Tag: Russia

Why a PM resigning doesn’t matter

I’ve been preoccupied with events in DC and thus slow to comment on Serbian politics. Certainly the resignation of the prime minister is a credit to the demonstrators. They have maintained the pressure for months in the aftermath of the collapse of the Novi Sad train station canopy.

Waves of protests

In my way of counting this is a third wave of recent popular protests against President Aleksandar Vucic. The first wave was the anti-violence protests starting in late 2023. The second was environmental protests against lithium mining last summer and fall. Now we are seeing massive protests asking for accountability for the Novi Sad tragedy, which occurred last November 1. The common thread is that Serbs are asking for more transparency, accountability, and rule of law.

The protests show profound dissatisfaction with Vucic. He has introduced a semi-authoritarian system. The state vilifies and arrests dissenters, denies them outlets for free expression, and buys support with government jobs and contracts. Meanwhile, he and his allies are harvesting rents from any and all who want to do business in Serbia.

While united on the street, the opposition is fragmented among small political parties and their egotistical leaders. There is no opposition ready to govern. Some of the demonstrators are calling for a technical government to prepare for elections. Vucic won’t likely do that. He doesn’t hesitate to cheat when need be during electoral campaigns and at the polls. A technical government might put a crimp in his style.

Democratic backsliding has worked well for Vucic

But he is also genuinely popular in much of the country. He is a devoted Serbian nationalist who has attracted a lot of foreign investment from China, Europe, and the US. Despite his democratic backsliding, he has also gained political support from Washington and Brussels. They have regarded him as better than any of the conceivable alternatives, which are mostly on the nationalist right. And they like Vucic’s supply of ammunition to Ukraine and his willingness to mine lithium. Fawning over Vucic by the US government and by Germany has been particularly noteworthy.

Beijing has been investing mainly in steel, other metals, mining, and the automotive industry. In addition to its potential future in the European Union, Serbia is attractive partly because of lax regulation and enforcement. The Novi Sad collapse is symptomatic. China also supplies internal security technology that Vucic no doubt appreciates.

Moscow is not a big investor anywhere these days but gets lots of electronic components and political support from Serbia. Most notable is Serbia’s refusal to align with EU Ukraine sanctions.

One lapdog is as good as another

In this context, the resignation of a prime minister with little power doesn’t make a lot of difference. Vucic is the man, not Vucevic. If he thinks he’ll win, or can ensure that he’ll win, the President will call new elections. That has worked for him in the past to quiet protests. Or he will choose another lapdog prime minister who will do what the President wants without objection.

The prospects for real democracy in Serbia are dim, but of course that is true elsewhere as well. But that’s not a good reason not to try. My sentiments are with the demonstrators.

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A stronger American still fumbles

President Biden made a farewell appearance at the State Department yesterday. As a former Foreign Service officer, I’m of course delighted that he did this. It is especially important and timely because the Department now faces Donald Trump’s threat of loyalty tests and mass firings.

Biden’s understandably directed his remarks at justifying what his Administration has done on foreign policy. So how did he really do?

The bar was low

Certainly Biden can justifiably claim to have strengthened America’s alliances. The bar was low. Both in Europe and Asia the first Trump Administration had raised doubts. Allies could not depend on Washington’s commitment to fulfill its mutual defense obligations. Biden’s claim that compared to four years ago America is stronger because of renewed and expanded alliances is true. He is also correct in claiming he has not gone to war to make it happen.

The extraordinary strength of the American economy is an important dimension of this strength. Voters decided the election in part on the issue of inflation. But the Fed has largely tamed that and growth has been strong throughout. Manufacturing is booming, including vital semi-conductor production. Investment in non-carbon energy sources has soared. The defense industrial based is expanding.

Biden is also correct in asserting that America’s antagonists are worse off. Russia has failed to take Ukraine because of the US effort to gather support for Kyiv. Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are weaker. Only the Houthis in Yemen are arguably stronger than four years ago.

China is facing serious domestic economic and demographic challenges. But I don’t know why Biden claims it will never surpass the US. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, it already has, though obviously per capita GDP in China remains much lower.

