Tag: Russia
Peace in our time will bring more war
Pete Hegseth announced a major change in US policy on Ukraine today. The most unqualified Defense Secretary ever offered to appease Russia by
- Ending US support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO;
- Abandoning Ukraine’s war goal of regaining control of all its sovereign territory;
- Anticipating an end to most US assistance to Ukraine;
- Excluding US troops from any post-war peacekeeping force;
- Asking European allies to provide such a force without a NATO Article 5 guarantee.
This gives Russian President Putin everything he hopes for except direct and immediate control over the government in Kyiv.
This is not peace through strength
Hegseth claimed he was proposing peace through strength. But that is pure illusion. He is pulling the rug out from underneath Ukrainian President Zelensky. At best (from Ukraine’s perspective), his remarks would make Ukraine a buffer state between NATO and Russia.
But maintaining Ukraine as a buffer state would be impossible. The Europeans would need to monitor a confrontation zone between Russia and Ukraine that is more than 1200 miles long. Kyiv, abandoned by the US, would want nuclear weapons to ensure Ukraine’s survival. That Russia would not allow.
Another Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory would be just a matter of time. And in the meanwhile Russia would be doing everything it could to bring down Zelensky. That wouldn’t be difficult if he agreed to anything like what Hegseth proposes.
I hardly need mention that partition of Ukraine as Hegseth proposes will have a dramatic impact in the Balkans. Serbia will try to grab territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. American and European troops will be at risk.
Worse: appeasement of Russia in Ukraine will be a signal to Beijing that Washington won’t defend Taiwan. Some of that damage may already have been done with Hegseth’s speech. He has undermined the deterrence he claims to find vital.
Real peace through strength is the alternative?
The Biden Administration pursued a Goldilocks policy on Ukraine. Enough support to make Russia’s territorial gains slow and costly. But not enough to provoke Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, which Putin has contemplated in the event Moscow faced calamity.
That worked well enough given its objectives. But it wasn’t enough–nor did it intend–for Ukraine to win the war. Kyiv, like Moscow, is struggling with manpower shortages. The only way for it to win the war is with overwhelming technological superiority. Ukraine’s forces have developed a lot of their own weapons and tactics. But they will need more unqualified US and European support to win.
The alternative to Hegseth’s appeasement is to provide that support. That would be real peace through strength.
A Ukraine win would strengthen the West
The implications of Kyiv winning are good for the US and Europe. Moscow would then need to abandon its imperial ambitions. Putin might survive using repression, but only as a much-diminished figure at home and abroad. Russia’s economy and demography will need rebuilding. It will be at least another generation before Moscow can threaten a neighbor.
Reasonable people in Moscow would quickly switch the position on Ukrainian membership in NATO. They would come to see that as the best guarantee of a Ukraine without nuclear weapons. They know better than anyone else that NATO membership has kept Germany non-nuclear.
Europe would gain enormously from the opening of a peacetime free market with Ukraine reconstructing itself. The US would get the privileged access to Ukrainian rare minerals it seeks.
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Kosovo is democratic but complicated
Kosovo voted yesterday. The electoral mechanism seems to have worked reasonably well except for a cyberattack. That appears to have been overcome. Prime Minister Kurti (LVV) got 41%, his PDK opposition 22%, the LDK opposition 18%, and AAK (Ramush Haradinaj) 7%. Minorities will hold 20 seats. Turnout was relatively low (around 40%), despite a lively campaign. I haven’t yet seen how the preliminary percentages translate into parliamentary seats. That could change the picture.
For background, here is a primer. So far as I can tell, the EU observer mission has not yet reported its findings.
The winner loses…but the losers didn’t win
The Prime Minister led by an almost a 2/1 margin over his nearest competitor. But he lost his absolute majority in parliament. While minority votes could put him in the majority, he won’t get enough of them. He will now need the seats of either the PDK or the LDK to regain the majority. The freewheeling way he has governed will make that difficult. Both the PDK and AAK have said they are unwilling to govern with VV. Still, it can’t be ruled out, especially if he is willing to give up the prime ministry. The LDK seems more open to the idea.
