Tag: Russia
This week’s “peace picks”
Frighteningly busy week in DC. Experts bloom even before the cherry blossoms:
1. Chinese Heir Apparent, Xi Jinping and U.S.-China Relations, SAIS, rm. 806 Rome, 12-2 pm March 5
Since 2009, the Islamist insurgency known as Boko Haram has escalated its attacks across Nigeria, targeting the country’s security forces, politicians and innocent civilians – Muslims and Christians alike. The Nigerian government, led by President Goodluck Jonathan has demonstrated itself ill-equipped and unprepared to manage such a crisis, juggle economic woes, compounded by the country’s fuel crisis and political unrest.
Last summer, General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, confirmed Boko Haram’s links to al-Qaeda. Only after Boko Haram bombed the United Nation’s headquarters in Abuja did Washington take notice of this emerging threat to international security. Not only is Nigeria the largest African oil exporter to the U.S. but its peacekeeping contributions are the largest on the continent, as is its population. In November 2011, the Sub-committee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House Homeland Security Committee, chaired by Rep. Patrick Meehan (R-PA), released a report on Boko Haram’s threat to the U.S. homeland.
Join us as we assess Boko Haram’s threat to Nigeria, the region, and the United States.
Keynote Remarks by
The Honorable Patrick Meehan (R-PA)
Member, United States House of Representatives
Followed by a Discussion with
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.
Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic Council
Ricardo René Larémont, Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science and Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton
3. After Elections: Next Steps in Yemen’s Transition, IFES, 12-1:30 pm March 6
Where:
IFES
1850 K Street, NW, 5th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
Yemen’s February 21 presidential election resulted in the end of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 32-year rule. While some questioned the purpose of a one-candidate election, many others hailed it as a crucial first step in Yemen’s transitional process.
As the country moves forward, please join for a conversation on the next steps in Yemen’s political transition that will address issues including:
- What are the priority issues for the constitutional committee?
- What will be the role of civil society, youth protesters and opposition groups?
- What challenges exist for reconciliation with entities such as Al-Hirak and the Houthis?
Featured Speakers:
Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid, Head of the UN Human Rights Training and Documentation Centre for South West Asia and the Arab Region
Grant Kippen, Chief of Party in Yemen, IFES
Ibrahim Sharqieh, Deputy Director of the Brookings Doha Center (invited)
Moderated by Michael Svetlik, Vice President of Programs, IFES
Please RSVP by registering online
NOTE: Lunch will be served.
4. Arab Spring or Islamic Winter? SAIS, Rome Auditorium, 2-3:30 pm March 6
A politically incorrect debate among Arab, US and European observers a year after the Arab uprisings.
A question and answer period will follow.
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Rome Building Auditorium
Moderator: Kurt Volker, Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Robbie Friedmann, Georgia State University
Karim Mezran, Johns Hopkins University
Daniele Moro, Visiting Scholar, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Pablo Pardo, Washington Correspondent, El Mundo
Daniel Robinson, Chief White House Correspondent, Voice of America
Samuel Tadros, Hudson Institute
5. Assessing the Implications of the Russian Presidential Election, Woodrow Wilson Center, 10-noon March 7i
Live Briefing from Moscow and DC
The Kennan Institute will sponsor a Moscow-Washington, DC seminar assessing the implications of the first round of the Russian presidential vote. U.S. commentators will be joined via video conference in Moscow with some of Russia’s leading political actors, including Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Ryzhkov.
Moderator: Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute
Maria Gaidar, Founder, Democratic Alternatives (DA!), Russia
Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation
Henry Hale, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University
Stanislav Belkovsky, Director, National Strategy Institute, Moscow
By Videoconference from Moscow:
Moderator: Olga Bychkova, Journalist, Ekho Moskvy
Alexei Navalny, Attorney, Moscow Bar Association
Vladimir Ryzhkov, Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and Chairman, Republican Party of the Russian Federation
Please note that seating for this event is available on a first come, first served basis. RSVP is required to attend. Please call on the day of the event to confirm. Please bring an identification card with a photograph (e.g. driver’s license, work ID, or university ID) as part of the building’s security procedures.
The Kennan Institute speaker series is made possible through the generous support of the Title VIII Program of the U.S. Department of State.
