Tag: Russia
Fin de regime
My guess is that we are finally in the waning days of the Asad regime in Syria. UN envoy Brahimi was in Damascus yesterday and will talk with the Russians this weekend. His is sounding like a last ditch effort. Moscow has made it clear that it will no longer prop up Asad. Now they have to be convinced to give him a shove in the right direction. It shouldn’t be all that hard. Bashar’s military police chief has famously absconded, joining his foreign ministry spokesperson. The regime is cracking, though not yet crumbling.
This is a delicate moment in which a great deal is at stake. The devil is in the details. Brahimi is still pressing for a solution that jibes with last June’s Geneva agreement, which Moscow and Washington both endorsed, on formation of a fully empowered government with Bashar still in place. I doubt the revolutionaries will accept it. They want him out before agreeing to a ceasefire. Provided that condition is met, a negotiated transition of power to some sort of “unity” government (which means it would include a “remnant” of the Asad regime) with a guarantee of a future transition could be a good thing, provided it genuinely puts Syria on a democratic path and extracts it from the violence now on going. But it could also sell the Syrian revolution short by putting a new autocrat in place and creating conditions for renewed violence.
There will be precious little real international support for a true transition to democracy. The Saudis and Qataris, who have provided the bulk of the arms and money to the revolutionaries, are not much interested in anything beyond getting Asad out and installing a Sunni (preferably Islamist) regime, democratic or not. The Russians, Iranians and Iraqis will fear that outcome and want to preserve a secular regime, whether democratic or not. The Americans and Turks will want a secular democracy, but they are not in a position to insist on it. The Americans have been reluctant to get too involved. Only if Turkey decides to put its boots on the ground inside Syria will it have the kind of clout required. Even then, it may fail to get what it wants.
The Syrians hold the key to the outcome. But of course they point in many different directions. There are lots of Syrians who would prefer a secular democracy, but they are stronger among the nonviolent protesters than among the revolutionary military forces deciding the outcome. The Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, now recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, is trying to project a unified and moderate image. But the results so far are rudimentary: a few press statements, not always on the most pressing issues. There is still no transition government.
Jabhat al Nusra, a leading Islamist group among the fighters, is producing more substantial results. Rejecting the Coalition, it is anti-Western, Islamist, socially conservative and hard-fighting. The United States has designated it a foreign terrorist organization. Washington’s primary concern is its links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which Jabhat al Nusra denies. But I’ve also heard that the designation was done in part to please the Russians, who are genuinely (and justifiably) concerned with Syria becoming a source of Islamist extremism that could infect parts of Russia. Baghdad is also worried about a Sunni extremist regime in Syria that would try to counter Prime Minister Maliki’s increasingly Shia (and autocratic) drift in Iraq.
Few in Syria want the state to collapse or divide territorially. The revolution has not been fought on ethnic or sectarian grounds, even if it has exposed ethnic and sectarian divisions. Only Syria’s Kurds lean in the direction of federalism, inspired and supported by their confrères in Iraq. But I see no real plan on the horizon to prevent revenge killing, despite the very real likelihood it will happen. If there is extreme violence against the Alawites or other minorities thought to have supported the regime, collapse and division become more likely.
All decisions that depend on the will of a single individual, as Bashar’s to step aside does, are inherently unpredictable. There is of course the possibility he will refuse and hang on for a while, even defying the Russians to do so. A Google search for “fin de regime” turns up a lot of hits concerning Syria, in 2011. The longer this goes on, the worse it will be in the end.
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Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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Bashar al Asad’s apocalypse
I published a daring series of predictions at the end of last year. Very few were correct. The only two that came close were these:
Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
Even then, you’ll need to ignore the part about Kosovo meeting all the requirements (it hasn’t yet) and that last part about a successful Al Qaeda bombing in the U.S. (that hasn’t happened yet either). Is it an accident that the two places I know best were also the subject of my most accurate predictions?
