Tag: sanctions
Stevenson’s army, May 11
– Costa Rica is suffering from a ransomware attack.
– FP says Marcos is no Duterte on foreign policy
– Politico reports US arms advice to Taiwan.
– David Ignatius sees peace progress in Armenia.
– DNI testified in open session.
– GOP candidates fight over China.
– EU can’t get Hungary to agree on sanctions.
– NYT notes Russia has captured most of east.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, May 6
-Scotusblog has the best analysis I’ve seen about the Supreme Court leak: look at the bylines and what happened before.
– Votes on a non-binding motion to instruct have no legal force or effect, but the supermajority vote on Iran puts a new deal in jeopardy.
– NYT show what the war looks like to Russians.
– Nicaragua wants to connect with US.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, April 23
[The magnificent “Merchant of Venice” ends its run at STC tomorrow.]
– An issue that may come up in next week’s discussion of the Courts is the Chevron Doctrine and delegation of powers to the bureaucracy. See this CRS report.
– Moldova worries about Russian threats
– Cornell prof says sanctions won’t stop the Ukraine war.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
The Russians are moving the goal posts
Polina Ivanova (@polinaivanovva), FT’s Russia correspondent, summarized the Russian military briefing today on Twitter:
Russia’s military held a big briefing this afternoon, announcing the war was entering a ‘second phase’. Here’s a summary of how Russia, at this point in the war, is depicting what it set out to do, why, and where we’re at. (relaying their words, pls don’t shoot msnger). It had two options: fight a war in the east, but allow Kyiv to replenish its forces, or start off by knocking out Ukrainian military capacities across the country.
Over a month of war, Russia has knocked out most of Ukraine’s military capacities, the generals claimed, so can now move on to next phase, which will only be focused on the east, which could involve heavy bombardment. Russia had never intended to capture Kyiv, Kharkiv and other cities, the generals said – these are not setbacks in other words, it’s all part of the plan.
And the plan was to distract Ukrainian forces while Russia/ Donetsk/Luhansk made territorial gains in the east. Numerous statements made about not targeting civilian infrastructure, avoiding civilian casualties. Defence ministry briefing also shared a new official figure for the number of Russian soldiers killed, the second statement by Russian side during the course of this war. Said 1,351 were killed – figure is far below Ukrainian and international estimates.
The link she provided for the Russians own account does not work for me, so I am not citing it.
That would have made sense
The strategy the Russian briefing provided would have made sense. It was more or less what I expected them to do: focus on the south and east, but threaten Kyiv as a diversionary tactic. But it is not what they did. They failed to knock out most of Ukraine’s military capacity and tried to take Kharkiv and Kyiv, in addition to Kherson and Mariupol in the south. They are now restating their military objectives to align better with what they think they might achieve.
Good news for the Ukrainians
If this briefing betokens an end to the sieges of Kiev and Kharkiv, it is good news for the Ukraianians. Even if the Kremlin continues its long-range bombardment of those cities, how hard will its ill-provisioned soldiers fight after learning that their efforts are diversionary? The Russian briefing is confirmation that Ukraine has successfully defended its capital and its second largest city. That would be cause for celebration if its third largest, Odesa, were not still at risk.
The fight in the south is still ferocious
So far, the Ukrainian defense has blocked the Russian westward advanced towards Ukraine’s third largest city and vital port. The Russians have focused much of their bombardment on Mariupol, which sits on the route from the areas Moscow already controls in the east and Crimea. There won’t be much of Mariupol left once the Russians either succeed or fail, but for now it is holding on. That’s important. There can be no Russian claim of victory if they don’t get a land route to Crimea (in addition to the bridge they have already built over the Kerch Strait from mainland Russia).
But it’s not over until the puffy guy sings
Putin will continue to aim for something he can call success. He’ll not only want the land route to Crimea but also recognition (or at least acceptance) of the “independence” of Donestk and Luhansk as well Ukrainian “neutrality.” The Ukrainians don’t want to do any of that. Nor do they seem to be aiming to throw the Russians out of Crimea and Donbas, but they’ll want to keep that option open for the future. If the West is willing to maintain its punishing sanctions, those hopes might be justified.
Putin is facing a difficult choice. He can continue the bombardment of Kyiv and Kharkiv as well as the brutal southern campaign, hoping for a breakthrough to Odesa. Or he can try to negotiate a ceasefire in place that would enable him to resupply and refresh his forces. This war won’t be over until we hear from him. The Russians are moving the goal posts, but we don’t yet know how far.
Stevenson’s army, March 20
– WaPo says the war is headed to stalemate.
– NYT reports administration debates over escalation.
– Kori Schake analyzes Russian incompetence.
– WSJ believes house arrest for Russian intelligence head.
– WSJnotes Russian dependence on imports.
– NYT hears from academics on dangers to US democracy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Irredentism is not limited to Russia
I am pleased to publish this piece, which I co-authored with SAIS colleague Sinisa Vukovic:
One of us has been critical of US State Department praise for President Vucic of Serbia. Some American diplomats are accepting the notion that he is genuinely pro-European and concerned only with the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. That is a mistake, especially in the midst of the Ukraine war. His reasoning about Serbia’s responsibilities and relations with its neighbors bears a distinct resemblance to Vladimir Putin’s justifications for aggression:
– Protection of ethnic kin, based on the assumption that the President of Russia or Serbia is responsible to defend Russians or Serbs wherever they live.
