Tag: Russia
Follow the money
The real difference between the candidates on foreign policy issues is not what they say they would do but what they want to fund, which ultimately affects what whoever is elected can do. The Ryan budget proposal, which Romney has said he backs, cuts international affairs spending by almost 10% in 2013 and close to a quarter by 2016 while funding a giant military buildup (on top of the buildup that has occurred since 9/11). Obama does not propose cuts to military spending, but he is trying to keep it below previously projected levels. His “international affairs” budget proposal for 2013 would keep that category more or less at current levels, taking inflation into account.
The consequences of this difference between the candidates for American foreign policy are dramatic. We are already overusing our highly competent, effective and expensive military forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, they often substituted for far cheaper, but unavailable, civilians: the military provided not only humanitarian aid, which it is required to do in “non-permissive” environments, but also development and state-building assistance. I won’t be surprised if the U.S. military (along with the paramilitary parts of CIA) now has more foreign assistance money available than USAID. The Ryan budget proposal, if adopted, would dramatically increase reliance on the U.S. military for non-military aid, statebuilding, international law enforcement and other fundamentally civilian tasks.
This is not smart. At well over $1 million per deployed soldier (counting support and infrastructure costs), the U.S. military is a fabulously expensive way of getting things done. Relying on it for civilian tasks is the international equivalent of relying on emergency rooms for routine medical care. You may get it done, but only at a far higher price than providing the same care in doctors’ offices or community clinics.
The supposedly business-savvy Governor Romney is suggesting both health care in emergency rooms and use of our armed forces when civilians might suffice. Moreover, experience indicates that the existence of a strong military instrument without equally strong civilian instruments will get us into wars that we might otherwise avoid: need I mention Iraq? If anyone doubts whether our military has been thinking ahead to Iran, this map should be instructive:
I do not mean to suggest, as many of those publishing this map do, that we would be better off without these military installations. Clearly they lend credibility to the threat of force that will be essential if ever there is a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. And if diplomacy fails, the military option needs to be on the table.
But it is hard for me to imagine that we spend more 1 one-thousandth of the cost of these bases on the diplomatic effort with Iran. We may in fact spend significantly less. That means that a 1 one-thousandth chance of a diplomatic solution is worth pursuing. I would put the real odds of diplomatic success at more like 50/50 or maybe 25/75. Someone on the right might say the odds are 1/10. But what Ryan and Romney are proposing is that we cut the diplomatic effort and increase the military push. Does that make financial sense?
I hasten to note that Romney has also made some sensible proposals to use American foreign assistance money more effectively by focusing on rule of law and establishing conditions for successful private initiative. The trouble is there won’t be any money in the government kitty to do those things if he is elected and the Ryan budget adopted.
Iran is the odd problem these days. It may require a military solution, but that is unusual. China as a currency manipulator does not. Even Russia as a geopolitical threat, if you think it one, requires diplomacy more than military mobilization. George W. Bush, no retiring violet, did not try to respond militarily to Russia when it went to war with Georgia, a country he wanted to get into NATO. The list of problems not amenable to military solution is long: Pakistan’s drift toward extremism, Afghanistan’s corrupt government, the stalled Middle East peace process. It is striking that the international community is busy mobilizing an exclusively military response to Islamist extremism in Mali, where a more balanced approach that emphasizes local community economic development would be far more likely to succeed.
I know it won’t happen, but this is what the two candidates should be asked at the debate: given the strains on the U.S. military, what would you do to strengthen America’s civilian instruments of foreign policy and how are those priorities reflected in your budget proposals?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
How do you say fast and furious in Arabic?
I’m surprised the American-imposed limits on arms transfers to the Syrian opposition from Qatar and Saudi Arabia are front page news today in the New York Times. It has been common knowledge for some time that the United States does not want shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons (man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS) transferred to Syrian rebels. Anti-tank weapons are likewise blocked.
I thought it obvious why. But apparently not, so let’s review the merits of the case. These weapons pose a serious threat to commercial aircraft and other civilian targets. Washington does not want to transfer weapons that fall into extremist hands and are then used against Americans. “Fast and furious” comes to mind–the scandal surrounding a transfer of guns to Mexican drug cartels in order to track them that ended in the murder of American border patrol agent. So, too, does the Washington-sponsored mujahideen effort against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which armed radical Islamist forces that are now fighting against the Americans.
