Tag: Russia
What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
This is not easy
American Ambassador Robert Ford is returning to Damascus, where violence continues. Security forces and pro-regime militias killed dozens yesterday while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was meeting with opposition Syrian National Council members in Geneva. It is not clear how many the defector-manned Free Syrian Army has killed, but the SNC is claiming its armed partners will only defend Syrians and not undertake offensive operations.
There is no sign of the Arab League observers Bashar al Assad claims to have agreed could be deployed. Syria is now saying that sanctions have to end before observers can be deployed. I guess Damascus forgot to mention that earlier.
What is to be done? More of the same I am afraid. There is no quick solution. Even if Bashar were to exit suddenly, there would still be a regime in place fighting for its life with the resources Iran provides. The effort now has to focus on tightening sanctions, especially those imposed by the European Union and the Arab League as well as Turkey. It is important also to continue to work on the Russians, who have so far blocked any UN Security Council resolution.
Burhan Ghalioun, who leads the SNC, goes over all these issues and more in his Wall Street Journal interview last week. Unfortunately, it attracted attention mainly for what he had to say about Syria being able to recover the Golan Heights and breaking its military alliance with Iran. Much more interesting were his commitment to nonviolence, to a “civil” state, to countering sectarianism, to Arab solidarity and to building a serious democracy with rule of law. The outlines of an SNC program are starting to emerge, including a desire for an orderly transition, maintenance of state institutions and elections within a year. But I found it hard to credit his dismissal of the Muslim Brotherhood. It has long played an important underground role in Syria and is likely to persist as an important political force in the post-Assad period.
The Americans seem to me still focused on hastening Bashar’s removal. That is certainly a worthy goal, but it may not happen. We also need to be worrying about sustaining the nonviolent opposition, which is under enormous pressure every day. Ambassador Ford’s return may give them a boost, but he is unlikely to be able to do much to help them or to communicate effectively with the regime, whose listening skills are minimal.
Getting the observers in would be one important step, but it is unclear to me whether they really exist. If Bashar did agree to them, could the Arab League deploy them within a reasonable time frame? Who are they? How many? How have they been trained? What rules of behavior will they follow? How will they report?
Bluff is not going to win this game. Enforcing sanctions, persuading the Russians to go along with a Security Council resolution, deploying Arab League observers, sustaining the protesters, keeping an exit door open for Bashar: none of it is easy, but together these things may begin slowly to turn the tide.
Here is Bashar al Assad with Barbara Walters: he asks for evidence of brutality, denies that he has given orders for a crackdown and suggests the UN is not credible. He likely also thinks the sun revolves around the earth:
Getting ready for post-Assad Syria
While my enthusiasm for nonviolent revolution in Syria has not waned, some of the best pieces of the past week have focused on the risks involved.
International Crisis Group (ICG) weighed in with an analysis of where things might go wrong:
- the fate of the Alawite community;
- the connection between Syria and Lebanon;
- the nature and implications of heightened international
involvement;- the long-term impact of the protest movement’s growing
militarisation; and- the legacy of creeping social, economic and institutional
decay.
Patrick Seale offered a more generic warning of civil war and a far-fetched (or is it imaginative?) proposal for BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) mediation to avoid it (with thanks to Carne Ross for tweeting it).
Meanwhile, back at the Arab League they imposed in principle serious sanctions on Syria, including a ban on transactions with its central bank as well as travel by regime big shots and a halt to Arab development projects in Syria. As usual, some of the important stuff is not mentioned. Commercial air transportation with Syria will continue, assets in the Gulf have not been frozen, and neighbors Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan have not committed to complying with the sanctions, which will probably be implemented slowly and incompletely. Even if all were willing, the regime would find ways of taking advantage of sanctions to enrich its least savory characters.
One other thing is also certain: the longer it takes to get rid of Assad, the more difficult the transition to a democratic regime will be. No one can pretend that the Syrian National Council (SNC) is yet ready to govern, even if Libya and France have recognized it (the latter as a partner for dialogue and not a government). It needs to hasten its preparations, which so far seem rudimentary. The SNC (and other elements of the opposition?) will reportedly meet in Cairo within a week to elaborate its vision and plans for the transition. The Syrians could do worse than take that ICG list of issues and work on serious plans to resolve them.
PS: The UN Human Rights Commission “Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” published this morning, makes grim reading. Here are a couple of randomly chosen paragraphs:
48. Several defectors witnessed the killing of their comrades who refused to execute orders to fire at civilians. A number of conscripts were allegedly killed by security forces on 25 April in Dar’a during a large-scale military operation. The soldiers in the first row were given orders to aim directly at residential areas, but chose to fire in the air to avoid civilian casualties. Security forces posted behind shot them for refusing orders, thus killing dozens of conscripts.
49. Civilians bore the brunt of the violence as cities were blockaded and curfews imposed. The commission heard many testimonies describing how those who ventured outside their homes were shot by snipers. Many of the reported cases occurred in Dar’a, Jisr Al Shughour and Homs. A lawyer told how security forces took positions in old Dar’a during the operation in April. Snipers were deployed on the hospital rooftop and other buildings. “They targeted anyone who moved”, he said. Two of his cousins were killed on the street by snipers.
Syria is not hopeless
Bashar al Assad continues to defy international pressure by cracking down violently on peaceful protesters in Syria. The internationals are running out of ideas about what to do: Arab League suspension, contact group, tightening sanctions against economic mainstays of the regime, helping the Syrian National Council (SNC) unify and project a program, renewed pursuit of a UN Security Council resolution and ambiguity about whether military force will be used are on Robert Danin’s list, which isn’t much different from Andrew Tabler’s.
