Tag: Russia
GOP critique: Russia and Latin America
This is the fifth installment of a series responding to the Romney campaign’s list of ten failures in Obama’s foreign and national security policies.
Failure #7: A “Reset” With Russia That Has Compromised U.S. Interests & Values
The “reset” with Russia has certainly not brought great across the board benefits to the United States, but things were pretty bad between Washington and Moscow at the end of the Bush Administration, which had started in friendly enough fashion with George W. getting good vibes from Putin’s soul. Bush 43 ended his administration with a Russian invasion of a country the president wanted to bring into NATO. Neither our interests nor our values were well-served by that. But there was nothing we could do, so he did nothing.
A reset was in order. With Putin back in the presidency, it should be no surprise that it hasn’t gotten us far, but certainly it got us a bit more cooperation during Medvedev’s presidency on Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan than we were getting in 2008. The Russians are still being relatively helpful in the P5+1 talks with Iran and the “six-party” talks on and occasionally with North Korea. Their cooperation has been vital to the Northern Distribution Network into Afghanistan.
The Republicans count as demerits for President Obama his abandonment of a missile defense system in Europe, without mentioning that a more modest (and more likely to function) system is being installed. They also don’t like “New START,” which is an arms control treaty that has enabled the U.S. to reduce its nuclear arsenal.
I count both moves as pluses, though I admit readily that I don’t think any anti-missile system yet devised will actually work under wartime conditions. Nor do I think Iran likely to deliver a nuclear weapon to Europe on a missile. It would be much easier in a shipping container.
The fact that the Russians could, theoretically, increase their nuclear arsenal under New START is just an indication of how far behind the curve we’ve gotten in reducing our own arsenal and how easy it should be to go farther. The Romneyites don’t see it that way, but six former Republican secretaries of state and George H. W. Bush backed New START.
The GOPers are keen on “hot mic” moments that allegedly show the President selling out America. This is the foreign policy wonk version of birtherism. In this instance, they are scandalized that he suggested to then Russian President Medvedev that the U.S. could be more flexible on missile defense after the November election. The Republicans see this as “a telling moment of weakness.” I see it as a statement of the screamingly obvious. Neither party does deals with the Russians just before an election for some not-so-difficult to imagine reason.
More serious is the charge that President Obama has soft-pedaled Russia’s backsliding on democracy and human rights. I think that is accurate. The Administration sees value in the reset and does not want to put it at risk. The arguments for targeted visa bans and asset freezes against human rights abusers are on the face of it strong.
The problems are in implementation: if someone is mistreated in a Russian prison, are we going to hold Putin responsible? The interior minister? The prison warden? The prison guards? How are you going to decide about culpability for abuses committed ten thousand miles away? And if the Russians retaliate for mistreatment of an American citizen in a Louisiana State penitentiary, what do we do then? While many of the people involved may not care about visas and asset freezes, where would the tit-for-tat bans end up?
Russia has unquestionably been unhelpful on Syria, blocking UN resolutions and shipping arms to the Asad regime. The Russians have also supported Hugo Chávez and used harsh rhetoric towards the United States. But what Romney would do about these things is unclear. His claim that Russia is our number one geopolitical foe is more likely to set the relationship with Moscow back than help us to get our way.
Failure #8: Emboldening The Castros, Chávez & Their Cohorts In Latin America
I’m having trouble picturing how the octogenarian Castros have been emboldened–to the contrary, they are edging towards market reforms. Obama’s relaxation of travel and remittance restrictions has encouraged that evolution. It would be foolhardy to predict the end of the Castro regime, but cautious opening of contacts is far more likely to bring good results than continuation of an embargo that has never achieved anything.
I’d have expected the Republicans to compliment Obama on getting the stalled trade agreements with Colombia and Panama approved, but instead they complain that he waited three years while negotiating improvements to them that benefit U.S. industry. Given the difficulty involved in getting these things ratified, it is unsurprising that President Obama doesn’t want to reach any new trade agreements in the region, or apparently anywhere else.
