Tag: Russia
Make sure time is not on his side
President Obama issued a statement Friday (that’s when we say things we don’t want too widely noticed) marking the 18th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide:
…we pause to reflect with horror and sadness on the 100 days in 1994 when 800,000 people lost their lives. The specter of this slaughter of mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters haunts us still, and reminds the nations of the world of our shared responsibility to do all we can to protect civilians and to ensure that evil of this magnitude never happens again.
The irony here should not be lost: we are in the midst of a much slower and less bloody but still brutal repression of civilian dissent in Syria, where the toll amounts to something over 10,000 during the past year. No one has called it genocide, but it is certainly what the trade knows as politicide: an effort to murder political opponents, especially of the Sunni Islamist persuasion, into submission. Human Rights Watch reports today on extrajudicial executions.
I can imagine the discussion among the White House staff. Some will have argued: let’s get the President to put out a statement on Rwanda that is also applicable to Syria today. Maybe that will get some action. Others will have added that phrase at the end about the magnitude of the evil, hoping to avoid the obvious implication that we really ought to do something to stop Bashar al Assad. The result is a statement that sounds vigorous but implies nothing.
Don’t get me wrong: I understand full well why the White House would hesitate to take military action in Syria. But we should be asking ourselves if we are doing everything in our power short of military force to end Bashar’s brutal crackdown as soon as possible. The Obama Administration will claim it is doing its best. Here is a checklist to make sure:
1. Provide financial, communications and intelligence support to the Syrian opposition provided it unifies and keeps its efforts as peaceful as possible. This should include real-time intelligence on the operations of the Syrian army, which is necessary for protection of civilians.
2. Encourage the opposition to flesh out its National Covenant with more specific provisions to protect minorities and regime loyalists from revenge killing should Bashar al Assad step aside.
3. Make sure sanctions are implemented strictly not only by the United States but also by other countries , especially members of the Arab League. Iraq, which has not signed up for them so far as I can tell, should be high on this list. Syrian oil reportedly traversed the Suez Canal recently, contravening sanctions.
4. Use our significant information operations capabilities to ensure that Syria’s dissident voices are heard throughout the country and that the Syrian military and business elite are encouraged to defect from the regime. If we have begun such efforts, they are a deep, dark secret.
5. Work diplomatically to bring the Russians around to the view that their interests in port access and arms sales will be served best by abandoning Bashar. This we are surely doing, but are we ready to offer Moscow a serious quid pro quo?
6. Get Kofi Annan to beef up his request for ceasefire observers to 1000 and help him deploy them quickly, with the capability to move quickly around the country and communicate instantaneously from wherever they are.
7. If the ceasefire fails to take hold by April 15, as now seems likely, return to the UN Security Council to seek a resolution condemning the Assad regime, calling for Bashar to step aside and instituting an arms embargo against the regime.
8. Seek to block arms and money transfers from Iran to Syria, even if there are no formal multilateral restrictions.
9. Prepare for a major post-conflict Arab League peacekeeping mission, which will be necessary to separate the Syrian army and the Free Syria Army and to protect minorities, in particular Allawis, Druze, Christians and others who have supported the Assad regime.
I doubt any of this will work quickly. Bashar al Assad feels he is winning, has started to back away from the Annan ceasefire supposed to go into effect this week, and no doubt hopes to restore his authority, as his father managed to do after killing tens of thousands in Hama in 1982. Splits in the opposition, including a Kurdish walkout, will give him renewed confidence. But the Syrian regime is on the economic ropes and will not be able to eliminate a resistance that is now widespread and broadly (but not universally) supported by the population. We need to hang tough for the long haul, as we did in Burma, making sure time is not on Bashar al Assad’s side.
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Let your people go!
Tonight is the Jewish festival of Passover, when we celebrate liberation. Last year, I called this season the Passover of Arab liberation, but noted the difficulties Syria was facing.
This year we seem to be somewhere in the middle of the ten plagues, with Bashar al Assad not even beginning to think about letting his people go (and in fact inflicting the plagues, which is not something pharaoh did). The mutual ceasefire deadline is set for April 12, provided Damascus pulls back from populated areas and ceases artillery fire on April 10. In the meanwhile, Bashar seems to have intensified the military attacks in an effort to do as much deadly damage as possible to his opposition. While I hope Kofi Annan’s effort is successful, you’d have to be Moses-like in inspiration to bet on it.
We should nevertheless consider the possibilities. If by some fluke the Syrian army really does withdraw from some places, I hope the revolution will tuck away its guns and somehow demonstrate its overwhelming superiority in numbers. It is particularly important that April 12/13 see a massive demonstration of opposition in Damascus and Aleppo, even if that means everyone just staying home in a general strike. It will also be vital that the UN deploy observers quickly, and in far greater numbers than the couple of hundred currently contemplated.