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Henry Hale//Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan InstituteAssistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Affairs, The George Washington University
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Ariel Cohen //Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation
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Director, National Strategy Institute, Moscow
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Maria Gaidar //Founder, Democratic Alternatives (DA!), Russia
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Journalist, Ekho Moskvy
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Attorney, Moscow Bar Association
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Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and Chairman, Republican Party of the Russian Federation
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Blair A. Ruble//Director, Kennan Institute and Comparative Urban Studies Project
6. The Saffron Revolution: Prospects for Democracy in Burma, Center for National Policy, noon-1:15 March 7
Featuring:
Former Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security CouncilMarvin Ott
Former Deputy Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on IntelligenceJennifer Quigley
Advocacy Director, US Campaign for Burma
*A light lunch will be served*
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800
Map
Click here
7. Time to Attack Iran? U.S. Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Program, Carnegie Endowment, 7-8:30 pm March 7
6:00 – 7:00 PM
Networking Reception
7:00 – 8:30 PM
Debate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Participants: Elbridge A. Colby, CNA
Participants: Jamie M. Fly, Foreign Policy Initiative
Participants: Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University
Moderator: Eli Lake
Moderator: Newsweek and The Daily Beast
To RSVP, click here.
Despite diplomatic negotiations, international condemnation, and harsh economic sanctions, Iran continues to violate its international obligations by pursuing nuclear weapons capability. While some are still holding out hope for a negotiated solution, a different debate has emerged in the United States over whether it is now time for the use of military force to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions.
Join the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) as it hosts a debate over the use of the military option against Iran’s nuclear program with Elbridge A. Colby (research analyst at CNA), Jamie M. Fly (FPI executive director), and Matthew Kroenig (assistant professor at Georgetown University) on March 7, 2012, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW). Eli Lake, senior national security correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast, will moderate the discussion.
Background Reading
- Dr. Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012.
- Elbridge A. Colby and Austin Long, “Why Not to Attack Iran,” The National Interest, January 11, 2012.
- Jamie M. Fly and Gary Schmitt, “The Case for Regime Change in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012.
8. Who Owns the Syrian Revolution? The Roles and Challenges of Women and Minorities in the Syrian Uprising, USIP, 9:30-12:45 March 9
As the Syrian uprising enters its second year, uncertainty about the challenges confronting women and minorities looms especially large. Women have played a critical role throughout the uprising, with activists like Suhair al-Attasi, Razan Zaitouneh, and others emerging as leaders of protest and resistance to the Assad regime. Yet their contributions have often been overshadowed. Questions persist about whether women’s concerns and perspectives will be fully addressed, either in the current uprising or in a potential post-Assad Syria. How can Syrian women ensure that their voices are heard as the revolution unfolds and a new Syria takes shape?
Tensions around the future of minorities in Syria are also escalating. While the opposition includes Christians, Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and other minorities, the Syrian National Council (SNC), the most widely-recognized coalition of anti-regime forces, has struggled with the perception that it is not truly inclusive. It is often seen as heavily influenced by Islamists whose outlook toward minorities is viewed as uncertain, despite the SNC’s commitment to pluralism and tolerance. The Syrian regime, meanwhile, has characterized the opposition as a terrorist movement led by Sunni extremists. It has played, with some effect, on the fears of Syrian minorities about what their future might hold should the Asad regime be overthrown. As violence in Syria has escalated, moreover, sectarian tensions have become apparent. Can the uprising succeed without full support from Syria’s minorities? Will it be possible to prevent Syria from falling into sectarian conflict, and potentially a sectarian civil war?
To address these and other issues concerning the roles and challenges of women and minorities in Syria’s revolution, on March 9, from 9:30 am – 12: 45 pm, the U.S. Institute of Peace will hold two moderated discussion panels, co-sponsored with United for Free Syria and the Syrian Emergency Task Force.
9:30 am – 11:00am | Panel 1: Women and the Future of the Syrian Revolution
Speakers:
- Ms. Rajaa Altalli
Ms. Altalli is a Syrian political activist who serves as Director of International Relations for the organization Syrian Christians for Democracy.” She is a also co-founder of the Support Center for Syrian Minorities based in Washington, D.C. Ms. Altalli is a Ph.D. candidate in mathematics and geometric analysis at Northeastern University in Boston, and has taught mathematics at several universities in Syria.