Hugo Chávez looms large for the Republicans. They view him as a strategic threat. Obama thinks he has not “had a serious national security impact note on us.” That Chávez is virulently anti-American there is no doubt. But to suggest that he seriously hinders the fight against illicit drugs and terrorism, or that his relationship with Hizbollah is a threat we can’t abide, is to commit what the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” We’ve got a lot bigger drug and terrorism challenges than those Venezuela is posing.
Except for Mexico, Obama has not paid a lot of attention to Latin America. That’s because things are going relatively well there. If Chávez goes down to defeat in the October 7 election and a peaceful transition takes place, it will be another big plus, one that will redound to Obama’s credit. There are other possibilities, so I’d suggest the Administration focus on making that happen over all the other things the GOP is concerned about.
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This week’s peace picks
There is far too much happening Monday and Tuesday in particular. But here are this week’s peace picks, put together by newly arrived Middle East Institute intern and Swarthmore graduate Allison Stuewe. Welcome Allison!
1. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Political Progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monday September 10, 10:00am-12:00pm, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, The Bernstein-Offit Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speaker: Patrick Moon
In June 2012, the governing coalition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had taken eighteen months to construct, broke up over ratification of the national budget. In addition, there has been heated debate over a proposed electoral reform law and the country’s response to a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. Party leaders are once again jockeying for power, and nationalist rhetoric is at an all-time high in the run-up to local elections in early October.
Register for this event here.
2. Just and Unjust Peace, Monday September 10, 12:00pm-2:00pm, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs
Venue: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, 3307 M Street, Washington, DC 20007, 3rd Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Daniel Philpott, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Lisa Cahill, Marc Gopin
What is the meaning of justice in the wake of massive injustice? Religious traditions have delivered a unique and promising answer in the concept of reconciliation. This way of thinking about justice contrasts with the “liberal peace,” which dominates current thinking in the international community. On September 14th, the RFP will host a book event, responding to Daniel Philpott’s recently published book, Just and Unjust Peace: A Ethic of Political Reconciliation. A panel of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish scholars will assess the argument for reconciliation at the theological and philosophical levels and in its application to political orders like Germany, South Africa, and Guatemala.
Register for this event here.
3. The New Struggle for Syria, Monday September 10, 12:00pm-2:00pm, George Washington University
Venue: Lindner Family Commons, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Room 602
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Gregory Gause, Curt Ryan, Marc Lynch
Three leading political scientists will discuss the regional dimensions of the Syrian conflict.
A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
4. Impressions from North Korea: Insights from two GW Travelers, Monday September 10, 12:30pm-2:00pm, George Washington University
Venue: GW’s Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Room 505
Speakers: Justin Fisher, James Person
The Sigur Center will host a discussion with two members of the GW community who recently returned from North Korea. Justin Fisher and James F. Person will discuss their time teaching and researching, respectively, in North Korea this Summer and impressions from their experiences. Justin Fisher spent a week in North Korea as part of a Statistics Without Borders program teaching statistics to students at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. James Person recently returned from a two-week trip to North Korea where he conducted historical research.
Register for this event here.
5. America’s Role in the World Post-9/11: A New Survey of Public Opinion, Monday September 10, 12:30pm-2:30pm, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, 6th Floor, Joseph H. and Claire Flom Auditorium
Speaker: Jane Harman, Marshall Bouton, Michael Hayden, James Zogby, Philip Mudd
This event will launch the latest biennial survey of U.S. public opinion conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and is held in partnership with them and NPR.
RSVP for this event to rsvp@wilsoncenter.org.
6. Transforming Development: Moving Towards an Open Paradigm, Monday September 10, 3:00pm-4:30pm, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, Fourth Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Ben Leo, Michael Elliott, Daniel F. Runde
Please join us for a discussion with Mr. Michael Elliot, President and CEO, ONE Campaign, and Mr. Ben Leo, Global Policy Director, ONE Campaign about their efforts to promote transparency, openness, accountability, and clear results in the evolving international development landscape. As the aid community faces a period of austerity, the panelists will explain how the old paradigm is being replaced by a new, more open, and ultimately more effective development paradigm. Mr. Daniel F. Runde, Director of the Project on Prosperity and Development and Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, CSIS will moderate the discussion.
RSVP for this event to ppd@csis.org.
7. Campaign 2012: War on Terrorism, Monday September 10, 3:30pm-5:00pm, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Josh Gerstein, Hafez Ghanem, Stephen R. Grand, Benjamin Wittes
With both presidential campaigns focused almost exclusively on the economy and in the absence of a major attack on the U.S. homeland in recent years, national security has taken a back seat in this year’s presidential campaign. However, the administration and Congress remain sharply at odds over controversial national security policies such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. What kinds of counterterrorism policies will effectively secure the safety of the United States and the world?
On September 10, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will hold a discussion on terrorism, the ninth in a series of forums that will identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. White House Reporter Josh Gerstein of POLITICO will moderate a panel discussion with Brookings experts Benjamin Wittes, Stephen Grand and Hafez Ghanem, who will present recommendations to the next president.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience. Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BITerrorism.
Register for this event here.
8. Democracy & Conflict Series II – The Middle East and Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace, Tuesday September 11, 9:30am-11:00am, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, ROME Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Azizah al-Hibri, Muqtedar Khan, Laith Kubba, Peter Mandaville, Joseph V. Montville
More than a year and a half following the self-immolation of a street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, Arab nations are grappling with the transition toward sustainable peace. The impact of the Arab Spring movement poses challenges for peaceful elections and establishing stable forms of democratic institutions. This well-versed panel of Middle East and human rights experts will reflect on the relevance and role of Islamic religious values and the influence of foreign policy as democratic movements in the Middle East negotiate their futures.
Register for this event here.
9. Israel’s Security and Iran: A View from Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, Tuesday September 11, 9:30am-11:00am, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, Kenneth M. Pollack
While Israel and Iran continue trading covert punches and overheated rhetoric, the question of what Israel can and will do to turn back the clock of a nuclear Iran remains unanswered. Some Israelis fiercely advocate a preventive military strike, while others press just as passionately for a diplomatic track. How divided is Israel on the best way to proceed vis-à-vis Iran? Will Israel’s course put it at odds with Washington?
On September 11, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, the former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Defense Forces, for a discussion on his views on the best approach to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, Lt. Gen. Haloutz will take audience questions.
Register for this event here.
10. Montenegro’s Defense Reform: Cooperation with the U.S., NATO Candidacy and Regional Developments, Tuesday September 11, 10:00am-11:30am, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 1625 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 211/212
Montenegro has been one of the recent success stories of the Western Balkans. Since receiving a Membership Action Plan from NATO in December 2009, in close cooperation with the U.S. it has implemented a series of defense, political, and economic reforms, which were recognized in the Chicago Summit Declaration in May 2012 and by NATO Deputy Secretary General Vershbow in July 2012. Montenegro contributes to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and offers training support to the Afghan National Security Forces. In June 2012 it opened accession talks with the European Union.
Register for this event here.
11. Inevitable Last Resort: Syria or Iran First?, Tuesday September 11, 12:00pm-2:00pm, The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
Venue: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 N. Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203, Suite 200
Speakers: Michael S. Swetnam, James F. Jeffrey, Barbara Slavin, Theodore Kattouf, Gen Al Gray
Does the expanding civil war in Syria and its grave humanitarian crisis call for immediate international intervention? Will Iran’s potential crossing of a nuclear weapon “red line” inevitably trigger unilateral or multilateral military strikes? Can diplomacy still offer urgent “honorable exit” options and avoid “doomsday” scenarios in the Middle East? These and related issues will be discussed by both practitioners and observers with extensive experience in the region.
RSVP for this event to icts@potomacinstitute.org or 703-562-4522.
12. Elections, Stability, and Security in Pakistan, Tuesday September 11, 3:30pm-5:00pm, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Frederic Grare, Samina Ahmed
With the March 2013 elections approaching, the Pakistani government has an opportunity to ensure a smooth transfer of power to the next elected government for the first time in the country’s history. Obstacles such as a lack of security, including in the tribal borderlands troubled by militant violence, and the need to ensure the participation of more than 84 million voters threaten to derail the transition. Pakistan’s international partners, particularly the United States, will have a crucial role in supporting an uninterrupted democratic process.