The PDK, LDK, and AAK did not win either. Even if the PDK and LDK join together in coalition, they won’t have enough seats to gain the majority. Putting together a 3-party coalition isn’t going to be easy. Resentment of Kurti might help. The three opposition parties were united during the campaign in criticizing him. They don’t like his handling of the economy and blame him for strained relations with the US and EU.
What next
Parliamentary systems that produce ambiguous results of this sort generally need some time to work things out. Despite strains between them, I suppose President Osmani will give Kurti a chance to forge a parliamentary majority. If he fails, the PDK may get a chance to bring in a government that includes the other opposition parties.
If Kurti keeps the prime ministry in coalition with an opposition party, the US and EU will pressure him to consult more. They want him to show more flexibility in dealing with Serbia. That isn’t likely to produce results, given past experience.
Almost any conceivable alternative prime minister will try to reduce strains with the US and EU. All the other political parties have criticized Kurti for inflexibility.
But all have governed in the past, with not much better results when it comes to dealing with Serbia. Belgrade is likewise is inflexible in dealing with Pristina. It demands creation of an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities inside Kosovo with no quid pro quo.
The broader context
Kosovo’s future depends today more on what happens beyond its borders than on this ambiguous election result. Ric Grenell, Trump’s former envoy, is telling everyone in the Balkans he will again be in charge of the region. He loathes Kurti. Last time around, he tried to partition Kosovo. Likely he’ll try again. Or at least insist on self-governance for the Serbs in the north that compromises the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. And he’ll wield control over NATO accession as a stick. He’ll also wield USAID assistance, which will need to be unfrozen.
Even without the American push for partition, any discussion of partition of Ukraine will open the question in the Balkans. Russia and Serbia will encourage Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. They will also try to get the Serb-majority north to leave Kosovo. Moscow and Belgrade will figure the US and EU will be unprepared to defend either country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
While the Trump Administration is bad news for Kosovo, so too are future elections in Europe. Further strengthening of the right in Germany this month will stymie EU expansion, already slowed to a crawl.
Kosovo is a good example of successful democratization in the Balkans. But it is also complicated, both internally and in the broader geopolitical context.
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Why a PM resigning doesn’t matter
I’ve been preoccupied with events in DC and thus slow to comment on Serbian politics. Certainly the resignation of the prime minister is a credit to the demonstrators. They have maintained the pressure for months in the aftermath of the collapse of the Novi Sad train station canopy.
Waves of protests
In my way of counting this is a third wave of recent popular protests against President Aleksandar Vucic. The first wave was the anti-violence protests starting in late 2023. The second was environmental protests against lithium mining last summer and fall. Now we are seeing massive protests asking for accountability for the Novi Sad tragedy, which occurred last November 1. The common thread is that Serbs are asking for more transparency, accountability, and rule of law.
The protests show profound dissatisfaction with Vucic. He has introduced a semi-authoritarian system. The state vilifies and arrests dissenters, denies them outlets for free expression, and buys support with government jobs and contracts. Meanwhile, he and his allies are harvesting rents from any and all who want to do business in Serbia.
While united on the street, the opposition is fragmented among small political parties and their egotistical leaders. There is no opposition ready to govern. Some of the demonstrators are calling for a technical government to prepare for elections. Vucic won’t likely do that. He doesn’t hesitate to cheat when need be during electoral campaigns and at the polls. A technical government might put a crimp in his style.
Democratic backsliding has worked well for Vucic
But he is also genuinely popular in much of the country. He is a devoted Serbian nationalist who has attracted a lot of foreign investment from China, Europe, and the US. Despite his democratic backsliding, he has also gained political support from Washington and Brussels. They have regarded him as better than any of the conceivable alternatives, which are mostly on the nationalist right. And they like Vucic’s supply of ammunition to Ukraine and his willingness to mine lithium. Fawning over Vucic by the US government and by Germany has been particularly noteworthy.
Beijing has been investing mainly in steel, other metals, mining, and the automotive industry. In addition to its potential future in the European Union, Serbia is attractive partly because of lax regulation and enforcement. The Novi Sad collapse is symptomatic. China also supplies internal security technology that Vucic no doubt appreciates.
Moscow is not a big investor anywhere these days but gets lots of electronic components and political support from Serbia. Most notable is Serbia’s refusal to align with EU Ukraine sanctions.