It seems far more likely that Bashar will not withdraw or cease fire. What then? There is really no sign of international will to intervene. Despite ample documentation of artillery attacks on civilian targets as well as helicopter operations, neither the Turks nor the Arab League are preparing serious military action to enforce a no-fly zone or create humanitarian corridors or safe zones. The Syrian security forces are busy mining the borders so that civilians can’t escape. While it seems unlikely that Bashar can prevail 100%, he is well on his way to reducing the opposition to a low-intensity insurgency, with the bulk of the population sullenly resenting but accepting restoration of the dictatorship. At least for a while, it is likely to be significantly more draconian than before the rebellion started.
This is a bad outcome, but I am afraid not the worst. If the fighting continues to escalate and Bashar still survives, the consequences could be catastrophic for the region. The violence might then overflow Syria’s borders and pose serious problems for Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and maybe even Turkey. If Bashar manages to stay in place, it is vital that the Friends of Syria, that unwieldy conglomeration of more than 80 countries, maintain and tighten its efforts, in particular the sanctions and diplomatic isolation. We see in Burma how strategic patience can win the day.
Many of my friends and colleagues are appalled that nothing more is being done. I can’t describe myself as comfortable with this state of affairs. But it is important to recognize that there are other priorities on earth. The Administration’s first concern has to be Iran. There is no way to get a negotiated solution to its nuclear challenge, or prevent the Israelis from using military means, unless the United States maintains a credible military threat. Entering a war with an uncertain outcome in Syria would not be a smart prelude to dealing with Iran. American resources, though large, are not infinite–we wouldn’t want to run out of cruise missiles or suffer serious aircraft losses in a second priority fight.
There is also a diplomatic factor. The best way to mount a credible threat against Iran is with UN Security Council backing. What are the odds of the Russians conceding that if we go to war with Syria without their cooperation? The odds may not be good in any event, but we need at least a small chance for success.
So I am afraid our Syrian heroes will need to continue their efforts. I still prefer they be nonviolent ones. Nothing that has happened in the last few weeks of violent attacks convinces me that the Free Syria Army will shorten the reign of Bashar al Assad by as much as a single day. It is far more likely that their attacks will frighten large numbers of people who might otherwise have joined nonviolent protests.
I’ll pray for the Syrians at Seder tonight, as I trust many Jews around the world will do. Not because I think praying will do the Syrians any good, but because the parallel between today’s Syrians and our own liberation narrative should inform our sensibilities. The people of Syria are seeking the freedom that Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Yemenis have all started to enjoy, even if they are still at the beginning of their journeys through the wilderness. I hope the Syrians catch up soon.
The most frequent injunction in the Old Testament is to treat a stranger like ourselves:
…you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt… {Leviticus 19:33-34}
Bashar: let your people go!
PS: I missed this Monday, but you shouldn’t:
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*?
I debate David Kanin, my colleague here at SAIS, today on the question the asterisk* question. Here are the notes I prepared for myself:
I appear before you today to debate the following proposition: that the asterisk* following Kosovo that will be used in European regional meetings somehow limits or conditions its sovereignty and independence.
That is not the case. The footnote attached to that asterisk * refers to two things: UN Security Council resolution 1244 and the advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence issued by the International Court of Justice. The advisory opinion says that the declaration was not illegal. The controversy, if there is any, concerns 1244.
I’ve got four factual propositions about 1244 for you today:
- UN Security Council resolution 1244 does nothing to preserve Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo but instead provides the basis for a final status decision.
- The process preliminary to a final status decision foreseen in resolution 1244 was completed in March 2007 when former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari reported to the UNSG.
- The decision itself was taken in the Kosovo declaration of independence, now accepted and recognized as establishing a sovereign state by 89 other sovereign states.
- The International Court of Justice, in response to a request initiated by Serbia, has advised that the declaration of independence violated no international law.
Let me explain.
1244: You may have heard, because Belgrade declares it long and loud, that UNSC resolution 1244 acknowledges Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. That it does. In the preamble, the resolution reaffirms “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” But this is preambular language, which in international law is not binding. Circumstances change. The United States and 88 other countries have decided that they no longer wish to uphold a commitment that existed in 1999, but which they are not obligated to continue. This is their right: no one can claim that the United States gave up its right to extend recognition when it voted in favor of 1244. Certainly the ICJ did not think so.