- Ms. Farah Al Attasi
Ms. Al Attasi is a prominent author and commentator who appears frequently on Arab and American media to discuss Syrian affairs, as well as Middle Eastern issues and U.S. relations with Arab and Muslim worlds. She is currently Executive Director of the American Arab Communication & Translation Center (ACT), the founder and president of the Arab Information and Resource Center in Washington D.C., and owner of Zenobia Lounge, the first multicultural café and bookshop about the Arab and Muslim worlds. In addition, Ms. Al Atassi is the author of many publications in Arabic and English, including a collection of short stories titled “The Mask.”
- Marah Bukai
Ms. Bukai is a Syrian American author, academic researcher, and journalist who has dedicated her professional life to building bridges between the United States and the Arab and Muslim worlds through cultural dialogue. She has worked as senior media adviser at Vital Voices, a lecturer at the University of Maryland and Georgetown University, and is currently Public Diplomacy Program Specialist at FSI. Ms. Bukai is also the founder and chair of the Alwatref Institute for Humanitarian Studies, which aims to bridge the gap between East and West and increase the knowledge of the Middle East among American people. Bukai has five publications of poetry, including, most recently, a volume of poems titled “O,” that was published by Waref Publishing House in Washington, D.C.
- Rasha Alahdab, Esq.
Ms. Alahdab is a founding partner of Syrian Women for Syria, and a founding board member of Syrian Expatriates for Democracy. She is also a member of the Secretariat in the Syrian National Assembly and a member of the law office of the Syrian National Council, as well as a member of the law office of the National Change Current, a Syrian opposition organization.
- Ms. Rafif Jouejati
Ms. Jouejati is the CEO of a Virginia-based management consulting firm, and has been supporting the Syrian Revolution since March 2011. She currently serves as the English-language spokesperson for the Local Coordination Committees in Syria, the National Consensus Movement, and Activists for a Free Syria. She also supports the SNC’s Media Office by writing, translating, and editing press releases, statements, and other communiqués. Ms. Jouejati is also the Program Manager for the SNC-sponsored “A Thousand Years for Syria” initiative.
- Kathleen Kuehnast, Ph.D. (Moderator)
Director, Center of Innovation on Gender and Peacebuilding
U.S. Institute of Peace
11:00 am- 12:45 pm | Panel 2: The Roles and Challenges of Minorities in Syria’s Revolution
Speakers:
- Abed Alo, M.D.
Born in a Kurdish village north of Aleppo, Syria, Dr. Alo is a Surgeon and Fellow of The American College of Surgery. Dr. Alo has been active in the Syrian Kurdish Diaspora in the United States, and an active participant in and supporter of the Syrian pro-democracy movement since it’s inception. Dr. Alo will be speaking on behalf of the Syrian Kurdish community. Dr. Alo is also a member of United for Free Syria.
- Mr. Oudei Abouassaf
Born in Damascus, Syria, Mr. Abousassaf’s family is originally from the Druze-majority city of Sweida, in the south of the country. He is a member of the board of Syrian Expatriates in Support of the Syrian Revolution, Sweida. From 2009 – 2011 he held a position in the Department of Defense. Mr. Abouassaf was last in Syria in January 2011 and saw first-hand the situation on the ground in Syria. Mr. Abouassaf will speak on behalf of the Syrian Druze community.
- Mr. Oubab Khalil
Mr. Khalil, an Alawite, grew up in Lattakia province, Syria. He received a B.A. in law from Beirut Arab University in 2001, and he joined the Syrian Law Society Damascus Bar in 2003. Mr. Khalil immigrated to the United States in 2006, where he has been an outspoken critic of the Syrian government, and involved in promoting freedom and democracy in Syria; efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Syria; and raising awareness about the importance of establishing a secular and pluralistic state in Syria. Mr. Khalil is a member of the board of Syrian Expatriates Organization.
- Najib Ghadbian, Ph.D.
A Syrian academic and member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Professor Ghadbian is associate professor of political science and middle east studies at the University of Arkansas. He is the author of several books and articles in English and Arabic. His Arabic book, “The Second Assad Regime: Bashar of Lost Opportunities,” was published in 2006. Dr. Ghadbian was a signatory to the Damascus Declaration and is currently active within the Syrian opposition abroad.