I’ll rely on other people for my next big prediction: Andrew Tabler and Jeff White, who know Syria much better than I do, were at the Washington Institute yesterday predicting the end of the Asad regime within weeks, at most a few months. Even if the Mayan apocalypse hasn’t happened, Bashar al Asad’s will.
According to Jeff, the regime’s military capacity to defend itself is way down. Its air power, artillery and Scuds are little avail. Its large-scale maneuver capacity is declining, as are its numbers. There is fighting in 12 of 14 provinces. Regime armor and mechanized infantry can no longer move freely. The only potential major game changers out there are Hizbollah, Iran and chemical weapons. Iran and Hizbollah are not likely to risk more than they already have.
Rebel offensive performance is improving. They are taking objectives and interrupting lines of communication. They appear to be self-sustaining now in arms, their numbers are still growing, and they are capable of more sustained and coordinated action. The Islamists are playing an increasing role. Rebel losses are up, especially among commanders, but their recruitment stream is still strong.
Jeff suggest five possible endgames:
1. Province by province dismantlement of the regime, which has already begun.
2. Chaotic collapse of the regime.
3. Controlled regime contraction to Damascus or the coast.
4. A headlong rush to the coast.
5. Regime recovery, which looks unlikely.
Possible indicators the end is near: there may be desperate pleas for a ceasefire, evacuation of Russian nationals, senior defections or flight, military units abandoning the regime, a coup attempt and last (but not entirely in jest) burning papers at the Iranian Embassy.*
Andrew agreed. There is a marked deterioration in the humanitarian situation, with food in short supply, refugee and displaced people camps overcrowded and ill-equipped. The revolution is turning in an Islamist direction, in part because of U.S. unresponsiveness to its needs. Anti-Western sentiment is strong. It was a mistake to designate Jabhat al Nusra as a terrorist organization before recognizing the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
The Coalition remains badly divided by sect, class, rural/urban and by personality. While the military and civilian leaderships have met and issued a joint statement, how the two insurgent efforts will be combined at various levels is not at all clear. The armed rebellion, with which the U.S. is not well-connected, is likely to be in the lead once Bashar falls. The U.S. should be sending arms, more to gain influence than anything else, as they are no longer needed as much as once they were for military purposes. We need to be ready also with civilian assistance, which has been too slow. The aid should be overt and direct, not covert and indirect, if we want to gain influence over the outcome. Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may well move faster than we do, as they have with arms, with consequences for our interests.
It is clear Syria will need a lot of help once this is over. Post-war reconstruction has stumped the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has boots on the ground, which isn’t going to happen in Syria. Working through and with the Coalition, which we’ve now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, to produce a decent outcome is going to be an an enormous challenge. Failure could ignite a broader conflict in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Success would damage Hizbollah and Iran. This one is worth a candle.
*This morning I would add use of cluster bombs.
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The street called straight
It would be a mistake for anyone to extrapolate from the current situation in Syria to an outcome. It is, after all, in Damascus that the once main street (الشارع المستقيم) is only called straight. But we are now approaching a denouement, however many more deviations may still occur.
The indicators are both internal and external. You know your regime is in trouble when you can’t get to the capital’s main airport without going through rebel checkpoints, most of the border crossing points with Turkey and several important northern army bases are also in insurgent hands and the revolutionaries have grounded or destroyed something like 100 of your air force’s planes and helicopters. It’s also trouble when the Americans start talking about the consequences if you use weapons of mass destruction and Jim Dobbins publishes a piece in the Financial Times suggesting ways in which intervention could be justified. UN Envoy Brahimi’s recent tête-à-têtewith the Russian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State should also give you pause.
Washington and Moscow are now concluding that they really do share a common interest in preventing a radical Islamist takeover in Syria. It’s about time. Moscow has been unwise to continue to bank on Bashar al Asad as a bulwark against Sunni extremism. Washington has been unwise to think it could steer the revolution in Syria in a democratic direction without making any major commitment in arms or military action. If they can find common cause now, they may still have time and influence enough to prevent the worst from happening.