Samina Ahmed of Crisis Group’s South Asia project will discuss ideas from her new report. Carnegie’s Frederic Grare will moderate.
Register for this event here.
13. Islam and the Arab Awakening, Tuesday September 11, 7:00pm-8:00pm, Politics and Prose
Venue: Politics and Prose, 5015 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008
Speaker: Tariq Ramadan
Starting in Tunisia in December 2010, Arab Spring has changed the political face of a broad swath of countries. How and why did these revolts come about–and, more important, what do they mean for the future? Ramadan, professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford and President of the European Muslim Network, brings his profound knowledge of Islam to bear on questions of religion and civil society.
14. Beijing as an Emerging Power in the South China Sea, Wednesday September 12, 10:00am, The House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2170 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515
Speakers: Bonnie Glaser, Peter Brookes, Richard Cronin
Oversight hearing.
15. The Caucasus: A Changing Security Landscape, Thursday September 13, 12:30pm-4:30pm, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, B1 Conference Center
Speakers: Andrew Kuchins, George Khelashvili, Sergey Markedonov, Scott Radnitz, Anar Valiyey, Mikhail Alexseev, Sergey Minasyan, Sufian Zhemukhov
The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 threatened to decisively alter the security context in the Caucasus. Four years later, what really has changed? In this conference, panelists assess the changing relations of the three states of the Caucasus — Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan — with each other and major neighbors, Russia and Iran. They also explore innovative prospects for resolution in the continued conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the possibility of renewed hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh. This conference is based on a set of new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memos, which will be available at the event and online at www.ponarseurasia.org. Lunch will be served.
RSVP for this event to REP@csis.org.
16. Author Series Event: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Little Afghanistan: The War Within the War for Afghanistan”, Thursday September 13, 6:30pm-8:30pm, University of California Washington Center
Venue: University of California Washington Center, 1608 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Rajiv Chandrasekaran
In the aftermath of the military draw-down of US and NATO forces after over ten years in Afghanistan, examinations of US government policy and efforts have emerged. What internal challenges did the surge of US troops encounter during the war? How was the US aiding reconstruction in a region previously controlled by the Taliban?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran will discuss his findings to these questions and US government policy from the perspective of an on-the-ground reporter during the conflict. This forum will shed light on the complex relationship between America and Afghanistan.
Register for this event here.
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Bear hug
Milan Marinković of Niš continues his series on the new government in Belgrade:
Last week Serbian defense minister Aleksandar Vučić spent a few days in his first official visit to Russia. After meeting with Russian deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin, who previously served as ambassador to NATO, Vučić told media the two sides agreed to engage in defense industry cooperation. The project would involve joint participation in the international market. In relation to this, Vučić announced that Serbia was going to open a factory for manufacturing complex military systems.
The agreement is currently in the preliminary stage. An expert team should be formed soon to work out specific details. In Serbia analysts are divided on potential effects of the cooperation. Some believe it could benefit Serbia’s defense industry, which is already a successful exporter of military equipment to third-world countries. Others are more cautious due to insufficient information and fear that Russia will obtain too much influence in Serbia.
The likely strengthening of military ties between Russia and Serbia is not a surprise. Shortly after becoming defense minister, Aleksandar Vučić said that Serbia, as a “militarily neutral“ country, will not join NATO or any other military alliance, but remains free to develop bilateral relationships with anyone. He praised good cooperation of the Serbian army with the Ohio National Guard, but criticized his predecessor for neglecting “other parts of the world” – notably Russia. Although Vučić’s narrative suggests that Belgrade is planning to keep on walking a thin line between East and West, for the moment it appears to be tacking East.
It is not only in defense affairs that Russo-Serbian relations are on the increase, but also in the economy. Russia says it is seriously interested to take part in vital infrastructure projects in Serbia as a major investor. The Serbian government has admitted it may have to sell several state-owned monopolies in order to reduce the ever growing budget deficit and public debt. Instead of private companies – either foreign or domestic – the most likely candidate to buy some of these is the Russian state. Russia is also frequently mentioned as a potential buyer of the steel factory in the town of Smederevo, which Serbia recently re-nationalized following the withdrawal of U.S. Steel from ownership of the factory.