- Ms. Dima Moussa, Esq.
A Syrian-born attorney and member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Ms. Mousa has been affiliated with the Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University, focusing on Arab women’s rights. She has also volunteered with an organization that assisted Iraqi refugees in adjusting to life in the United States. In recent months, Ms. Moussa has been active in the Syrian-American community, serving as a media spokesperson for a key grassroots movements in Syria, in addition to independently working with activists inside and outside Syria. Ms. Moussa is fluent in Arabic and English, in addition to speaking Assyrian.
- Steven Heydemann, Ph.D. (Moderator )
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives
U.S. Institute of Peace
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The coming week’s peace picks
Too much this week, and most of it happening Wednesday:
1. Are economic sanctions the key to resolving the nuclear dispute? CSIS, February 27, 6-8 pm.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) is pleased to invite you to a debate on the recent sanctions imposed on Iran. These sanctions target Iran’s banking sector and are widely believed to have had significant effects not just on Iran’s ability to acquire materials for its nuclear program, but also its energy sector and economy as a whole. Although many agree that Iranian development of a nuclear weapon would have serious security implications for the Middle East, questions about whether or not this is truly Iran’s intent and what the United States should do about it remain hotly contested. Does diplomacy still offer a means of resolving this issue and, if so, are the economic sanctions being passed on Iran making a diplomatic solution harder or easier to achieve?
Two highly distinguished scholars will come to CSIS to present opposing views on this issue and debate the policy of sanctioning Iran on its merits. The debate will feature:
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
and
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Maloney will present her argument that sanctioning Iran has become counterproductive and that the U.S. “cannot hope to bargain with a country whose economy it is trying to disrupt and destroy.” Mr. Rubin will take the opposing view that “only overwhelming pain” will convince the Iranian leadership to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
A cocktail reception with appetizers will begin at 6:00pm and the debate will commence at 6:30pm.
RSVP to David Slungaard at dslungaard@csis.org.
Webast: For those that cannot attend, the debate will live streamed. A link to the webcast will posted on this page on the day of the debate.
This event is the 13th installment of PONI’s ongoing Live Debate Series, which is an extension of the PONI Debates the Issues blog. The objective of the series is to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of the arguments on both sides of key nuclear policy issues. Please join us for what promises to be an exciting debate on a crucial issue of concern for the nonproliferation community, international security analysts, and regional specialists focusing on the Middle East.
2. Policing Iraq, USIP, February 29, 9:30-11:30 am
Under Saddam Hussein, a complex web of intelligence and security institutions protected the regime and repressed the Iraqi people. Underfunded and mismanaged, the Iraqi police were least among those institutions and unprepared to secure the streets when Coalition Forces arrived in 2003 and disbanded the rest of the security apparatus. Iraq’s police forces have made important strides, and some 400,000 Iraqi police have been trained and stationed across the country. However, with the U.S. drawdown in Iraq, the future of the Iraqi police and U.S. police assistance is uncertain.
On February 29, the United States Institute of Peace and the Institute for the Study of War will co-host a panel of distinguished experts who will discuss the history of the Iraqi police and the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. This public event will introduce a new USIP Special Report by Robert Perito on “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire.”
Speakers
- General Jim Dubik (U.S. Army, ret.), Panelist
Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of War
Former Commander, Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq - Dr. Austin Long, Panelist
Assistant Professor, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs
- Ginger Cruz, Panelist
Former Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) - Robert Perito, Moderator
Director, Security Sector Governance Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Author, USIP Special Report, “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire” - Tara Sonenshine, Introduction
Executive Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace - Marisa Cochrane Sullivan,Introduction
Deputy Director, Institute for the Study of War
3. Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace in the Horn of Africa: A New Approach? Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th floor auditorium, February 29, 10-11:30 am
The Horn of Africa is one of the world’s most conflicted regions, experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990. In recent months, the region has been afflicted with drought, famine, refugee migrations and military confrontations. All of these dynamics have catapulted the Horn of Africa upwards on the priority list for US policymakers.