Rumint has it that there are hundreds of thousands of MANPADs already in circulation. If so, it is hard to understand how none have made it into Syria. I am told that American ones come with a difficult-to-replace 90-day battery. If effective, that would make them relatively unattractive. I don’t know whether Russian, Chinese, Iranian, British and other systems have similar immobilizing measures. There have been a number of incidents in which MANPADS have been used against civilian aircraft: in Rhodesia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Iraq. Some attempts were successful, others not. It does not take a lot of imagination to picture why officials in Washington would worry about MANPADS getting into the wrong hands.
Anti-tank weapons come in a bewildering variety, wire-guided and not. Some seem to have made their way to Syria, where the rebels have often destroyed the regime’s tanks. I have a hard time understanding why Washington would worry much about the transfer of these weapons, especially if they are already in theater. It would of course be wiser to transfer them to more reliable people, but war doesn’t allow a lot of fine distinctions to be made.
A birdie tells me that the Syrian opposition is getting all the AK-47s and other “light” weapons it needs. It is not doing them a whole lot of good. The Syrian army is using artillery, tanks, snipers and the occasional aircraft to project force far beyond the range the rebels can target effectively when they shoot back.
The real question for Washington at this point is whether to allow the Syrian opposition to get MANPADS, which it would use to enforce a de facto no-fly zone over the areas that it controls. This could level the playing field and allow the opposition to hold on to liberated areas. I haven’t been enthusiastic about the arming of the opposition, not the least because it strengthens extreme Islamist and other anti-democratic forces that should not inherit Syria from the Asad regime. But with the civic opposition yesterday demonstrating in favor of arming Free Syrian Army, it is hard to oppose a shift in Washington’s stance that would allow MANPADS with appropriate self-limiting technology and anti-tank weapons to reach it.
U.S. government officials have been insisting that they draw the line at “lethal” assistance, presumably to bolster their so far unsuccessful efforts to turn the Russians and Chinese around on Syria and allow a UN Security Council resolution with teeth to pass. But with Iran, Hizbollah and the Russians pouring arms and men into Asad’s efforts to crush the rebellion and Syria repeatedly firing artillery into the territory of NATO-member Turkey, isn’t it time to consider leveling the playing field, as the diplomats say?
If that shift takes place, we have to recognize that there is a real possibility that the weapons will some day be used us. How do you say “fast and furious” in Arabic?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Obama’s second term international priorities
I admit to being cheered last weekend looking at the TPM Electoral Scoreboard. It has President Obama over the 270 electoral votes needed to win, counting only the states that strongly favor, favor or lean in his direction. All the toss-up states save North Carolina are showing thin margins in favor of the President. Key Senate races in Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Virginia are likewise showing small margins for the Democratic contenders. It is still a long time (and three nationally televised debates) to election day, but the drift for the moment is clear.
The President is also getting over 50 per cent approval for his handling of foreign policy. Far be it from me to want to rain on his parade, but I think he should do more and better on international issues in the future.
The President hasn’t had much to say about what he would do on foreign policy in a second term, apart from completing the U.S. turnover of security responsibility to the Afghans (as well as withdrawing more troops) and preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, preferably by diplomatic means but if necessary using force. He hasn’t said much on the Middle East peace process (such as it isn’t), maintained silence on Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s re-concentration of power, showed reluctance to do anything about Syria, hesitated to challenge China, and lacks new ideas on Pakistan and Russia.
I don’t say all this is wrong. Hesitation with China definitely beats Romney’s bellicosity, which will create the animosity we need to avoid. China has already revalued its currency significantly, something the President might want to take more credit for. It is not at all clear to me what he can do about Pakistan or Russia at this point. Maybe let them stew in its own juices for a while, until they soften up. The choices in Syria are difficult ones. Doing anything more will have real costs.
America needs, as the President never fails to say, to put its own house in order. Nation-building at home he calls it. But I would still like to know what his foreign policy priorities will be in 2013-17. The fact that Mitt Romney has failed to force Obama to specify more clearly his future foreign policy priorities is just one of the many shortcomings in a Republican campaign that will be remembered for its many unforced errors and lapses in good judgment.
But there are a few things even a convinced Obamista like me would like to see the President do or say. With no need to worry about re-election after November 6, I hope he’ll get tough with both Israelis and Palestinians. Admittedly he tried during the first term, insisting on a complete settlement freeze. But this was an ill-conceived formulation that led to intransigence on both sides rather than progress. The situation in Syria has deteriorated so badly that it may be worth another run in the Security Council at a no-fly zone. Once the Americans are down to whatever minimum numbers are required in Afghanistan, I hope Obama will find ways to toughen his stance with Pakistan. Iraq, too, needs a bit tougher love.