The process preliminary to a final status decision: 1244 also “authorizes the Secretary General…to establish an international civilian presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.” This is complicated but it clearly associates “substantial autonomy within the FRY” with an interim UN administration. The resolution goes on to say that one of the main responsibilities of the international civilian presence is “promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo” as well as “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”
What was that political process? The President of the Security Council was absolutely clear: on October 24, 2005 he said “The Council…supports the United Nations Secretary-General’s intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo’s Final Status, as foreseen in Security Council resolution 1244…” The Secretary-General thereafter appointed Marti Ahtisaari to conduct that political process, with the full participation of Serbia and Montenegro as well as the Russian Federation. As Ahtisaari said in his final report: the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo
…by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future.
That process concluded in March 2007 with Ahtisaari’s recommendation: “independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community” for Kosovo.
Serbia and Russia rejected this recommendation.
The final status decision: That was their right, but other states accepted it. Kosovo proceeded with its declaration of independence, which was not unilateral but thoroughly coordinated with not only the United States but also the European Union and many other states. When asked for its opinion, the ICJ could find nothing in international law—including in resolution 1244—to bar Kosovo from declaring its independence. Other sovereign states clearly have the right to recognize, or not, as they see fit.
Conclusion: So what does the asterisk signify? Nothing more than what it says in the footnote: a UNSC resolution that is the basis for a final decision on Kosovo and an ICJ opinion that found nothing unlawful about how the final decision was taken.
The asterisk conditions Serbia’s claims of sovereignty, denying them full validity, while doing nothing to limit Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence. I’d wear that asterisk with pride.
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The road to Damascus runs through Moscow
The Syrian National Council (SNC) issued its Covenant this week, while the Friends of Syria today issued the Chairman’s conclusions from its meeting in Istanbul.
Friends of Syria is a group of countries and international organizations that are supporting “the just cause of the Syrian people,” which they define as a transition away from dictatorship and towards democracy. Its statement is a tawdry model of diplomatic waffling. Mostly it reiterates things said previously, without the means or the will to make them happen. As Ian Black, The Guardian’s Middle East editor tweeted to me, “awful! reeks of urge to sound purposeful + united while ignoring toughest questions. diplomacy of lowest common denominator.”
Ironically, since Syria’s international friends have criticized the SNC repeatedly for its failure to outline a vision of the New Syria, the SNC statement is a model of clarity. The New Syria will be “a civil, democratic, pluralistic, independent and free state”:
Syria’s new democratic order will be founded on the principle of “unity in diversity” and will embrace all individuals and communities without any exclusion or discrimination.
If this is not explicit enough, the Covenant specifies:
The constitution will ensure non-discrimination between any of the religious, ethnic or national components of Syrian society – Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmens or others. It will recognize equal rights for all within the context of Syria’s territorial and demographic integrity and unity.
It is hard to beat this for clarity.
There is an important moment of fuzziness in the Covenant, though it could be a translation issue or just something on which I don’t have the required background. It says:
The transitional government will be committed to hold free and fair elections upon the fall of the current, illegitimate regime. A constituent assembly, formed by the transitional government, will engage in drafting a new constitution containing the principles of this Covenant and submit it to a free referendum.
Does the transitional government form the constituent assembly? It seems to me the constituent assembly should be the result of the elections. And who forms the transitional government? Does it exist before the constituent assembly elections and continue after them? How is it chosen? Or does the constituent assembly choose the transitional government? These are not small questions. I’ll hope that there is more clarity about them than in the English translation of the Covenant.
Of course the main question now is how to begin a transition when Bashar al Assad is still holding on to power, with pretty solid support from the Syrian army and security services as well as the country’s diplomats. Sadly, the Friends of Syria offer nary a hint, apart from urging no arms sales and tightening of sanctions. Humanitarian assistance, which the Friends emphasize, is not going to be sufficient to initiate the political dialogue that Kofi Annan’s plan calls for. If the revolutionaries are able to unsettle Damascus, spreading peaceful demonstrations throughout the capital, that would make a big difference.
The missing international piece of this puzzle is Russia. It has to be convinced to read Bashar the riot act. Only the Americans can hope to bring Moscow around to do this. The road to Damascus runs through Moscow.
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The joke is on us
The temptation to do an April Fool’s post is great, but the barriers are greater: how can anyone joke about Bashar al Assad murdering Syria’s citizens and managing nevertheless to stay in power? Or about nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian theocracy? A war we are losing in Afghanistan? A peace we are losing in Iraq? A re-assertive Russia determined to marginalize dissent? An indebted America dependent on a creditor China that requires 7-8% annual economic growth just to avoid massive social unrest? I suppose the Onion will manage, but I’m not even one of its outer layers.
Not that the world is more threatening than in the past. To the contrary. America today faces less threatening risks than it has at many times in the past. But there are a lot of them, and they are frighteningly varied. Drugs from Latin America, North Korean sales of nuclear and missile technology, Al Qaeda wherever, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the wrong hands, bird or swine flu… Wonks are competing to offer a single “grand strategy” in a situation that does not permit one. Doctrine deprived Obama has got it right: no “strategic vision” can deal with all these contingencies. They require a case by case approach, albeit one rooted in strength and guided by clear principles.