In response to this on-going crisis, the Wilson Center’s Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity established a Horn of Africa Steering Committee in 2010 that focused on developing a regional US policy framework for the Horn. A conflict mapping report that analyses the major patterns, cross-cutting issues, and interrelationships in the Horn’s ongoing armed conflicts was subsequently commissioned, as well as a set of recommendations for US policy in the region going forward.
On February 29, 2012, the Leadership Project, in partnership with Alliance for Peacebuilding and Institute for Horn of Africa Studies and Analysis (IHASA) The overall objective of the recommendations publication is to employ a conflict resolution-oriented approach to a US regional framework for the Horn, including the need to promote good governance, increase human security (not just state or regime security), strengthen regional cooperation, and boost economic development and regional economic integration.
This event will be taking place at the Woodrow Wilson Center in the 6th Floor Auditorium on February 29th from 10:00am-11:30am. Please RSVP to leadership@wilsoncenter.org.
Program Agenda
Scene-Setter
Paul Williams, Associate Professor, George Washington University
Discussants
Akwe Amosu, Director, Africa Advocacy, Open Society Institute (Invited)
Chic Dambach, Chief of Staff, Congressman John Garamendi, CA
Raja Jandhyala, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, US Agency for International Development
Ambassador David Shinn, Former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Professor, George Washington University
Location:
Event Information
When
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
10:30 AM to 12:00 PM
Where
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Participants
Panelists
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Natan B. Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Shibley Telhami
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
5. Presidential Elections in Russia – What’s Next?, Carnegie Endowment, February 29, 12:30-2 pm
Dmitri Trenin, James F. Collins
Register to attend
With Russia’s presidential election less than a month away, Vladimir Putin is facing the most serious challenge since the establishment of his “power vertical.” Tens of thousands of people have taken to the streets across Russia, undeterred by plunging winter temperatures. Moscow is also facing challenges abroad—its recent veto of the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian regime has threatened its relations with much of the Arab world, and the U.S.-Russia “reset” appears stuck in neutral.
Dmitri Trenin and Ambassador James F. Collins will discuss how Russia’s presidential elections will influence its policies.
6. China’s International Energy Strategies: Global and Regional Implications, Elliott School (Lindner Family Commons) February 29, 12:30-1:45 pm
Philip Andrews-Speed, Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, the German Marshall Fund of the United States; Associate Fellow, Chatham House
Discussant: Llewelyn Hughes, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, GW
China is now a major player in the international energy arena. Imports of all forms of energy are increasing; national energy companies are investing around the world; and the government is active in different forms of energy diplomacy. These behaviors are driven by a range of interests from within and outside China. The external political consequences are rather greater than the economic ones, and vary around the world. China is a key player, along with Japan, in the progress of energy cooperation in East Asia.
RSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/ASFeb29
Sponsored by Sigur Center for Asian Studies
7. Assessing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities Amidst Economic Challenges: The Foreign Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, 2172 Rayburn, February 29, 1:30 pm
Full Committee
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Full Committee to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
8. To What Extent Is Iran a Threat to Israel? 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW, Suite M100 February 29, 4-6 pm
9. Measuring and Combating Corruption in the 21st Century, SAIS Rome building rm 200, March 2, 12:30-2 pm
Summary: Nathaniel Heller, co-founder and executive director of Global Integrity, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact developmentroundtable@jhu.edu.
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Kofi time
Huffington Post has just published my latest on Syria:
With Kofi Annan chosen to be the joint UN/Arab League Special Envoy and today’s Friends of Syria meeting in Tunis, the stage is set for a more serious diplomatic effort to bring the Syrian crisis to a close. Kofi’s marching orders include:
The Special Envoy will provide good offices aimed at bringing an end to all violence and human rights violations, and promoting a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis.The Special Envoy will be guided in this endeavor by the provisions of the General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 and the relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States. He will consult broadly and engage with all relevant interlocutors within and outside Syria in order to end the violence and the humanitarian crisis, and facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people through a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition.
This broad mandate, which the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have approved, implicitly points in the direction of the Arab League plan that Russia and China previously vetoed, even if it does not explicitly mention the need for Bashar al-Assad to step aside. The ambiguity is intended to hide the differences of view on the UNSC, but clearly no political solution can meet the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people with Bashar still in office.