But none of these things comes close to the big one: avoiding a nuclear Iran and the proliferation of nuclear weapons it will precipitate. This is the overwhelming first priority, as it threatens a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East and a sharp increase in the risks of war, even nuclear war, there. Israel lacks the means to do serious and permanent damage to Iran’s nuclear program with conventional weapons, but it has all it needs to obliterate Iran with nuclear weapons.
If we fail to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, the prospects are grim. What do you think Israel is likely to do if it perceives that Iran is getting ready to launch a nuclear weapon targeted on Tel Aviv? Will it wait and see whether the Iranians are, as many people think, “rational actors”? Or will it try to ensure that none of Iran’s missiles will ever get to launch? Launch on warning, which is what the Israelis will most likely do, is inherently unstable.
Lots of my colleagues are having second looks at containment, because the prospects for conventional military action against the Iranian nuclear program look so limited. Admittedly, containment is the fallback position.
But containment with two convincing rational actors who have the better part of an hour to make decisions, the best conceivable communications with each other and no serious threat to regime survival other than a single adversary is one thing. Containment with two actors who each believe the other is irrational (both could even be right), one of whom has less than full confidence in regime survivability even without a war, maybe 10 minutes to make decisions, and no reliable communications is something else. Yes, India and Pakistan have survived almost 15 years without using nuclear weapons on each other, and the increasing trade between the two creates disincentives to war. But a nuclear exchange between the two is still far more likely than war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And we are a long way from trade between Iran and Israel as a barrier to conflict.
Andrew Sullivan, in a fit of hopefulness, comments:
To date, Obama’s response has been like Reagan’s: provide unprecedented military defense systems for Israel, deploy our best technology against Iran, inflict crippling sanctions, and yet stay prepared, as Reagan did, to deal with the first signs of sanity from Tehran. Could Obama find an Iranian Gorbachev? Unlikely. But no one expected the Soviet Union to collapse as Reagan went into his second campaign either, and it had not experienced a mass revolt in his first term, as Iran did in Obama’s. And yet by isolation, patience, allied unity, and then compromise, the unthinkable happened. I cannot say I am optimistic—but who saw the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1984?
Hope however is not a policy. What should Obama do to try to resolve the Iran nuclear issue in a second term?
The Administration has been understandably reluctant to put a serious package of incentives for Iran to forgo a nuclear weapon on the table before the U.S. election. Negotiating a deal with Iran is not going to help on November 6. But I hope after November 6 the Administration will make a direct and convincing offer to Tehran: temporary suspension of enrichment, a full accounting of past activities, tight and unfettered safeguards, no enrichment ever above 20%, no stockpiles of enriched uranium in a form that can be further enriched, and a permanent commitment not to seek nuclear weapons in exchange for full sanctions relief. That would be a policy, not a hope.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This week’s peace picks
It’s a busy week, with lots of variety:
1. Pulling Pakistan out of Economic Crisis, Monday September 24, 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Sixth Floor
Speakers: Shahid Javed Burki, Parvez Hasan, Eric Manes, Aisha Pasha
This event marks the release of a new study on Pakistan’s economy. It is produced by Beaconhouse National University’s Institute of Public Policy, based in Lahore, Pakistan.
2. Russian-Iranian Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy, Monday September 24, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Sixth Floor
Speaker: Mark N. Katz
Moscow does not want to see Tehran acquire nuclear weapons. Despite this, Russia has been reluctant to cooperate much with the U.S. in preventing this. In his talk, Mark N. Katz, Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University, and former Title VIII-Supported Research and Short-Term Scholar, Kennan Institute, will discuss why this is.