One lapdog is as good as another
In this context, the resignation of a prime minister with little power doesn’t make a lot of difference. Vucic is the man, not Vucevic. If he thinks he’ll win, or can ensure that he’ll win, the President will call new elections. That has worked for him in the past to quiet protests. Or he will choose another lapdog prime minister who will do what the President wants without objection.
The prospects for real democracy in Serbia are dim, but of course that is true elsewhere as well. But that’s not a good reason not to try. My sentiments are with the demonstrators.
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A stronger American still fumbles
President Biden made a farewell appearance at the State Department yesterday. As a former Foreign Service officer, I’m of course delighted that he did this. It is especially important and timely because the Department now faces Donald Trump’s threat of loyalty tests and mass firings.
Biden’s understandably directed his remarks at justifying what his Administration has done on foreign policy. So how did he really do?
The bar was low
Certainly Biden can justifiably claim to have strengthened America’s alliances. The bar was low. Both in Europe and Asia the first Trump Administration had raised doubts. Allies could not depend on Washington’s commitment to fulfill its mutual defense obligations. Biden’s claim that compared to four years ago America is stronger because of renewed and expanded alliances is true. He is also correct in claiming he has not gone to war to make it happen.
The extraordinary strength of the American economy is an important dimension of this strength. Voters decided the election in part on the issue of inflation. But the Fed has largely tamed that and growth has been strong throughout. Manufacturing is booming, including vital semi-conductor production. Investment in non-carbon energy sources has soared. The defense industrial based is expanding.
Biden is also correct in asserting that America’s antagonists are worse off. Russia has failed to take Ukraine because of the US effort to gather support for Kyiv. Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are weaker. Only the Houthis in Yemen are arguably stronger than four years ago.
China is facing serious domestic economic and demographic challenges. But I don’t know why Biden claims it will never surpass the US. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, it already has, though obviously per capita GDP in China remains much lower.
Some claims gloss over big problems
Biden is rightly proud that there is no longer war in Afghanistan, but he glosses over the chaotic withdrawal. He also doesn’t mention the failure of the Taliban to keep its commitments.
He vaunts progress on climate change, but without acknowledging that the goal of keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees centigrade will not be met.
Biden talks about infrastructure in Africa. But not about its turn away from democracy, civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and the unresolved conflict in Libya.
He urges that Iran never be allowed to “fire” a nuclear weapon. That is a significant retreat from the position that Iran should never be allowed to have one.
Biden mentions the impending Hamas/Israel ceasefire. But he says nothing about Israel’s criminal conduct of the war in Gaza. Nor does he blame Israel’s right-wing government for the long delay in reaching a deal.
Biden’s legacy
At the end, Biden seeks to bequeath three priorities to Trump: artificial intelligence, climate change, and democracy. He no doubt knows that Trump isn’t going to take the advice on climate or democracy. He might on artificial intelligence, as his Silicon Valley tycoons will want him to.
Sad to say, Biden’s legacy will lie in other areas. Fearful of nuclear conflict with Russia, he failed to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defeat Russia. He was reluctant to rein in Israel for more than a year of the Gaza war. He failed to stop or reverse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. America is stronger than it was four years ago, but it has not always used that strength to good advantage.
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Getting to Syria’s next regime
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria was swift. Now comes the hard part: building a new regime that is an improvement. We know from past experience some of the elements required. Let’s review those, in light of the discussion among Syrians above.
Safe and secure environment
Above all, a safe and secure environment free of large-scale violence is a prerequisite.
The biggest threat for now is in the north. Turkish and Turkish-supported forces there are pressing hard against Kurdish and Kurdish-led forces. Turkiye President Erdogan wants the Kurds east of the Euphrates and at least 30 kilometers from the border. An American-mediated truce between the Turks and the Kurds has broken down. There is a real risk of a major conflict between them. Turkiye says its objective is eliminating the Kurdish forces. But Ankara and its allies don’t seem to make much distinction between specific Kurdish forces and Kurds iin general.
In other parts of the country there are also risks. It would be a mistake to assume that Assad did not organize “stay behind” forces. Even if not organized, they may emerge spontaneously, or Islamic State sleeper cells may awaken. In Iraq, the Saddam Fedayeen originated the insurgency against the American occupation that the Islamic State continued. There is still the possibility of revenge killings. A single mass grave near Damascus apparently holds 100,000 bodies. That means close to one million people with motives for seeking revenge.