Kofi will surely meet with Bashar al-Assad. The question is whether he will be able to tell him that the P5 want him out. Colum Lynch notes that in his last trouble-shooting effort Kofi arranged for power-sharing in Kenya. Bashar has spilled far too much blood in Syria for the opposition to accept sharing power with him. The Russians should by now be wondering whether their best bet for holding on to port access and arms sales in Syria is Bashar. Once they decide differently, Kofi will have the support he needs for defenestration.
Anne-Marie Slaughter today in the New York Times calls for “no-kill” zones established by the Free Syria Army (FSA) near Syria’s borders with Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This would require a major effort to arm the FSA and provide it with special forces advisors. The notion that this can be done “to protect all Syrians regardless of creed, ethnicity or political allegiance” without precipitating the chaotic ethnic and sectarian civil war that Anne-Marie herself recognizes as the worst outcome is unrealistic. And doing it without taking down Syria’s air defenses would condemn the effort to failure.
Only the U.S. can quickly and effectively destroy Syria’s Russian-supplied air defense and severely damage his artillery, which is bombarding his opponents. At yesterday’s Syria event at the Center for National Policy, colleagues evoked the image of President Clinton reacting to the shelling of Sarajevo, suggesting that President Obama might do likewise.
We too readily forget that Clinton waited three and half years — until Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole started taking him to task for not carrying out his campaign promise to bomb the Serbs — before initiating the military action that ended the war in Bosnia. I doubt even a Republican candidate bemoaning what is happening in Syria would get the White House to drop other priorities in favor of another Middle East war.
The Syrian opposition doesn’t have years, or even months. It needs protection quickly. The best bet is a vigorous diplomatic effort by Kofi Annan.
Today in Tunis the Friends of Syria called for a ceasefire, humanitarian relief to the cities under attack, deployment of UN peacekeepers and the beginning of a dialogue process aimed at a political settlement. They also named the Syrian National Council “a” legitimate representative of the Syrian people and promised further sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Damascus. They did not call for arming of the opposition, which has been left up to individual states. The Saudis made it clear they thought it a good idea (and they will presumably do it).
Few believe Bashar al-Assad will cave. I won’t be surprised if he eventually does, though I’m not prepared to predict when. His army and other security forces are exhausted and won’t want to enter the cities they have been shelling from afar. If Bashar can get the international community to accept responsibility for feeding the inhabitants and maybe even maintaining law and order, he may count himself lucky. His security forces could then lick their wounds and prepare to fight another day, while blaming the internationals for anything that goes wrong.
Syria is showing us the limits of military force. It is a blunt tool that in this instance is likely to bring about the civil war that we should most want to avoid. Diplomacy won’t be pretty. It will require negotiations with Bashar al-Assad and acceptance of compromises that are odious. But it is our best bet for the moment. Kofi time.
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Serbia, Kosovo and 1244
1244 is the UN Security Council resolution that ended the NATO/Yugoslavia war over Kosovo in 1999. Today in Brussels, Pristina and Belgrade agreed that Kosovo would be represented internationally as Kosovo, with a footnote referencing both UNSC resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision that found no prohibition (in 1244 or anywhere else) on its declaration of independence.
Belgrade is anxious to portray this as a victory. B92 quotes President Tadic:
Kosovo will not be presented in regional fora and institutions as an independent country, but in line with UN Resolution 1244 on Kosovo and the opinion of the International Court of Justice.
He is entitled to his interpretation of the agreement, but mine is different. Let me explain.
Belgrade has long been anxious to drag 1244 into all discussions of Kosovo because it makes reference in the preamble to Yugoslav sovereignty. But preambular language is not legally binding and the substantive text of the resolution clearly foresees a political process to decide Kosovo’s status. It is the claim of those states that have recognized Kosovo as independent and sovereign that the Marti Ahtisaari-led negotiations, in which Russia and Serbia participated fully, constituted that political process. The terms of 1244 have therefore been fulfilled, even if no new UNSC resolution has passed. Last year’s ICJ opinion advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international law, confirming that 1244 does not prevent Kosovo from sovereignty and independence, despite the preambular reference to Yugoslav sovereignty.