Pretty much the only important political document Moscow and Washington have agreed on since the Syria rebellion began is last June’s “action group” communiqué. That will be at least part of the basis for the current talks. It foresees a Syrian state that
• Is genuinely democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also means that the commitment to multi-party democracy must be a lasting one, going beyond an initial round of elections.
• Complies with international standards on human rights, the independence of the judiciary, accountability of those in government and the rule of law. It is not enough just to enunciate such a commitment. There must be mechanisms available to the people to ensure that these commitments are kept by those in authority.
• Offers equal opportunities and chances for all. There is no room for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.
How to get there from here is hard to picture, but the goal is admirably clear. The action group statement is also admirably clear on the steps to be taken to achieve a transition to such a state:
• The establishment of a transitional governing body which can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place. That means that the transitional governing body would exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent.
• It is for the Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All groups and segments of society in Syria must be enabled to participate in a National Dialogue process. That process must not only be inclusive, it must also be meaningful—that is to say, its key outcomes must be implemented.
• On this basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the legal system. The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular approval.
• Once the new constitutional order is established, it is necessary to prepare for and conduct free and fair multi-party elections for the new institutions and offices that have been established.
• Women must be fully represented in all aspects of the transition.
It is that first step in the process that is both crucial and problematic: the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers. What this suggests is an interim government fully empowered even with Bashar al Asad still in Damascus, as this “action group” transition plan makes no reference to his stepping aside (a key demand of the Syrian opposition and source of friction between Washington and Moscow). This is not only hard to picture, but so far as I am aware has never been successfully attempted in the past. I asked a knowledgeable person recently: he could not think of an example. The best I can come up with is the current coalition arrangements in Zimbabwe, where President Mugabe is still in place but a good deal of governing authority is in opposition hands. That is not an encouraging precedent.
There are other problems with the idea of a negotiated transition. Jebhat al Nusra, the Al Qaeda in Iraq franchise that operates in Syria, will not be interested in one. They have two strong points: lots of weapons and a reputation for fighting the regime (and avoiding exploitation of the population) that appears unequaled. It will be hard for the Washington-favored Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces to compete with the more radical Sunni extremists who have been in the vanguard of the fight against Asad, using weapons paid for by wealthy Saudis and Qataris.
One thing might level the playing field: an international intervention force, which the UN is just beginning to think about. That is what was lacking in Libya, allowing extremists a much freer hand there than has been healthy either for American diplomats or the political transition. But who would be willing to send troops into Syria at the end of this horrendous civil war, when revenge killing, the struggle for power and disorder will be at their peak? Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been willing to pump money and arms to their favorites, but they are hardly suitable as impartial peacekeepers. Turkey and Iran are viewed as protagonists within Syria, the former in favor of the rebellion and the latter against it. Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Tunisia are hardly in a position to embark on a difficult foreign venture. Europe and the United States do not want their own boots on the ground and will oppose Russian and Chinese troops in Syria.
As it has from the beginning, Syria poses far more problems than the international system can answer. The guys with guns will control the transition in Syria, with consequences that could take the country far from the democratic transition that the action group would prefer. Moscow and Washington will need to cooperate and exert a lot of influence to prevent that from happening.
PS: Having violated my general rule of always reading Mike Eisenstadt before publishing, the best I can do now is cite his piece on what a hard fall might look like.
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Consequences
The NBC report that Bashar al Asad is preparing chemical weapons for use has generated a contradictory response: President Obama, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen have all warned there will be consequences. My Twitterfeed concurs that use of chemical weapons would be “suicidal” for Bashar.
But there is little that can be done once these weapons are out of their storage sites and loaded on airplanes or missiles, as the report ambiguously suggests might be the case. The numbers of troops required to secure the Syrian chemical weapons stocks is on the order of 75,000. It is clear enough that U.S. troops have not yet been deployed in these numbers anywhere near Syria in preparation for their seizure.
That wouldn’t be a sufficient or appropriate response in any event. It would put a substantial number of American troops in harm’s way without any guarantee of success. So what might we be thinking of doing?
