Tag: Russia
Next steps in Syria
Many observers regard appointment of an interim government by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as a key next step in trying to supplant Bashar al Assad, who shows no signs of stepping aside. I would not ordinarily count appointment of a committee to consider the matter and report back in ten days as progress, but all things in diplomacy are relative. Maybe it is. The National Coalition reports after its most recent General Assembly meeting:
The General Assembly of [the] coalition agreed to form a committee to communicate with political and revolutionary forces inside Syria, and with international organizations and governments to assure support for the interim government. The chair of this committee is Mr. Ahmed Maaz Al-Khateeb, president of the National Coalition Syrian, and includes Mr. George Sabra, Mr. Mustafa Sabbagh, Professor Bourhan Galion, Dr. Ahmed Syed Yusuf and Mr. Ahmed Al-Jerba. The Committee was asked to complete its mission in 10 days and send a report to the General Assembly. A decision to form the interim government will be made then.
Obviously appointment of the interim government is not proving easy. It can’t be, since it will determine an initial distribution of power that may be hard to overturn. The luminaries named to the committee are key leaders of various opposition efforts, past and present. They are also notably all male.
But the idea of consulting before acting is not a bad one. One of the supposed advantages of the National Coalition over the previous umbrella opposition organization, the Syrian National Council, is its connections to the revolutionary forces inside Syria. If an interim government fails to acquire legitimacy there, including with the Free Syrian Army factions, it won’t be worth much.
Where progress is even less evident is in Washington. There are lots of ideas being put forward for more vigorous action on Syria. Here’s my informal tally sheet:
- Use the Patriot missile batteries in Turkey to enforce a no-fly zone inside Syria along the border.
- Send U.S. military and intelligence equipment and/or training to the opposition.
- Outreach to Alawites and other minorities, to compensate for Sunni domination of the Coalition.
- Intensified engagement with the Russians to convince them to abandon Assad.
- Increase assistance to local liberated communities, especially those willing to help find and neutralize chemical weapons.
- Deploy air and other military assets prepared to strike or seize chemical weapons depots.
But if President Obama is seriously considering any of these, he did not give a hint of it in his Inauguration speech. Nor did I detect any sign of it meeting last week with Syria-focused people in the U.S. government.
The Russians though have begun to evacuate some of their citizens. This is a preliminary signal. A more definitive one would be closing of the Embassy in Damascus. Tehran is also sounding alarmed, and Bashar’s mother is thought to have left Damascus.
The regime still shows no sign of crumbling, only cracking. The opposition reports today the defection of 450 soldiers, but high-level defections (especially of key Alawite officers) are few and far between. A stalemate seems to be emerging. A “mutually hurting stalemate” is precisely the precondition for a negotiated outcome. A good negotiated outcome would be one in which Bashar al Asad steps aside and the regime gives up power, not one in which it is given another lease on murdering Syrians. UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is presumably hard at work trying to get to yes on that.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testifies today in both the Senate and the House on the Benghazi attack in September that killed the American ambassador to Libya and three of his colleagues. She has reason to be relieved that Syria is not the focus, since the Administration has so far failed in its indirect efforts to collapse the Asad regime. Maybe tomorrow’s Senate confirmation hearing for Senator John Kerry will provide an opportunity for questioning about that. Or is the American political class going to skip altogether opportunities to examine whether we could, and should, be doing more to stop a slaughter that has now taken more than 65,000 lives?
PS: The Benghazi incident evoked this rather trenchant response from the Secretary this morning:
Visit NBCNews.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks this week
A light week after the Inauguration, with back-to-back discussions Thursday of the Israeli elections:
1. Legacies of a Lost Empire: Unresolved Territorial and Identity Problems in the Post-Soviet Era
Date and Time: Tuesday, January 22 / 12:00pm – 1:00pm
Address: Woodrow Wilson Center
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speaker: Pilar Bonet (Chief Correspondent in Moscow, in charge of the Russian Federation, CIS countries, and Georgia, El País)
Description: More than twenty years after the collapse of the USSR, a number of frozen conflicts dating from the collapse persist to this day. They endure as hostages to geostrategic thinking, and are fueled by ethnic and identity contestation on the ground. Pilar Bonet, Chief Correspondent, Moscow, El Pais, former Title VIII-supported Research Scholar and Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar has covered many of these conflicts, and will concentrate her discussion on the cases of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.
