Tag: Russia
So it fizzled. When will the next time come?
Yesterday’s insurrection and impending coup is today’s fizzle. Yevgeny Prigozhin has agreed to turn the Wagner troops around while he expatriates himself to Belarus. Ostensibly he and Putin reached an agreement, with Belarus’ President Lukashenko mediating, to avoid bloodshed. The Wagnerites get amnesty. Putin gets to stay in the Kremlin.
Question marks
I suppose it could be that simple. After all, if you are a Russian patriot, civil war is not appetizing. But there are still lots of question marks. Why did Prigozhin light the fuse? Why did he decide to abandon the effort? Did he fail to get support he thought would be forthcoming from others? Why did Russian forces not attack the Wagner column? What did Putin agree to do in exchange for the standdown?
Then there are the longer-term questions. Can Prigozhin really be safe in Minsk? Will this incident weaken Putin’s hold on power? If you are a Wagner fighter do you really believe there will be no retaliation? Are you willing to stick with an enterprise that apparently lost the contest? How will this incident affect the extensive Wagner operations in Africa and Syria? How do you feel if you are a Russian soldier on the front lines in Ukraine? What about ordinary Russian citizens? Does Chinese President Xi think Putin is a reliable partner?
Cracks are showing
Prigozhin for weeks has been complaining loudly about Russian Defense Minister Shoigu and Chief of Staff Gerasimov. Prigozhin accuses them of incompetence, failure to supply Wagner’s forces, and even an attack on his men. Neither Shoigu nor Gerasimov has been seen for a few days. Putin appeared to come down hard on their side in the pissing match with Prigozhin, but it is also possible he has agreed to sack them, but we’ll have to wait and see.
In any event, the Wagner fizzle suggests Putin’s hold on power is not quite as tight as many imagine. Prigozhin can’t be the only discontent almost a year and a half into a war that has gained Russia little and cost a lot. The crackdown that is sure to follow the Wagner non-coup could widen the fissures in the ruling elite. But there is still little sign of popular willingness to challenge the Kremlin.
Keep the popcorn for next time
Some will worry that Putin falling could bring chaos to a nuclear-weapons state. Or put those weapons into the hands of someone like Prigozhin. Those are legimate concerns, but there is little the West can do about them. The US, UK, and Europe are bystanders who can do little more than keep up their support for Ukraine and hope that somehow Moscow decides to cut its losses and leave. In the meanwhile, it was a good show while it lasted. If you haven’t finished your popcorn, hold on to it. Next time might not be far off.
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Stevenson’s army, June 24
What’s happening in Russia? Have to watch and wait. Updates at NYT, also at WaPo, and at this independent Russian site
Meanwhile, quick takes from Anne Applebaum and Tom Nichols.
Lawfare says a new Iran nuclear deal has to stay verbal.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Sit tight, unite, and prepare for opportunity in Russia
I missed the start last night, but Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group rebel forces are still moving toward Moscow from Rostov-on-Don today. They made it half way so far, to somewhere past Voronezh. That itself is amazing. Why hasn’t the Russian air force torn the Wagner column to pieces?
The outcome is uncertain
The outcome is however entirely uncertain. The insurrection could still fizzle. It could suffer catastrophic defeat. Wagner could become mired in a stalemate. Or it could succeed in chasing Putin from the Kremlin. Chechen forces are said to be getting ready to stop their progress toward Moscow. But those forces also have reason to be unhappy with Putin, so will they do the necessary for him?
Nor should we regard Prigozhin’s Wagner forces as heroes. They have fought, tortured, and robbed in Syria and several countries in Africa (Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan). They participated in the Trump-encouraged hacking of the US presidential election in 2016. Prigozhin is no more of a democrat than Putin. Maybe less.
Insurrection could have consequences, even if it fails
But this insurrection, even if ultimately unsuccessful, will have consequences if it lasts more than a day or two. Putin’s hold on power will look tenuous. Russian troops in Ukraine, already demoralized, may hesitate to follow orders from a military command fighting Russians on the outskirts of Moscow. Some might even join the rebellion.
Ukraine’s army will be emboldened and press its counteroffensive harder. Distracted, the Russian army command could make serious mistakes, of either commission or omission. Fighting on two fronts is never easy, but if one is your home front it is likely to get priority.
Belarus could rise against President Lukashenko, who lacks electoral legitimacy. Constituent republics of the Russian Federation might do likewise. Russia might “rupture.” Moscow could find itself fighting not just with Prigozhin but also with half a dozen other rebellious forces.
Sit tight
The West (read the EU, UK, and US) have little direct say in this situation. Brussels, London, and Washington will want to be cautious, lest they give Russians cause to unite. They will also worry that Putin, his back to the wall and his life at risk, could take desperate measures, like use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine or even against his enemies inside Russia. Until now, that has seemed unlikely, but the man is frightened and may have few other cards to play.
