Tag: sanctions
Stevenson’s army, August 31
– I missed the strength of Trump’s support in 2016 because I didn’t follow social media. I still don’t, but I look fro journalists who do. So I flagged this NYT report about conservative dominance of Facebook. And I know from Pew studies that 43% of Americans get their news from Facebook. And Congress is using social media much more than in the past.
– I’ve regularly sent around the Military Times polls of service people on political questions. Their methodology makes the results suggestive rather than certain, but it is surprising to see the drop in support for Trump compared with 4 years ago.
– NYT today notes Taiwan’s military exercises and fears of a Chinese attack. I also commend USNIP’s speculative story about a possible US-Chinese war over Taiwan.
– Also see Politico’s column on how the Chinese view the US elections.
– I’ve never worked in the Pentagon building. [My two summers with the Navy Dept were in the old Main Navy on Constitution Ave.] So I was surprised to read about how technologically “retrograde” the building is.
– CNAS has good material on US sanctions policies globally.
– Breaking Defense reports on the new Unified Command Plan.
More later. I’m just beginning to catch up on the papers from last week.
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The odious route to peace in Syria
A bit after 34 minutes in this briefing on US Syria sanctions, Faysal Itani asks two important questions of Joel Rayburn, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary: 1) what conditions would Syria have to fulfill to get relief from sanctions and more normal relations with the US? 2) what do we do if the sanctions cause collapse of the regime?
Joel responds that there are six Trump-approved conditions Assad or any Syrian government would have to meet :
- Cease sponsorship of terrorism;
- Severe its military relationship with Iran and Iranian proxies;
- Cease hostility to regional neighbors;
- Surrender weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cease its WMD programs in a sustainable way;
- Create conditions for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) to return safely;
- Hold war criminals accountable, or allow the international community to do so.
Rayburn was at pains to point out that the first four were problems even before 2011. Only the last two stem from the war since then.
On regime collapse, Joel just shifts the responsibility to Syrian President Assad.
Both these answers are problematic.
The six conditions (which somehow become seven when Joel refers to the Caesar Act) are tantamount to regime change in Syria. There is no way Assad would survive numbers 5 and 6, especially as he himself is a prime candidate for war crimes accountability. 1-4 are less obviously connected one-by-one to regime change, but they amount to the same thing. It is a radically different Syria that could agree to meet these conditions.
The trouble is that we are nowhere near getting any of these conditions fulfilled. There is little likelihood that even the strict sanctions now being implemented will get us there any time soon. In the meanwhile, the sanctions will make life harder for many innocent Syrians and give the regime the foreign bogey-man it needs to blame for conditions it itself created. We need to do much more to ease humanitarian relief and remittances into areas the regime does not control and to prevent the regime from targeting UN agency relief, much of which we pay for, to its supporters.
The longer-term question is when can we hope that negotiating relief from sanctions with Assad will get us a worthwhile fraction of the conditions we have set? That’s how sanctions really work: you get something in exchange for relief from them, not in response to imposing them.
The prospect of regime collapse is what limits how long we can wait. It would mean risking revival of the Islamic State and resurgence of Al Qaeda or some 3.0 version of them, with all the harm that implies for US forces in Syria, the neighboring countries, and for Americans elsewhere in the world. It’s a judgment call, but it would be a serious mistake to wait too long. A year–at the outside two–of Caesar sanctions should be enough to tell us whether we have reached the point of diminishing returns.
It is profoundly odious to contemplate talks with Assad, and particularly difficult to do so if it looks as if his regime might be on the verge of collapse. His first priority in such talks would be self-preservation. But that is what we need to contemplate, unless we are willing to invest much more blood, treasure, and weapons in enabling an alternative to Assad that could take over quickly, avoid state collapse, and govern in a way more to our liking. I see no sign whatsoever that Americans–and certainly not Donald Trump–have the stomach for such a state-building commitment in Syria.
Joel and Syria Special Envoy Jim Jeffrey are hoping that Russia will save us from this conundrum. It would be nice if, as they often suggest, Moscow decides Assad is no longer their man. The Russians tell any American who will listen that they are unhappy with him. Some think Moscow could defenestrate Assad and find a more pliable proxy, in order to gain access to World Bank reconstruction funding, but they haven’t done it through a decade of rebellion and war.
A main factor here is money: if Moscow is willing to continue to bail out the Syrian economy, it is hard to imagine Assad crying “uncle.” But if Moscow–which is feeling the pinch of both Covid-19 and low oil prices–decides it is time, then a serious negotiation about Syria’s political future without Assad might begin. The Iranians–also pinched by Covid-19 and low oil prices–are a far less important financial factor.
The problems with relying on Russia to get rid of Assad are many. Moscow’s primary purpose there is to prevent regime change, not cause it. This is both a question of principle and interest, as it protects a fellow autocrat and the Russians’ biggest footprint in the Mediterranean. Moscow enjoys the discomfort Assad causes the West as well as the use of Syrian naval and air force facilities. Putin has taken good advantage of the situation in Syria to drive a wedge into NATO and pry Turkey loose, though not quite out.
All-in-all, Syria has been a winning wicket for Moscow. They talk smack about Assad to entertain the Westerners, but they aren’t likely to risk losing it all by unseating him until they can be sure the replacement will be at least as useful.
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Peace Picks| May 4- May 9
- CSIS Debate Series: Do Human Rights Protections Advance Counter-terrorism Objectives | May 4, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | CSIS | Register Here
Does democracy foster economic growth? Do human rights protections advance counterterrorism objectives? Does great power competition hurt or empower the continent? Does the U.S. even need a foreign policy for sub-Saharan Africa? Since the 1990s, there generally has been consensus about U.S. priorities and policies toward the region. While continuity has its merits, it also acts as a brake on creativity, innovation, and new thinking about U.S. interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The CSIS Africa Debate Series offers an opportunity to question and refine policy objectives to meet a changing political landscape.