Register for this event here: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/legacies-lost-empire-unresolved-territorial-and-identity-problems-the-post-soviet-era
2. Libya: A State in Search of Itself
Date and Time: Thursday, January 24, 2013
6:30 PM – 7:45 PM
Address: Lindner Family Commons, Room 602 , 1957 E Street NW
Speakers: Mary-Jane Deeb (Chief, African and Middle Eastern Division, Library of Congress), Karim Mezran (Senior Fellow, Rafiq Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council)
Moderator: Ambassador Edward Skip Gnehm, Director, Middle East Policy Forum
Description: Despite successful parliamentary elections in July 2012, Libya faces numerous obstacles to state development. Rife with internal divisions and regional tensions, Libya struggles to achieve national cohesion and advance the political process. Moreover, the country’s fractious and divisive political environment inhibits institution building and complicates efforts to restore internal security. In light of Libya’s institutional and security challenges, the panelists will discuss current developments and prospects for Libya’s political future.
Register for this event here: https://docs.google.com/a/aucegypt.edu/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dFJiRVdla1I1R2k2NE53NUYyaEhnc0E6MQ
3. The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?
Date and Time: January 24, 2013, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM
Address: Brookings Institution, Saul/Zilkha Rooms
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Speakers: Martin S. Indyk and Natan B. Sachs
Moderated by: Daniel L. Byman
Description: Israelis head to the polls next week, just one day after President Barack Obama’s second inauguration as the peace process remains stalled and changes sweeping the Arab world introduce new challenges for Israel. The tense relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, the projected winner of next week’s elections, raises questions as to how the two countries will cooperate in dealing with these challenges, and others, including Iran’s nuclear program. What do the election results tell us about Israel’s trajectory in the coming years? How will the United States and the region react to a new Israeli government? On January 24, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion on the election outcomes and their meaning for Israeli domestic and foreign policy and for the incoming Israeli government’s relationship with the United States. Panelists will include Brookings Fellow Natan Sachs, who has spent the last four weeks in Israel observing the election campaign, and Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings and former U.S. ambassador to Israel. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, Saban Center Research Director, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
Register for this event through sending an email to: events@brookings.edu
5. Elections in Israel
Date and Tme: Thursday, January 24, 2013 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM
Address: Lindner Family Commons, Room 602 1957 E Street NW
Speakers:Yoram Peri (Abraham S. and Jack Kay Chair in Israel Studies, University of Maryland) , Ilan Peleg (Charles A. Dana Professor of Government & Law, Lafayette College) , Gershon Shafir (Professor of Sociology, University of California, San Diego), Jonathan Rynhold (Schusterman Visiting Professor in Israel Studies, GW)
Moderated by: Marc Lynch
Description: Three leading political scientists will discuss the outcomes and implications of Israel’s January 2013 parliamentary elections.
Register for this event here: http://tinyurl.com/cqzscq3
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Iran nuclear cliff
It isn’t often that Washington reaches a consensus on Iran, but that seems to be what is happening. Patrick Clawson urges a generous offer to Iran, to test definitively whether a deal stopping it short of nuclear weapons can be reached. Suzanne Maloney sees 2013 as the make or break year:
Dennis Ross, Trita Parsi, and Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett had long ago come to the conclusion a big package was needed to woo Tehran from its nuclear ambitions, from widely varying premises.
2013 is the make or break year for the same reason we faced a “fiscal cliff” crisis at the end of the last Congress: Washington has set itself up for a big decision. Either we get a deal that prevents Iran from getting nuclear weapons, or the Administration (with ample Congressional support) has committed the United States to go to war. Suzanne is surely correct that the American people are not “there” yet, but I see that as a good thing: it gives the Administration maximum negotiating leeway. Maximum but not infinite: Congress (Democrats and Republicans) will have to lift sanctions if a deal is reached. It won’t happen unless the majority is satisfied that the deal blocks Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.
