Tag: Russia
This week’s “peace picks”
Loads of interesting events this week:
1. Georgian-South Ossetian Confidence Building Processes, Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th floor, February 6, noon- 1pm
Dr. Susan Allen Nan will discuss the Georgian-South Ossetian relationship, including insights from the 14 Georgian-South Ossetian confidence building workshops she has convened over the past three years, the most recent of which was in January. The series of unofficial dialogues catalyze other confidence building measures and complement the Geneva Talks official process.
Please note that seating for this event is available on a first come, first served basis. Please call on the day of the event to confirm. Please bring an identification card with a photograph (e.g. driver’s license, work ID, or university ID) as part of the building’s security procedures.
The Kennan Institute speaker series is made possible through the generous support of the Title VIII Program of the U.S. Department of State.
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Associate Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
by
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former National Security Adviser and CSIS Counselor and Trustee
Willard Room, Willard InterContinental Hotel
1401 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Introduction by
John Hamre, CSIS
Remarks by
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Interviewed by
David Ignatius, The Washington Post
Book Signing
from 4:00 to 4:30 p.m.
-Books will be available for purchase-
This invitation is non-transferable. Seating is limited.
To RSVP please e-mail externalrelations@csis.org by Wednesday, February 2.
This book seeks to answer 4 questions:
What are the implications of the changing distribution of global power from West to East, and how is it being affected by the new reality of a politically awakened humanity? Why is America’s global appeal waning, how ominous are the symptoms of America’s domestic and international decline, and how did America waste the unique global opportunity offered by the peaceful end of the Cold War? What would be the likely geopolitical consequences if America did decline by 2025, and could China then assume America’s central role in world affairs? What ought to be a resurgent America’s major long-term geopolitical goals in order to shape a more vital and larger West and to engage cooperatively the emerging and dynamic new East? America, Zbigniew Brzezinski argues, must define and pursue a comprehensive and long-term geopolitical vision, a vision that is responsive to the challenges of the changing historical context. This book seeks to provide the strategic blueprint for that vision.
5. The Unfinished February 14 Uprising: What Next for Bahrain? Dirksen, 9:30-11 am February
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Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 106
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POMED DC Events Calendar
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alex.russell@pomed.org
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As the February 14th anniversary of the start of mass protests in Bahrain approaches, now is a critical time to analyze events over the past few months and discuss expectations for the coming weeks. With the release of the BICI report in late November, which detailed systematic human rights abuses and a government crackdown against peaceful protesters, the Government of Bahrain was tasked with a long list of reforms and recommendations. At this juncture, nearly two months after the release of the report, it is essential for the United States to debate the Kingdom’s reforms and how to move Bahrain forward on a path of democratic progress. Human rights groups continue to raise significant human rights concerns with respect to the situation on the ground. What are some of these concerns? What are the current realities on the ground in Bahrain? What are the strategies of the country’s political opposition parties and revolutionary youth movement, and how is the monarchy reacting? What are some expectations and challenges regarding the palace-led reform process? And, importantly, what constructive roles can the U.S. play in encouraging meaningful reform at this time? Please join us for a discussion of these issues with: Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) Elliott Abrams Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Joost Hiltermann Deputy Program Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group Colin Kahl Associate Professor, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security Moderator: Stephen McInerney Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy To RSVP: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dGFWVEU3dzBVNUtiTzFKYW5OVlZ3UXc6MQ This event is sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the National Security Network, and the Foreign Policy Initiative. For more information, visit: http://pomed.org/the-unfinished-february-14-uprising-what-next-for-bahrain-2/
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6. An Assessment of Iran’s Upcoming Parliamentary Elections, Woodrow Wilson Center, 12-1:15 pm February 9
with
Hosein Ghazian
and
Geneive Abdo
Location:
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Geneive Abdo //Director, Iran Program, The Century Foundation
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Visiting Scholar, Syracuse University
This event requires a ticket or RSVP
The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) and the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
invite you to
One Year Later:
Has the Arab Spring Lived Up to Expectations?