3. The Myanmar Conference @ CSIS, Tuesday September 15, 8:00 AM – 4:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 conference facility
Speakers: Jim Webb, Kurt Campbell, Christopher Johnson, David Steinberg, Salai Ngun Cung Lian, Tin Maung Maung Than, Ernie Bower, Serge Pun, David Dapice, Shigehiro Tanaska, Elizabeth Hernandez, Mathew Goodman, Stephen Groff, Christopher Herink, Thomas Dillon, Gregory Beck, Murray Hiebert, Michael Green
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) will host a select and high-level group of experts and senior policy makers for The Myanmar Conference @ CSIS, to be held September 25, 2012, at the CSIS B1 conference facility. We have recruited a world-class group of experts to kick off the on-the-record dialogue around four key themes:
i. Political and Security Developments in Myanmar
ii. Trade, Investment, and Infrastructure
iii. Humanitarian Situation and Foreign Assistance
iv. Conclusions: Recommendations for U.S. Policy toward Myanmar
The conference is being organized around the time of the visits of Myanmar President Thein Sein and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to the United States in late September. There is great interest to explore the implications for U.S. policy in the wake of the political and economic reforms in Myanmar and the recent easing of U.S. sanctions ahead of the U.S. presidential and congressional elections in November.
Register for this event here.
4. Ambassador Cameron Munter on Pakistan, Tuesday September 25, 9:00 AM – 10:30 AM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Cameron Munter
In one of his first public event since returning from Islamabad, Ambassador Cameron Munter will deliver an address on the challenges and opportunities ahead in Pakistan. Frederic Grare will moderate.
Register for this event here.
5. Campaign 2012: Arab Awakening, Tuesday September 25, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Benjamin Wittes, Stephanie Gaskell, Raj M. Desai, Shadi Hamid, Tamara Cofman Wittes
Following the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the death of U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens, the United States is weighing its position and policies in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. More than a year after the initial Arab uprisings, the United States is questioning the state of its relations with the nascent Arab democracies and the emerging Islamist regimes. As the second anniversary of the Arab revolutions approaches, political and economic instability persists alongside growing anti-American sentiment, forcing the United States to adapt its policies to the evolving landscape in the Middle East. With the U.S. election just over six weeks away, many American voters are questioning the presidential candidates’ foreign policy strategies toward the region and wondering how the volatility in the Middle East and North Africa will affect the United States in the months and years ahead.
On September 25, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will hold a discussion on the Arab Awakening, the tenth in a series of forums that will identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. POLITICO Pro defense reporter Stephanie Gaskell will moderate a panel discussion where Brookings experts Tamara Cofman Wittes, Shadi Hamid and Raj Desai will present recommendations to the next president.
Register for this event here.
6. Georgia on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections, Tuesday September 25, 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Carnegie Conference Center
Speakers: Thomas de Waal, Mamuka Tsereteli, Cory Welt
On October 1, Georgia votes in a parliamentary election which is set to be its most important and closely-watched contest since the Rose Revolution of 2003. The election is also a shadow leadership election, and its outcome will determine who becomes the leader of the country when a new constitution takes effect next year, as the second term of current president Mikheil Saakashvili ends.
The governing party, the United National Movement, is facing a strong challenge from the recently formed opposition Georgian Dream coalition, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili. The political temperature is high as both sides are predicting victory and exchanging claims and counter-claims about the conduct of the election.
Register for this event here.
7. 2012 African Economic Outlook Report, Wednesday September 26, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Atlantic Council
Venue: Atlantic Council, 1101 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005, 11th Floor
Speakers: Todd Moss, Mthuli Ncube, Mwangi Kimenyi, John Simon, J. Peter Pham
The Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center and the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution are pleased to invite you to a panel discussion on the findings of the 2012 African Economic Outlook (AEO) report. The AEO is a collaborative effort of the African Development Bank, the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Development Program, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. The annual report surveys and analyzes the economic performance of fifty-three African countries, including, for the first time, Eritrea and newly independent South Sudan.
This year’s report focuses on a critical area of the continent’s socio-economic development: youth unemployment and education. Youth unemployment has been a persistent problem for a majority of African countries and a formidable obstacle to economic growth and stability. Youth dissatisfaction played a major role in the escalation of political unrest in North Africa in the past year, which resulted in a significant decrease in economic growth in the region. Given Africa’s rapidly growing population, the demographic pressure on labor markets in African countries will continue to increase. If African countries commit to education and skills training, however, Africa’s youth bulge could become a significant competitive advantage in a rapidly aging world.
Mthuli Ncube, chief economist and vice president of the African Development Bank, will provide brief remarks on the reports’ findings and broader implications for Africa’s future, followed by a panel discussion. Panelists will discuss the many unpredictable factors threatening the continent’s economic growth offer brief remarks and policy recommendations for African nations before opening the floor to a question and answer session.
RSVP for this event to achuck@acus.org.