My guess–but it is only that–is regime decapitation. Any order to use chemical weapons will have to come from the top. If the Americans have done nothing else in the almost two years of killing, they should at least have discovered Bashar’s hiding places. Using cruise missiles, the U.S. can destroy dozens of sites with extraordinary precision. Whether or not Bashar himself is hit (remember how many times we missed Qaddafi?), his ability to continue in command is likely to be severely degraded, as they say.
Another thought is to pour arms into the revolutionary forces in the hope that they will be able to seize the remaining chemical weapons. But without specialized training and equipment, that really would be a suicidal course of action. It is far more likely that chemical weapons will scare a large part of the population out of Syria, creating enormous problems for its neighbors, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan.
The problem with either proposition is that we have no idea what would come next. Decapitation would precipitate a rush both within the regime and from the outside to try to seize control of the state apparatus. The most likely winners are guys with lots of guns. That includes the Syrian security forces as well as the more heavily armed and capable revolutionaries, who come from the Sunni Islamist end of the political spectrum. If neither wins a definitive victory, the civil war would intensify, with terrible consequences both inside Syria and in the region. There is a real risk that punishing Asad will generate an outcome even more inimical to U.S. interests.
There is still a real possibility that reports of imminent chemical weapons use are false or exaggerated. But if they are true, someone had better be thinking of a better idea than I’ve had about what “consequences” are appropriate, feasible and productive. Bashar al Asad and lots of other autocrats will notice if he uses chemical weapons and there is no reaction. That would further undermine U.S. and NATO credibility, which is already at a perigee.
There is a report today that the Russians and Americans are meeting hastily to discuss Syrian chemical weapons. If the possibility of their use pushes Washington and Moscow together to a political solution, that would be a really good outcome for all concerned, except Bashar al Asad and his regime.
PS: Ambassador Ford says it is above his paygrade to decide what is to be done in the event Syrian uses chemical weapons. Certainly the implication of American military action is strong.
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This week’s peace picks
It’s a relatively light week for foreign policy events with all eyes focused on the US elections.
1. Political Shiism in the Arab World: Rituals, Ideologies, and Politics, Monday November 5, 9:00 AM – 11:30 AM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Arlington Campus, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 2201, Truland Building, Room 555
Speakers: Jana al Horr, Solon Simmons, Terrence Lyons
Researchers and experts on Arab politics have often debated the role of political Shiism as a source of regional instability and conflict following the 2003 U.S-Iraq war. Some argue that the expansion of political Shiism in the Arab world is a quest for political leadership resulting from a long-standing conflict with Sunnis, coupled with centuries of Shiite political and economic marginalization. Other argue that political Shiism holds revolutionary elements that can be re-interpreted to fit any political context that Shiites perceive as threatening. This view perceives that Shiite religious elements can be made to fit the current needs of various political contexts and are the main drivers of political mobilization and ultimately conflict. Both these views offer a narrow and restricted description of political Shiism; hence, the literature on political Shiism lacks a systematic understanding of the phenomenon. To address this gap, the research asks the following questions: (1) What is political Shiism? Is it monolithic? What are its forms? And who are its ideologues?; and (2) How do Arab Shiites mobilize for political protests?
In order to answer these questions, the research provides an examination of rituals, ideologies, and speeches of political Shiism embedded in the historical and geographical context of the Arab region in specific, and the Middle East in general, during the last century. Following a combination of methodological approaches, the research will first examine the centrality of Ashura rituals and celebrations in political Shiism; second, the research will explore the plurality of political Shiism thought in the twentieth, its progression from quietism to activism, and the influence of regional politics on its development; third, through analyzing current speeches of Shiite leaders in Lebanon and Iraq, the research will shed light on contemporary political Shiism language, its themes that mobilize the masses, and its connection to past ideologues previously examined.
The research seeks to extend the debate over the forces of mobilization of political Shiism, and contribute to a more constructive and coherent understanding of Shiite political actions in the Arab world. It confirms that the transformation of political Shiism from quietism to activism can be traced back socio-political changes that occurred in the early twentieth century. Additionally, it identifies how conflict associated with political Shiism is not linked to the Sunni-Shiite schism. Instead, the divide between the Arab world and the West is at the heart of political Shiism. Furthermore, the research highlights the importance of Ashura in political Shiism, but it is the rituals coupled with local and regional political events that create mobilization.