A public panel featuring:
John L. Esposito
University Professor & Founding Director
ACMCU, Georgetown University
Heba Raouf
Associate Professor
Cairo University
Radwan Ziadeh
Fellow, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace
Moderated by:
Farid Senzai
Director of Research
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
February 9, 2012 – 4:00-6:00 pm
Georgetown University Hotel & Conference Center | Salon H
One year has passed since protestors took to the streets across the Arab World. Join the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding for an engaging panel on what progress has been made on the ground and where the revolution will go from here.
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John L. Esposito is University Professor, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies and Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Esposito specializes in Islam, political Islam from North Africa to Southeast Asia, and Religion and International Affairs. He is Editor-in-Chief of Oxford Islamic Studies Online and Series Editor: Oxford Library of Islamic Studies, Editor-in-Chief of the six-volume The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, The Oxford History of Islam (a Book-of-the-Month Club selection), The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, The Islamic World: Past and Present, and Oxford Islamic Studies Online. His more than forty five books include Islamophobia and the Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, The Future of Islam, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (with Dalia Mogahed), Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (a Washington Post and Boston Globe best seller), The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, Islam and Politics, Political Islam: Radicalism, Revolution or Reform?, Islam and Democracy (with J. Voll). His writings have been translated into more than 35 languages, including Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Bahasa Indonesia, Urdu, European languages, Japanese and Chinese. A former President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America and of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, Vice Chair of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, and member of the World Economic Forum’s Council of 100 Leaders, he is currently Vice President (2012) and President Elect (2013) of the American Academy of Religion, a member of the E. C. European Network of Experts on De-Radicalisation and the board of C-1 World Dialogue and an ambassador for the UN Alliance of Civilizations. Esposito is recipient of the American Academy of Religion’s Martin E. Marty Award for the Public Understanding of Religion and of Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azzam Award for Outstanding Contributions in Islamic Studies and the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Award for Outstanding Teaching.
Heba Raouf Ezzat holds a Ph.D in political theory and has been teaching at Cairo University since 1987, and is also an affiliate professor the American University in Cairo (since 2006). She currently serves as Visiting Senior Fellow at the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Her research, publications and activism is focused on comparative political theory, women in Islam, global civil society, new social movements and sociology of the virtual space. She is also a cofounder of Islamonline.net which is now Onislam.net, an academic advisor of many youth civil initiatives, the member of the Board of Trustees of Alexandria Trust for Education – London, and the Head of the Board of Trustees of the Republican Consent Foundation – Cairo. She was a research fellow at the University of Westminster (UK) (1995-1996), the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (1998 and 2012), and the Center for Middle East Studies, University of California-Berkeley (2010). She recently participated in establishing the House of Wisdom, the first independent Egyptian Think Tank founded after the Egyptian revolution 2011.
Radwan Ziadeh is a Fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, and a Dubai Initiative associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is the founder and director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies in Syria and co-founder and executive director of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C.
Farid Senzai is Director of Research at ISPU and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University. Dr. Senzai was previously a research associate at the Brookings Institution, where he studied U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, and a research analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he worked on the Muslim Politics project. He served as a consultant for Oxford Analytica and the World Bank. Dr. Senzai is currently on the advisory board of The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life where he has contributed to several national and global surveys on Muslim attitudes. His recent co-authored book is Educating the Muslims of America (Oxford University Press, 2009). Dr. Senzai received a M.A. in international affairs from Columbia University and a Ph.D. in politics and international relations from Oxford University.
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Please RSVP here: http://arabspringispu.eventbrite.com/
For a map and directions to the GU Conference Center, please visit: http://www.acc-guhotelandconferencecenter.com/map-directions/
mem297@georgetown.edu
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Dr. John Hamre
President and CEO, CSISModerated by
Dr. Bulent Aliriza
Director and Senior Associate, CSIS Turkey ProjectCenter for Strategic and International Studies
B1 Conference Room
1800 K. St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
9. China, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Security and Trade, 12:30-2 pm, Rome Auditorium, SAIS
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Plan B
Yesterday a treasured Twitter follower described me as optimistic on Syria, because I saw some promise of a serious transition in the current draft UN Security Council resolution. The caveats did not fit in 140 characters: I was optimistic if the draft resolution were to pass and if the Americans, Europeans and Arab League continued to insist that Bashar al Assad step aside and allow the transition to begin.