8. Will the Monarchs Reform? Challenges to Democracy in the Gulf, Wednesday September 26, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Project on Middle East Democracy at SEIU
Venue: SEIU, 1800 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036, First Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Maryam al-Khawaja, Les Campbell, Kristin Diwan, Stephen McInerney
While 2011 and 2012 have witnessed unprecedented changes across the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates – have not been shaken to the same degree, with the notable exception of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the dramatic uprisings across the region have had a clear impact on both the populations and governments of the Gulf, and it is worth examining political developments and the state of human rights in these countries.
How have the uprisings and political changes in other Arab countries been perceived by both the governments and citizens of the GCC? What steps have been taken by these governments to prevent similar changes from happening in their own countries, and how have these steps been received both domestically and internationally? What, if any, steps toward democratic reform have been taken, and what future actions might we expect from Gulf governments with regard to reform? How have the GCC governments changed their approach toward their citizens, civil society organizations, media outlets, and labor unions? How have the dramatic political changes in the region affected relations between the U.S. and the governments and people of the Gulf? And how can the U.S. and other international actors engage with the Gulf in a manner that helps its citizens realize their democratic aspirations?
Register for this event here.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The unlikely parade
According to Serbia’s constitution, all citizens have the right to a peaceful demonstration. Homosexuals appear to be exempt from the rule. Even though LGBT activists announced several months in advance their plan to stage the Gay Pride events, including the parade, September 30-October 7. Serbian prime and interior minister Ivica Dačić recently stressed that the demonstration could be banned if the police assess the security risks as too high. Dačić added that he basically supports human rights of all people, including homosexuals, but is not going to risk the lives and safety of his policemen and potential participants of the parade.
Last year the Pride Parade was banned at the eleventh hour. The official explanation was that far right extremists were planning terrorist actions. No further information has been released since, nor has anyone been arrested in connection with these allegations. Organizers now fear the government will use the security risks as an excuse to ban Pride once again.
The issue is weightier than a few demonstrators in Belgrade. Now a candidate for EU membership, Serbia is hoping to get a date to start accession talks, which brings with it substantial financing. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Reeker was among the first foreign diplomats to state public support to the Pride organizers. Several EU officials – including Jelko Kacin, the European parliament rapporteur for Serbia – have confirmed their attendance. While this year’s Gay Pride may not be crucial for Serbia’s further progress toward EU membership – at least not to the extent that improvement in relations with Kosovo is – the Europeans will certainly take it into account when deliberating on whether the country merits the date.
The first attempt by LGBT organizations to hold the parade was in 2001. The event ended in chaos, with participants brutally battered by football hooligans and militant ultranationalists. The organizers accused the police of deliberately failing to protect them. Scenes from television reports suggest they may well have been right.
Frightened of violence, LGBT activists were not even thinking of organizing the parade again until 2009, but the government eventually decided to disallow it. The decision has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court only recently, which gives the LGBT community some hope that this year the tide might be turned.
In 2010, hundreds of Serbian lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transexuals were finally allowed to occupy a strictly enclosed area of the capital for about an hour, completely surrounded by cordons of police. Whether the demonstration was a success is debatable however. While the participants suffered no attack during the rally thanks to the immense security presence, the rest of the town saw a series of clashes between hooligans and riot police, who were ordered to show as much restraint toward rioters as possible. Belgrade was trashed. Of about 200 injured, a large majority were policemen. The government was believed to have allowed the demonstration only to improve its chances of getting EU candidate status.
Serbia is a conservative society and people generally oppose the gay parade. Although most of them disapprove violence against the LGBT population, they also believe that homosexuals should not express their sexual identity in public places. Homophobia is mainly present among younger generations. Teenagers are the most violent members of extreme nationalist and football hooligan groups.
In addition to the issue of human rights in general and gay rights in particular, the government’s hesitancy raises the question of Serbia’s institutional capability to guarantee its citizens an elementary level of safety. There is a widespread belief that the militant far right groups consist entirely of “kids” from the margins of society who use violence merely as a way to express frustration. While that may be true for some of the low-level operatives, the bulk of their leaders – especially of football hooligan groups – are well situated individuals with criminal records that involve serious offenses such as armed robberies, drug trade, extortion, murder attempts and so on.
Despite their criminal activities, most of these extremists have rarely, if ever, been brought to justice. The support they enjoy from the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), which is the most popular and influential institution in the country, helps them gain legitimacy among ordinary people and portray themselves as the “ultimate guardians of the Serb Orthodoxy and heroic tradition.” Outgoing Russian ambassador Aleksandr Konuzin – who is almost as popular here as SPC – was photographed with members of far right groups on several occasions, including his visit to the Serbs from northern Kosovo.