Some claims gloss over big problems

Biden is rightly proud that there is no longer war in Afghanistan, but he glosses over the chaotic withdrawal. He also doesn’t mention the failure of the Taliban to keep its commitments.

He vaunts progress on climate change, but without acknowledging that the goal of keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees centigrade will not be met.

Biden talks about infrastructure in Africa. But not about its turn away from democracy, civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and the unresolved conflict in Libya.

He urges that Iran never be allowed to “fire” a nuclear weapon. That is a significant retreat from the position that Iran should never be allowed to have one.

Biden mentions the impending Hamas/Israel ceasefire. But he says nothing about Israel’s criminal conduct of the war in Gaza. Nor does he blame Israel’s right-wing government for the long delay in reaching a deal.

Biden’s legacy

At the end, Biden seeks to bequeath three priorities to Trump: artificial intelligence, climate change, and democracy. He no doubt knows that Trump isn’t going to take the advice on climate or democracy. He might on artificial intelligence, as his Silicon Valley tycoons will want him to.

Sad to say, Biden’s legacy will lie in other areas. Fearful of nuclear conflict with Russia, he failed to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defeat Russia. He was reluctant to rein in Israel for more than a year of the Gaza war. He failed to stop or reverse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. America is stronger than it was four years ago, but it has not always used that strength to good advantage.

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Getting to Syria’s next regime

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria was swift. Now comes the hard part: building a new regime that is an improvement. We know from past experience some of the elements required. Let’s review those, in light of the discussion among Syrians above.

Safe and secure environment

Above all, a safe and secure environment free of large-scale violence is a prerequisite.

The biggest threat for now is in the north. Turkish and Turkish-supported forces there are pressing hard against Kurdish and Kurdish-led forces. Turkiye President Erdogan wants the Kurds east of the Euphrates and at least 30 kilometers from the border. An American-mediated truce between the Turks and the Kurds has broken down. There is a real risk of a major conflict between them. Turkiye says its objective is eliminating the Kurdish forces. But Ankara and its allies don’t seem to make much distinction between specific Kurdish forces and Kurds iin general.

In other parts of the country there are also risks. It would be a mistake to assume that Assad did not organize “stay behind” forces. Even if not organized, they may emerge spontaneously, or Islamic State sleeper cells may awaken. In Iraq, the Saddam Fedayeen originated the insurgency against the American occupation that the Islamic State continued. There is still the possibility of revenge killings. A single mass grave near Damascus apparently holds 100,000 bodies. That means close to one million people with motives for seeking revenge.

Unifying the many armed groups under the new Syrian government will be a major challenge and priority. HTS has announced its intention to do this. But it will need to convince rebel leaders and find the resources to pay the fighters. Eventually it will need to demobilize many of them and integrate them into civilian life.

Rule of law

While there was some looting of government offices in Damascus, most Syrians have maintained law and order. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the leading force in the revolution, has kept police and government officials in their positions. Opposition forces in the south and other parts of the country have done likewise. There has been no sign, yet, of widespread revenge killings.

It will be years before Syria can reform its laws. In the meanwhile, there are urgent issues. Perhaps first among them is establishment and protection of property rights. In Idlib, HTS had a serious system for property issues. Expanding that to the national level will be a major challenge. Without that, it will be hard even to start reconstruction. According to the World Bank and the European Union, Syria has suffered an enormous amount of infrastructure damage. In 14 cities, they estimate damages of $8.7-11.4 billion.

Syria’s judicial sector was not independent of the Assad regime. It did what it was told. Judges and prosecutors will need to be vetted and new ones trained and named. Prison officials and guards will need to be likewise vetted and many replaced. Lawyers will need to be trained and retrained.

Accountability will be a priority. Identifying those responsible for Assad regime abuses will be easy at the top levels. But most of those people will have fled. Europe and the US need to be alert for their entry and capture them sooner rather than later. At the lower levels, many perpetrators will try to melt into the general population. It will be difficult to ferret them out and put them on trial quickly. Doing so will take years of concerted effort. It is not easy to gather the evidence a serious jury trial requires.