American military strength is uncontested in today’s world and unequaled for a couple of decades more, even in the most draconian of budget situations. A stronger economy is on the way, though uncertainty in Europe and China could derail it. All America’s problems would look easier to solve with a year or two, maybe even three, of 3-4% economic growth. The principles are the usual ones, which I would articulate this way:
- The first priority is to protect American national security
- Do it with cheaper civilian means as much as possible, more expensive military means when necessary
- Leverage the contributions of others when we can, act unilaterally when we must
- Build an international system that is legitimate, fair and just
- Cultivate friends, deter and when necessary defeat enemies
My students will immediately try to classify these proposition as “realist” or “idealist.” I hope I’ve formulated them in ways that make that impossible.
There are a lot of difficult issues lying in the interstices of these propositions. Is an international system that gives the victors in a war now more than 65 years in the past vetoes over UN Security Council action fair and just? Does it lead to fair and just outcomes? Civilian means seem to have failed in Syria, and seem to be failing with Iran, but are military means any more likely to succeed? If the threats to American national security are indirect but nonetheless real–when for example North Korea threatens a missile launch intended to intimidate Japan and South Korea–do we withhold humanitarian assistance?
America’s political system likes clear and unequivocal answers. It has categories into which it would like to toss each of us. Our elections revolve around identity politics almost as much as those in the Balkans. We create apparently self-evident myths about our leaders that don’t stand up to scrutiny.
The fact is that the world is complicated, the choices difficult, the categories irrelevant and the myths fantasies. That’s the joke: it’s on us.
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Missive offense and defense
America’s patriots were hard at work this week, not attacking the nation’s enemies but each other. First the Romney brigade launched a missive, apparently the first salvo in a planned barrage. The Obama missive defense went ballistic. The question is this: how much difference is there, really, between the two presumed candidates?
On one issue, defense spending, there is a clear and present difference: Obama is in the midst of cutting close to half a billion dollars from projected increases in the Pentagon budget over the next ten years. Romney says he would not do that (without explaining how he would avoid it). He has committed himself to a naval buildup, apparently in anticipation of a Chinese challenge that will be decades in the making. Presumably to cover the interim, he has declared Russia America’s main foreign threat. Obama is already moving to shore up America’s presence in Asia and the Pacific, but he shows much less concern about Russia and more about Iran.
Romney has said Iran will not get a nuclear weapon if he is elected president. Obama says Iran will not get a nuclear weapon while he is president. Romney is clearly thinking more about military threat that enables diplomacy and Obama more about diplomacy enabled by military pressure. That’s a distinction with a difference in emphasis.
Both candidates are Israel‘s best friend. Obama has its back. Romney has its front. Neither is willing to pressure his best friend to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians. Romney seems inclined to ignore their existence. Obama does not but has reached a dead-end on the issue.
Both candidates are also Castro’s worst enemy. Romney would pursue a tougher isolation policy with Cuba, one that has failed for more than 50 years to bring results. Obama would try to undermine the Castro regime with soft power, a more recent approach that has also failed to work.
On Iraq and Afghanistan, there are again some real differences. Romney says it was a mistake for Obama to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq. Obama asks how they could stay if Iraq did not want them and refused to allow immunity from prosecution. Romney says the drawdown in Afghanistan is too fast. Obama leans toward accelerating it. That difference too is real: Romney would stay in Afghanistan to win, Obama wants to get out before we lose.
Then there are the issues that have not yet been launched. Romney will likely say Obama hasn’t done enough to support the rebellion in Syria. Obama won’t say it, but he hesitates on Syria because he wants to keep his powder dry and needs Russian support on Iran. Obama will vaunt his accomplishments against Al Qaeda. Romney will criticize Obama for failing to bring around Pakistan.
There are also the intangibles. Romney says the United States needs to be number 1 and lead. Obama says the United States needs to collaborate with others and share burdens. Romney says he would never apologize for the United States. Obama apologizes when we are responsible for something going terribly wrong. Romney will say Obama is too soft. Obama will say Romney is too simplistic.
There are some who think this kind of missive exchange is clarifying or otherwise edifying. I’m not so sure, even if I think my team–that’s the Obamites–got the best of it on this occasion. I guess I am nostalgic, but it would be nice to return to the “water’s edge”: that’s a foreign policy that ignores partisan differences once we leave the east and west coasts to go abroad. We shouldn’t hide the real differences, but there is more similarity here than either side would like to admit. Nor will they do so any time before November.
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