International Atomic Energy Agency officials are in Tehran today trying to gain access to an Iranian site thought to have been used in the past for nuclear weapons research. The Americans regard Iran coming clean on those activities as vital to any deal that lets Iran off the sanctions hook. It is unlikely we’ll have a quick answer to the many questions about Iran’s past activities, but the talks today are important to opening the door.
At the same time, the P5+1 (5 permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) are haggling with Tehran over a date to continue the political-level nuclear talks, which are supposed to convene this month. The main issue seems to be whether sanctions relief will be on the agenda. The Americans in particular have wanted to reserve all but the smallest sanctions relief (parts for aircraft) for later on, after seeing real progress on nuclear questions. The Iranians want sanctions relief up front.
The emerging consensus in Washington in favor of a big package to test Iran’s intentions and reach a definitive conclusion could end years of uncertainty and haggling. But it also raises the very real possibility of going over the Iran nuclear cliff to war.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria is getting what Assad wants
A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):
|
Submitted on 2013/01/05 at 9:44 am
Dear Mr Serwer, Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations. The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest. Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists. I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers. The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power. In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off. On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform. Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative. When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf. The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran. These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict. In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term. I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation. Best, Hashem Alshamy |
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
War’s end can be deadly too
My Twitterfeed this morning is full of references to a video of Syria’s thugs finishing off rebels with knives and concrete blocks. Fortunately for you, the video did not work for me, so I am not even tempted to post it.
The behavior is, however, worth noting, as it is precisely what makes revenge killing highly likely. How would you feel if one of Asad’s thugs bludgeoned to death your brother, uncle, cousin? Of course you might not know precisely who did it, but you might suspect, or you might know someone working for the Shabiha whom you suspect of doing such things, or you might just feel someone needs to be taught a lesson. If a law and order vacuum follows the fall of Asad, it will be tempting to teach these people a lesson, prevent them from disappearing into the woodwork, or just satisfy the thirst for justice. Once it starts, tit for tat violence is difficult to stop. Police are no longer on the streets, courts have ceased to function as judges flee, prosecutors are seek refuge from infuriated relatives of people they sent to prison.
Most of the Syrian opposition will say it does not seek revenge. They will proclaim loudly that anyone who does not have Syrian blood on their hands can remain in their jobs and continue to provide public services. We have nothing against the Syrian state, they will say, only against those individuals who abused power and mistreated its citizens.
But who does not have Syrian blood on their hands? How do they prove it? It is notoriously difficult to prove a negative, and very hard to respond to accusations outside the neutral space of a serious justice system. It will take years to determine who was responsible for the killing of 45,000 or so opposition victims. Why should perpetrators be allowed to get away with their crimes in the meanwhile?
These are some of the issues that lead me to conclude that Syria is going to need an international peacekeeping force to prevent the worst from happening after the fall of the Asad regime. Such a force cannot bring justice or prevent all abuses, but it can–properly mandated, resourced and led–create what the military refers to as a “safe and secure environment,” provided the warring parties reach at least a temporary political accommodation against further bloodshed. There will still be incidents and reprisals, but if they can be kept below the level of mass atrocity it will give Syria a much better chance to move in a more democratic direction.
A commenter on a previous post suggested Indonesia and Malaysia might be able to contribute several thousand troops. That’s a start, though it seems likely Syria will require tens of thousands. The UN and Arab League–the two most likely leaders of such a peacekeeping force–should be developing the plans, not only for the peacekeeping forces but also for meeting other urgent requirements: humanitarian relief (food, water, shelter and sanitation), macroeconomic stabilization to prevent the currency from collapsing altogether, and support to whatever political process the Syrians can agree on.
America’s luminaries are still focused on a no-fly zone and arms for the rebels. We are past the point where either makes much sense. The rebels have obtained sufficient arms to contest the Syrian security forces throughout most of the country, and they are quickly downing most of the Syrian air force. The death toll is way up–around 400 per day recently–as Asad unleashes what little he has left that he hasn’t already used. I’ve got to hope that UN Envoy Brahimi is successful in getting the Russians to pressure Asad to step aside. Nothing short of that will open the door to a negotiated outcome, which is far more likely to reduce the death toll than continuation of the fighting.
