanted them to be more flexible on negotiations, but I’m not certain.
Kerry hit a lot of other subjects. On Afghanistan, he put his chips on a good April 2014 presidential election, which has to provide legitimacy to Karzai’s successor. Kerry wants “a metric” for stopping infiltration and attacks on Americans from Pakistani territory. He noted China is “all over” Africa (and America has to get into the game). Al Qaeda has dispersed at the urging of Osama bin Laden and is now a threat in the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb, where the solution is not only drone strikes but (unspecified) civilian efforts. We don’t like what Egyptian President Morsi says about Jews, but we need him to maintain the peace treaty with Israel. On Israel/Palestine, Kerry was cagey and refused to be drawn out, except to reiterate commitment to the two-state solution. The solution to climate change is energy policy, which will enable job growth. The “war on drugs” is ill-conceived. We need to do more on the demand side.
Here is the lengthy (four hours?) video of the hearing:
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