Today it is clear that the first of my caveats has not been realized: the Russians and Chinese have both voted against, with 13 other members of the Security Council voting in favor. This is a real setback, heading us into scenarios 2 or 4 of my previous post on how bad things could get: the regime wins or civil war. We’d be lucky now to get into scenario 1: divided sovereignty, with some areas held by the opposition.
Moscow and Beijing will no doubt sell the vetoes back home as necessary to defy the U.S. and stop Western imperialism of the sort that took down Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. In fact what they have done is to protect Bashar al Assad at a moment when he is killing more of his own people than ever. Over 200 are reported to have lost their lives in overnight shelling of a neighborhood in Homs, an epicenter of the uprising. Yesterday’s commemoration of the father’s slaughter of people in Hama thirty years ago has sadly led to ferocious confirmation that the son is struck from the same mold.
What is to be done now? Some will propose military intervention without Security Council approval. That was done in Kosovo, where the UN blessed the outcome in Security Council resolution 1244 even if had not blessed the intervention before it happened. I doubt the U.S., NATO or the Arab League have the stomach or resources for that. If they had wanted to do that, they would not have allowed a vote at the Security Council.
They are much more likely to feed the violent opposition to the regime by arming and perhaps training the Syrian Free Army, which appears to have liberated parts of the country but is unable to hold them if the unfree Syrian army strikes back. Encouraging the Syrian Free Army will unfortunately put the country on the path to civil war, with frightening consequences for minorities and secularism if the rebels win and even worse consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood if they lose. And terrible consequences for everyone if the fighting is prolonged.
Far preferable in my view would be a return to nonviolent protest, with Arab League observers once more deployed in an effort to protect demonstrators from the worst abuses. Certainly the situation has deteriorated badly since the Arab League monitors were confined to quarters. Getting them out into the main contested areas as soon as possible would at least provide the eyes and ears required to communicate what is going on to the rest of the world, even if Bashar al Assad now seems unlikely to accept restraints.
President Obama this morning issued a statement that includes this:
The Syrian regime’s policy of maintaining power by terrorizing its people only indicates its inherent weakness and inevitable collapse. Assad has no right to lead Syria, and has lost all legitimacy with his people and the international community.
I agree that Assad has no right to lead Syria and has lost legitimacy, but unfortunately it does not follow that the regime’s collapse is inevitable. No doubt even a defeated UNSC resolution, when the vote is 13 to 2, confirms a loss of international legitimacy. But the father also lost legitimacy and nevertheless survived for many years thereafter, successfully passing power to the son.
What the United States, Europe and the Arab League need to do now is to keep up the pressure by maintaining and tightening sanctions, redeploying the observers if it is safe enough to do so and encouraging continued nonviolent protest in forms (boycotts in particular) that do not expose large numbers of people to the regime’s violence. They also need to consider new measures: blockade of arms shipments? extension of the financial sanctions used against Iran to Syria? Reinforcement of the Arab League observers?
Yesterday’s worldwide demonstrations focused on Syria’s embassies abroad. The next round should focus on Russia’s and China’s.
Some of the bodies from the massacre in Homs that the regime says didn’t happen:
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The UN poised to act on Syria
Turtle Bay has helpfully posted the latest UN Security Council draft resolution on Syria. It does many good things (condemns the regime’s repression, calls for access for the Arab League monitors, international journalists and the UN, endorses the Arab League efforts, calls for accountability), but the key question is whether it is sufficient to initiate a transition in Syria away from the Assad regime. Here are the most relevant provisions:
6. Calls for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s people, without prejudging the outcome;
7. Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States;
The text fails to call for Bashar al Assad to step down or transfer authority to his vice president, an apparent concession to the Russian view that the UNSC is not about regime change. The real clinker here is “without prejudging the outcome,” which is intended to shield Bashar.
My guess is that this is nevertheless sufficient to initiate a transition, provided the Arab League, the Americans and the Europeans stay firm and united (and the text is not watered down further). This means maintaining sanctions and pushing for Bashar to step aside, even though the resolution is not explicit on this point. The UNSC may not want to call for his ouster, but the Arab League and individual member states are entitled to press for it. It is impossible to picture “a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition” unless he does, since at least some of the Syrian opposition will be unwilling to meet under Bashar’s auspices.