Stable governance

While Assad’s Syria conducted elections and had a parliament, it operated as an autocracy. The Assad family, the Ba’ath party, and Alawite military officers were pillars of the regime. It showed no respect for the rights of others. The new regime should reflect what Rafif calls a core commitment to human rights, including freedom of expression and religion. The mantra today is “inclusion,” which ultimately will require political pluralism, including full participation of women and minorities.

That will not be easy. HTS is also an autocratic organization, with little respect for women’s equality and dubious commitment to equal rights for minorities. It has appointed an interim government with little “inclusion” and has been less than clear about the role of women.

Political parties and civil society organizations are emerging quickly, but elections are still far off. It may be possible and desirable to convene a national dialogue of notable citizens. Russia and Iran, the foreign mainstays of the Assad regime are calling for one. Choice of participants would of course be problematic. But a national dialogue may provide common ground not only for Syrians but also for international powers interested in Syria.

Ultimately Syria will need a new constitution. Lots of constitutional proposals already exist. But Syria will need a constituent assembly of some sort to draft a democratic and inclusive document. Many of the issues involved have been discussed, but difficult choices lie ahead.

In the meanwhile, local governance will need to suffice. Syrians have practiced it a good deal in opposition-held areas in recent years. It won’t be a bad place to start.

Sustainable economy

Syrians are destitute. Their most immediate needs are food and fuel. Humanitarian assistance should flow as soon and as quickly as possible. This means using the United Nations and international relief organizations, which are already overburdened by Gaza and Lebanon.

Going much beyond humanitarian relief will require relief from sanctions and de-designation of HTS as a terrorist group. This will take time and convincing. The Americans and Europeans will want to be sure they are not snookered. They won’t want to provide reconstruction assistance to a new regime that fails to meet reasonable criteria. The big money will come from the World Bank and the Gulf. Washington and Brussels control the former and influence the latter.

Assad’s regime was dependent on production and trade of Captagon, an amphetamine. That will have to stop. HTS will crack down hard, but it will need also to generate economic opportunities to replace the drug trade. Syria is a country with limited oil and gas resources, big agricultural and tourism potential, and a good geographic location. Where its future livelihood will come from is unclear. Like Jordan and Egypt, it will need international assistance for decades into the future.

The World Bank has found that disruption of social networks has caused most of the economic damage in Syria. Restoring trust will take time and effort.

Social well-being

Half of Syria’s population is either refugees or displaced within the country. Many will want to return home. Others will not. Compensation for destroyed or expropriated property will be a major issue. Some communities will never return to their pre-war composition. Others will want to make an effort to do so.

The health system in Syria has imploded. Even in areas where the Russians and Syrian did not attack hospitals, sanitary supplies and equipment are limited. Many doctors and nurses have fled. Technical capabilities are not up to modern standards. Rebuilding will be a major enterprise.

The education system still functions in most of the country. Children go to school in both government and opposition controlled areas. But many buildings are destroyed and students will be behind in learning. Efforts were made to keep the education system in some opposition-controlled areas compatible with Syrian government requirements. But the culture of the schools and the experience of the students will be dramatically different.

The international dimension

Syria now faces two main challenges from neighbors. One is the Turkish effort to destroy the Kurdish institutions in the northeast. The other is the effort to destroy the strategic assets of the Syrian Arab Army, which Israel is bombing. Additionally, Israel has seized a UN-patroled buffer zone on the Golan Heights. HTS leadership is not prepared to fight Israel, even though some of its cadres would like to do so. HTS wants to bring the Kurdish institutions under Damascus authority. The Kurds are amenable. They do not advocate independence or union with the Kurds in Iraq. But Turkiye has vowed to try to destroy the Kurdish institutions. This is a serious threat and could vastly complicate the post-war situation.

Russia appears to be withdrawing much of its military assets from Syria. Iran has already done so. The US for now is maintaining its troops in support of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The Americans will want to withdraw, but will not do so before Donald Trump takes office in January. What he will do is not clear.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) is still the main international community statement on political transition in Syria. It is not a bad one.

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More remains to be done, but credit is due

Opposition and Turkish forces now control Syria’s northwest, northeast, north, south and the main cities of its north/south axis. But most of the west–the provinces of Latakia and Tartus–are still not fully in opposition control. Ditto much of the center.

The Alawites

The Alawite sect to which Bashar al Assad belonged constituted only about 10% of Syria’s population before the civil war. But Alawites are a plurality in the west. They live more in the countryside than in the main cities. The leader of the opposition, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), has named a military commander for the west. He met with Alawite notables in Latakia Tuesday. @GregoryPWaters cites an Alawite professor present, who reports:

The broad, summarized headlines that we all felt were true:

– No to sectarianism absolutely

– No to violating the property of individuals and institutions

– No to division

– No going back, everyone was harmed by the previous regime in one way or another

That is as friendly a message from HTS as possible. It is not entirely surprising. HTS has been reaching out to Syria’s minorities to preserve Syria’s unity. The Alawites of Latakia and Tartus suffered a great under their co-religionist Assad. They lost a lot of young people in the war. They had to toe the line or risk the full weight of his repression. Many Sunnis and others resented their access to privilege and power.

The trick now is to somehow hold individuals who committed abuses accountable while not mistreatinthe rest. Many of Assad’s henchmen, Sunni as well as Alawite, will have fled to Latakia and Tartus. Ferreting them out and giving them fair trials will not be easy.

The Russians

Besides the Alawites, the Russians are a problem in the west. They operate the Syrian Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia and lease a naval base farther south in Tartus. The air base has since 2015 launched thousands of sorties against opposition forces and civilians. The naval base is Russia’s only naval facility in the Mediterranean. Turkey has closed the Bosporus to military traffic due to the war in Ukraine. So the Tartus base is particularly important to the Russians. The air base is not, as its role has been overtaken by events.

Still, Moscow is insisting on keeping both. Russia will be arguing that the Syrians shouldn’t rely too heavily on Turkey. HTS has not signaled that it wants them out. Putin will be lucky to retain the naval facility.

The Islamic State

Much of the white area on the above map is sparsely populated. But it hosts Islamic State cells. HTS will now have to shoulder the burden of eliminating them. It should be willing to do so, as the Islamic State is a rival, not an ally. But it isn’t easy. The Americans could be helpful from the air and might be willing. Someone should ask, or offer. Once HTS gets that done, the Americans will not want to stay in Syria. And future President Trump won’t want them to.

A remarkable job

HTS-led forces have done a remarkable job in a short time. The risks of fragmentation are still there, but lower than a week ago. Abu Mohammed al Jolani has sent the right political signals. There is still more to be done, but credit is due.

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Winners and losers from Assad’s fall

The success of Syrians in deposing Bashar al Assad poses the question of who wins and who loses. Inside Syria, Hayat Tahrir al Sham is the big winner for now. It led the breakout from Idlib and inspired the many risings elsewhere in Syria.

There are lots of other countries that stand to win or lose something in the transition. Let’s assume Syria remains reasonably stable and its government basically inclusive and not vindictive, which appears to be HTS’ intention. We can try to guess the pluses and minuses for the rest of the world.

Turkiye is the big winner

In the region, Turkiye is the big winner. President Erdogan had been ready to negotiate with Assad, who refused to engage. Erdogan lost patience and backed a military outcome. He unleashed both Turkish proxies and HTS, which could not have armed and equipped itself adequately without Ankara’s cooperation. He does not control HTS 100%, especially now that it is in Damascus. But he will have a good deal of influence over its behavior. Let’s hope he uses it in the democratic and less religious direction. That however is the opposite of what he has been doing at home.

Erdogan has two primary goals in Syria. First is achieving enough stability there to allow many of the three million Syrian refugees in Turkiye to return. Returns will take time, but there is already a spontaneous flow back into Syria. The second is keeping the Syrian Kurds associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) away from Turkiye’s border with Syria. Erdogan would also like its Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) dissolved. Or at least as far from power as possible.

Refugee returns look like a good bet. Disempowering the Kurds in eastern and northern Syria does not. They are well-established and cooperate closely with US forces in that area. Future President Trump will want to withdraw the Americans. But the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces will remain essential to fighting the Islamic State (IS). HTS, IS, and the PKK all carry the “terrorist” label in the US and Europe. But HTS and IS are rivals. HTS will want the Kurds to continue to fight IS. They will also be vital, at least temporarily, to preventing Iran from re-establishing a land route through Syria to Lebanon.

Israel wins and loses

The Israeli government would have preferred to see the Assad devil it knew stay in power. But his fall means the Iranians and their proxies will no longer be stationed along the northeastern border of Israel. The Israelis have already moved their troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone inside Syria. They didn’t want some known or unknown force filling that vacuum. That advance might give them a stronger position in future negotiations with Damascus, whenever those occur.

But Israelis have to be worried that a jihadist group led the overthrow of Assad. Ahmed al Sharaa, the birth name of HTS’s Abu Mohammed al Jolani, was born in Riyadh to Syrian parents. They were displaced from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The second Palestinian intifada motivated his conversion to jihad. It is hard to picture someone with that background more pliable than the impacable Assad on border and Palestinian issues. Jolani himself appears to have said little about Gaza or the Lebanon war. But some of his followers are clear about where they want to go next:

Lebanon and Jordan

Lebanon and Jordan, two key neighbors of Syria, can hope to be winners from the change of regime . Both will want to see Syrian refugees return home, as they were a strain on their economies. They will also stand to gain from reconstruction and eventually a more prosperous Syria.

Assad had been financing his government and his cronies with proceeds from the export of the stimulant Captagon. Decent people in both Beirut and Amman will welcome relief from that flood of poison into and through their societies. Some of their corrupted politicians may regret it.

Lebanon will have to reabsorb Hezbollah fighters who supported Assad. They will be a defeated and unhappy lot. But the Lebanese Army and state stand to gain from any weakening and demoralization of Hezbollah. Anyone serious in Beirut should see the current situation as an opportunity to strengthen both.

Iran and Russia are the biggest losers

Apart from Assad, Tehran and Moscow are the biggest losers. They backed Assad with people, force, money, and diplomacy. They are now thoroughly discredited.

Iran has already evacuated its personnel from Syria. Tehran has lost not only its best ally but also its land route to Lebanon.

Russia still has its bases. Almost any future Syrian government will have a hard time seeing what it gains from the Russian air force presence. Moscow’s air force brutalized Syrian civilians for almost 10 years. The air bases will no longer have utility even to Moscow. Moscow will prioritize keeping the naval base at Tartus, which is important for its Mediterranean operations.

The Gulf gains, Iraq loses

Gulf diplomacy was trying to normalize relations with Assad in the past year or two. But few Gulfies will mourn his regime, provided stability is maintained. Qatar may be more pleased than Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi. The Saudis and Emiratis are less tolerant of political Islam. Nor do they like to see regimes fall. Qatar is more comfortable with political change, including of the Islamist variety.

Iraq’s Shia-dominated government loses a companion in Damascus. It won’t welcome a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus. But Baghdad, like the Gulf, is unlikely to mourn the fall of Assad. He did his damnedest to make life difficult for Iraqis after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

The United States and Europe gain but will need to ante up

The US and Europe have long viewed Assad as a regrettable but necessary evil. They hesitated to bring him down for fear of what might come next. Now they need to step up and fund Syria’s recovery, mainly through the IMF and the World Bank. They will want Gulf money invested as well. The best way to get that is for them to ante up matching funds.

That is also the best way for them to gain leverage over the political settlement. If they want an inclusive outcome, they’ll need to be ready to pay for it. Hesitation could open the door to malicious influence.

Let the Syrians decide

That said, the details of the political settlement should be left to the Syrians. They will need to write a new constitution and eventually hold elections. The extensive constitutional discussions the UN has hosted for a decade may offer some enlightenment on what Syrians want. Just as important in my view is how the new powers that be handle property issues. Only if property rights are clearly established and protected can Syria’s economy revive. But who rightfully owns what and what to do about destroyed property are complicated and difficult issues.

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Will Syria stay together or fragment?

One of the threats to Syria now that Assad has fallen is fragmentation. In my experience, all Syrians say they want to preserve the country and its borders. But the conflicts among them and with neighboring countries can foil that goal and lead to partition.

The pieces of the puzzle

Syria’s population is mixed. Ninety per cent of its population is Arab. The rest is mainly Kurdish and Turkmen. More than 70% of Syrians are Sunni Muslim. But there are also various denominations of Christians as well as Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, Shiites and others. Damascus was thoroughly mixed. Several concentrations of Kurds were found along the northern border with Turkey, along with Turkmen and Arabs. The Alawite “homeland” was in the western, Mediterranean provinces of Tartous and Latakis. But they were a plurality and not a majority there. More Sunnis have sought refuge there, as under Bashar al Assad, an Alawite, those provinces were relatively safe.

The war is superimposing on this hodge-podge an additional dimension: military control of territory. Hayat Tahrir al Sham, the leader of the uprising, will control much of Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. Turkey and its surrogates will control most of the northern border. They are trying to push Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) east of the Euphrates, an area the SDF already dominates. Other opposition forces will be in charge of the south and the Jordanian border. The Druze have long maintained their insular community in Suwayda. It is unclear who will dominate Damascus. The southerners are arriving there first, but it is hard to picture HTS settling for second fiddle there.

There are no clear pre-existing regional lines along which Syria might fragment, except for the provincial boundaries. But those do not generally correspond to ethnic or religious divisions. The pieces of the puzzle do not fit together. They overlap and melt into each other.

The divisive forces

That would be a good reason to avoid fragmentation. Homogenization of ethnic groups on specific territory would require an enormous amount of ethnic “cleansing.” Ordinary Syrians don’t want that. But there will be forces at work that might make it happen.

The Turkmen/Kurdish conflict has already removed a lot of Kurds from Afrin in the northwest and border areas farther east. Ankara backs the Turkmen and wants to prevent Kurdish access to Türkiye. This is because the Syrian Kurds have supported Kurdish rebels inside Türkiye. The Kurds have built their own governing institutions in eastern Syria. They might seek independence if they get an unsatisfactory political outcome at the end of the war.

The Alawites of Tartous and Latakia are dreading revenge from the rest of Syria for mistreatment under the Assad dictatorship. They could try to set up their own statelet, perhaps even attaching it to Lebanon. They could also try to chase the Sunni Arab population out, while importing as many Alawites as possible from Damascus. Many there served the Assad regime and will want out.

The unifying forces

Syria’s neighbors won’t want a breakup. Türkiye has the most clout because of its presence in Syria and support for HTS. Ankara will oppose even autonomy for the Kurds. Jordan and Iraq have less clout, but they won’t want fragmentation either. Nor will Russia and Iran, which supported Assad and are big losers due to his fall. Ditto Israel and the United States, which would fear radicalization of any rump Syria if its Kurds or Alawites secede. Israel doesn’t want a jihadist entity on its northern border.

HTS and other opposition forces will also resist fragmentation. They want to govern all of Syria, not a part of it. HTS has moderated its attitude toward non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslims. It has also tried to minimize revenge and has emphasized continuity of the Syrian state. But HTS is an authoritarian movement, not a democratic one. It remains to be seen how it will behave in practice.

The obvious solutions

The obvious solution is decentralization. Devolving authority to provincial and municipal institutions offers minorities opportunities to govern themselves, or strongly influence how they are governed. The Alawites and Kurds might be satisfied with decentralization, provided they also get reasonable representation at the national level. The Kurds already have their own institutions. Some non-Kurdish opposition areas in Syria have used local councils for governance since the 2011 uprising against Assad.

There are also power-sharing arrangements that can assuage minority concerns at the national level and lower levels. Quotas in parliament, reserved positions in the state hierarchy, and qualified majority voting in parliament or local councils. I’m not an enthusiast for these, as they often entrench ethnic warlords, but sometimes they prove necessary.

Syrians may invent mechanisms I haven’t considered. In any event it is they who should decide. The country will need a new constitution, then in due course elections. The existing road map for Syria’s political process is UN Security Council resolution 2254, which Assad stymied. HTS and the rest of the opposition can revive it and gain international support by doing so.

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