So I see no loss to Kosovo in a footnote requiring reference to 1244. To the contrary, it seems to me Kosovo’s right to a political process that would determine final status is rooted in 1244–that is what makes Kosovo different from all those other provinces around the world that would like independence. Coupled with the ICJ decision, the footnote should be read as a clear and unequivocal statement that Kosovo is entitled to seek recognition as a sovereign and independent state.
It now has that recognition from more than 85 other sovereign and independent states, which is more than have bilaterally recognized many other states on earth. Bilateral recognitions generally stop once a state is a member of the United Nations. That is the next hurdle for Kosovo. It needs membership in the UN General Assembly, which requires a positive recommendation by the Security Council.
So far, Russia has put its veto at the disposal of Serbia to prevent Kosovo’s UN membership. But I’ve got to wonder out loud how long that will last. Russia’s recognition of Abhazia and South Ossetia deprives its stance of any moral rectitude. Once Kosovo is accepted in Balkans circles, including by the five non-recognizing European Union states, as Kosovo* {that * is meant to represent the footnote referencing two things that together confirm Kosovo’s right to seek international recognition}, why would Moscow continue to block membership under the same formula in the UN General Assembly?
There is another aspect to this agreement that is positive for Pristina. It opens the door to a “contractual” relationship between Kosovo* and the EU, one that should certainly include an agreement on trade, visas and other key items. Pristina has good reason to celebrate, even if no one can enjoy having their state identity footnoted.
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Bear apparent
The Russian role in the Balkans has long been of great concern to some of my Western-oriented friends there, even though it arouses little interest in Washington, DC. Milan Marinković tries to explain why it is important:
Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Konuzin is chiefly known for incidents he occasionally makes. His public warnings to Belgrade as to the consequences Serbia will face should it dare to join NATO no longer raise eyebrows.
The more aggressive stance Konuzin takes, the more popularity he wins among Serbs. At a recent pre-election convention of the Serbian progressive party (SNS), Konuzin was a guest together with several Western diplomats. Even though SNS declares itself pro-EU, the party stalwarts booed the Westerners in attendance but greeted Konuzin with a standing ovation.
According to opinion polls, SNS is the most popular party in Serbia and the main rival to the currently ruling Democratic party (DS) of President Boris Tadic in the forthcoming elections. SNS’s possible rise to power could afford the Kremlin an opportunity to further increase its influence in Serbian politics.
Serbia hopes to benefit from the risky tactic of balancing between Moscow and Brussels. In 2008 Belgrade sold its oil monopoly NIS to Russian state-owned behemoth GAZPROM – many believe in return for Russia’s support on Kosovo. Whatever was behind the decision, the transaction has allowed Moscow to pursue its interests in Serbia more assertively.
The monopoly in energy supplies is one of several levers Russia has at its disposal. Others include various historical ties between the two nations, most notably religious and cultural ones. Serbia is dubbed “little Russia” in the Balkans. Russophilia is widespread among Serbs, which facilitates lobbying for Russia’s interests. The most active pro-Kremlin lobbyists in Serbia are senior officials of conservative nationalist parties along with several prominent members of the dominant faction within Serbian Orthodox Church – by far the most influential (nominally) non-governmental institution in the country.
At this point, Serbia is not counted among top priorities of Russian foreign policy. Russia plans to expand its sphere of influence in concentric circles. Moscow is currently looking to consolidate its power in the former Soviet Union’s periphery in order to set the stage for a prospective “Eurasian union.”
The second phase of Russia’s geopolitical expansion would involve ex-member states of the Warsaw Pact from Central and Eastern European. Serbia – and Balkans in general – most likely are scheduled for the third round. Until then, the Kremlin will seek to maintain the level of influence it already has in Serbia and will not hesitate to augment it whenever an opportunity presents itself. Keeping Serbia out of NATO is a vital part of this strategy.
The natural counterbalance to Russian power in the Balkans is Turkey. The two countries already compete in Bosnia. Belgrade and Ankara have significantly strengthened bilateral relations in recent years, as Serbia wants to attract Turkish investment. Pro-Russian circles in Serbia vehemently oppose Turco-Serbian rapprochement as harmful to Serbia’s national interests.