Militant ultranationalists were most privileged during the prime ministry of former conservative nationalist prime minister Vojislav Koštunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), which ended in 2008 after an attack on the U.S. embassy building in Belgrade amid riots against Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The order for security forces to withdraw could not have been issued except by a top police or government official, but even four years later it still remains a mystery who was in command that day.
Several other cases have also clearly illustrated the strength of Serbian far right militants. During the 2010 gay parade, they demonstrated not only surprisingly high organizational capabilities, but also considerable knowledge of guerrilla tactics in their battle with police. Last year evidence appeared in some media of young Serbs attending Russian camps to learn military skills. Perhaps the most notable example was a few years ago, when leaders of a football hooligan group managed to wiretap police communications prior to a derby match and thus learn about police plans to prevent them from fighting with rival fans.
The overal number of militant extremists in Serbia is estimated to be between ten and fifteen thousand. Most, if not all, of them are well known to the police and intelligence agencies. Professor Zoran Dragišić, a prominent security expert, has asserted that it would have taken the Gendarmerie no more than seventeen minutes to arrest the vast majority of violent militants. So far there has been no indication of political will to order such a nationwide police operation. It’s high time.
PS from Daniel Serwer 2 October: Milan is not the only Serbian citizen who sees possible cancellation of the parade as reflecting badly on the security services.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
שנה טובה! لله أكبر
It is Rosh Hashanah, the first day of the seventh month, when Jews celebrate the new year and creation of the world. Don’t ask me how or why the world was created in the seventh month. I have no idea.
I’d like to wish a happy new year (שנה טובה, shana tova) to all my readers: it was a beautiful fall morning in Washington, one that belies the horrors of the repression in Syria, the murderous attack in Benghazi, the violence against American embassies, consulates and bases in Tunis, Cairo, Khartoum and elsewhere. We are fortunate indeed to enjoy a peaceful capital, one that approaches the November election with some anxiety but no real fear. I can write what I like, say what I like, publish what I like, worrying only about who might sue me rather than who might kill or arrest me. This is not my privilege, but my right.
I talked yesterday with a Venezuelan who left her country because of a well-founded fear of persecution and found asylum in the United States. She anticipates Chavez will win again in her country’s elections next month. I’ve seen her look of pain and longing for home in the eyes of Bosnians, Kosovars, Palestinians, Iraqis, Libyans, Syrians and I don’t know how many other nationalities. My immigrant grandparents never had it though: they were glad to leave places that are now in eastern Poland and Belarus for a better life, as they had previously left Russia, and likely Spain before that. My grandmother refused to tell me where she was born. When I came back and asked what her native language was, she told me (in heavily accented New Yorkese), “Don’t be smart. I told you I did not want to talk about that!”
I feel reasonably safe in predicting that the year ahead will see many more people displaced and unable to return home. Some will be fortunate enough to find asylum in the U.S. or some other decent place. Some may even adopt my grandmother’s attitude: I’m better off now, why should I look back? But all too many will not. They will suffer violence, brutality, poverty, hunger, thirst, dislocation, discrimination, abuse. They will fight for their rights, rebel against oppression, flee for their lives. If you believe the statistics, the world is a good deal more peaceful and a good deal more democratic than it was in the last century. But there are a lot more people and a lot of bad things are still happening to a substantial percentage of them.
Jews devote most of the new year to worship of the deity. The basic message is the same as the Muslim one:
الله أكبر
Allahu akhbar. God is great.
But it is not a god who creates the problems that lead to mistreatment of people, or a god who will solve them. Sometimes nature contributes with a drought, a storm, an earthquake or something of that sort. But most of the problems that still plague large parts of the world are man-made. Even worse, they are often made with good intentions. All the people I know who have committed war crimes can give you decent rational explanations of why the did what they did: to protect their own people, to prevent massacres in the future, to respond to provocations. Their reasoning often hides greed for money or power. It almost always requires that they not be judged by the standards they use to judge others.
So the part of this morning’s synagogue service I liked the best was not the praise of our common, much-praised deity, but this part:
When will redemption come?
When we master the violence that fills our world.
When we look upon others as we would have them look upon us.
When we grant to every person the rights we claim for ourselves.
שנה טובה الله أكبر
Happy new year. God is great.
RSS - Posts