– Exaggeration of the threats Russians/Serbs face in other countries and calls for preventive action, including interference in the internal politics of neighboring countries.
– Use of gross disinformation to exaggerate urgency, while attributing the reports to others so as to maintain plausible deniability.
– Exploitation of the Orthodox Church to claim ethnic unity in the face of alleged religious persecution.
– Abuse of linguistic identity to claim that anyone who speaks Russian/Serbian is protected by Moscow/Belgrade.
These and other examples indicate that Vucic, like Putin, rejects civic identities and the notion that sovereignty stops at a state’s borders.
Vucic has moved definitively away from liberal democracy and back towards repressive ethnonationalism. The press is not free in Serbia and dissent is increasingly perilous. Vucic has befriended Vladimir Putin, refused to align with EU sanctions on Russia, and even now is allowing Air Serbia to double service Moscow. Vucic claims to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as he must because of Serbia’s claims to Kosovo, but he is doing little to support Kyiv.
Like Putin, who advocates a “Russian world,” Vucic has also attached himself to people who believe in creating a broader ethnonationalist polity than the territory Serbia currently occupies, the “Serbian world.” He habitually refers to his own role vis-a-vis “Serbs” (Serbi) not Serbians or citizens of Serbia (Srbijanci).
Here is some of the evidence for Vucic’s irredentist ambitions:
Serbian world
September 26, 2020, (then) Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vulin started talking it up:
Vucic must create the Serbian world. Belgrade must gather in itself and around itself all Serbs, and the President of Serbia is the President of all Serbs.
(Vučić treba da stvara srpski svet. Beograd mora da u sebi i oko sebe okupi sve Srbe, a predsjednik Srbije je predsjednik svih Srba)
On April 9, 2021, Vulin specified:
Current geopolitical circumstances do not favor the idea of unification of all areas where Serbs live, but this will inevitably happen in ten, twenty or fifty years…wherever they live, in Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska. What we need is the situation where the care for all Serbs, wherever they live, is managed from one center, and that is Belgrade, and I see nothing controversial about it.
During his party convention, July 18, 2021, Vulin explained the rationale behind Serbian world:
The people that has experienced genocide in Jasenovac, that has experienced Oluja [the Croatian military Operation Storm in 1995], and the March pogrom [in 2004 in Kosovo] does not have the right to surrender its fate to the hands of others, that others decide about the future of their children. People whose experience postulates that when it does not have its own soldier, its own police officer, its own judge, it does not have the rights…Serbia needs to have an army that can defend Serbia and Serbs wherever they live.
Effectively, he is calling for protection of Serbs by creation of Greater Serbia, the idea that drove Slobodan Milosevic to war at least four times.
On the same day Vucic reacted:
The official state policy is that Serbia’s state borders are inviolable, and we do not care about others’ borders. We have to protect our own, and unequivocally demonstrate what is our policy.
No doubt having gotten an earful from Western diplomats, Vucic backed off a bit the next September:
In that notion [Serbian world] there is nothing threatening, nothing that would endanger anyone else… it does not talk about borders or anything else, and besides, it is not part of the official state policies.
But it is
It is state policy and Vucic must know it. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, that the Parliament adopted in December 2019, is centered around the following premise:
Protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, military neutrality, safeguard of Serbian people outside of the Republic of Serbia’s borders, European integration, and efficient rule of law
(očuvanje suverenosti i teritorijalne celovitosti, vojna neutralnost, briga o srpskom narodu van granica Republike Srbije, evropske integracije i efikasna pravna država)
Regarding the safeguard of Serbian people living outside of Serbia’s borders, the Strategy specifies it “is an existential matter for the survival of the Republic of Serbia.”
It’s dangerous to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo
The same Strategy also exclaims:
Preservation of Republika Srpska is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Serbia
(“Očuvanje Republike Srpske jedan je od spoljnopolitičkih prioriteta Republike Srbije”)
To explain what is meant by this, Vulin (again as MoD) stated in May 2019:
Republika Srpska has always been a priority of the Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia. Republika Srpska may not have its own army, but Serbian people heve their own army.
(“Republika Srpska je uvek prioritet politike Vlade i predsednika Republike Srbije. Republika Srpska nema svoju vojsku, ali srpski narod ima svoju vojsku.”)
This is essentially a pledge to intervene militarily in Bosnia if the RS is threatened, something Milosevic declined to do.
Vucic agrees:
We are one people, as President Milorad Dodik said. There is no such thing as Croatian Serbs or Bosnian Serbs. My father is not a Bosnian Serb, he is a Serb. He may be from Bosnia, but he is not any other Serb but only a Serb.
The threat to intervene is not only against Bosnia. Responding to Montenegrin President Djukanovic’s accusations that Serbia is expansionist, Vucic stated:
Djukanovic should know that I will always defend Serbs, and I will always defend Serbia. I have not alternative, but my own country and my own people
On Kosovo, the risk is even clearer: Vucic mobilized the Serbian army when Kosovo insisted on implementation of an agreement concerning cross-boundary/border recognition of license plates (!).
Serbia is serious
I take Serbia seriously. Its vast re-armament (with Russian and Chinese as well as Western weapons) serves its national security purposes, which are clearly not limited to the current territory of Serbia. No one watching Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine should fail to recognize the risks in the Balkans.