Russia’s Balkan aspirations could be undermined by the country’s internal constraints. Moscow is already facing serious challenges, such as growing discontent over corruption and social inequalities, as well as seething Islamist militancy in the Caucasus region. Whether Russia will manage to regain its old glory and continue to expand its influence in the Balkans largely depends on how it deals with its own domestic issues.
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Nonviolence in Syria revisited
Yesterday was busy on peacefare.net, with some vigorous comments and tweets about my post on Syria. I thought I might review the bidding this morning.
First my own error: I meant the first line to say that TheAtlantic.com‘s headline on my piece, “Why the Syrian Free Army should put down their guns,” was infelicitous, not felicitous (and I’ve made that change in the post). The piece never calls for them to put down anything. What I said was this:
It would be far better if defected soldiers worked for strictly defensive purposes, accompanying street demonstrators and rooting out agents provocateurs rather than suicidally contesting forces that are clearly stronger and better armed.
Taking guns away from people in the midst of war just doesn’t work, in Syria or anyplace else. Only when Syrians feel secure will they give up their weapons.
That day I fear is a long way off. One of my critics writes:
Assad will not go until there is a gun to his head, period.
That may be correct, but there is no telling when some brave soul will do the necessary. I believe the odds of that happening increase if the protesters can maximize the numbers of people demonstrably joining their effort. Violence by the regime is intended to keep their numbers down. But violence by the FSA does too.
One tweet yesterday asked if I would send my children off to a demonstration in Syria given the behavior of the regime. The answer is no, I would not. Nor would any responsible parent. That is why I suggested less dangerous forms of protest. If all the ones I have mentioned have been tried, maybe it is time to try some new ones.
Another commenter says:
Nonviolence may work where the government either worries about its international reputation (the British in India, the U.S. South, So. Africa), or where it has decided in advance to retreat (Russians from Eastern Europe), or where the power structures are willing to give up an unpopular ruler to preserve their own position (Romania, Serbia, Egypt).
I don’t think this accurately describes the situations cited, or exhausts the possiblities. All governments, even autocratic ones, depend on the consent of the governed. In autocracies, that consent is compelled through fear. Bashar al Assad is trying–with considerable success–to re-instil fear in the Syrian population. That is what the protesters need to counter: not the use of force, but the fear it engenders. Thinking strategically about how that can be accomplished–something I admit only Syrians can seriously do–is vital.
That is what I am not seeing, though of course it may be happening behind the scenes. It would require careful analysis of the regime’s main pillars of support (some minorities, middle class, army, intelligence services, police, Iran, Russia?) and definition of courses of action to undermine them. Some will of course prove “softer” targets than others, but all have a stake in the regime and need to be weaned from providing it support. I don’t see how the little violence of which the FSA is capable today contributes to the strategic objective.
Nor do I think the constant refrain of those calling for “safe areas” is wise. Safe areas aren’t safe. They have to be made safe. They did not succeed in Bosnia. They utterly failed to protect the people who were in them and exposed them to the worst genocidal behavior of the war. The failure brought international intervention, which I suppose is what some advocates of a safe areas in Syria hope will happen. I’m convinced it won’t. Eliminating Syria’s air defenses and destroying its artillery would be a major military operation conducted against a Russian ally a few weeks before Putin’s re-election. It isn’t going to happen, before the elections or thereafter.
A word about covert support to the FSA, which is what people I have a lot of respect for over at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs are touting as a “least worst” military option. Presumably the Turks, who apparently have “lost” some military officers on the wrong side of the border, are already engaged in this. Without air support (NATO’s contribution in Libya), I have little confidence that supplying weapons will do much for the FSA, which seems to have quite a few already. Organization and discipline count for a lot in war, and that is what the FSA lacks (and will find hard to obtain under current conditions).
Even if they manage somehow to get organized and under more centralized control, the best the FSA is going to be able to manage is a military contest that amounts to civil war, which from the American perspective is the worst of all possible worlds. Far better to support a ceasefire, withdrawal of the Syrian army from population centers, and return of the Arab League observers in far larger numbers than before, preferably with UN support. That won’t put Homs back to the status quo ante, but it will give Syrian citizens another chance at demonstrating nonviolently that they have withdrawn their consent from the murderous regime of Bashar al Assad.
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