Unifying the many armed groups under the new Syrian government will be a major challenge and priority. HTS has announced its intention to do this. But it will need to convince rebel leaders and find the resources to pay the fighters. Eventually it will need to demobilize many of them and integrate them into civilian life.
Rule of law
While there was some looting of government offices in Damascus, most Syrians have maintained law and order. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the leading force in the revolution, has kept police and government officials in their positions. Opposition forces in the south and other parts of the country have done likewise. There has been no sign, yet, of widespread revenge killings.
It will be years before Syria can reform its laws. In the meanwhile, there are urgent issues. Perhaps first among them is establishment and protection of property rights. In Idlib, HTS had a serious system for property issues. Expanding that to the national level will be a major challenge. Without that, it will be hard even to start reconstruction. According to the World Bank and the European Union, Syria has suffered an enormous amount of infrastructure damage. In 14 cities, they estimate damages of $8.7-11.4 billion.
Syria’s judicial sector was not independent of the Assad regime. It did what it was told. Judges and prosecutors will need to be vetted and new ones trained and named. Prison officials and guards will need to be likewise vetted and many replaced. Lawyers will need to be trained and retrained.
Accountability will be a priority. Identifying those responsible for Assad regime abuses will be easy at the top levels. But most of those people will have fled. Europe and the US need to be alert for their entry and capture them sooner rather than later. At the lower levels, many perpetrators will try to melt into the general population. It will be difficult to ferret them out and put them on trial quickly. Doing so will take years of concerted effort. It is not easy to gather the evidence a serious jury trial requires.
Stable governance
While Assad’s Syria conducted elections and had a parliament, it operated as an autocracy. The Assad family, the Ba’ath party, and Alawite military officers were pillars of the regime. It showed no respect for the rights of others. The new regime should reflect what Rafif calls a core commitment to human rights, including freedom of expression and religion. The mantra today is “inclusion,” which ultimately will require political pluralism, including full participation of women and minorities.
That will not be easy. HTS is also an autocratic organization, with little respect for women’s equality and dubious commitment to equal rights for minorities. It has appointed an interim government with little “inclusion” and has been less than clear about the role of women.
Political parties and civil society organizations are emerging quickly, but elections are still far off. It may be possible and desirable to convene a national dialogue of notable citizens. Russia and Iran, the foreign mainstays of the Assad regime are calling for one. Choice of participants would of course be problematic. But a national dialogue may provide common ground not only for Syrians but also for international powers interested in Syria.
Ultimately Syria will need a new constitution. Lots of constitutional proposals already exist. But Syria will need a constituent assembly of some sort to draft a democratic and inclusive document. Many of the issues involved have been discussed, but difficult choices lie ahead.
In the meanwhile, local governance will need to suffice. Syrians have practiced it a good deal in opposition-held areas in recent years. It won’t be a bad place to start.
Sustainable economy
Syrians are destitute. Their most immediate needs are food and fuel. Humanitarian assistance should flow as soon and as quickly as possible. This means using the United Nations and international relief organizations, which are already overburdened by Gaza and Lebanon.
Going much beyond humanitarian relief will require relief from sanctions and de-designation of HTS as a terrorist group. This will take time and convincing. The Americans and Europeans will want to be sure they are not snookered. They won’t want to provide reconstruction assistance to a new regime that fails to meet reasonable criteria. The big money will come from the World Bank and the Gulf. Washington and Brussels control the former and influence the latter.
Assad’s regime was dependent on production and trade of Captagon, an amphetamine. That will have to stop. HTS will crack down hard, but it will need also to generate economic opportunities to replace the drug trade. Syria is a country with limited oil and gas resources, big agricultural and tourism potential, and a good geographic location. Where its future livelihood will come from is unclear. Like Jordan and Egypt, it will need international assistance for decades into the future.
The World Bank has found that disruption of social networks has caused most of the economic damage in Syria. Restoring trust will take time and effort.
Social well-being
Half of Syria’s population is either refugees or displaced within the country. Many will want to return home. Others will not. Compensation for destroyed or expropriated property will be a major issue. Some communities will never return to their pre-war composition. Others will want to make an effort to do so.