War is deadly, but post-war can be deadly too. It is time to be thinking about how to end this war and begin the peace in an orderly way.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
It is not too early
UN special envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi said Friday in Moscow of the Russian Foreign Minister:
I think Sergey Lavrov is absolutely right that the conflict is not only more and more militarized, it is more and more sectarian…And if we are not careful and if the Syrians are not careful, it will be a mainly sectarian conflict.
The day was a particularly bloody one: more than 200 people are said to have been killed in Homs.
The fear of sectarian conflict is well-founded. No matter how many times Syrians tell me that their revolution is not sectarian and aims at a civil state and open, democratic society in which all citizens are equal, the normal mechanisms of violent conflict lend themselves to increasing polarization along sectarian lines. I am afraid, so I seek safety where I can find it, which for Alawites and some other minorities is with the government while Sunnis seek protection from the Free Syrian Army.
Of course there are Sunnis who fight for the Syrian government and minorities who fight for the rebels, but there will be fewer and fewer as time passes. Then when Assad goes, individuals will try to recover property and seek revenge for the harm done to themselves and their families, even if the more organized and disciplined military units on both sides remain disciplined. Revenge killing spirals quickly, polarizing people further and driving them into the arms of their family, tribe, sect or ethnicity. Building a state on the ruins of a fragmented society is far more difficult than anyone imagines in advance.
That’s why I also welcome something else Brahimi said:
Perhaps a peacekeeping force may be acceptable. But it must be part of a complete package that begins with peacekeeping and ends with an election.
This is the first I’ve seen the obvious mentioned at his level: peacekeeping forces are going to be needed in Syria. They will be needed not only to protect minorities but also to support the post-war state-building effort. We’ve seen in Libya what happens when the new state does not have a monopoly on the means of violence. Extremists of all sorts, including Al Qaeda franchisees, set up shop. State-building without a monopoly on the means of violence becomes a dicey proposition. There will be more than two armed forces in Syria at the end of the civil war: Syrian army, local militias, regime Shabiha, Free Syria Army, Jabhat al Nusra and other jihadi extremists.
The issue in Syria is where peacekeeping troops can be found. Even if they are needed, that does not mean they will be available. The obvious troop contributors have all been protagonists in the proxy war of the past two years: Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The Turks and Russians may be willing, but won’t trust each other. The Americans will not want to put troops into Syria. Nor will the Europeans. China now has experience in 20 UN peacekeeping operations and might like to extend its reach into the Middle East, if the Americans and Russians will allow it. Iran is out of the question, though it will likely stir up trouble using some of the regime militia forces left over. There are lots of other possibilities, but few I can think of that meet the full panoply of desirable criteria: impartial, Arabic-speaking, experienced and self-sufficient in peacekeeping operations, available for deployment abroad. Algeria and Morocco?
A related question is who would authorize and supervise a peacekeeping operation. The UN is one possibility, but the divisions in the Security Council over the past two years hardly suggest it could act decisively. The Arab League is another. Still another is an invitation from a new Syrian government, which would have the advantage of picking which countries to invite and directing where they deploy. But that could defeat the whole purpose of inviting in a more impartial force.
If–against the odds–an international peacekeeping force is somehow put together and somehow properly authorized for Syria, it is important to remember Brahimi’s caution, written before he took up his present position:
Even if such peacekeepers are well-armed and well-trained, however, they will be no match for much larger and well organized forces intent on destroying the
peace or committing mass atrocities. It has to be said upfront that the military forces, civilian police, human rights experts and international aid workers will not provide security, protection, justice, social services and jobs for all of the millions or tens of millions of inhabitants of the country.
A solid political solution is a prerequisite to a peacekeeping deployment.
Syria is going to be a very difficult post-war operation. It is not too early to be thinking about who will conduct it and under what mandate.
RSS - Posts