China, India, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and other countries that Putin has courted may try to come to his rescue, mainly by providing markets for Russian oil. Except for China, their means are limited. Beijing is more likely to wait until it sees the outcome, which will necessarily be a weakened Russia more dependent on Chinese largesse.
Prepare
A Russia without Putin would be an opportunity for the West. If the rebellion succeeds, a united Western front in dealing with Prigozhin will be vital. He is no more principled than Putin. Steering a post-Putin Russia towards complete withdrawal from Ukraine and encouaging emergence of something resembling democracy there will be a major diplomatic challenge. Now is the time to prepare for it.
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Stevenson’s army, June 22
– In FP, Gen. McChrystal says we have to change how we make foreign policy because of AI
– Jonathan Guyer of Vox assesses how close China and Russia are
– CFR has good background on industrial policy
– Dan Drezner criticizes a big but stupid article in NYT
– TNSR has big article on escalation management in Ukraine
– Lawfare tells how to sanction-proof a government
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 20
-WaPo summarizes the Blinken visit. Note what he said to the news media, echoing the traditional US position on Taiwan.
-A CFR panel has its report on Taiwan policy.
– New reports say China and Cuba are negotiating a military base.
– FT says the Chinese exam for college is full of XI ideas.
– NYT investigation concludes Russia blew up the Khakhovka dam.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Road to nowhere in Montenegro
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montengrin Helsinki Committee. He writes:
Early parliamentary elections in Montenegro attracted the lowest turnout ever (56%). They have not brought major surprises. The populist movement “Europe Now!” gained seats in parliament, as expected. It won only a thin majority (24 MPs to 21) over the “Together” coalition led by former President Djukanović’s DPS. That creates additional uncertainities and confusion in an already compromised and disrupted political situation.
Government formation faces challenges
One thing seems clear: no coalition is possible between the two largest parliamentary groups. Milojko Spajić will almost certainly be given the mandate to form the the next government. He excludes any possibility of forming a cabinet with DPS.
Spajić also rejects a coalition with incumbent “technical” Prime Minister Abazović’s URA Movement, which won 12.5% and 11 seats (together with “Democratic Montenegro”). The bitter feud between the two is based on still unproven accusations of illegal election funding by a South Korean crypto-currency trader, now under investigation. The outcome of that proceeding may be harmful both for Spajić and Abazović. It has already become an important – if not the most important – feature of post-election Montenegro.
The pro-Serbian, pro-Russian For the Future of Montenegro coalition won 14.7% and 13, which puts them in a vital position despite a big decline from the previous election.
The country is not in good shape
Parliamentary elections in August 2020 expelled DPS from the majority. Despite much pro-EU rhetoric, the results since have been poor. Two annual EU Commission reports on Montenegrin progress have shown regression, despite EU Commissioner for Enlargement Varhelyi’s effort to support the populists who took power. In the meantime, the two anti-DPS governments have caused dissaray in all segments of social, economic, and political life, with clear signs of influence coming from Belgrade and Moscow.
The last barrier against collapse remains Montenegro’s NATO membership. Even that was significantly compromised by intentional disruption of important activities of Agency for National Security against the Serbian/Russian spy network in the country. Abazović has overseen constant, debilitating purges there.
Spajić promotes a wishful thinking economic program, “Europe Now 2.0.” But even he acknowledges the country is on the brink of financial implosion. “No salaries for public servants after September,” he has stated bluntly. But that has not prevented him from promising increases in salaries and pensions while announcing elimination of the state Pension Fund! Those voters who supported Spajić as well as two other coalitions close to Serbian President Vučić ignore the risk of economic crisis. They count on promises of miraculous progress by a new government empowered soon.
They may find themselves utterly surprised. Neither Spajić nor Jakov Milatović, the vice-president of “Europe Now!” and newly elected President, can guarantee political harmony even within their own political ranks. Milatović remains close not only to Serbian President Vučić, but also to Abazović. That complicates Spajić’sposition.
The internationals
The Western diplomatic community in Podgorica prefers stability underwritten by a stable qualified majority in the Parliament. They ignore the perils of participation by pro-Serbian and pro-Russian parties, despite their anti-NATO and de facto anti-EU standings. The problem will be how to include the ethnic minority parties (Bosniak, Albanian, and Croatian) in the new government. Western diplomats may intend to politely order them to join.
Both Abazović and Milatović, together with other leaders of the projected majority, support the Serbian proposal for “Open Balkans,” which the US backs. Spajić is unlike to oppose it if he wants to become prime minister.
So, the proverb has been confirmed: “once you enter the wrong train – all the stations are the wrong ones.” Montenegro entered the wrong train in August 2020. Insisting on continuing the journey does not ensure but rather endangers Montenegrin political stability and economic viability. It is a destructive and detrimental project. The next station may have the name “Grave Consequences.” The names of other “stations” would not be good even to mention here…
The return from the road to nowhere will be long and painful. The later it comes, the worse it will be.
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