The health system in Syria has imploded. Even in areas where the Russians and Syrian did not attack hospitals, sanitary supplies and equipment are limited. Many doctors and nurses have fled. Technical capabilities are not up to modern standards. Rebuilding will be a major enterprise.
The education system still functions in most of the country. Children go to school in both government and opposition controlled areas. But many buildings are destroyed and students will be behind in learning. Efforts were made to keep the education system in some opposition-controlled areas compatible with Syrian government requirements. But the culture of the schools and the experience of the students will be dramatically different.
The international dimension
Syria now faces two main challenges from neighbors. One is the Turkish effort to destroy the Kurdish institutions in the northeast. The other is the effort to destroy the strategic assets of the Syrian Arab Army, which Israel is bombing. Additionally, Israel has seized a UN-patroled buffer zone on the Golan Heights. HTS leadership is not prepared to fight Israel, even though some of its cadres would like to do so. HTS wants to bring the Kurdish institutions under Damascus authority. The Kurds are amenable. They do not advocate independence or union with the Kurds in Iraq. But Turkiye has vowed to try to destroy the Kurdish institutions. This is a serious threat and could vastly complicate the post-war situation.
Russia appears to be withdrawing much of its military assets from Syria. Iran has already done so. The US for now is maintaining its troops in support of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The Americans will want to withdraw, but will not do so before Donald Trump takes office in January. What he will do is not clear.
United Nations Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) is still the main international community statement on political transition in Syria. It is not a bad one.
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More remains to be done, but credit is due
Opposition and Turkish forces now control Syria’s northwest, northeast, north, south and the main cities of its north/south axis. But most of the west–the provinces of Latakia and Tartus–are still not fully in opposition control. Ditto much of the center.
The Alawites
The Alawite sect to which Bashar al Assad belonged constituted only about 10% of Syria’s population before the civil war. But Alawites are a plurality in the west. They live more in the countryside than in the main cities. The leader of the opposition, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), has named a military commander for the west. He met with Alawite notables in Latakia Tuesday. @GregoryPWaters cites an Alawite professor present, who reports:
The broad, summarized headlines that we all felt were true:
– No to sectarianism absolutely
– No to violating the property of individuals and institutions
– No to division
– No going back, everyone was harmed by the previous regime in one way or another
That is as friendly a message from HTS as possible. It is not entirely surprising. HTS has been reaching out to Syria’s minorities to preserve Syria’s unity. The Alawites of Latakia and Tartus suffered a great under their co-religionist Assad. They lost a lot of young people in the war. They had to toe the line or risk the full weight of his repression. Many Sunnis and others resented their access to privilege and power.
The trick now is to somehow hold individuals who committed abuses accountable while not mistreatinthe rest. Many of Assad’s henchmen, Sunni as well as Alawite, will have fled to Latakia and Tartus. Ferreting them out and giving them fair trials will not be easy.
The Russians
Besides the Alawites, the Russians are a problem in the west. They operate the Syrian Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia and lease a naval base farther south in Tartus. The air base has since 2015 launched thousands of sorties against opposition forces and civilians. The naval base is Russia’s only naval facility in the Mediterranean. Turkey has closed the Bosporus to military traffic due to the war in Ukraine. So the Tartus base is particularly important to the Russians. The air base is not, as its role has been overtaken by events.
Still, Moscow is insisting on keeping both. Russia will be arguing that the Syrians shouldn’t rely too heavily on Turkey. HTS has not signaled that it wants them out. Putin will be lucky to retain the naval facility.
The Islamic State
Much of the white area on the above map is sparsely populated. But it hosts Islamic State cells. HTS will now have to shoulder the burden of eliminating them. It should be willing to do so, as the Islamic State is a rival, not an ally. But it isn’t easy. The Americans could be helpful from the air and might be willing. Someone should ask, or offer. Once HTS gets that done, the Americans will not want to stay in Syria. And future President Trump won’t want them to.
A remarkable job
HTS-led forces have done a remarkable job in a short time. The risks of fragmentation are still there, but lower than a week ago. Abu Mohammed al Jolani has sent the right political signals. There is still more to be done, but credit is due.
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