Serbia is thus slowly but surely getting sucked into Russia’s sphere of influence. Being almost devastated economically, Serbia is in no position – and generally has no reason – to antagonize any country, and certainly not one like Russia, which is a force to be reckoned with even when at its weakest. Serbia needs good relations with Moscow. But having a good relationship is quite different from building a strategic partnership. If Serbia is still committed to European integration, as its government claims, then it must seek major allies among leading EU states as much as in the Kremlin.
A big part of the orientation towards Russia is based on populism. Serbs love Russia, including many who also support the country’s bid for EU membership. Vladimir Putin would no doubt win presidential elections in Serbia by a large margin if he were eligible to run. At the same time, the ongoing economic crisis is making the EU look less attractive in the eyes of the Serbian public – as evidenced by latest opinion polls.
Russia’s deep pockets may help save Serbia in the short-term. The question is whether Serb affection for Russia will be good or bad for Serbia and its European ambitions in the long run.
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America should not play Asad’s game
David Rohde asks “Is Syria America’s Responsibility?” But he never really answers that question, which is a good one. Instead he answers another one:
We must embrace Syrian moderates and openly declare them our allies. Whether or not we should provide them with military aid is a separate debate. But if we are going to provide non-lethal aid we should do so wholeheartedly. We cannot say America is behind you — secretly.
Of course we can and have often said America is behind you secretly. The fundamental problem is not secrecy, it is whom to assist and how. There is a military opposition and a civilian one. I’d rather we pumped non-lethal support into the civilians, Islamist or not. They are organizing upwards of 100 peaceful demonstrations (often more than 150) each day in Syria. The military effort is scaring Allawites, Christians and others into supporting the regime. The day they go out into the streets to demonstrate–which they will not do so long as the Free Syria Army is attacking–is the day Bashar will be forced from power.
But let’s be clear: Syria is not America’s responsibility. What is happening there is Bashar al Asad’s responsibility. The “responsibility to protect” is in the first instance Syria’s. Russia and Iran, as Syria’s prime military allies, are also responsible for what is becoming an effort to frighten Syrians into submission through random, but sectarian, killing. This technique was used in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to establish the “republic of fear.”
I doubt it will work in Syria, because too many people have already lost their fear. But let’s be clear: there is a lot to be afraid of, as events in the past couple of days at Daraya, a community near Damascus, testify. Upwards of 200 people appear to have been murdered by regime forces. Don’t click on this video if you are even remotely squeamish:
It is of course difficult to suggest that people subjected to this treatment should not respond by defending themselves. They certainly have every right to do so. But it is not clear that revolutionary violence will win the day over a regime that is armed to the teeth and ready to kill. It is for Syrians to decide what the best strategy is. But those of us concerned to see the revolution come out on top and Syria eventually evolve into a democracy are rightly concerned when we see priority given to military assistance.
Revolution and war are political struggles. Empowering those who will take Syria in a democratic direction is what America should worry about. Those are the civilian activists, who risk being pushed aside because Bashar al Asad prefers a military fight he thinks he can win. We should not be trapped into playing his game.
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Wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds
Yesterday’s Security Council decision to end the UN Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) is one of those inevitable moves that makes me wonder how the international system, such as it is, manages to survive. We had several hundred trained observers in Syria in close contact with officials of the Asad regime and at least some of the opposition activists. They played a critical role in reporting what was going on in Syria for several months and in assigning responsibility for events like the Houla massacre. We know we are going to need that kind of knowledge of the local terrain whenever a transition away from the Asad regime begins. What do we do? We withdraw the observers.
Fortunately the UN is wise enough to leave a couple of dozen international officials behind in Damascus. Their immediate concerns will be coordination of humanitarian assistance and support for the newly named UN/Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. But they will also be the vital brain trust of any future UN transition mission. My compliments to friend and colleague Edmond Mulet, who heads of UN peacekeeping, for maintaining at least a seed of something that can grow if and when circumstances permit.
While it is amply clear that the Annan plan failed, largely because the opposition was unwilling to negotiate with the regime so long as Bashar al Asad remains in place and Asad was unwilling to step aside, it is not clear if the savvy Brahimi has better prospects. He has rightly spent the last week or so trying to ensure stronger and more unified Security Council support for his mission, but he does not seem to have succeeded yet. The Americans have decided to go around the UN to collaborate with Turkey and provide more direct support to the Syrian revolutionaries. The Russians canceled a meeting scheduled for today in New York of the “action group” for Syria. When diplomats cancel meetings, things are not going well.
I won’t be surprised if withdrawal of the observers precipitates intensification of the fighting in Syria. With less likelihood of being observed internationally, both sides will try to gain advantage. The sectarian dimension of the fighting will deepen. The Iranians are playing a more and more critical role in supporting the regime, with the opposition reporting not only Iranian boots on the ground but also direct engagement in fighting. Saudi Arabia and Qatar will be upping their ante in the form of weapons for the opposition, which is begging for shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) to counter Asad’s increased use of aircraft.
None of this is good news. While conventional wisdom holds that Asad cannot last, when and how he goes will be important. Continuation of the violence for even a month or two more risks serious regional destabilization, which is the worst outcome for the United States. It is not uncommon these days for people to question whether the territorial division in the Levant, rooted in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, can last. If the state structure of the region starts to implode, the consequences could be a good deal more chaotic, and geographically more widespread, than what happened during Iraq’s sectarian civil war in 2006-7.
I am wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds.
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The worst of all possible worlds
It is getting hard to keep score, though this graphic from Al Jazeera English may help. Today’s big news is the defection of Syria’s prime minister, who didn’t like Bashar al Asad’s “war crimes and genocide.” About time he noticed. There are reports also of more military defections, even as the battle for Aleppo continues.
Does any of this matter? Or does Bashar get to hold on to his shrinking turf despite going into hiding and losing the support of regime stalwarts?
Michael Hanna offers an important part of the answer in a Tweet this morning:
Syrian defections follow strictly sectarian pattern, likely hardening core support. 1st big Alawi defection, if it comes,will be devastating
The Asad regime is increasingly relying on a narrow base of Alawite/Shia (about 12-13% of the population) support, as Sunnis (like the prime minister) peel away and denounce Bashar’s violence against the civilian population, which is majority Sunni. Christians and Druze have also been distancing themselves, and Kurds have taken up arms against the regime (without however aligning themselves with the opposition). The opposition draws its strength from the majority population and is supported by Sunni powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. What we are witnessing is a regional sectarian war in the making, one that could last a long time and involve ever-widening circles in the Levant.
The Alawites fight tenaciously because they think they know what is coming. This is an “existential” war for them: if the lose, they believe they will be wiped out.
That, along with Russian and Iranian support, could make this go on for a long time. If it does, the consequences for Syria and the region will be devastating. Damascus has already unleashed extremist Syrian Kurds to attack inside Turkey. Jordan is absorbing more than 100,000 Syrian refugees. Iraq’s efforts to guard its border with Syria have led to a confrontation with its own Kurdish peshmerga. Fighting between Sunnis and Alawites has spread to Lebanon, which is also absorbing large numbers of Syrian refugees. The Syrian opposition claims to have captured 48 Iranians in Damascus, sent there to help the regime (Tehran unabashedly claims they were religious pilgrims).
Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of sectarian polarization is an interest broadly shared in the international community. As The Economist pointed out last week, Russian interests won’t be served if Syria descends into total chaos. Some would like to suggest that territorial separation is a solution. This is nonsense: no one will agree on the lines to be drawn, which will be decided by force of arms directed against the civilian population. That is the truth of what happened in Bosnia, however much the myth-makers delude themselves.
There are several ways the violence might end:
- a definitive victory by the opposition (it is hard now to picture a definitive victory by the regime).
- an international intervention to separate the warring forces and impose what the U.S. military likes to call a “safe and secure environment.”
- a coup from within the regime, followed by a “pacted” (negotiated) transition.
Any of these would be better than continuation of the current chaos, which is the worst of all possible worlds. But I’m afraid that is the mostly likely course of events until Moscow and Washington get together and decide to collaborate in ending the bloodshed.
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