One important contribution of the dissertation is that it offers an inside descriptive look into the formation of political Shiism, its main ideologues, and issues that distinguish political Shiism as one of the main forces for political mobilization in the Arab world. The research aims at providing a broader understanding of political Shiism to address the gaps that exist in the current literature, and offer a new way of thinking about this rising religio-political phenomenon.
2. The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in the Arab World, Monday November 5, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steven Heydemann, Robert Perito, Querine Hanlon, Daniel Brumberg, Manal Omar
If the first season of the “Arab Uprisings” brought hope, the second season has illustrated many hard challenges, not least of which is restructuring the military, policy and intelligence services of Arab states. Even in Tunisia, where the military played a crucial role in supporting the “Jasmine Revolution,” the ultimate loyalty of the security services remains an open question. To examine this issue, USIP will convene a panel of experts on Monday, November 5, 2012 from 9:30am-11:30am to discuss the institutional, economic and political challenges posed by the quest to remake security sectors into allies of pluralistic democratic change. Please join us for what promises to be a revealing and provocative discussion.
Register for this event here.
3. Turkey in the Middle East: Role, Influence, and Challenges, Monday November 5, 6:00 PM – 7:15 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: Omer Taspinar, Bulent Aliriza, Edward Skip Gnehm
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, Turkey is a major player in the Middle East. Turkey’s active involvement in the Syrian crisis, rivalry with Iran, and outspoken advocacy of Palestinian statehood place Turkey at the center of regional events. The panelists will examine Turkey’s rising role in the region, addressing regional opportunities as well as domestic politics.
Register for this event here.
4. Aiding Conflict: The Impact of U.S. Food Aid on Civil War, Tuesday November 6, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, Hall of Government, 2115 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Kendrick Seminar Room, Room 321
Speaker: Nathan Nunn
This paper examines the effect of U.S. food aid on conflict in recipient countries. To establish a causal relationship, we exploit time variation in food aid caused by fluctuations in U.S. wheat production together with cross-sectional variation in a countrys tendency to receive any food aid from the United States. Our estimates show that an increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence, onset and duration of civil conflicts in recipient countries. Our results suggest that the effects are larger for smaller scale civil conflicts. No effect is found on interstate warfare.
Register for this event here.
5. Post-Election Day Analysis – What Happened and What Comes Next?, Wednesday November 7, 10:00 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Attendance by webcast only.
Speaker: Benjamin Wittes, William A. Galston, Robert Kagan, Thomas E. Mann, Isabel V. Sawhill
This year’s presidential and congressional elections are likely to be close—perhaps very close. They will have a profound impact on the nation’s future course in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres. The outcome of the November 6 election will raise important policy and political questions: What was key to the winning presidential candidate’s success, and what do the results reveal about the 2012 American electorate? In what direction will the new administration take the nation? What might a lame duck Obama administration and Congress look like—and how will the negotiations over the fiscal cliff proceed? What will be the congressional dynamics? What are the incoming administration’s policy prospects during the 113th Congress? And what are the consequences for U.S. foreign policy?
On November 7, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will host a final forum analyzing the election’s outcomes and how these results will affect the policy agenda of the next administration and Congress. Panelists will discuss the approach of the incoming administration, the political makeup of the new 113th Congress and the prospect for policy breakthroughs on key social, fiscal and foreign policy issues.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience. Participants may follow the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag #BI2012.
6. Syria: The Path Ahead, Thursday November 8, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Room
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Michael Doran, Salman Shaikh
As the Syrian conflict approaches its twentieth month, fears are mounting that Bashar al-Assad’s regime may stay in power or that Syria will collapse into sectarian war. An enduring conflict in Syria will have far-reaching consequences for the region, could threaten key U.S. partners, and may require urgent decisions. Has the struggle for democracy in Syria been lost? Is there more the United States could do to influence events there? What steps could the international community take to prevent strife and sectarianism from spreading throughout the region?