What Danin and Tabler are trying to do is accelerate Bashar al Assad’s departure. I wish them luck in that, and I hope we do all they recommend. But I think we need also to prepare for a long siege. Bashar is trying to outlast the protesters, and he might well succeed unless they, and we, get smarter.
They need to get clever about new ways of defying the regime and demonstrating widespread support. The streets are dangerous these days, and the use of violence by some of the demonstrators is going to make it worse. Some stay at home, general strike or boycott-type demonstrations are in order. As Chenoweth and Stephan point out, it is much harder for the regime to respond to these. And much less risky for the demonstrators if they do nothing but fail to appear for work. More coordinated evening banging on pots and pans is another possibility. Do it twice and everyone will understand its significance.
The internationals also need to prepare for the long haul. This means using the time available to get the SNC up to snuff, with a serious plan and program for the future. Yeh, I know there are proposals for this working their way through the State Department, but too slowly for my taste. It also means talking with the Russians about their naval base at Latakia. They are sure to lose it if they don’t switch sides before Bashar falls. The trick is to convince them that his fall is inevitable and they may as well help make it happen, in hope of ensuring their basing rights for the future.
We also need to press for international human rights monitors. They appear to have been part of the Arab League deal (a written copy of which I still haven’t seen). At some point, the regime may give in to these, because it will want confirmation that it has defeated the protests. If Bashar continues to refuse them, he only embarrasses himself.
Syria is not hopeless. But it may take a long time.
There are still things to do about Syria
I’m an enthusiast, as most Americans I know are, for our ambassador in Damascus, Robert Ford, so here is his Skype performance with Andrew Tabler yesterday at The Washington Institute:
TWI is good about writing up its events quickly, so I won’t attempt that. Just a few high points:
- There is a lot of chatter about revolutionary violence, which inevitably will lead to more regime violence, alignment of minorities with the regime and ultimately sectarian conflict;
- The newly established Syrian National Council (SNC) needs to develop a serious program for how it will govern that promises protection for minorities, establishes broad legitimacy within Syria and attracts international support;
- Concerted multilateral pressure targeting regime individuals, the central bank, the state-owned Commercial Bank and oil sales will hamstring the regime and weaken the allegiance of both the merchant class and some military elements to the regime;
- Regional pressure and openness to refugees, especially from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, can also help.
While Russia and China blocked a UN Security Council resolution, they are now urging reforms and might be convinced to go along with international monitors focused on establishing the facts of what is going on. If Bashar al Assad then refuses them, it will reflect badly on him.
Policy conclusions:
- Discourage violence, help the opposition with the tactics of nonviolent civil resistance, including general strikes;
- Help the SNC develop its governance program, with ownership clearly staying with the Syrians;
- Tighten up sanctions;
- Form a regional Friends of Syria including neighboring countries;
- Talk with the Russians and Chinese about international monitors with a UN mandate.
PS: Some courageous Syrians, said to be demonstrating Friday in Damascus:
A step in the right direction
Nadim Shehadi argues in The Guardian
Syrian political society will emerge and show its real face only after the regime is gone, and not before. This will not be a phoenix rising from the ashes, rather a battered society that will be trying to find its way after a long and dark period.
Until then, he advises we stop calling the opposition “the opposition” (because doing so legitimizes the regime) and lower our expectations to about as close to zero as possible, since no Syrian can reveal his true political identity without serious risk.
Fortunately, the Syrian opposition seems not to be taking Shehadi’s advice. Instead it formed a Syrian National Council on Sunday in Istanbul, whose chair outlined its purposes:
…[to] achieve the goals of the revolution to topple the regime, including all of its components and leadership, and to replace it with a democratic pluralistic regime.
Admittedly, this is not yet much of a program, and the people ready to speak openly for the Syrian National Council at present appear all to be expatriates, even if it is claimed that the Local Coordinating Committees that organize demonstrations inside Syria were represented in Istanbul.
But it is vital that the Syrians create something that can be viewed internationally and internally as a legitimate alternative to Bashar al Assad. If diaspora Syrians can help provide the alternative, all the better, even if their role is likely to decrease in the future.
No one watching the course of events in Libya and Egypt can doubt the importance of minimal coherence and legitimacy in the leadership of a rebellion. Libya had such a body, now called the National Transitional Council and recognized widely as the legitimate governing authority. Egypt did not. As a result, the protesters acquiesced in turning over the transition to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has proven an infelicitous choice from the perspective of those who forced Hosni Mubarak to step down.
The Syrian National Council has a tough job ahead. Some Syrians have begun to take up arms against the regime, which has not hesitated to use indiscriminate force against the protesters. They cannot expect foreign military help. NATO is in no mood for another Libya. There is no demand for it in the Arab world, and the Russians won’t let a Security Council resolution authorize it because of their longstanding alliance with Syria, which includes a naval base at Latakia. While sanctions are taking their toll on the Syrian regime, Iran is doing what it can to relieve its friends in Damascus and ensure that they survive.
Syria is a complex society, with ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions that the Assad regime has long exploited to prevent the emergence of a united opposition. It will not be easy to keep Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shia, Christiansand Muslims on the same wavelength. That a reasonably united opposition appears now to be emerging is significant, even if Shehadi is correct that the real, battered face of Syria will only emerge after the Assad regime is gone.
Here is a recent (September 28) Al Arabiya report on the demonstrations in Syria:
