Tag: Russia
Montenegro needs to right itself, now
Miodrag Vlahović, former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, writes:
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić should be gratified. Politicians close to him have finally become part of the 44th Government of Montenegro, Serbia’s neighbor to the southwest.
Others are not so pleased. The US Embassy in Montenegro has expressed concern that there are pro-Russian parties in the government. The EU Mission warns of hindrance to the European agenda. The new government uses European and NATO rhetoric, but their political practice and decisions follow the Belgrade-Moscow lead.
What happened
A Bosniak party enabled this governing coalition. It holds six ministerial mandates in the farcically cumbersome cabinet of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić. That is what it got to compensate for joining with parties that deny the Srebrenica genocide and treat war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladić as heros.
The new government has the two-thirds majority (54 out of 81 deputies) needed to enact significant legal and constitutional changes. They will want to enable dual citizenship and enact changes that would eliminate the civic concept of Montenegrin society. Already political leaders are presenting themselves as “the only authentic representatives” of their ethnic group. The dysfunctional Bosnian model of governance, based on ethnic group rights, is the daydream of ethnic nationalists in Montenegro.
But that is only one dimension of the new political constellation. The government includes no one who identifies as Montenegrin. The shrunken opposition includes parties of a civic, European and democratic orientation, but American and European diplomats have deemed them not “reformed enough.”
What it means
Spajić will allegedly try to implement the official European agenda and Euro-Atlantic policy. He will be doing this in cooperation with declared opponents of NATO, advocates of lifting EU-required sanctions against Russia, and parties that want to realize Greater Serbia. Mission impossible, but therefore desirable from the commanding heights of Belgrade and Moscow.
These same parties of the governing coalition, including Prime Minister Spajić himself, naturally look with enthusiasm at the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House. That shows precisely how little they are really oriented towards Europe, which Trump despises.
The Western policy of appeasement towards Serbia has now handed Montenegro to Moscow. The Biden Administration wasted four years pushing the anti-European project known as “Open Balkans.” That has enabled Vučić to meddle not only in Montenegro but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, with inevitable negative implications for North Macedonia as well.
Deliveries of Serbian arms and ammunition to Ukraine and mammoth contracts for lithium exploitation in Serbia have made this possible. They are both an explanation and a verdict. The EU’s continuing financial support for Serbia, regardless of Belgrade’s other behavior, reveals its true intentions, which condemn the rest of the Balkans to instability.
What needs to be done
Montenegro is on the brink. The Bosniak party is in power with nationalist populists and chauvinists from the Serbian-Russian milieu. A coalition of three nationalist parties presided over the beginning of the 1992 war in Bosnia. The Bosniak leaders who join this coalition will enable threats to Montenegrin sovereignty and independence.
The opposition parties need to answer the question whether this is a “point of no return” for Montenegro. There will be no help from the West. That makes the task of the opposition urgent and dramatic. Montenegro needs to right itself, now.
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine, to date
The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on February 24, 2022. It is now two and a half years since then. The Russians started with overwhelming advantages in equipment, money, manpower, and geography. How has it gone? How might it go in the future?
Geography matters
On the eve of the invasion, the Russians had troops poised to Ukraine’s north in Belarus, east in Donbas, and south in Crimea. Ukraine was poorly defended in the north and south. The Russian armored column aimed at Kyiv, only 100 miles from the Belarus border, proceeded well. The Russians made it to the suburbs and the airport before the Ukrainians stopped them and decimated their lengthy armored column as well as the forces they intended to deploy at the airport.
Despite weeks of effort, the Russians failed to take Kharkiv, a Russian-speaking city less than twenty miles from the Ukraine/Russia border. The Russians were more successful in Donbas and the south, where they advanced, respectively, westward from territory occupied in 2014 and northward from Crimea. The fall of Mariupol in May 2022 was a major defeat for Ukraine.
The Russians largely held on to their gains in the south and east, but the Ukrainians stopped them from taking all of Donestk and short of Odesa. Ukrainian boat drones sank the flag ship of the Russian Black Sea fleet. A Ukrainian offensive in the summer of 2022 failed to make more than marginal gains in the south, but it forced the Russians to leave the east poorly defended. That enabled a Ukrainian offensive that retook a substantial area near Kharkiv by fall. Kyiv then also managed to retake Kherson in the south.
Stalemate
Since then, the confrontation lines have moved little. Russian forces during 2023 dug in, preparing multiple lines of defensive fortifications along the 600-mile front. Only in the winter of 2023/24 and spring of 2024 did Russia gain significant territory near Kharkiv. That was courtesy of the Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, which held up assistance to Kyiv, and the Biden Administration, which blocked Ukraine from bombarding staging areas inside Russia. Once aid started to flow again, the Biden Administration authorized Kyiv to strike the staging areas. The Ukrainians within weeks began pushing the Russians back to the border. They have also forced the Russian Black Sea fleet out of Crimea.
In short, neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians have much to show for the past year or even two. The Ukrainians have foiled the Russians’ most ambitious hopes: to take Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Odesa, But the Ukrainians have been unable to roll back the Russians from territory gained in 2014 in the east and in 2022 in the south.
People matter too
As notable as the geography is the sociology. Ukrainians mostly fled west to Ukrainian-speaking areas as well as European Union member states rather than Russia and Belarus. There were instances of spying for, and defections to, Russia from the security services. But the Russian-speaking population, including the President, mostly chose loyalty to Kyiv. Support among Ukrainians for continuing the war flagged some in 2023. And it is weaker in the east and south where most of the ground fighting has taken place. But continuing the fight has remained the majority view. Throughout, support for President Zelensky and for regaining control of 100% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, has remained high.
Russian human rights abuses during and after combat were rife. These included murder of civilians and prisoners of war, shelling of civilian targets, kidnapping and trafficking of Ukrainian children, and pillage. The Russians did not spare Russian-speaking Kharkiv and Mariupol, where indiscriminate attacks and other abuses were intense. Russian President Putin nevertheless proceeded in September 2022 with annexation of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson, despite not controlling their entire territory.
A more authoritarian Russia turns to totalitarians for help
The war in Ukraine has also had global repercussions. In Russia, it has enabled President Putin–reelected with a ridiculous 87% of the vote in March 2024–to widen his autocracy. He has chased liberal media and civil society from the country, ended any pretense of an independent judiciary, and murdered political opponents. The Russian governing system has earned the epithet “hybrid totalitarianism,” which requires not only obedience but also vocal support.
Moscow has turned to much-sanctioned Iran and North Korea to acquire weapons. While China hasn’t supplied weapons systems, Russia depends on Beijing for political support, oil and gas sales, and dual-use components. Thus Moscow’s westward thrust into Ukraine has increased its political, economic, and military dependency on Asia while cutting it off from the West.
The West rediscovers geopolitics
In the U.S., the 2022 invasion reawakened concern about Russian intentions and European security. But it also generated among some Republicans a return to isolationism reminiscent of the 20th century inter-war era. President Biden attempted to forestall the invasion by releasing classified information concerning the Russian preparations. He also mobilized NATO to provide massive military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Kyiv and the EU to sanction Moscow.
NATO has deployed additional forces along the easternmost flank of the Alliance. European NATO members are raising their defense budgets and planning responses to any future Russian moves against Moldova or Alliance members on its eastern flank. Concern about Russian territorial ambitions gave Finland and Sweden a strong push toward joining NATO and the EU good reason to reduce dependence on Russian energy.
The unipolar moment of Pax Americana was short. It reigned uncontested only a decade or so until 9/11. It then ended definitively with the withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011. Now Russia and China are not just building up their capacities but also using them. Russia is applying in Ukraine the skills it acquired in Syria after deploying its air force there in 2015. China is flexing its muscles in the South China Sea and near Taiwan.
The division of the world will not be so neat as during the Cold War. India, Hungary, and Serbia, for example, are trying to straddle the growing divide between East and West, as the Philippines did in the Pacific during the presidency of Rodrigo Duerte. Much of the global South likewise aims to hedge and extract benefits from both East and West.
The East is doomed, but the West may not fare well either
Hard as it may be to picture on any given day, the contest between East and West has a foreseeable eventual outcome. The Russian economy, though growing faster than anticipated, is increasingly dependent on oil and gas exports to gain funds for military expenditures that do not benefit consumers. China faces a major financial crisis. Its local governments are deeply in hock. Both countries are in dramatic demographic decline. The Iranian theocracy is aging and limping economically, crippled by sanctions. North Korea is a nuclear armed totalitarian state that keeps its population in dire poverty. If these were the main threats to liberal democracy, we would have little to fear.
But they are not. The main threats to the West are internal. Racism, protectionism, populism, and charlatanism are combining with greed, corruption, inequity, and disinformation to produce political forces that aspire to permanence in power. Liberal democracy is at risk in both the US and Europe, where only centrist right/left coalitions are keeping extremists out of power. The decisive factor in the Ukraine war may no longer Russia’s staying power, but rather the West’s. The Ukrainians will continue to fight, but they will have the means only if we continue to support them. That is only one reason why the election of Kamala Harris is vital.
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Biden is toast, but don’t burn him
I expect President Biden will soon announce the withdrawal of his candidacy. That’s good. His decline since I saw him up close last winter is obvious. While I would still far prefer him to Trump, he is wise to throw in the towel. He has a fantastic record of restoring the country to sanity and steady economic growth, reknitting its alliances, appointing capable and diverse officials, getting a lot done on climate change, meeting the Russian challenge in Ukraine, shoring up defenses against China, and I could go on. Bowing out now ensures a positive legacy.
Challenges ahead
The rumor mill suggests the convention will be an “open” one with several candidates to replace Biden on top of the ticket. That seems to me a bad idea. It ensures a floor fight that will necessarily be divisive. It could also stimulate street demonstrations, which could get out of hand. I favor handing the baton to Kamala Harris. Biden has repeatedly avowed that she is ready to take over. He should let her do so.
The campaign against Trump will still be an uphill battle, no matter the candidate. The Democrats need not only to unify. They need to present a clear and compelling alternative to Trump’s lying, criminality, and immorality. He is a terrible candidate. That Biden in his weakened condition is still running neck and neck with him in the polls suggests the Democrats can recover from the last few weeks to win.
Biden can help
Biden can be a useful surrogate in the effort. He still has strong Democratic support and could help to get voters to the polls. He is a formidable fundraiser and a savvy political operative. His sterling record contrasts dramatically with the chaos and decline of Trump’s presidency. Biden may be toast, but it would be a mistake for any successor candidate not to use his record and his savvy.
Whoever the Democratic candidate, s/he should rely a good deal on Biden, whether or not he remains in the presidency. The mistake Al Gore made–not to rely on President Clinton’s record–should not be repeated. Biden has been a successful president. Running away from him would be a big mistake.
Trump is worse than too many think
I’m hearing wishful thinking about a second Trump term. To the contrary, it will be far worse than his first. Just listen to what he says. He wants to weaponize the Justice Department, claiming falsely that Biden has done it. He wants to cut taxes for the rich again and raise them on middle class people who (necessarily) spend most of their income. Trump will give Ukraine to Putin and won’t protect Taiwan. And he’ll support extremists in Israel who want to expel Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. If you think the world is problematic now, just wait until a new Trump presidency.
Trump will also use a return to the White House to deliver retribution to those who oppose him. Take it from the Australians:
Part II isn’t out yet.
And remember this: Trump deployed unidentifiable law enforcement personnel on the streets of Washington (and wanted them to fire on demonstrators), he has praised the January 6 rioters, he is a committed racist, and he has appointed Supreme Court Justices who think a woman shouldn’t be allowed to decide on her own health care. That’s in addition to being a rapist, a tax cheat, and a Russian asset. Trump is far worse than too many think.
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The Balkans are simmering
My ten days in the Balkans June 18-28 visiting Sarajevo, Skopje, Tetovo, and Pristina constituted my first trip there in more than five years. I’ll try to summarize my impressions/findings here. I won’t reveal sources and methods, but it is no secret that I have talked with prominent politicians in and out of power, government officials, diplomats, thinktankers, civil society people, and university professors and students. My focus is on the conflicts: are they over? getting worse? staying the same? metamorphizing?
Sarajevo is mostly looking good…
In Sarajevo I found the wars of the 1990s fading both in memory and in physical representation. The city shows few scars or even memorials from the siege of 1992-95. The young mayor is a woman better known for her work in academia than politics when the city council selected her. She and her family lived on the confrontation line during the war. The city is almost entirely restored, the confrontation line erased, and the metropolitan area significantly expanded, especially to Ilidza in the west. That is where the much-lauded Sarajevo School of Science and Technology resides (photo by DAVOR BILANDŽIĆ, a local guide, as I neglected to take one):
Serbs I talked with are living comfortably in the city. Many more are commuting from Republika Srpska to the east, where Bosniaks are also said to be buying apartments because they are cheaper. Bosniaks have even returned to Stolac in southern Bosnia, from which Croats ethnically cleansed them in 1993.
…but
But political life in Bosnia still revolves around ethnic identity. A big gap is opening between the society, where individuals speaking a more or less common language get along without much friction, and politics, which organizes and mobilizes around whether you are Serb, Croat, Bosniak (Muslim, whether religious or secular), or Other. The worst interethnic violence I heard cited was that someone had slashed tires on some Serbian-plated vehicles. Reprehensible, but not a war crime. It isn’t clear who did it, but it caused the Orthodox prelates to boycott the Inter-religious Council. The Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish members continue to meet.
Some pessimists suggest that the ethnic groups are just waiting for the next opportunity to slaughter each other. I hope that is not true, but we can’t be sure. The Dayton constitution under which the country is governed enshrines ethnic identity as a major factor in politics. Generations of living under that system has empowered ethnic nationalists, with consequences that could be catastrophic. Some think young people are even more nationalist than their parents. I find that hard to believe of the many 20- and 30-somethings noisily frequenting the bars in central Sarajevo until late at night, but that indicator may not reflect the rest of the country.
Skopje is restored too, but with a difference
In what is now officially North Macedonia, which never saw serious fighting in the capital, Skopje shows many signs of two conflicts that have plagued the country for decades. In 2014, the government launched a much-needed reconstruction of the center of the city. An ethnic nationalist government adorned it with grotesquely large statues of Greek heroes and a triumphal arch.
These monuments underlined the false claim that modern Macedonia, whose majority population is Slav rather than Greek, has roots in ancient history. That not only annoyed Greece but increased the sharp contrast between the mainly Macedonian part of the city and the more traditional other side of the river:
The construction of an Orthodox Church on the grounds of Skopje’s large, mainly Ottoman-era fortress remains stalled due to Albanian claims that the work is destroying an ancient Illyrian site. A colleague who has spent her career working on Macedonian/Albanian relations suggested to me that the “social distance” between citizens of different ethnicities is growing, due in part to separate schools, mutually incomprehensible languages, and little concern with inter-ethnic comity. But the politicians cooperate in coalitions that always include both Macedonians and Albanians. So the situation is the inverse of that in Sarajevo: the political class cooperates reasonably well, but ethnicity increasingly governs the society.
Pristina celebrates its own modern heroes
Pristina, which also suffered no widespread destruction, sports monuments to Kosovo’s conflict with Serbia. The monumental statues of Kosovo heroes, both nonviolent leader Ibrahim Rugova and Kosovo Liberation Army fighters, are prominent:
There are also now giant portraits of Kosovo’s former President Thaci and its former Parliament Speaker Veseli, both on trial in The Hague for war crimes. Statues of Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright, who supported Kosovo in the 1990s, occupy prominent spots, and Bill Clinton Boulevard interests with (Senator) Bob Doll (sic) Street. The commercial bustle distracts attention from all these monuments and portraits, but they are not hard to find.
Nevertheless, Serbs now circulate safely and freely in Pristina, despite the still high interethnic tension in the northern four municipalities, which are majority Serb and contiguous with Serbia. Few young Albanians learn Serbian. Even fewer Serbs learn Albanian. Physical separation is the rule rather than the exception. Most Serbs live in Serb-majority municipalities. There is little political cooperation at any level.
Ambitions are similar…
In all three countries, I found similar government goals. Economic development is the top priority. Politicians in the capitals all agree that their citizens want jobs created and corruption reduced.
Kosovo’s prime minister is generally regarded as having clean hands. The country’s rule of law scores have been improving. But more than one person suggested that the administration lacks expertise and competence, both at the national and the municipal levels. The prime minister seems to his opponents to value loyalty more than capability.
The new prime minister in Macedonia is proud that the mayors from his political party who gained election two years ago have not garnered criticism for corruption. The party he inherited in 2017 was both broke and corrupt. He has rebuilt it and would be unlikely to welcome back his predecessor, who has fled to Hungary. The new government will include Albanians who have mostly been in opposition, displacing an Albanian party that had been in power for all but two of the past 12 years. That party had garnered a lot of criticism for arrogance and patronage.
…but Bosnia is different
In Bosnia, the situation is more complicated, as usual. The US has sanctioned the President of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb 49% of the country, for corruption, along with members of his family. The economy in much of the RS–which depends heavily on Russian financing–is moribund. Its eastern wing is depopulated. Corruption also plagues the main Croat nationalist political party, but evidence has proven hard to find. Its leader is careful not to leave his name on paper.
For reasons I find hard to fathom, the US and the international community High Representative preferred when they got a chance to torpedo the head of the main Bosniak party, not the Croat or Serb. The only explanation I heard was that its leader allegedly opposed meaningful state-building. A puzzling first choice for international ire, he is now in opposition but has maintained his command of a main Bosniak political party. The other two ethnic leaders are still on the target list.
Geopolitics heighten tensions
In all three countries, the US and EU are in competition with Russia and China. The Russian objective is to de-stabilize and thereby cause Washington grief. It does this using politicians in Belgrade, including the President, as proxies. Serbia seeks dominance of the Serb populations in neighboring countries. This “Serbian world” objective is a carbon copy of Putin’s “Russian world” that justified the invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese are looking to use the Balkans, especially Serbia, as a trade route into the EU, which is still the region’s (and Serbia’s) main trading partner.
The US declares that it wants to see all the countries of the Balkans in the Western camp. But Washington has turned a blind eye to Serbia’s definitive turn in the last couple of years towards the East. Belgrade happily takes weapons from Russia and investment from China. The EU claims to want all the states of the Western Balkans to become members, but that prospect is far off. In the meanwhile, Brussels fails to use sanctions and even verbal condemnation against those standing in the way of EU accession.
Macedonia in the middle
Moscow will be pleased with the new Macedonian government. It includes a deputy prime minister who is a vigorous Russophile, as well as two others close to Moscow. A Hungarian bank said to have Russian financing granted a 1 billion euro loan to the new government immediately after it was sworn in. The newly installed President has refused to use the country’s official name, North Macedonia. The 2018 agreement with Greece to use that name was a major EU achievement.
The new prime minister in Skopje is nevertheless at pains to emphasize his Western orientation, his ambition for EU membership, and North Macedonia’s fidelity to NATO membership. His Albanian coalition partners will insist on those points. A deputy prime minister can either be someone important or someone the prime minister wants to keep an eye on.
Macedonia’s biggest current international issue is with EU member state Bulgaria. Sofia is insisting that Skopje recognize in its constitution the fewer than 1000 citizens who identify as Bulgarians. The new prime minister campaigned against that. But he may be willing to do it in the final stage of EU accession, when the Bulgarians can’t afterwards raise additional issues. In the meanwhile, some optimists hope the Bulgarians will be willing to absent themselves from decisions on Macedonia’s accession process. That is what Hungarian Prime Minister Orban did on EU aid to Ukraine.
Bosnia is split, as always
The Russians will also be pleased with the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs and Croats there combine often to do things Moscow enjoys, including the defanging of the judicial system. The Europeans have been reluctant to use their considerable leverage in Bosnia, thinking that the accession process will fix everything. Brussels has not sanctioned the Serb leader, despite Washington pressure. Moscow seems ready to continue giving him money, with little prospect of ever getting it back.
The Bosniak and other participants in the current government of the 51% of the country they control in condominium with the Croats owe their position to the Americans. But they are a weak reed to lean on. While the Federation’s economy is doing better than that of the RS, its politics are still far from functioning at what we like to think of as a Western level.
Pristina is bandwagoning without benefits
Unlike Belgrade and the RS, the authorities in Pristina have no option to hedge their bets. Kosovo necessarily “bandwagons” (that’s the technical term) with NATO and the EU.
But the current prime minister is unhappy with Washington and Brussels for appeasing Belgrade. The results are felt keenly in the EU-sponsored and US-supported “dialogue” between Pristina and Belgrade. Kosovo wants Belgrade to withdraw a letter disowning an agreement on political normalization reached last year. Pristina asks that Serbia sign the agreement and transfer for trial the self-confessed organizer of a September 2023 terrorist plot. The prime minister has made these legitimate desires a condition for re-engaging in a dialogue that has produced precious little. That angers the EU and US, which see the dialogue as an end in itself, not just a means.
The result is anomalous. Kosovo is in the dialogue mainly to improve relations with the US and EU. But its conditions for participating are doing the opposite. This is not the first time Pristina has displeased its closest friends. Somehow it needs to find a way to make demands of Belgrade without alienating Brussels and Washington.
American leadership is decisive, but so too is European vigor
Most everyone I talked with recognized that America’s November election will be decisive for the Balkans. President Trump favored partition of Kosovo and will no doubt continue in that direction if re-elected. His willingness to surrender part of Ukraine to Russia will re-open the partition question in the Balkans.
Trump’s reliance on Serbophile Richard Grenell for advice on the Balkans and his son-in-law’s investment in Belgrade will guarantee support for Serbia’s ambitions. That would precipitate challenges to Serbia’s borders as well as Bosnia’s and perhaps Montenegro’s and Macedonia’s. Such challenges will spark violence, ethnic cleansing, and ultimately war. The simmering Balkans will boil over into instability, and even regional war if Trump gets another chance to pursue ethnic partition.
President Biden, while in my view too soft on Serbia, has maintained nominal support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the Western Balkan states. In a second term, he should correct course. He should give up on political normalization between Kosovo and Serbia, which is a bridge too far, and stiffen policy towards Serbia. He should also try to get past the Dayton constitution in Bosnia and pressure Bulgaria to postpone its hope for constitutional change in Macedonia.
The EU is appointing Estonia’s anti-Russian* prime minister as the new High Representative for foreign affairs. That will give Washington a stronger reed to lean on than the incumbent. He and his chief negotiator came from two countries, Spain and Slovakia, that do not recognize Kosovo. They both leaned towards appeasing Serbia. Kaja Kallas will be far more vigorous in countering Moscow’s influence. Biden will get along well with her. Trump won’t.
*A careful reader writes:
One small quibble – Kallas is not “anti-Russian,” she is anti-Kremlin or anti-Putin, or anti-Russian imperialism.
I accept that amendment.
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Is the sun setting on the West?
These are the thoughts I offered at today’s University of Tetovo conference on “The Future of the Western Balkans after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”:
- It is a great pleasure to be with you here in Macedonia, and in particular at the University of Tetovo.
- Yes, I said I am in “Macedonia,” because article 7 paragraph 5 of the Prespa agreement protects my personal right to call the country what I want. The “North” part is for official usage. I hope your new President will respect that.
- But her reluctance is part of the issue I want to talk about today: is the sun setting on the West? By the West, I mean those countries that are liberal democracies that base their open political systems on individual rights safeguarded by independent judiciaries.
- Lest I be misunderstood, let me say at the outset that my answer is “no.”
- But there are certainly a lot of reasons why someone might come to the erroneous conclusion that liberal democracy as a governing system is in trouble.
- First, there is the US: Donald Trump is seeking re-election on the false premise that the 2020 election was “stolen,” his recent trial was “rigged,” and everyone but him is “corrupt.”
- His campaign is anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and anti-Muslim. But the pollsters are telling us he may do relatively well among immigrants, minorities, and Muslims, all of whom are important in the “swing” states that will decide the election.
- He will certainly lose the popular vote. He did last time by about 10 million.
- But because of an 18th-century compromise embedded in the U.S. constitution he could still win in the Electoral College, where less populous, former slave states of the south get greater weight than their populations.
- Yes, the U.S. constitution contains an illiberal system for electing the president that makes some individual votes count more than others.
- A Trump win will unquestionably put liberal democracy as a governing system on the ropes. He has promised to govern as a dictator on day one. If he gets away with that, you don’t have to ask how he will govern on day two.
- He is skeptical about NATO, friendly to Vladimir Putin, and an enemy of free trade and international agreements and institutions in general.
- A Trump victory would have inevitable repercussions in the Balkans. He and his minions are ethnic nationalists. They will favor ethnic nationalists in the Balkans, in particular of the Serbian variety.
- Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, will have good economic reasons to do so once he has his hands on prime property in downtown Belgrade.
- Richard Grenell, Trump’s handmaiden, has made no secret of his political allegiance not only to Trump but also to President Vucic.
- So yes, if Trump wins you can expect his second administration to back genocide-deniers, Serbian world supporters, and pro-Russian miscreants throughout the Balkans.
- But I don’t really think Trump will win. The campaign has begun but won’t peak until fall.
- One of the good things about American elections is that we don’t know the outcome until after the votes are cast. Polls this early mean little.
- The media loves the campaign horse race they create, but only Election Day counts.
- Whatever the outcome, the fate of Ukraine will be important to you here in the Balkans. Trump would no doubt surrender Ukraine, or part of it, to Putin. Biden will not.
- America is not the only uncertainty.
- The European Union election results forebode a shift toward ethnic nationalism in Europe this year and next.
- Germany and France are at risk of bringing to power people who would abandon Ukraine and, like Trump, befriend ethnic nationalists in the Balkans.
- That would make support for Ukraine and resistance to its partition more difficult.
- A partitioned Ukraine would promote similar ambitions elsewhere, including the Balkans.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina would be at risk. So too would Kosovo and Macedonia.
- The return of Trump, resurgent ethnic nationalism in the EU, and the outcome of the Ukraine war are the big far-away problems for the Balkans, but the nearer problems in the Balkans are worth noting too.
- First and foremost is Alexandar Vucic’s Serbia.
- I was among those who hoped when Vucic first came to power that he would turn Serbia in a definitively Western direction.
- I arranged his first public appearance in Washington at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where I teach.
- I went to see him a year later in Belgrade, after writing a paper on the things Serbia needed to do to consolidate its democracy: free the media, establish the independence of the judiciary, and commit itself to the reforms required to accede to the European Union.
- He has done none of those things. Quite the opposite.
- The media in Serbia are not only under government tutelage but are also blatantly pro-Russian and racist, especially towards Albanians and Bosniaks. They are not much better towards me.
- The judiciary is little improved, if at all.
- And progress on implementing the acquis communautaire has been minimal.
- Vucic today rules a Serbia that is ethnic nationalist, irredentist, and increasingly autocratic. It can’t even pretend to administer a decent municipal election in Belgrade.
- The Serbia Against Violence movement is courageous, but Vucic has for now no viable Western-oriented opposition.
- And Serbia is aligned increasingly with Russia and China on the international stage.
- In addition, Vucic has managed, without firing a shot, to take over the governments in Podgorica and Banja Luka, thus realizing de facto the first stage of the Serbian world.
- He won’t be able to do that in Kosovo, but he has tried with violence: the kidnapping of two Kosovo police, the rent-a-riot against NATO peacekeepers, and the September 24 terrorist action.
- All those efforts failed, but he will continue trying.
- Unfortunately, the Americans and Europeans are still seeking to pacify Serbia and have not done anything to punish its resorts to violence in Kosovo.
- Vucic will likely also be active here in Macedonia. Increasing tension between Macedonians and Albanians will be his preferred mode of operating.
- Russia will back these efforts. But I think it a mistake not to recognize that in addition to serving Putin’s purposes Vucic has his own reasons for stoking ethnic strife in the Balkans.
- A successful, democratic Kosovo next door that respects the rights of Serbs is unwelcome to Vucic.
- So too is a successful, democratic North Macedonia that can aspire to EU membership before Serbia.
- Exacerbating ethnic tensions in Macedonia could help Vucic to gain de facto control of Skopje, which would need Serbian backing if it steps back from the West.
- I hope that day does not come. But if it does, I hope the citizens of Macedonia will do as they have in the past. At critical junctures, they have chosen to support the Macedonian state and ensure that it treats all minorities with respect.
- That in my view is the right reaction to Serbia’s ambitions. Macedonia has little to gain from Serbia or Russia.
- It has a great deal to gain from NATO and eventually EU membership.
- The problem in Macedonia is common throughout the Balkans, as well as in the United States and the European Union. Our Western systems leave the electoral door open to people who don’t support liberal democracy.
- They prefer ethnic rule without any serious possibility of alternation in power.
- The counterweights to autocratic ambitions in liberal democracies are strong institutions, especially the justice system, and vigorous civil society.
- Both should be focused mainly on individual rights, which make the political system far more fluid and more difficult to dominate.
- But even in a long-established democracy like the United States institutions can be hijacked and civil society repressed.
- Doing that is easier in relatively new democracies like Serbia, which can no longer claim to be one.
- Montenegro is headed in the same direction: a democracy in form but an autocracy in practice.
- Bosnia has never really achieved what I would term a democratic system, and 49% of the country is an ethnic autocracy.
- This is despite the fact that among Bosnia’s citizens there is remarkably little ethnic tension.
- I came to Macedonia Friday night from Sarajevo, where an enormous gap is opening up between the politics and the society.
- Ethnic nationalism dominates the politics. Mutual respect and even friendship is more common among the citizens, who however have failed to vote out people who do not really represent their own respect for individuals and their rights.
- Your challenge as citizens is to prevent something similar happening in Macedonia. The sun will begin to set on the West here earlier than in the United States.
- I wish you well in meeting your responsibilities to defend the institutions, invigorate civil society, and protect the rights of all.
- That is what will prevent the sun from setting on the West!
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Could the message be any clearer?
I spoke this morning at Hudson Institute-US/Europe Alliance event on Foreshocks in the Black Sea and Western Balkans: Repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine War. I drew on this post:
All too often those who follow the Balkans view Moscow and Beijing as manipulating President Vucic. That is not the whole story. He “has agency” in the awkward syntax of political science. Vucic has decided to align his increasingly autocratic regime with Russia and China, as well as with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Hungary. He likes their “might makes right” style, which gives him some hope of recovering Kosovo or part of it. He would no doubt befriend Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, if Pristina hadn’t beaten him to it by establishing its embassy in Jerusalem.
The many reasons why
Ethnonationalist, autocratic preference comes naturally to Vucic, who learned his politics at Slobodan Milosevic’s knee. But he had a choice when he became Prime Minister in 2014. He could have adopted a truly pro-Western approach. He has long talked pro-EU. If deed had followed words, Serbia would today have a consolidated democracy well on its way to accession. Instead, it has drifted towards authoritarian rule. Freedom House ranks it generously as “partly free.” Its ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) “has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations.”
Vucic has not only presided over Serbia’s democratic decline. He has encouraged it. Many Balkan watchers complain about “stabilitocracy.” They mean by that the alleged Western preference for incumbent rulers because they provide stability, despite democratic shortcomings. But that ignores the fates of Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski, Montenegrin President Djukanovic, and Kosovo President Thaci. Vucic fears lack of Western commitment to stability. He worries, I hope rightly, that the day he faces defeat in an election or indictment in an international court no one in Europe or the US will trouble themselves with him.
There are no doubt ample economic reasons for Vucic’s autocratic drift as well. China is not beneficent, but its mining, rail, and tire projects and investments leave ample room for hiring well-connected locals and skimming off a percentage to support Vucic-connected oligarchs and politicians. Moscow deals are even less transparent. Both the Chinese and the Russians are all too willing to help as well with internal security cooperation that might go a yard further than the Americans or Europeans would countenance, including extensive electronic surveillance.
Vucic is serious about the Serbian world
But in the end the biggest factor in Vucic’s Eastern leanings is his admiration for those who take what they want, without offering any excuses. Vucic wants to govern all the Serbs of the Balkans, de facto if not de jure. His minions call that ambition the “Serbian world.” In Milosevic’s era it was known as Greater Serbia. Vucic is achieving his objective de facto in Republika Srpska and in Montenegro with minimal violence. That won’t be possible in Kosovo. Any violent move there would throw the Balkans back into chaos and ethnonationalist slaughter.
Belgrade’s new government includes the strongest Serbian world advocate, Deputy Prime Minister Vulin. He claims to have organized the terrorist incident in northern Kosovo last year. It was intended to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention.
The new Prime Minister was Defense Minister last year when a rent-a-crowd injured dozens of NATO peacekeepers and when Serbia kidnapped police from the territory of Kosovo. He denies genocide in Bosnia and vaunts his ambition to get Montenegro “closer” to Serbia. He shows no sign of accepting as valid the two agreements negotiated last year on normalization with Kosovo. His predecessor disowned them. The new Foreign Minister, the former Ambassador in Washington, can talk for an hour or so with an EU diplomat without mentioning them.
Vucic himself has made it clear he is biding his time until geopolitical circumstances allow him to grab at least northern Kosovo.
This is where the Chinese, who want to do likewise with Taiwan, and the Russians, who have already annexed something like 18% of Ukraine, are most useful. They help Vucic keep alive the hope that some day he can seize what he wants.
So where will the fate of the Balkans be decided?
We should take Vucic’s ambition seriously. Washington and Brussels need to extinguish it. It will be difficult to do that until Biden wins in November and Ukraine evicts Russia. It will be impossible if Trump or the Russians win. Washington, Donbas, and Crimea will decide the fate of the Balkans.
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