Speakers:
Rashid Abdi: Former Project Director, Horn of Africa, International Crisis Group
Dr. Naunihal Singh: Assistant Professor of National Security, US Naval War College
Colonel (ret.) Chris Wyatt: Director of African Studies, US Army War College
Karen Allen: Senior Research Advisor, Institute for Security Studies (ISS); Former Foreign Correspondent, BBC News
Judd Devermont: Director, Africa Program
- Webinar-Disinformation pandemic: Russian and Chinese information operations in the COVID-19 era| May 5, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | AEI | Register Here
Was the COVID-19 virus produced in the US? Was it created by the US Army? So Moscow and Beijing would have you believe.
Russia and China aggressively manipulate perceptions to achieve their own aims. Their increasingly aggressive information campaigns are converging in method and narrative. What can the US and its allies — and the average citizen — do to inoculate against these disinformation viruses?
Speakers:
Frederick W. Kagan: Resident Scholar; Director, Critical Threats Project
Dan Blumenthal: Director, Asian Studies; Resident Fellow
Zack Cooper: Research Fellow
- COVID-19, Oil Prices, and Prospects for Iran-GCC Relations | May 6, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The concurrent crises of COVID-19 and tumbling oil prices are deeply felt across the Gulf region. The U.S.-led sanctions, already a huge burden on Iran’s economy, massively limit Tehran’s foreign trade options and export revenue as the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates the country’s economic troubles. On the other hand, the energy-exporting states of the Gulf Cooperation Council are facing a steep decline in oil and gas export revenues for the foreseeable future. These economic shocks coincide with a sharp and a financially expensive competition for influence across the Middle East.
How might the present deteriorating economic realities impact the geopolitical calculations of Iran, the GCC states, and U.S. interests in the Gulf region? Will the economic downturn shape the willingness of the GCC states to stand with the Trump administration in confronting Tehran leading up to the US elections in November? Is there any opportunity for Iran and the GCC states to consider a reset in relations that have been contentious since 1979. MEI is pleased to host a panel to discuss these questions and more.
Speakers:
Mohammed Baharoon: Director general, B’huth
Dina Esfandiary: Fellow, The Century Foundation
Bilal Saab: Senior fellow and director, Defense and Security program, MEI
Alex Vatanka (Moderator): Senior fellow and director, Iran program, MEI
- Analyzing the Impact of the “Maximum Pressure” Campaign on Iran | May 6, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM | Hudson Institute | Register Here
The Islamic Republic of Iran is in the midst of a severe political and economic crisis brought on by the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign and worsened by the coronavirus outbreak. The regime has called for Washington to lift U.S. sanctions on humanitarian grounds, and significant voices, including from previous administrations, have called for the easing of sanctions on the basis of compassion.
However, the crisis presents the United States with opportunities to increase the pressure not only on the regime, but also on its proxies—Hezbollah first among them. What is the range of policy options toward Iran and Hezbollah that Washington faces? What is the goal of maximum pressure as currently implemented? Should the Trump administration stay the course or consider refining the policy?
Speakers:
David Asher: Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Michael Doran: Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Scott Modell: Managing Director, Rapidan Energy Group and former Senior Iran Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mohsen Sazegara: President, Research Institute on Contemporary Iran
- Safeguarding Asia’s Most Vulnerable During COVID-19 | May 7, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
COVID-19 has taken the world by a storm, but none are more deeply affected than the world’s most vulnerable. Refugees and the internally displaced, individuals living under authoritarian regimes, and others living in countries with limited healthcare resources are facing, in some cases, life or death situations. While many countries battling their own domestic fight with COVID-19 are tempted to turn inwards, the U.S. as a global leader in the promotion of freedom has a responsibility to galvanize attention and partnership to ensure that the world’s most needy are receiving the assistance they need during the pandemic. Join us to learn about the unique challenges faced by Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, the impoverished in North Korea, and the marginalized in China.
Speakers:
Daniel Sullivan: Senior Advocate for Human Rights, Refugees International
Kristina Olney: Director of Government Relations, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation
Jeongmin Kim: Seoul Correspondent, NK News
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Stevenson’s army, March 10
-CSIS ran a pandemic war game last fall and has lessons applicable to the coronavirus problem.
– Here’s a summary of the law Congress passed last week to respond medically to the coronavirus. The administration is now considering new legislation to respond to the economic effects and looming recession.
-NYT details many of the ways North Korea has evaded sanctions and made money.
– Daily Beast says Taliban leader whom Trump talked to is on targeted kill list.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 1
An agreement has been signed; many difficult steps to follow. NYT analysis.
U.S., analyst of military contractors wonders whether they will go or stay.
CNAS has numbers on recent US sanctions.
Authorities matter: NYT says US is considering invoking Defense Production Act of 1950 to force production of masks and other medical items to deal with coronavirus.
WaPo details the conflict and bureaucratic disarray as the administration tackled the coronavirus.
NYT graphics show how Afghanistan became an”invisible war.”
David Sanger assesses the deal with the Taliban.
Another assessment from the Atlantic.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 29
An agreement has been signed; many difficult steps to follow. NYT analysis.
U.S., analyst of military contractors wonders whether they will go or stay.
CNAS has numbers on recent US sanctions.
Authorities matter: NYT says US is considering invoking Defense Production Act of 1950 to force production of masks and other medical items to deal with coronavirus.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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