On November 8, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will explore these and other questions about the conflict in Syria. Panelists Mike Doran, the Roger Hertog senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Director of the Brookings Doha Center Salman Shaikh, appearing by video conference, will discuss policy options for the U.S. and international community, with a focus on Shaikh’s recently authored paper, “Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It).” Daniel L. Byman, senior fellow and research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will moderate the discussion.
Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #SavingSyria. After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.
Register for this event here.
7. Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, Conciliation, Thursday November 8, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs
Venue: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University, 3307 M Street, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200
Speakers: Eric Patterson, Timothy Shah, John P. Gallagher
Why don’t wars “end well?” From Rwanda to Colombia to Afghanistan, it seems that modern wars drag on and on, with terrible costs for civilians and their neighbors. In his new book, Ending Wars Well, Berkley Center Senior Research Fellow Eric Patterson argues that just war principles can provide a framework for bringing wars to modest yet enduring conclusions. More specifically, he criticizes grandiose peace schemes that are not rooted in the realities of security and political order. In contrast, he proposes a model that begins with investment in Order as a practical and moral imperative. This provides a foundation for Justice (e.g. punishment, restitution) and Conciliation in unique situations.
Patterson uses Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, East Timor, the Camp David Accords, and the US Civil War as test cases for this model. The Berkley Center’s Timothy Samuel Shah will moderate Patterson’s discussion with LtCol John Gallagher, a former West Point professor and current staff officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Register for this event here.
8. Anti-Extremism Laws in Russia, Pakistan, and China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Thursday November 8, 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM, Freedom House
Venue: Freedom House 1301 Connecticut Ave. NW 4th Floor Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: David Kramer, Virab Khachatryan, Peter Roudik, Aleksandr Verhovsky, Laney Zhang
Freedom House is pleased to host a roundtable with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on the anti-extremism legal frameworks in China, Pakistan, and Russia. Moderated by Freedom House President David Kramer, the on-the-record roundtable will provide an opportunity for participants to engage experts and authors of The Law Library of Congress’s report Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism. The participants will compare and contrast the differing approaches to anti-extremism laws in China, Pakistan, and Russia. The round table comes at an important time as repressive regimes are developing anti-extremism laws and implementing them in broad terms to suppress criticism.
Register for this event here.
9. Afghanistan 2014: What Happens Next? A Discussion with the Former Ambassador of Afghanistan Said Tayeb Jawad, Thursday November 8, 7:30 PM – 9:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Henry Harding Auditorium, Room 213
Speaker: Said Tayeb Jawad
Delta Phi Epsilon Professional Foreign Service Sorority and the Afghan Student Association proudly present “Afghanistan 2014: What Happens Next? A Discussion with the Former Ambassador of Afghanistan, Said Tayeb Jawad.” The Ambassador will discuss the future of Afghanistan with the scheduled U.S. withdrawal and the 2014 Afghan elections.
Register for this event here.
10. Cyber as a Form of National Power, Friday November 9, 5:00 PM – 6:30 PM, Institute of World Politics
Venue: The Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Samuel Liles
Dr. Samuel Liles is an associate professor at Purdue University West Lafayette in the Computer Information Technology Department of the College of Technology where he teaches computer forensics. Dr. Liles is a faculty member with CERIAS at Purdue University. CERIAS is known as the premier multidisciplinary academic center in information security and assurance, and has produced nearly half of the PhD graduates in that field in the US over the last 15 years. Previously he was a professor in the Information Resources Management College at The National Defense University in Washington DC, and prior to that the Computer Information Technology Department at Purdue University Calumet. As a researcher his interest is in cyber warfare as a form of low intensity conflict has had him presenting to audiences world-wide. Samuel Liles completed his PhD at Purdue University primarily studying cyber conflict, issues of cyber conflict, information assurance and security, and cyber forensics.
RSVP for this event to kbridges@iwp.edu.
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