The resolution rules out any authorized use of force: “nothing in this resolution authorizes measures under Article 42 of the Charter.” But for now at least that is fine. No one outside Syria is prepared to use force there.
The concluding provision for an Arab League report on implementation within 21 days and every 30 days thereafter is a yawn to most of us, but of course it is important to ensure that this issue get back regularly to the Security Council without the Russians running interference. If the Russians defy my prediction and don’t veto, this resolution could set the snowball in motion and we may well see the back of Bashar al Assad before spring.
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The likely Russian veto
Russia faces a big decision in the UN Security Council: whether to veto the draft resolution on Syria, or use the threat of a veto to extract further concessions in the text and then go along, maybe by abstaining.
There are ample reasons for Moscow to veto. In its current form the resolution foresees “delegation by the President of Syria of his full authority to his Deputy to fully cooperate with the national unity government in order to empower it to perform its duties in the transitional period.” If seriously implemented, this would mean the end of Bashar al Assad, though not necessarily of his sidekicks. Farouk al-Sharaa, the vice president, is a solid Assad regime type. But once a transition is set in motion, it will be difficult for Moscow to prevent it from gathering momentum.
That is not something Prime Minister Putin would like to see happening, especially in the run-up to Russia’s own March 4 presidential election. Putin will want to maintain his image as strong, unmoveable and defiant of the West. Russian protesters will view any concession on Syria in the Security Council as an incentive to up their game: if Syrians can displace an autocrat, why can’t Russians follow suite?
So the odds are in favor of a Russian veto this week, but there is still a slim possibility they would allow a defanged resolution to pass. The text is already less than crystal clear on what is supposed to happen. It reads like an obfuscated “puzzler” on Car Talk. The part immediately preceding the text on delegation of powers to the vice president reads this way:
Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ initiative set out in its 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States, aimed at:
So the delegation of powers is not to happen right away. There is to be a serious political dialogue aimed at the delegation of powers. There is lots of wiggle room here: what is the “whole spectrume of the Syrian opposition?” Elements of the opposition will likely refuse to take part. Who is to blame if the dialogue doesn’t happen? What if it takes a long time?
The main Russian concern will be to ensure that any resolution passing the Security Council cannot be interpreted as authorizing the use of force against the Syrian regime. While the Arab League has been at pains to emphasize that it is not asking for military intervention but rather indicating a way forward that will avoid it, the resolution still has a few points on which the Russians can be expected to balk. For example:
stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to resort to the use of force or the threat of force,
Moscow will want that to read “nothing in this resolution permits States…” Nor will Moscow like this bit at the end:
Decides to review Syria’s implementation of this resolution within 15 days and, in the event that Syria has not complied, to adopt further measures, in consultation with the League of Arab States;
Moscow will read “further measures” as opening the door to military intervention.
But these points seem to me negotiable: the West and the Arab League are far from pressing for the use of force against Bashar al Assad, even if some of the Syrian opposition would support it. How would President Obama justify another war in the Middle East in the midst of an election campaign? Only if Bashar al Assad is dumb enough to commit truly mass atrocities, which he so far has avoided on a daily basis, even as the numbers add up to well over 5000. Washington does not want to engage militarily–it is far more likely to make the mistake of throwing its weight behind the Free Syrian Army, perhaps clandestinely.
If the Russians can get a real commitment to no use of force, and if they would like this problem to go away and not come back before their own elections, they might even abstain on a resolution that, while changed from the current draft, is not too far off in its general outlines. I’m not holding my breath, just hoping that somehow the UNSC can finally move on what is a major threat to international peace and security. Getting the outlines of a transition plan through the Security Council is only a first step, but that’s how journeys start.
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How bad could Syria get?
It is hard to be optimistic about Syria. The question is, how bad could it get? The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:
- the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
- the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.
These two factors yield four scenarios:
- Divided sovereignty: Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others. Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas. A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
- The regime wins: Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail. The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
- Protesters win: international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not. The regime loses control of the country and has to yield. Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
- Civil war: Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection. Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines. Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.
1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.
2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid. Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government. The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.
2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns. We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent. But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.
The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4. Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help. If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.
Let there be no doubt: “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities. Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better: “protesters win.” For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.
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This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
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